After the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, the Japanese army in North China cooperated with the Pacific Theater in order to stabilize the rear. The unprecedented and tragic "great sweep", especially the "May Day anti-sweeping" in Jizhong (known as the Jizhong Operation (also known as the No. 3 Operation) in Japanese war history), suffered the most painful losses. However, due to various reasons, there are many obvious discrepancies in domestic articles on the May Day anti-sweeping campaign. All kinds of self-media articles on the Internet are full of errors and omissions, especially the Battle of Songzhuang (some called the Battle of Songzhuang or the Great Victory of Songzhuang) are quite controversial.
This article will tell the most authentic history of the "May Day anti-sweeping" operation based on the most authoritative historical materials in China and Japan. Salute to the anti-Japanese martyrs!
Welcome to reprint, please indicate the source of the article: History of the War of Resistance
First, the situation of the Central Hebei Military Region and the combat sequence of the troops before the war
The Japanese army in North China divided Hebei into five areas, including Jidong, Jixi, Jibei (Pingbei), Jinan and the surrounding central area, and the central plain area was called Jizhong. The Eighth Route Army, on the other hand, referred to the boundaries of the Jinghan, Jinpu, Shide, and Beining railway lines as Jizhong District.
According to the pre-war intelligence of the Japanese army in North China, the Jizhong Military Region has a total of 14,000 regular troops, generally operating in regiments, each regiment has a strength of 1,000-1,500 people, organized according to the three-three system, with 700-1000 rifles, 10-20 light machine guns, 4-6 heavy machine guns, 2-4 mortars, and each person carries 30-50 rounds of bullets. In addition, according to the Office of the Jizhong People's Anti-Japanese Struggle History Research Association in January 1987, the "Jizhong People's Anti-Japanese Struggle Materials" No. 43 recorded that the main force of the Jizhong Military Region was about 14,700 people.
Its popular armed forces are divided into two types: semi-detached and non-detached militias. The semi-detached militia is formed as a young anti-enemy vanguard and a guerrilla group, and although its combat effectiveness is lower than that of the regular army, it can quickly mobilize the local people to fight because of its direct contact with the masses. The militia that does not leave work is a self-defense force to defend their hometown, composed of young and middle-aged men and women in each village, and is divided into the Youth Resistance Pioneer, the basic cadre team, and the general self-defense force, and there are detachments, brigades, or squadrons at all levels in counties, towns, and villages, and a command system is established according to the administrative district. In addition, we receive assistance from people and other people through the National Salvation Congress (Peasants' Salvation Congress, Youth Salvation Congress, Workers' Salvation Congress, etc.). Its military operations are carried out by the head of the regular force or directly subordinate to the commander of the military sub-district. However, the combat effectiveness is worse than that of the semi-off-production militia, and only one-tenth of the personnel have rifles or pistols. It is mainly responsible for intelligence collection and transmission, rescuing the wounded and sick, transporting supplies, replenishing regular troops, and clearing the field in the empty room. The number of its personnel varies from region to region, and the Japanese army in North China has surveyed several villages in Jizhong, and the results show that "one-tenth of the residents have joined the Self-Defense Forces, and another tenth have participated in the backbone of active hostile activities." ”
The sequence of regular troops of the Jizhong Military Region is as follows:
Commander of the Eighth Route Army and Jizhong Military Region Pin Zhengcao, Political Commissar Cheng Zihua, chief of staff Sha Ke. It has jurisdiction over the 6th-10th Military Subdistrict, as well as the Jizhong Huimin Detachment and the Second Cavalry Regiment.
Wang Changjiang, commander of the 6th Military Subdistrict, Zhao Chengjin, deputy commander, and Kuang Fuxiao, political commissar, had jurisdiction over the 16th Regiment (during the "May Day Sweep", he was ordered to go south to the Jilu Military Region), the 21st Regiment, and the Jizhong Garrison Brigade (under the jurisdiction of 2 regiments)
The commander of the 7th Military Sub-district, Yu Quanshen, and the political commissar Wu Xi, had jurisdiction over the 17th Regiment, the 22nd Regiment, the 3rd Anti-Japanese Regiment, and the 1st-3rd District Regiment
The commander of the 8th Military Sub-district, Chang Deshan, the deputy commander Zhang Kongqian, and the political commissar Wang Dawu, had jurisdiction over the 23rd Regiment and the 30th Regiment
Han Wei, commander of the 9th Military Subdistrict, Liu Ziqi, acting commander, and Wei Hongliang, political commissar, had jurisdiction over the 18th Regiment, the 24th Regiment, and the 18th, 30th, 38th, and 42nd District Teams
Zhou Biao, commander of the 10th Military Subdistrict, Yan Lixuan, deputy commander, Shi Rong, political commissar, and Xiao Xinhuai, chief of staff, had jurisdiction over the 27th Regiment, the 29th Regiment, the 32nd Regiment, and the 5th Guerrilla Corps. Source: The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part II), pp. 140-144.
