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Fuso talks about the side effects of Pelosi's visit to Taiwan |: Japan may accelerate the pace of constitutional revision through Taiwan

author:The Paper

The Paper's special contributor Fang Di

On August 2, 2022, U.S. House speaker Pelosi visited Taiwan, blatantly provoking China's Taiwan-related red line. On August 3, foreign ministers of the Group of Seven (G7), including Japan, issued a joint statement on Taiwan, claiming that China's actions could escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait and demanding that China not unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi refuted the statement as "reversing black and white and confusing right and wrong" and asked ," "Where do they come from?" Who gives them such qualifications? On August 5, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida met with Pelosi, and the two sides openly talked about the Taiwan issue, and Kishida Fumio also falsely claimed that the fall of Chinese missiles into the so-called Japan's exclusive economic zone "seriously affects regional and international peace and stability", and Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate closely to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. While Pelosi was busy "stirring up trouble" in Asia, Japan was also making "small moves" on Taiwan-related issues, gradually drifting away on the wrong road.

Fuso talks about the side effects of Pelosi's visit to Taiwan |: Japan may accelerate the pace of constitutional revision through Taiwan

U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Pelosi. Visual China figure

The U.S. military base in Okinawa, Japan, became pelosi to guard the front line

As an ally with the largest U.S. overseas military base, Japan's military strategic significance on Taiwan-related issues is self-evident. In the evening of pelosi's channel, a total of 22 KC135 air tankers arrived at the US military Kadena base in Okinawa, Japan, from an external base, and a large-scale gathering of air tankers at the Kadena base is rare. In addition, at about 6 p.m. on the same day, after the US EP3 electronic reconnaissance aircraft confirmed takeoff, 5 tankers and 8 F-15 fighters deployed at kadena base were also confirmed at 8 p.m.

Former Abe cabinet deputy chief cabinet chief of office for security and former nobukatsu hara has made no mistake in saying that without NATO in Northeast Asia, the US side will not be able to achieve its strategic goal of intervening in the Taiwan Strait without Japan's support. As an ally of the United States, although Japan was cautious on the eve of Pelosi's escape to Taiwan, it suddenly claimed that five missiles in the Chinese military exercise on the island had fallen into the exclusive economic zone advocated by Japan about an hour before Pelosi arrived in Japan on August 4. It can be seen from this that Japan is well aware of the possible turmoil and consequences of Pelosi's channeling of Taiwan, but it still vainly tries to take advantage of the tension in the Taiwan Strait to unite the United States to control China and cooperate with the United States to protect Taiwan, and while seeking greater control in the East Asian region, it will strive for more initiative in the "unequal" Japan-US alliance.

Pelosi may have snuffed out Taiwan or boosted the pace of the Japanese right-wing forces to amend the Constitution in Taiwan

It is widely believed in Japan that Pelosi's passage to Taiwan will further aggravate tensions in the Taiwan Strait, allowing Japan to speed up preparations for Taiwan-related issues. The Japanese government will link its own national security with the Taiwan issue, so the storm caused by Pelosi's channeling of Taiwan will inevitably affect Japan, and the Pelosi typhoon wave may become a catalyst for Japan to further accelerate its involvement in the Taiwan issue, using this as an excuse to promote getting rid of the shackles of the Constitution and strengthening the military layout in the East China Sea.

(1) Japan's right-wing forces are vainly trying to promote the upgrading of Taiwan-related relations

Japan's "pro-Taiwan" forces have long been delusional about promoting the escalation of Japan-Taiwan relations. First, the right-wing group movement is continuous. In recent years, many local groups in Japan have demanded that the Japanese Government promulgate the "Basic Law on Japan-Taiwan Relations" to provide a legal basis for bilateral cooperation in the fields of economy, disaster relief, security, and environmental protection; it has also requested the Japanese Government to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with the Taiwan authorities in the economic, cultural, educational, tourism, medical care, disaster prevention, and other fields, assist the Taiwan authorities in applying for membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP), and speed up the formulation of the Basic Law on Japan-Taiwan Relations related to diplomacy and security.

Second, there are frequent Taiwan-related activities within Japan's ruling party. In May 2022, Ken Suzuki, a member of the House of Representatives of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, led a delegation of LDP Youth Bureau members to Taiwan to hold talks with Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen. On the eve of Pelosi's escape to Taiwan, Shigeru Ishiba, former secretary general of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party and former defense minister, also led some Japanese parliamentarians to visit Taiwan on July 28 and hold talks with Tsai Ing-wen, despite China's opposition. During the talks, Shigeru Ishiba said that "Japan will shoulder its due responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific region" and jointly discussed with the Taiwan authorities on matters related to dealing with "taiwan's affairs."

Not only have some Japanese parliamentarians and politicians become more frequent and bold in their actions on Taiwan-related issues, but the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also decided to set up a new post of "Taiwan Planner" in the Asia and Oceania Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2022, mainly responsible for the East China Sea and Taiwan issues, including the Diaoyu Islands. In addition, some politicians have called for not only strengthening cooperation between Japan and the United States on the Taiwan issue, but also using Japan's influence in Southeast Asia to unite Southeast Asian countries to join in supporting Taiwan.

