Four Field Generals Series 71: Lü Zhengcao (II)
Author: Mast
After the July 7 Incident, the headquarters held an enlarged meeting in Luochuan in late August 1937 to determine that the policy of operations against Japan was "independent mountain guerrilla warfare." The first anti-Japanese base area created by our side, the Jin-Cha-Ji base area, was originally centered on Mount Wutai.
Creating base areas in the plains is a new thing for our army, and it is even more difficult. The Jizhong base areas created by Lü Zhengcao's leadership played a tremendous role in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, made tremendous sacrifices, and made tremendous contributions. Let's talk about these things today.
(1) The chairman's inscription praises the base areas in Jizhong, only this one example
The central Hebei region is located in the triangle of Ping, Tianjin and Baoding( Ding), between the Jinpu, Pinghan, Pingjin and Cangshi railways. It is located in the North China Plain, with developed transportation, a large population and rich products. The favorable conditions for establishing base areas in such areas are that they have a good economic foundation and can mobilize and strengthen the anti-Japanese armed forces; the unfavorable conditions are that they are located between important towns and railway lines, and the Japanese army can give play to its mechanized advantages, while our army has no terrain to rely on, and combat is far more difficult than in mountainous areas. The Jizhong region is the first plain base area established by our side, surrounded by heavy Japanese troops, and the difficulty and cruelty of the process can be imagined.
The establishment of base areas in this area is also of great strategic significance: After the Japanese army expanded its war of aggression against China, as the front line was lengthened, the war consumption was huge, and it had to implement the "war to feed the war" and plunder war resources from China. The Jizhong Plain is rich in resources and is a key area plundered by the Japanese army. By establishing base areas in Central Hebei, on the one hand, our side can effectively crack down on the Japanese army's attempt to "feed the war with war," and on the other hand, it can provide economic resources for the Jin-Cha-Ji border areas.
At the beginning of Lü Zhengcao's establishment of the Jizhong base area, under the leadership of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, he quickly established organizations at all levels, expanded the anti-Japanese armed forces, and at the same time incorporated all kinds of miscellaneous armed forces, which quickly opened up the situation. In April 1938, the Jizhong Military Region and the Third Column of the Eighth Route Army were established, with Lü as commander, to unify the leadership and command of the anti-Japanese armed forces in the Jizhong region.
By October 1938, the Jizhong base area had 44 counties, a population of about 8 million, and 63,000 members of the anti-Japanese armed forces.
Because the expansion of the hebei-central troops was too rapid, the various types of armed forces that were integrated were uneven, and the overall combat effectiveness of the troops was not strong. Yan'an was extremely concerned about this, and in November 1938 decided to send Cheng Zihua to Jizhong to strengthen leadership; at the same time, he Long sent 120 divisions (715, 716 regiments, etc.) to Jizhong to promote the regularization of local armed forces.
In particular, after He Long led the 120th Division to Jizhong, he gave great support to the Jizhong Military Region: First, he taught the Red Army's fighting style; second, he dispatched a large number of military and political cadres; second, he helped the Jizhong troops to carry out rectification training; and third, he led the Jizhong troops to fight a war and improved the combat effectiveness of the Jizhong troops through actual combat. The 120th Division has been in Jizhong for more than half a year, and has played a tremendous role in consolidating the base areas in Jizhong and regularizing the troops.
With the help of the 120th Division, by the autumn of 1939, the troops of the Jizhong Military Region were reorganized into 14 main regiments, 1 garrison brigade (2 regiments), and 7 guerrilla detachments (general) units. At the time of Xiaoqiao's reorganization, Lü Zhengcao's troops were less than 1 regiment (2 battalions). In 2 years, the force has expanded by about 30 times.
At the same time, the Jizhong base areas have also provided tremendous support to other base areas in terms of materials and soldiers. Taking the soldiers as an example, sporadic, there were two large-scale supports: one was in 1939, when the 120th Division arrived in Jizhong, 6,400 people, and about 22,000 people left Jizhong more than half a year later; the first was in August 1943, when Lü Zhengcao was transferred to the Jinsui Military Region, he took 9 formed regiments from Jizhong. Later Yiye troops had many Jizhong people. This shows the role and contribution of the base areas in Hebei.
Because of this, in April 1941 the Chairman specially wrote an inscription praising Wing Zhong as a model. This is the only case in the anti-Japanese base areas throughout the country. It can be said that the creation of the Jizhong base area was the greatest contribution of Lü Zhengcao's life.
(2) A tragedy that changed the "political commissar's final decision-making power"
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Japanese army carried out countless sweeps of various base areas. One of the most brutal was the May Day sweep of the Jizhong base areas in 1942.
