What is the essence of the conspiracy? It's about maintaining a balance. Whether Lenin engaged in "collective leadership" in the early days of the Soviets, or stalin's play of strongman politics later, these were all means of maintaining the balance of power. When the equilibrium is about to be upset, some very embarrassing and even embarrassing situations occur, as was the case with the great catastrophe in the Soviet Union in the mid-to-late 1930s. A world war shaped a large number of nobles for all countries, some of whom held amazing power, including Marshal Zhukov, the "supreme deputy commander-in-chief" of the Soviet Union.
Why did Zhukov quickly lose his seat on the Soviet political scene after the end of World War II? Some people believe that Zhukov replaced Stalin in the victory parade to review the three armed forces as the trigger. For a 67-year-old man, the risk of riding a horse through the entire ceremony is indeed greater. Stalin could not fight in person, and Zhukov was the right substitute. However, Lao Zhu's performance on the parade ground was indeed too excessive: every time he passed a phalanx, he was bound to stop in front to accept the shouts and salutes of the officers and soldiers, and even deliberately to the point of showing off his might.
Plus there was a small episode at the time: after the war, Soviet generals gathered together to take a photo and publish it in the newspaper. Before the supreme leader himself was present, Zhukov asked the reporter to take a picture of the generals first, and he took the initiative to stand in the C position. What is even more excessive is that later this "big picture" without Stalin actually flowed out and became a picture of some newspapers, which made the supreme leader even more angry. In Stalin's view anyway, this Zhukov wing hardened and could not be managed, and it could simply be disposed of.
Isn't it a little too careful that stalin was determined to bring down the former Soviet "supreme deputy commander-in-chief" just by being stolen from the limelight? If you believe this, then you are also underestimating the "politics" thing. In fact, until June 1946, Zhukov had a firm grip on a good hand, and two or three more attempts to steal the limelight from the leader were not enough to make his position collapse. It is himself who really harms him – as long as Zhukov is still "Zhukov", he is doomed to finish playing. In the end, not only Stalin, but no leader could tolerate the existence of such a role around him.
It is well known that Stalin was a remarkable controller, and without his trust and favor, Zhukov would not have been able to sit in such a prominent position. In other words, from Stalin's standpoint, he never doubted Zhukov's loyalty, and whether he continued to reuse the latter, depending entirely on whether the latter still had corresponding use value.
In fact, in the course of World War II, Zhukov did many acts that were close to "death". For example, on the eve of the Battle of Moscow, he vetoed all of Stalin's defensive ideas without mercy, as if refuting his staff officers, and said in a sinister manner in front of a cadre of generals:
"Fighting a war should not be done by you, the leader, but by me."
Throughout history, such words have often been very dangerous, referring to Han Xin's "the more the merrier", if Stalin really doubted Zhukov's loyalty, this sentence can be seen as a manifestation of the other side's attempt to monopolize military power. However, Stalin not only did not suppress Zhukov, but constantly raised the power of the latter, and finally let him sit in the position of second-in-command of the Soviet Union. The reason was nothing more than twofold: Zhukov could fight, and Stalin knew that he could never betray the motherland.
After the end of World War II, the situation was completely different. At that time, the total number of Soviet troops exceeded 12 million, and seeing that the war was far away, what bothered the Soviet top brass more than how to deal with this huge number of officers and soldiers was how to place those prominent military commanders. Stalin knew in his heart that if this problem was not handled well, it would inevitably trigger a series of terrible chain reactions within the core of power. In this regard, his method was to satisfy the "vanity" of these generals as much as possible, and at the same time find ways to strip the military power from these people.
For example, at that time, Zhukov was also the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Army group in Germany, the highest commander of the Soviet-occupied area, and many other positions, and the military administration was grasped, and even in the face of urgent matters, it could be cut first and then played. It was intimidating to hear these titles alone, but Zhukov was so far away from Moscow that he could not intervene directly in domestic affairs.
Similarly, Rokossovsky, who spent the first few years of World War II stationed in Poland as commander-in-chief of the northern army cluster, and later the Polish side was a key person, and Moscow simply sent a favor, arranged Rokossovsky to Poland as defense minister, and incidentally received a Polish field marshal rank. Although Konev, who joined hands with Zhukov to invade Berlin, was transferred back to Moscow as soon as World War II ended, and also served as the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Army and the first acting defense minister, this was actually only temporarily brought out to "replace" Zhukov. In 1950, Konev was immediately transferred to the commander-in-chief of the Kazan-Based Theater of Operations and thrown into a remote military region for "cold treatment".