In fact, after China passed the "Anti-National Secession Law," the Taiwan authorities did not dare to hastily declare "independence." The Japanese side has a clear judgment on this. However, as Sino-US relations have become increasingly downward in recent years and cross-strait relations have continued to deteriorate, the United States has deliberately touched China's bottom line on Taiwan, making Japan feel profitable and has a plan to do. Therefore, Japan envisions that under the background of "fighting without breaking" the Sino-US Taiwan-related issues, Japan will take the opportunity to play the "Taiwan card" on a large scale, and even to a certain extent, try to take advantage of the restraint and tolerance made by the Chinese side in the hope of peacefully resolving the Taiwan issue, and seek greater interests with a "gambler" mentality. The Pelosi channel will become an excellent time and criterion for Japan to observe China's reaction at close range.

(2) Make use of "taiwan has a problem" to vigorously promote constitutional revision and legislation

The escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait brought about by Pelosi's passage from Taiwan may become a powerful "basis" for Japan's right-wing forces to promote constitutional revision.

The first is to use the tension in the Taiwan Strait to render a security crisis and create an atmosphere for constitutional amendments and legislation.

On August 4, the Japanese side protested that the Chinese-Taiwan naval missiles had fallen into the so-called exclusive economic zone designated by Japan. Hiroshi Hosano, a member of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, said publicly on television that this incident once again confirmed that Japan is also a "party" in the Taiwan issue, and the Japanese people should realize the "authenticity" of the so-called "Taiwan matter is Japan's matter." At this time, the Japanese side also mentioned the dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea, and pointed out the so-called "middle line" in the East China Sea that the Chinese side does not recognize as an excuse to attack the mainland; first, it wants to use the tense waters in the Taiwan Strait to create the illusion that the so-called "middle line" is an established fact; second, it is to welcome Pelosi's visit to Japan to show that Japan and the United States stand together on Taiwan-related issues; third, by rendering up a "military threat" from China, it proves the "real existence" of the so-called "Taiwan has a problem, Japan has a problem," so as to win the people's support in Taiwan-related policies.

All along, the internal logic of Japan's domestic right-wing forces to intervene in the Taiwan issue has been to delineate Japanese waters with the Diaoyu Dao as the forefront of Japan's Okinawa territory, and even to use the Diaoyu Dao issue to "take the initiative to ignite the fire" to rationalize their intention to intervene in the Taiwan issue. The intention is to "hard-core kidnap" the forces opposing the revision of the Constitution on the grounds of defending Japan's national security, so as to alleviate the resistance of domestic public opinion and realize their long-cherished wish to revise the Constitution.

The second is to promote the formulation and implementation of security-related strategies and bills.

Japan has made it clear that it will revise its national security strategy in the second half of 2022, focusing on improving the ability to attack enemy bases and improving the economic and security strategy with a view to fundamentally strengthening Japan's defense forces. At present, the Japanese side has conducted several rounds of solicitation of opinions from manufacturing enterprises and scholars and experts in related fields from manufacturing enterprises and scholars and experts in related fields, centered on the strategy, such as "intelligence warfare and strategic propaganda," "defense production, technology base, and defense equipment transfer," "arms management and arms control," "national protection," and "future Japanese strategic environment."

In addition to the above-mentioned security strategy, Japan will also formally implement the Important Lands, etc. Investigation Act in 2022, which provides an important legal basis for Japan's expropriation of civilian land for military purposes. The bill breaks the current "Land Acquisition Law" provision that does not involve the use of land for military and defense purposes, and the Japanese government will be able to control and punish private landowners for military purposes. Under the Act, the Prime Minister of Japan may designate "Areas of Concern" and "Areas of Special Concern" within about 1 km of the land for important facilities and in areas such as outlying islands on the border, and require its land users to submit reports and materials on land use. At present, the Japanese side has set up a long-term management team composed of more than 30 people in the cabinet office to promote the implementation of the bill. Relevant people in Japan's domestic law said that there are many vague parts of the content of the bill, which may infringe on the people's property rights, private life, freedom of thought and conscience and other relevant rights protected by the Constitution.

With regard to the trend of the Japanese side interfering in the mainland's Taiwan issue under various pretexts in recent years, our side should closely follow up and study and judge as soon as possible, accurately counter the provocative acts of the "pro-Taiwan" forces within Japan, effectively curb the rampant spread of "anti-China" public opinion in Japan, resolutely crack down on the joint efforts of the international "pro-Taiwan and anti-China" forces, and strive to achieve "effective words and effective deeds."

(Fang Di, Center for Japanese Studies, University of Foreign Chinese, Ministry of Education, National and Regional Studies Base, Beijing)

Responsible editor: Zhu Zhengyong Photo editor: Zhu Weihui

Proofreader: Ding Xiao

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