Special attention is paid to the fact that as early as 1941, the Japanese army in North China implemented a policy of zoning "sweeping" and encroaching on the base areas in Central Hebei, and built more than 500 strongholds, ranking first among the base areas of the Eighth Route Army in North China. The former Tenth Military Subdistrict was completely reduced to an enemy-occupied area, which further compressed the activity space of the Eighth Route Army's Central Division. By the end of the same year, the anti-Japanese base area in central Hebei had shrunk by one-sixth, and its plains had suffered the greatest losses. Editorial Group of the "Zuoquan Military Anthology" of the Academy of Military Sciences: "Zuoquan Military Anthology" in "The Current Military Policy of the Enemy in Hua peixu", March 31, 1941, "On the Operations in one Year, the Situation of Army Building, and the Military Policies and Tasks for next Year", December 1941.
According to Japanese war history, Zhu Zhankui, the former commander of the 10th Military Sub-district, was captured in November 1941, and was later received by the top level of the Japanese army in North China, and carried out the so-called "Huairou" work in the QixinYuan of the North China Political Affairs Committee for two months. During the Jizhong campaign, the Japanese attempted to use Zhu Zhankui for so-called "political work", but escaped near Wangdu on May 28 (there is no detailed historical record of how Zhu Zhankui escaped. According to domestic historical data, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in November 1951 for historical issues, pardoned on March 5, 1975, and rehabilitated in 1979. According to Japanese historical records, "it is indeed very difficult to make a strong Communist Party member defect and betray", which shows that Zhu Zhankui did not surrender to the enemy and had a resolute attitude). It can be seen that the above-mentioned sequence of the 10th Military Sub-district is newly formed. Although the 10th Military Sub-district was "completely captured", there were still 3 regiments, 1 guerrilla corps formation, and the sequence still existed.
Since the Jizhong Military Region is mainly responsible for the supply of materials, the task of transportation. Therefore, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army made it clear that its operations should try to avoid "conflicts with the main forces of the Japanese army" in order to expand its power and strengthen its organization. Externally, propaganda-focused political offensives confronted the Japanese army; internally, they stepped up support for spring ploughing in order to grasp the hearts and minds of the people and increase the grain they needed."
According to the intelligence of the Japanese army in North China, in mid-March, the headquarters of the Central Military Region of the Eighth Route Army and the headquarters of the 7th, 8th, and 9th Military Sub-districts, possibly the sub-commander of the 10th Army, estimated to have a total of 7,000 main forces of the 7th Military Region and some of the 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Military Sub-districts, with a total of 7,000 backbone troops, and about 10,000 militiamen, were massing in the area west of the Tuotuo River north of Shide Road, and the troops of the 8th Military Sub-district and the Huimin Detachment were moving southeast of Baiyangdian, and the 9th Military Sub-district was returning to the area south of Baoding. The Japanese army in North China judged that the Eighth Route Army should prepare in advance for the spring anti-"sweep." The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part II), p. 146.
Japanese "Sweep"
Second, the "May Day Sweep" operational deployment of the Japanese army in North China and Hebei
The anti-Japanese base area in central Hebei was the supply of materials for jin-Cha-Ji, especially the base area in the Taihang Mountains in the north, and undertook the important task of transporting all kinds of materials from Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao, and Jinan. New recruits were added to the basic units. The rear supply office of its military district is located about 25 kilometers northwest of Dingxian County. At the same time, it posed a major threat to the main communication lines of the Japanese army, Pinghan, Jinpu, Shide and Bac Ninh Railway. Therefore, the japanese army in North China destroyed the anti-Japanese base area in Central Hebei, which not only ensured the safety of the railway line, but also occupied the rich resources of Central Hebei and further reached the strategy of "feeding the war with war". It also cut off the external material movement management and destroyed the supply of materials and soldiers in the base areas of Jin-Cha-Ji and Taihang Mountains. On May 12, after the battle in Jizhong, the north China Front reported that "the Japanese army wants to complete its completion as a security area in one fell swoop because of the protracted battle and the complete purge operation... Especially since this region is the cotton-producing area in North China and the most promising arable land area in North China, it is convinced that in the near future, it will become a major cotton producing area and occupy an important position in the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Circle'." The Second Historical Archive of China, the Central Archives, and the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences co-edited the Great Sweep of North China, Zhonghua Bookstore, 1998 edition, pp. 592-593.
