After the end of the turn-based mutual retaliation between Iran and Israel, it is necessary to analyze the new changes in the strategic landscape of the Middle East. Judging by the performance of Iran, Israel and Arab countries, Israel and Iran seem to have their own gains and losses. Israel's main dilemma remains to return to the upcoming battle for Rafah and how to deal with Palestinian governance in the future, while Iran's dilemma is even more serious: Israel has drawn a red line on the development of nuclear weapons without the approval of the Arab countries.
In the past few days, there are several news points worth paying attention to regarding the game between Israel and Iran: First, the Iranian side has confirmed that at least 10 countries have helped Israel counter Iran's missile and drone operations, which almost proves that the Arab countries in the Middle East do not approve of Iran's direct attack on Israel's mainland, or oppose Iran's practice of demonstrating stronger deterrence by attacking Israel. Iran has just reconciled with Saudi Arabia and other countries, and originally wanted to take advantage of the current anti-Israel sentiment in various countries to gain the leadership position, thinking that it could gain the understanding of Arab countries. But the reality is cruel, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other countries have provided Israel with help in defending against Iran's long-range attacks, which shows that Iran wants to obtain a better external environment and continue to exercise restraint and choose to keep a low profile on the issue of supporting Shiite forces abroad. Second, although Israel only carried out a show-style armed attack on Iran, it successfully destroyed the S-300 air defense radar used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to defend the nuclear facilities, which almost proves that it is easy for Israel to blow up Iran's nuclear facilities, and it is tantamount to drawing another red line. Israel has absolute superiority over Iran in terms of military technology, and this is to a certain extent what Arab countries are willing to see.
Of course, for Iran, long-range attacks on Israel have limited effect, but daring to fight is a victory in itself, and it also proves that sustained large-scale attacks can bankrupt Israel. To put it another way, Iran used this attack to prove its ability and willingness to fight its "enemies" in the Middle East. Iran, which has refrained from attacking Israel itself in the past, has now broken this restriction, which is certainly a deterrent to all countries, including Israel, the United States, and Arab countries in the Middle East.
If the direct flashpoint of the conflict between Israel and Iran was the attack launched by the Hamas group supported by Iran, then Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia all support Israel, which also proves that Iran's move is difficult to get the approval of neighboring countries. Another variable is the Kurds, which Israel seems to be pulling together against Iran. Now that it is reported that the missiles that hit Iran did not come from a long-distance run of Israeli fighter jets, but were fired from Kurdish-held areas in northern Iraq or Syria, it cannot be ruled out that the Iranian opposition, which was bribed by Israel, played a key role in the attack.
Israel's collusion with the Kurds is not only fearful of Iran, but also wary of Turkey. Erdoğan's support for Hamas and Palestine is inevitable that the restless Kurdish minority, which makes up about 20 percent of Turkey's population, will be countered by Israel by supporting the Kurds. If such a situation arises, it will be interesting to see whether Turkey, a NATO country, will build a deeper level of strategic trust with Iran.
As far as China is concerned, we must realize that the Arab countries in the Middle East themselves do not want to see Iran have a stronger military power, and the Arab countries' support for the Palestinian people is not the same as support for Hamas. All of this means that the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement promoted by China has instead been alienated because of the war in Gaza and because of further tensions between Iran and Israel.
In the future, the United States will continue to exaggerate the threat posed by Iran to Arab countries and continue to support Israel in eradicating Hamas. And the Arab countries will certainly pay lip service to the Palestinian people, while hoping for an early end to the war in Gaza, and at the same time hoping to use Israel's power to contain the Iranian military threat. And if Iran wants to get a better external environment, the only option is not to escalate the crisis, but to keep a low profile, even to control the Houthi attacks, and use the humanitarian catastrophe caused by Israel in Rafah as an opportunity to launch a public opinion war, and finally use the anti-Israel public opinion in the Middle East to change the situation that is unfavorable to Iran.