Because of the important strategic position of the Jizhong base area and its proximity to Pingjin, the Japanese army regarded it as a serious problem for its confidants. Okamura Ninji mobilized more than 50,000 Japanese mobile forces, and from May 1, with the cooperation of the Air Force, adopted tactics such as ten-sided attack, iron wall encirclement, back and forth netting, vertical and horizontal search, sectional combined attack, and rushing assault, and cooperated with the "three lights" policy to carry out a terrible sweep of Jizhong, which did not end until the end of June, which lasted for 2 months.
After two consecutive months of frenzied sweeping, the Jizhong base area was severely damaged and suffered heavy losses: the troops lost more than 16,000 people, the masses were killed and arrested more than 50,000 people; the Japanese army established more than 1,700 strongholds in the base area and dug more than 4,000 kilometers of blockade ditches. The entire Jizhong base area was "gridded" and divided into more than 2,600 small pieces, all of which became Japanese-occupied areas and guerrilla areas, and the main force had to be temporarily transferred to Ji'nan and other places.
In counter-sweeping, there is no distinction between the front line and the rear, and the headquarters is often the focus of enemy tracking. Once, as soon as the headquarters was stationed in a house in Zongzuo Village, Ping'an County, it was bombed by five Japanese planes in turn. The war room was hit by a bomb, and 1 staff officer and 1 messenger of the headquarters were killed on the spot, and Lu Zhengcao and Cheng Zihua escaped the disaster by lying under the bed. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the base areas were extremely difficult and difficult, and it was not at all as simple as the plot in the anti-Japanese drama.
The worst loss of the May Day sweep was the 8th Division of Jizhong. In the battle of Xuecun during the sweep, the commander Chang Deshan was killed, the political commissar Wang Yuanyin committed suicide with wounds in the leg, and the troops also suffered a large number of casualties. Among them, the sacrifice of Chang Deshan also prompted the headquarters to revise the "political commissar's final decision-making power".
Chang Deshan served as the chief of staff of the 6th Division of the Red Second Army during the Red Army period, experienced hundreds of battles, and saved He Long's life, and was an excellent military cadre that Lü Zhengcao personally asked He Long to go to Jizhong. Wang Yuanyin was an outstanding intellectual cadre who participated in the 129 Movement, but did not understand the military. At that time, after the first and second phases of the sweep, Hejian and Suning in the central area of the 8th Sub-district had been occupied by the Japanese army. On June 7, Chang Deshan and Wang Yuanyin led some of their troops to fight here.
On the same day, Chang Deshan learned that the Japanese army was preparing to encircle the central area again, and he urged him to immediately move to the outer line. However, Wang Yuanyin believed that the masses in the central area had suffered a lot in the sweep, rejoiced at the return of the troops, and now had to leave again, worried that it was "not good to give an account to the masses," and urged them to stay in the central area and persist in fighting. The two argued for a long time, and finally Chang Deshan obeyed the "political commissar's final decision-making power". As a result, xuecun was surrounded by the Japanese army, and Chang Deshan, Wang Yuanyin, Wang Wei, political commissar of the 30 regiment accompanying him, Zhao Zhenya, deputy regimental commander, and Meng Qingwu, director of the political department, were sacrificed.
"The power of the political commissar to make the final decision" refers to a power explicitly entrusted to the political commissar during the Red Army period, that is, when the political commissar has a dispute with a military commander of the same level, the political commissar has the right to stop the military commander's order. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army promulgated the Provisional Regulations on Political Commissars in December 1938, which slightly modified this provision: Military commanders bear greater responsibility for military administration and operational command, but when they violate the line or do not carry out the orders of their superiors, the political commissar has the power to stop the orders of the military commander; but the circumstances must be reported in detail to the higher authorities; before receiving instructions from the higher authorities, the military commanders must follow the opinions of the political commissars. This revision does not essentially change the "political commissar's final decision-making power", but only adds a vague premise that is difficult to operate in practice.
After Lu Zhengcao and others reported this situation, the headquarters was very shocked that so many cadres had died in one battle. After in-depth analysis, the army developed rapidly at that time, a large number of political work cadres came from progressive intellectuals, and generally lacked military experience. Under such circumstances, if the "political commissar's final decision-making power" continues to be retained, similar tragedies will occur sooner or later.
Therefore, on September 1 of that year, it was decided that the military operations in the war would be decided by the military chief of the unit. In October of that year, the Provisional Regulations on Political Commissars were amended: "In the event of a dispute between a political commissar and a military commander at the same level, the political commissar shall make the final decision, except for actions that are operational in the field, which shall be decided by the military commander." At this point, the decision on military operations was transferred to the hands of military commanders.