In early 1942, the Japanese army in North China decided to launch a "sweeping" operation against the central and southern parts of Hebei. Before the war, the intelligence units of the Japanese army in North China conducted a detailed investigation of the terrain, base facilities, and traffic conditions in the central Hebei region. According to the survey and collation data of its second lesson in late March of the same year, "The combat area includes Anguo, Raoyang, Anping, Shenxian, Shenze, Xianxian, Wuqiang, Wuyi, Suning, Boye, Hengshui, Shulu, Jinxian, Wuji and other counties, with a total area of about 9,000 square kilometers... The terrain is generally flat, with a large plain scattered throughout the villages. "The roads are mostly concave roads, the vehicular roads in non-vigilant areas have been damaged, and the enemy (referring to the Eighth Route Army) has built traffic trenches to connect the villages..." and so on.
In addition, the analysis of the operational characteristics of the Eighth Route Army in Central Hebei is also very accurate, and it is believed that the Eighth Route Army has scattered the establishment of "red areas" and underground organizations in the form of party organizations, and the "red areas" have set up strongholds and communication lines between each other to win the support of the people and establish "joint defense organizations." In this way, when "sweeping" the basic units of the Eighth Route Army, it is difficult to capture scattered small groups of troops, and they are completely integrated with the people, resulting in "bandits and people being inseparable." In addition, the "joint defense organizations" superficially assisted the Japanese army, but in fact they were "enemies," making it difficult for the Japanese army to truly cut off the contact between the various combat units of the Eighth Route Army and the underground organizations, the "red areas" and the "joint defense organizations" when they "swept up," and to strike at the troop movements and material transportation of the Japanese "sweeping" troops, while collecting intelligence and harassing operations.
In order to achieve the suddenness of the operation, the chief staff officers of the Japanese army in North China kept the operation strictly confidential in March and April 1942, and at the same time conducted on-site reconnaissance and research and preparation. The Japanese army attached particular importance to both military and political operations, so the deputy chief of staff, Major General Arishi Maeji Seizo, ordered the relevant administrative officers to conduct a local study near Baoding in mid-April. At the same time, he stressed the need to "take the elimination of the enemy's base areas and the strengthening of the enemy's blockade as the main operational objectives."
In mid-April, the North China Front determined that the operational policy was to "carry out a sharp attack and encirclement operation against the main forces of the Chinese Communists in the Central Hebei region with Lü Zhengcao as the commander, eliminate their base areas, and at the same time use various political, economic, and ideological tactics to achieve the goal of the public security area in one fell swoop." Decided to form the main force of the 41st Division (6 infantry brigades as the backbone, division commander Lieutenant General Shimizu Nobuki), the 2 infantry brigades of the 9th Brigade regiment (brigade commander Major General Kenkichi Ikegami), the 110th Division Regiment Shirataki Unit (4 infantry brigades as the backbone, commanded by the infantry regiment commander Major General Rishirō Shirataki), and the 26th Division Regiment Sakamoto Detachment (2 infantry brigades as the backbone, commanded by the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment Commander Sakamoto Yoshitaro Daisa), A total of 18 infantry brigades of the 13th Cavalry Regiment (Wing Commander Takeshi Yamazaki) and the Ogawa Unit of the Independent Mixed 7th Brigade Regiment (commanded by Ogawa Cedar Daisa, 29th Independent Infantry Brigade) were "sweeping" the backbone units. In addition, the 110th Division (Division Commander Lieutenant General Iinanuma), the 27th Division (Division Commander Lieutenant General Kumayoshi Harada), the 29th Flying Team, the Hebei Provincial Special Service (Major General Shigeji Suzuki, the head of the agency) and the Ishimon Special Service (the head of the agency, Ishida Toyozo Daisa) cooperated. Therefore, according to Japan's war history, the total number of troops invested should be more than 17,000 people, and the number of troops joining the cooperation should not exceed 20,000. The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part II), pp. 146-148.