Unlike Zhukov, although he was treated to some extent not very favorably, most of his colleagues understood the intentions of the high-level and therefore gladly accepted the new appointment. Even Konev, who had never been able to hide his unhappiness in his heart, did not say much, but Zhukov was not happy to obey such an arrangement.
On April 10, 1946, Zhukov returned to Moscow as he wished, and he was immediately treated as a hero. At the behest of the authorities, a large number of portraits and slogans were made and hung in every corner of Moscow; Zhukov was surrounded by applause and praise wherever he went. Stalin soon discovered, however, that Zhukov did not seem content with this—he never missed any opportunity to brush up on his presence, and even dared to publicly refute himself on many important occasions. Zhukov's intentions were clear, and he took it for granted that he should become commander-in-chief of the Soviet army, not to mention being on an equal footing with Stalin, or at least to be placed in a prominent position.
One thing stung Stalin deeply.
Originally, the Soviet high-level had been arguing about whether the department should implement the "one-chief system" and the "two-chief system.". The so-called "one-chief system" means that a power department and its subordinate units only set up a leader who speaks and counts, is directly appointed by the superior, and has the right to handle all affairs within the department. As the name suggests, the "two-chief system" is to set up a deputy next to the big leader of the department, and according to the regulations, although the deputy is half a level shorter than the leader, he can veto the leader's decision-making and avoid arbitrariness.
Both decision-making methods have their own advantages, the former is more efficient and can effectively avoid internal friction, but it will be a disaster to share a poor level of leadership, and the latter is more democratic, avoiding incompetent people's corpses. In this discussion, Zhukov made a sharp statement of his point of view, that is, to adhere to the "one-length system".
As we all know, at the beginning of the establishment of the Red Army, there was a very torturous encounter: the Soviet army at that time was a miscellaneous army, which included not only workers and peasants, the officers and men of the reorganized Russian army, and even bandits who were absorbed by the government. Especially in the absence of qualified operationally competent officers, the authorities absorbed a large number of "immediate combat forces", a considerable part of which were old Russian officers who were happy to be loyal to the Soviet regime. Although most of the appointments of the early armies were made by Trotsky, the founder of the Soviet army and the planner of the "October Revolution", he also had a heart hanging in his arms, fearing that in case the situation was unfavorable, the old Russian officers suddenly turned back on the water and beat a rake from behind.
For this reason, the resourceful Comrade Trotsky came up with a solution: he created a special post in the establishment above the company battalion level, appointed by the highest level personally; normally this position does not have the power to influence the military decisions of the commander of the forces, but if something goes wrong, the post can not only be stopped immediately, but even replaced by a superior in exceptional circumstances. Trotsky called this group of people on special missions "commissars," as we know the "commissar system."
There was a saying that the German army had a deep hatred for the Soviet political commissar, and even once the Soviet officers and soldiers were captured, the first thing they did was to pick the political commissar out of it and execute him one by one. In the eyes of the Germans, this group did not deserve to be regarded as soldiers at all. In fact, nowadays there is a great misunderstanding of the Commissars of the Soviet Army, who are actually a group of great warriors. The top brass originally wanted to increase their control over the officers and men at the grass-roots level through these people and preach positive energy, but under the unfavorable situation of the war situation, the political commissars with higher ideological consciousness than others often took the lead in the charge themselves, and their casualty rates were much higher than those of other branches of the army. So much so that after 1943, the High Command specifically issued a special order prohibiting the Commissar of the Soviet Army from charging at leisure.
On the other hand, the influence of the commissar on the Soviet army was not always positive. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the German "lightning tactics" shined, and the large Soviet army fell into great chaos. In the case of the loss of contact with friendly forces, some Soviet commanders tried to withdraw appropriately to retain their strength, but the political commissar resolutely refused on the grounds that "deserters are not allowed" and forcibly "laymen command insiders". As a result, a large number of Soviet troops missed the opportunity to break through, and the Germans were wiped out in vain. Zhukov's attitude toward the political commissar system was obviously not very friendly, and after the Battle of Kiev, Zhukov began to be favored by the High Command, and he repeatedly explained to his colleagues what it meant to be "outside, and the king's orders are not affected."
Of course, on the one hand, Zhukov could indeed fight and save the crisis; on the other hand, the Soviet top brass really did not have time to deal with him, and "senior political commissars" like Mehlis wandered to various fronts as representatives of the base camp, and as soon as they returned, they secretly stabbed Stalin with the "black material" of the generals, who hardly pursued him. In general, the political commissar system as a "two-chief system" was quite influential in the grass-roots establishment of the Soviet army, but it almost never restrained a general of Zhukov's level.
