But anyone who knows a little about World War II will certainly not be unfamiliar with the name of Marshal Zhukov from the Soviet Union. Not only was he recognized as one of the finest generals of World War II, but he was also one of only two people to be awarded the honorary title of "Hero of the Soviet Union" four times (the other being The Soviet leader Brezhnev, who was obsessed with various medals).
For the Soviet Union and the Red Army in World War II, Zhukov was synonymous with victory, another world-famous "red god of war" after Tukhachevsky. In recent years, however, there has been a growing number of negative comments about the Soviet marshal, saying that he would only rely on his superiority in strength to fight more and fight less; even more, he would not have fought without superiority in manpower. The so-called "God of War" was completely blown out by the Soviet Union itself.
So is this really the case? Will Marshal Zhukov only fight more and fight less?
Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1 December 1896 – 18 June 1974) was a famous Soviet military figure
Leningrad and Moscow, how to fight more and fight less?
Those who say that Marshal Zhukov fought more and less just forgot the two tough battles that established Zhukov's status as the "god of war" among the Soviet generals in World War II , the Battle of Leningrad and the Battle of Moscow. These two great battles, which were of great significance to the survival of the Soviet Union, not only did Zhukov not have the conditions to fight more and fight less, but on the contrary, he achieved his prestige by fighting more with less.
Speaking of the Battle of Leningrad, when Zhukov came to the front on September 10, 1941 as commander of the leningrad city defenses, he was able to mobilize only 8 divisions of the 7th and 23rd Armies, and 31 divisions and 2 brigades of the 8th, 11th and 27th Armies. However, 22 of these divisions were hastily rebuilt after being crippled by the Germans in previous battles, and the loss of personnel and weapons amounted to more than 50%.
Leningrad after being bombed by the Germans in September 1941
What's more, Zhukov's reserve consisted of only 6 newly formed infantry divisions, 2 militia divisions, and 2 mixed infantry brigades (these units had almost zero actual combat experience) composed of cadets and officers and men of the Interior Guard, for a total of less than 360,000 people. In the German Army Group North he faced, the troops directly involved in the siege were 29 German divisions (including 6 armored or motorized divisions) and 15 Finnish divisions (with 3 brigades), with a total strength of 550,000 troops.
Looking at the number of the two armies alone, the German army is already 1.4 times that of the Soviet army. In terms of technical weapons, the ratio of soviet and German artillery (including heavy mortars), tanks and aircraft is 1:2.7, 1:1.16, 1:5.8, and none of the Soviet troops has a numerical advantage.
On November 26, 1941, with the assistance of Finnish troops, the Germans marched to the Leningrad front
But the result? By the time Zhukov flew to Moscow on October 7, in less than a month the German offensive at Leningrad had been completely contained.
Focusing on the superiority of the German air force and tanks, Zhukov built a multi-level defensive line with artillery as the main body aimed at restricting the german armored advance, and also concentrated various cannons including anti-aircraft guns and naval guns in key areas for unified use, forming a dense artillery barrier in the main offensive direction of the German army, supplemented by mines, trenches and the counterattack of infantry units, which not only forced the German army that had been advancing all the way to stop, but even recovered Sosnovka and Koilovo.
Above_ Old photograph of the Moscow Defense War
In the ensuing Battle of Moscow, Zhukov faced an even more severe situation. Although the Soviets invested about 2 million troops in this campaign, they had an advantage over the Germans (1.7 million). But we must understand that the German army was put into the battlefield at one time, and the vast majority of the Soviet army was a batch of reinforcements that were put into the battlefield one after another, including fresh troops transferred from the Far East, and did not participate in the battle at the beginning of the battle.
That is to say, the German army maintained the superiority of the front line over the Soviet army throughout the campaign, and in the Battle of Vyazma-Bryansk, the Soviet army lost as many as 660,000 people, and the mobile forces that could be used were further weakened.
Above_ During the Moscow Defense War, in Moscow's Gorky Cultural Park, Soviet soldiers prepare anti-aircraft guns to fire back at German bombers
But Zhukov had completely stabilized the situation by November 1 after taking over the defenses of Moscow on October 8, and assured Stalin that a military parade on November 7 could be held on Red Square to commemorate the victory of the October Revolution. Immediately after the parade, the Soviets forced the Germans to retreat significantly with a strong counterattack.