More than 50,000 people in China said. Source General Lü Zhengcao's "Memoirs of Jizhong": "The commander of the North China Garrison Army, Okamura Ningji... Mobilized the main forces of the 41st Division and the Independent 9th Brigade, as well as the 110th Division, the 26th Division, and the Independent 7th Brigade and Regiment, totaling about 50,000 people (excluding the Pseudo-Zhi Experimental Security Army and the Garrison)...". The author found out that in order to support the Battle of Zhejiang and Gansu. In mid-May and late June 1942, the Japanese army in North China successively dispatched the main force of the 22nd Division, the Xiaojiang Mixed Brigade (five brigades of infantry drawn from the 26th Division and the 37th Division as the backbone), and the 237th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Division regiment and 2 brigades as the backbone. Coupled with the security guards in North China, the possibility of the Japanese army sending more than 50,000 people to launch a hebei-China war is low. Source: The War of Public Security in North China (Part II), 1982, 1st Edition, pp. 133-135
It is worth noting that the 41st Division, which was the main force of the campaign, was organized by the division and regiment headquarters and the infantry regiment headquarters, the 237th and 239th infantry regiments, and the 41st Wing with mountain artillery, engineers, and heavy troops. There are also divisional signal teams, weapons service teams, health teams, 1st and 2nd field hospitals, and sick horse factories. The operational quota was 13,835, and the civilian personnel of the army totaled 17,055. It can be seen that the 41st Wing is the main force of the 41st Division, equipped with mountain artillery, sappers, heavy troops and other units, while the 237th and 239th Wing is not equipped.
The establishment of the Independent Mixed 9th Brigade regiment was organized by the Brigade Command, the 36th Independent Infantry Regiment and the 40th Infantry Brigade and the Brigade's Signal Team, artillery unit, and task force, with a strength of 4963 personnel. It can be seen that the independent mixed 9th Brigade regiment is composed of 1 infantry company + 1 infantry brigade.
On April 28, 1942, the Japanese army in North China formally issued an order at the meeting of corps commanders: from May 1, the Jizhong operation began. The operation is divided into three phases, and the specific deployment is as follows:
1) Phase I: From May 1, the Shirataki Force, the Ogawa Force, and the Independent Mixed 9th Brigade regiment began to "sweep" the area north of the Tuotuo River, the area between Hejian and Suning, and the area south of Shide Road, planning to fight for 10 days. An attempt was made to drive the Jizhong Eighth Route Army into a pre-designed triangle of the Tuotuo River, the Fuyang River and The Shide River in the south of the Tuotuo River. At the same time, the 41st Division took a train to Handan and prepared for the battle on Shide Road.
2) Phase II: The 41st Division and the independent mixed 9th Brigade regiment from the Shide Route south to the north, and the Shirataki and Ogawa troops surrounded and destroyed the Eighth Route Army in the triangle from the north to the south of the Tuotuo River, and the plan was achieved within 5 days.
3) Phase III: The first phase of the third class operation, repeated "sweeping", completely eliminating the base facilities of the Eighth Route Army troops, the estimated combat time is about 10 days; and then entering the second phase of the third phase of operations, while "sweeping" the Eighth Route Army, vigorously promoting the construction of Japanese and pseudo strongholds, blockade lines, etc. Finally, the 41st Division was put under alert in the area, and the duration of the operation was expected to be about 15 days. Therefore, the total estimated duration of the third phase is 25 days.
Source: North China Public Security War (Part 2), edited by the War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, pp. 148-149.
Japanese stronghold
Third, the Japanese army in North China prepared for the war
In order to conceal the intention of fighting in Hebei, the 110th Division and the 27th Division stationed in the Central Hebei region continued to carry out "public security and rectification", built a large number of strongholds, pillboxes and other fortifications, and extended the trenches covering the sides of the railway and the main traffic roads. By the end of February 1942, the total length of the trenches was 3,900 kilometers, and the number of bunkers was about 1,300. At the same time, hundreds of kilometers of blockade lines were built at the foot of the mountain in the mountainous area west of the Jinghan Road, which consisted of stone walls and bunkers, the stone walls were 2 meters high and the bottom thickness was about 1 meter, in an attempt to block the supply money between Jixi and Jidong, and cut off the reinforcements of the Jixi and Jidong Eighth Route Army to the Jizhong Eighth Route Army. In addition, the so-called pseudo-guard corps and self-defense regiment training have been strengthened, and the training of pseudo-self-defense regiments in various villages in Jizhong has been particularly strengthened. This has caused unprecedented difficulties in the anti-"sweeping" of the Hebei Central Military Region.