At the same time, the "one-chief system" in the army has another meaning, and militaristic countries such as the Second German Empire and Nazi Germany never have deputies in various departments. Not only that, but the heads of departments were given amazing powers and could do almost as they pleased. According to the interpretation, this regulation is to cultivate the sense of honor of soldiers - want to get ahead? Then try to make a contribution on the battlefield as much as possible, and try your best to climb up! After the end of World War II, when the problem was thrown to people, whether it was out of the sense of honor of the soldiers or the desire for power, Zhukov naturally insisted on the "one-chief system" of the army. By implication, if the Soviet army could have only one supreme commander, who would it be? Of course it's me Zhukov, is there anyone else?
Although it is not clear, it is already seeking power, and this is stalin's greatest concern. After the end of World War II, Zhukov's reputation in the Soviet army had overshadowed Stalin's, and even the latter's orders were not as effective as the "Zhukov" character. Even Stalin couldn't figure out whether the Soviet army was surnamed "Su" or "Zhu" at the moment. What's worse is that the more he connived, the more Zhukov moved forward. Stalin knew that a character like his would never give up without winning the final victory; there were only two ways to get him to stop: either satisfy him or get him. Obviously, Stalin chose the latter.
When Zhukov returned to Moscow, he was planning to make a big splash in the political arena, but then he was hit with a heavy hammer.
In late April 1946, Goyageno Customs intercepted a train stuffed with valuables at the western border, filled with rare loot from Germany. According to the report of the head of the investigation, Abakumov, these things are enough to fill 85 large boxes, and the number is really frightening, and they belong to Zhukov. At the same time, Bulganin, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, criticized Zhukov's style problems, describing his mansion as "almost like it was in Germany." Not long after Zhukov signed and confessed his mistake, some people impeached Zhukov for being too egotistical, in professional terms, "a typical Bonapartist"; some people questioned Zhukov's close contact with Western leaders in Germany, afraid that he did not talk about something that should not be said. In short, during this period, the criticism of the "victory marshal" fell like a rainstorm, and Zhukov was soon overwhelmed.
At a high-level meeting in June 1946, Stalin finally threw out his final killing tactic. At the meeting, Zhukov was suspected of "engaging in treasonous activities" in an attempt to steal state power. Although this accusation is cruel enough, fierce enough to kill Lao Zhu, the author believes that Stalin did not really kill the heart, and the purpose of this step of temptation is even greater.
What was Stalin trying to do? As we said at the beginning of the article, the essence of politics is to maintain balance, and Stalin probably wanted to see what kind of impact the loss of Zhukov's turmoil would have on the current balance of power; and whether the elimination of a prominent military commander like Zhukov would lead to consequences that would be difficult to end.
Sure enough, at the beginning of the criticism meeting, the opposition came like a tsunami. The first to refute the accusations against Zhukov were Konev, who was quite suspicious of him. Subsequently, Rokossovsky, Vasilevsky and others also stepped forward, and how can the momentum of politicians be compared with these flesh-and-blood soldiers? Moreover, Stalin was not worried about disposing of a Zhukov, he was afraid that taking zhukov would offend the military forces behind him; or conniving at Zhukov to get everything he wanted would stimulate more "Zhukovs" to come and ask for it - it was extremely dangerous to arrange too many meritorious soldiers at the core of power to intervene in politics.
But on the other hand, we can also think that no matter how big the hat was for Zhukov, Stalin did not kill at all from the beginning. Sure enough, despite the fierce opening, Zhukov still had a thrilling pass, and he just lost his post and was sent to a remote military district.
Interestingly, in 1953, not long before Stalin's death, Zhukov was suddenly transferred back to Moscow. But what happened later was somewhat abrupt, and Stalin died before he could show his intentions. To say that his fate should not be extinguished, Zhukov also really picked up a big bargain; after using his influence to help Khrushchev ascend to the throne, he also received a rich political dividend, and got everything he had coveted as he wished.
Stalin, however, was not mistaken, for as long as Zhukov remained a "Zhukov", he would never be satisfied according to his character, and would only attempt to win the next victory after one victory had been achieved. Old Zhu is not unable to break the situation, he just needs to learn to pretend to be instigated and follow the trend behind the leader. But who would have imagined that such a "Zhukov" would appear? When he was closed at the ghost gate, Zhukov did not learn the slightest lesson, and even intensified. He constantly interrupted Khrushchev's speeches, and even "guided" Khrushchev in the appointment of cadres in front of everyone, and did whatever he wanted because of his own merits, and finally completely annoyed Khrushchev. It's just that the latter didn't know how to save face as much as Stalin and directly swept Zhukov to the end, and at this point, old Zhu didn't even have to do it as a commander of a remote military region.