During this period, Zhukov received only 100,000 infantry, 360 tanks and 2,000 artillery pieces. However, this world-famous "gun master" still relied on the anti-tank defense line built with artillery as the core, supplemented by "cavalry-mechanization" groups to carry out counter-offensives, and formed a strong reserve in key areas, which repelled the German army by 30-80 kilometers, so that the German army could not enter the city to rest before the arrival of the great cold wave, and finally defeated Moscow after paying a heavy price.
Above_ The surrender of the German army during the defense of Moscow
With more fighting and less, Zhukov could not do anything
As for the fact that after 1943, Zhukov always led the troops that maintained superiority over the German army to participate in the battle, which on the one hand shows that after two years of brutal fighting, the German army's strength was extremely depleted and could not make ends meet; on the other hand, the Soviet army had no way to do so. At the beginning of the war, due to mistakes in decision-making, insufficient preparation, and improper response, the Soviet army suffered huge losses, losing more than 3.3 million soldiers in the first year of the war.
Under heavy pressure, the new troops hastily formed by the Soviet army had to be filled with a large number of new recruits who had no combat experience and had not even touched a gun, and used such a force to compete with the German army that had won consecutive battles and almost all over Europe. Not only Zhukov, but even Stalin later admitted: "Before we really learned to fight in large armies in Kursk, the overall quality of the fascist army was much higher than ours, and many times the Red Army had to rely on numerical superiority to make up for the gap." ”
Joseph Vissarinovich Stalin (18 December 1878 – 5 March 1953)
Therefore, this is not to say that Zhukov had to fight more and fight less, but the objective conditions determined that the Soviet army must rely on its numerical superiority to win victory when its comprehensive combat quality was inferior to that of the German army. Otherwise, there would be no need to continue fighting, just surrender to the Nazis?
When the quality is inferior to the opponent, first use the quantity to make up for the attack, and then fight back when the quality goes up. If this is not possible, it is not criticism or accusation, but unreasonableness.
On September 10, 1941, the Germans occupied a retreating Soviet fortification on the outskirts of Leningrad
Winning by numerical superiority: the pursuit of warriors since ancient times
War is not boxing, and there has never been a one-on-one head-to-head contest of equals. If you commanded an army of 200,000 against the enemy's 100,000 soldiers and horses, would you send only 100,000 people to fight the enemy in order to be fair and not to leave behind the stigma of "fighting more and bullying less"?
I believe that the vast majority of military fans, including professional military experts, are very respectful of the famous general who wins more with less. But we must understand that although winning more with less is enough to show the greatness of the "God of War", it is very rare, and it can even be said to be rare. In the vast majority of cases, even in modern warfare, concentrating superior forces to annihilate the enemy is still regarded as a guideline by Chinese and foreign soldiers.
Napoleon once said: "In order to win, it is necessary to be able to concentrate superior forces that are greater than the enemy to fight." Marshal Montgomery, the first British general in World War II, was interviewed by reporters in his later years, and when asked why he was able to win many battles, he said: "I will never rush to shoot when there is no superiority in troops." It can be seen that the pursuit of superiority in troop strength is the only way for soldiers to win. If Napoleon and Montgomery could do this, why couldn't Zhukov?
Bernard Law Montgomery (17 November 1887 – 25 March 1976) was a British field marshal and military strategist
During the Cold War, out of the need for ideological struggle, Western countries not only vigorously criticized the performance of the Soviet Red Army in World War II, but also used the argument that the Soviet-German joint attack on Poland provoked a major war, the Soviet army's victory all relied on "man-sea tactics", and the Soviet generals could not fight without superiority in manpower, in order to smear the Soviet Union and highlight the importance of the Western camp for victory in World War II.
Even today, when various archival materials are gradually declassified and the truth is gradually made public, because Western countries still firmly grasp the right to speak in public opinion, many people still lack a correct understanding of the contribution of the Soviet army in World War II. Marshal Zhukov, an excellent commander who had made outstanding merits and made great contributions to the victory over the Nazis, was also met with unreasonable criticism.
Author: Lin Sen Correction/Editor: Lilith
Resources:
[1] "Iron-Blooded Sud" by Xu Yan
[2] Memories and Reflections by Zhukov
[3] "The Collision of Giants" David. M. Glantz, Jonathan. by M. House
[4] Montgomery 1988-1976 by Allen Muirhead
The text was created by the History University Hall team, and the picture originated from the Internet and the copyright belongs to the original author