On April 25 and 26, the Japanese army in North China downgraded the independent mixed 8th Brigade regiment stationed along the Shide and Shitai Road to Shunde, replacing the headquarters of the 108th Infantry Brigade and the 140th Infantry Regiment. At the same time, the newly integrated 9th Independent Mixed Brigade regiment directly under the japanese army in North China was stationed in the area along The Shide Road, and the 139th Infantry Regiment was transferred to the area along the Shitai Road, under the command of the 110th Infantry Regiment. It can be seen that the Japanese army attaches great importance to it and is fully prepared.
In addition to the above measures, the Japanese army in North China also carried out the following pre-war preparations:
1) Carry out special intelligence work, and in March, it has successfully deciphered the code of the radio station of the Jizhong Military Region, and set up an espionage squad to monitor and find direction. However, due to the fact that the Eighth Route Army began to control the airwaves and changed the code from April 26, the Japanese army in North China could only hope that the spies would collect. This has become one of the main reasons for the preservation of the main force of the Hebei Central Military Region in the "May Day Anti-Sweeping Operation."
2) Since the beginning of April, successive "sweeps" of eastern Hebei, western Hebei and southern Hebei have created the illusion of routine crusades in the Jizhong Military Region.
3) The participating units of the North China Front actively prepared, such as the "sweeping" main force 41st Division, in order to cope with the harassment of the Great Plains and the small units of the Eighth Route Army, studied the so-called "casting net tactics", that is, each infantry squadron spread out a column of divisions at 500-meter intervals, and the brigade then lined up the squadrons side by side to cover the front of the entire formation, in order to search for the enemy and drive them into the net. However, this method of warfare requires maintaining command liaison and concentration of forces between brigades and squadrons. Therefore, the Japanese army pre-arranged the second-line troops or reserve forces, and at the same time strengthened the communication links and command agility between the various units. In order to improve the mobility of the troops, each brigade has a bicycle team and a cavalry squad of about 20 people; when necessary, these bicycle teams and cavalry squads are assigned to each squadron to strengthen command and liaison, search for enemy information and cut off the enemy's retreat.
4. Strengthen the special task force attached to the wing, as well as political work classes in contact with the gendarmerie and the puppet army, specifically for the so-called "people's work".
The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., The North China Public Security War (Part II), pp. 150-153.
General Lü Zhengcao, commander of the Jizhong Military Region
Fourth, before the war, the Eighth Route Army was light enemy, resulting in an error in strategic judgment
The Japanese army in North China actively prepared for the war. The headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, on the other hand, appeared optimistic after the outbreak of the Pacific War and the idea of underestimating the enemy. This also affected the Jizhong Military Region, which on January 17, 1942, instructed all military sub-districts, holding that "after the outbreak of the Pacific War, although most of the enemy's army, especially the North China army, cannot be transferred to the ground, the increase in north China may be temporarily eliminated, the strength of the troops will be more depleted and dispersed, and it is inevitable that the military strength will be relatively weakened, and in order to supply the war, it is necessary to ensure the occupied areas and strengthen the grasp of the resources of our base areas." This contradiction has given rise to a new situation of resistance behind enemy lines." "The larger 'sweeping' of the enemy organization than before will be temporarily impossible, but the small sweeping, the 'sweeping' of the partitions will not stop and will increase ...". This judgment underestimated the possibility that the Japanese army in North China would be more active in fighting in support of the Pacific War and destroying the base areas, and the idea of light enemy in the base areas in Hebei and China spread rapidly. The Research Office of the Party Committee of Hebei Province of the Communist Party of China, ed., Selected Historical Documents of Central Hebei (Part I), in Instructions of the Party Committee of the Central Hebei Region of the Communist Party of China on the Work After the Outbreak of the Pacific War, January 17, 1942, pp. 601-602
However, in 1942, the situation in North China was not as expected by the Eighth Route Army. In early February, the Japanese army in north China launched a "great sweep" of more than a month in the northwest of Jin and the Taihang Mountains, with considerable losses. Therefore, on 11 February, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army instructed all corps to "break the view that the 'sweeping' behind enemy lines under the new situation of the target is regarded as the general 'sweeping' in the past, oppose the optimism of underestimating the war situation behind enemy lines since the outbreak of the Pacific War, and oppose the phenomenon of numbness." Soon the Japanese army increased its troops in the Jizhong region. This aroused the vigilance of the Jizhong Military Region. In April, instructions for anti-sweeping operations were issued one after another, ".... It is clearly pointed out: 'After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the enemy's view that it is impossible to sweep up the long-term sweep of Jizhong must be immediately eliminated.' We should further prepare for the spring sweep of the eventful autumn from an ideological and material point of view.'" But it was too late. At the same time, the Jizhong Military Region failed to detect the purpose of the Japanese army's sweep, that is, to "destroy Jizhong and turn Jizhong into a public security area." The 24th issue of "Materials on the People's Anti-Japanese Struggle in Jizhong" contains Su Jinzhang's "Review of the May Day" Anti-"Sweeping" of the 7th Military Sub-district in Jizhong Province.
Therefore, in late April, the Jizhong Military Region preliminarily determined the anti-"sweeping" policy as follows: The main forces should break through the encirclement circle of the enemy's "sweeping", shift from the inner line to the outer line, and turn behind the enemy; the regional units stayed in the original area to carry out guerrilla warfare; and before the enemy approached, the head organs of the Jizhong Military Region remained in the central area of the base area (Shenzhen, Wu, Rao, and An) to move around, and when the enemy approached us and basically formed a closed encirclement posture, they would begin to break through and move outward. Pages 5-6 of the 24th issue of "Materials on the People's Anti-Japanese Struggle in Jizhong" contains "The Military and Civilians of Jizhong Smashed the Japanese Kou "May Day" and "Sweeping Up" to Tide Over the Difficulties and Win Victory."
V. Phase I (1-10 May 1942)
Before the start of the operation, Ogawa's troops tried to prevent the Eighth Route Army from breaking through to the east. A barrage was erected on the Fuyang River near Xiaofan Town and between Zhixian County to form a natural interception line. On 30 April, the main force set off at sunset. On 1 May, it raided the area north of Suning, and on 2 May attacked the area north of the Tuotuo River. However, the Eighth Route Army troops quickly dispersed and changed into plain clothes, but in the battle on the 3rd, they still suffered heavy losses.
On 1 May, Shirataki's forces (attached to Sakamoto's detachment) besieged the area on the north bank of the Yulong River and the north bank of the Kidaogou River, and on the 2nd attacked the area north of Anping, but the main force of the Eighth Route Army quickly broke through to the east and south. Some of them lurk scattered in civilian clothes. To this end, the Japanese army began to advance to the north bank of the Tuotuo River on the 3rd (referring to Xingyi Town, Shenze, near the new camp), and dispersed the deployment of troops to carry out a comprehensive sweep.
At the same time , the 9th Independent Mixed Brigade , with the 13th Cavalry Regiment Yamazaki , attacked the area south of Shideok road. From May 5 to 9, Xiaochuan's troops used Hejian and Suning as their bases to "sweep" the Ziya River and the area on the north bank of the Tuotuo River. The 110th Cavalry Brigade (Captain Kajima Takenasa) "swept" near Wuji. All units of the Japanese army also comprehensively searched the lurking Eighth Route Army and weapons and materials, and organized villagers to "report and arrest" the cadres of the Eighth Route Army. To enhance intelligence gathering. Before the war, the Japanese army in North China set up an intelligence station in Shimen, and on May 4, it set up a combat command post here.
However, the Japanese army on the banks of the Shahe River and the Mudaogou River was met with local militiamen relying on traffic trenches and heroic resistance in the tunnels, and even young and old women actively participated in the war. Japan's war history said that this area was "known as a model area of the CPC Plain Base Area" and "extremely difficult when carrying out the work of rectification." The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., The North China Public Security War (Part II), pp. 154-155.
When the Japanese army tried to strengthen the blockade line of the Fuyang River, the organs of the Jizhong Military Region active on the west bank of the Fuyang River had begun to move outward. Because on May 7, it was found that the water level of the Fuyang River had risen. This meant that the Japanese lowered the sluice gates of the dam near Xiaofan Town, which hindered the rise of the Fuyang River level above the town. Therefore, the organs of the Jizhong Military Region and the accompanying units took advantage of the fact that the Japanese army's encirclement and sweeping had not yet begun, and on the night of May 8, they unknowingly crossed the Fuyang River near the south of Xiaofan Town and entered the area east of the Fuyang River and the Ziya River, jumping out of the encirclement circle of the second phase of the Japanese army's operation. This was the weakest point in the Japanese encirclement, and successfully opened the breakthrough. This also made the Japanese army's plan to encircle and annihilate the main forces of the Hebei Central Military Region never come to fruition. "Materials of the People's Anti-Japanese Struggle in Jizhong", no. 43, page 108, contains "The Leading Organs of Jizhong in the 'May Day Anti-Sweeping'".
On May 3, 1 and a half companies and 30 militiamen of the Security Brigade of the Jizhong Military Region won a victory in Baizhuang Village, east of Fukasawa City, killing and wounding more than 400 people below the enemy's Jinteng Wing Commander. From May 1 to 23, two companies of the Eighth Route Army, coordinated by the militia, repelled four enemy attacks at the village of Zhaohu between Wuji and Dingxian counties, and won the victory of killing and wounding more than 250 enemy soldiers. History of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, Military Science Publishing House, 1986
Militia of the Jizhong Military Region, guerrillas
Sixth, the "anti-sweeping" policy of the Central Hebei Military Region is wrong
The Japanese army in North China may carry out a large-scale "sweep" of the Jizhong Military Region. The Eighth Route Army in western Hebei preemptively attacked Li County, Boye, and Anguo in the southeast of Gaoyang on the night of April 26. After the "May Day Purge" began, Nie Rongzhen ordered all the troops in western Hebei to counterattack with all their might. Among them, the Yang Chengwu Department of the 1st Military Sub-district launched a large-scale offensive in the southwest of Yi County. However, it was counterattacked by the garrison of the 101st Division, which did not affect the situation of the battle. The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part II), p. 155.
Facing the Japanese offensive. The Jizhong Military Region did not suffer a major blow at the beginning of the campaign. Soon, however, under the influence of the Pacific War, he put forward the general policy of opposing "sweeping" and "launching armed self-defense of the whole people, launching a widespread and all-round guerrilla war, and carrying out comprehensive adherence." On the one hand, it is required to preserve the manpower and force of the military and civilians as much as possible to avoid the destruction of the enemy of 'sweeping'. On the other hand, it is necessary to seize all possibilities to actively hold up the position in order to destroy the enemy"; ordered that "the main force, except for the necessary part of the scattered insistence, should quickly jump out of the outer line, reach out to the key points of the anti-'sweeping' operation and the gaps behind the enemy's back, and actively attack the main point line"; and demarcate the targets of the attack of each division as follows: "The motou, Hengshui, Shulu, Shenxian, Ningjin, and Shide lines of the sixth division are: "The dingxian, Anguo, Xibocao, Xinle, Ding'an line and the Pinghan line From Xinle to Dingxian (Zhengdingbei)" of the seventh sub-district are "Cangxian and Qingxian of the eighth sub-district." , Wen'an, Xinzhen, Dacheng and Jinpu, Pingbao, Jinbao lines"; "Raoyang, Renqiu, Suning, Wangdu, Zhangdeng, GaobaoLi Line and Pinghan Line (Baoding to Dingxian County) of the Ninth Subdistrict"; "The Tenth District actively took the opportunity to advance towards the Daqing River and blasted the Beining Road one after another". In addition, "plainclothesers were heavily used in all divisions, forming demolition teams to carry out flying blasting to important point lines". "Selected Historical Documents of Jizhong" (Part I) in "The Cpc Central Hebei District Party Committee, Jizhong Military Region's Countermeasures for the Enemy's "Sweeping" of Jizhong and Me", May 7, 1942, pp. 638-640.
The Jizhong Military Region prejudged the second-step combat areas of the Japanese army, Shenxian County, Wuqiang, Raoyang and Anping, as the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Eighth Military Subdistricts of the Jizhong Military Region. According to the principle of external operations determined before the sweep of the Jizhong Military Region and the judgment of the enemy situation at this time, most of the main forces of the sixth sub-district scattered out of the estimated Japanese army's combined attack circle in advance, leaving the local armed forces to persist. However, Wang Changjiang, commander of the Sixth Subdistrict, in order to preserve the base area, still decided to lead a battalion of the main force regiment to stay in the Shennan base area. Most of the main forces of the Eighth Division also scattered out of the outer line, and the 30th Regiment of the Liuji Cadre Regiment and the local armed forces insisted on the central area. The party and government leading organs of all counties have persisted in counter-sweeping on the spot, and some county party committees have also put forward the slogan of "the district does not leave the district, and the county does not leave the county." In addition, the cavalry regiment of the Jizhong Military Region is also responsible for internal combat tasks. Li Bingxin edited "Blood In the Middle", p. 222
To sum up, the Jizhong Military Region was in the general policy of "counter-sweeping" in the early days. It was planned to rush the main force out of the outer line and break through the Japanese strongholds and communication lines. A small number of regular troops remain to fight local armed forces. However, the Japanese army had long been prepared for a counter-offensive and had taken a dual military and political offensive against the base areas in an attempt to completely destroy the Jizhong Military Region.
The Eighth Route Army fought
VI. Phase II (11-15 May)
At this time, the special intelligence department of the Japanese army in North China was still unable to determine the direction of the main force of the Eighth Route Army in Jizhong Province, and the situation learned was: "The headquarters of each army are unpredictable, and it does not take more than 3 days to be in the same place." Whether or not the enemy forces are indeed located in the area of operation is a matter of the greatest concern to the Front, but its movement is unknown." On May 7, the Japanese 27th Division sent an urgent telegram to the North China Front: "Comprehensively study and judge various intelligence, the main force of the enemy army in the triangle is gradually evading and moving to its northeast area." Therefore, the front army must change its battle plan, transfer the 41st Division to Tianjin, and encircle and annihilate the enemy army in the ziya river, Renqiu, and Hejian areas. In this regard, after comprehensively analyzing various intelligence, the General Staff Of the North China Front judged that "the enemy in the triangle seems to have been shaken by the prediction of our operational intentions, and the troops and residents have indeed moved, but the main force of the military region is still in the triangle, so the second phase of operational policy does not need to be changed." At the same time, in order to prevent the Eighth Route Army from breaking through, the North China Front ordered Xiaochuan's troops to "hold the main crossing point of the Yang River north of xiaofan town and Xiaofan town, and search for enemies who tried to escape and capture and annihilate them", and the cavalry wing "quickly assembled at Shulu and began to move in the 8th Qing Dynasty to hold the line of the Long (Fu) Yang River between Xiaofan Town and Hengshui". According to the order, Ogawa's troops and cavalry companies began to operate after the night of the 7th. The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part II), pp. 156-157.
Based on the above situation, the second phase of the Operation Of the Japanese Army in North China was conceived: "To enable Shirataki, Ogawa's troops, and the 13th Cavalry Regiment (Yamazaki's unit) to blockade the lower reaches of the Hutuo River from the south of Fuze and the lower reaches of the Fuyang River from Hengshui, and at the same time to enable the 41st Division to use Shide Road on the night of the 10th to rapidly transport troops to Xinji, Hengshui, and from dawn on the 11th, first annihilate the enemy forces in the southeastern area of Shenxian County, and successively annihilate the enemy troops in the southwestern area of Anping, as well as the enemy troops in Shenxian and the area east of Anping County." To this end, the 9th Independent Mixed Brigade regiment was organized into Ikegami Unit (3 infantry brigades, Sakamoto Detachment, and 2 infantry brigades of Shirataki Unit) and Ogawa and Yamazaki, all under the command of the 41st Division.
At dawn on May 11, the Okumura forces (the 41st Infantry Regiment Commander Major General Okumura Hanji commanded 6 infantry brigades as the backbone) set out along the Shide Road to attack the Eighth Route Army in the southeast of Shenxian County. Ikegami's forces encircled the southwestern part of Anping. The 110th Division, which was tasked with blockade, also reinforced Shirataki's troops in order to intercept the Eighth Route Army's retreat to the western mountains. At this time, the Eighth Route Army had dispersed in civilian clothes and quickly got rid of the "sweep" of the Japanese army. The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part II), p. 157.
Subsequently, on the 12th and 13th, the 41st Division ordered Ao Cun and Chishang to repeatedly "sweep" the northeast area of the road from Wuqiang to Anping; the internal troops of the Jizhong Military Region that insisted on Shen County and other places were squeezed into raoyang and Wuqiang counties. In the immediate operation of the Japanese army to divide the hinterland of the Jizhong base area and divide the area, the upper line troops in the Jizhong military area were attacked by the Japanese army. In the early morning of 12 July, the Japanese army "set out from various strongholds along the Cangshi Road, marched into separate routes, and 'encircled' us from the east of Shen'an Road, west of the Fuyang River, north of the Cangshi Road, and south of the Tuotuo River." At the end of the day, the cavalry regiment "three or four hundred commanders and fighters died heroically." Li Bingxin, Blood In The Middle, p. 223.
On the 14th and 15th, the Japanese army again focused on the northeast of Shenxian County and the Anping area. At the same time, the two troops of Ogawa and Yamazaki were ordered to "sweep" the area on the north bank of the Tuotuo River. By the 15th, the second phase of operations was completed, and preparations were made to begin the third phase of operations. Japanese war history records that "2299 enemy corpses were captured and 9525 people were captured." The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part II), p. 158.
The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency compiled "North China Public Security War" (Part 2) contains the deployment of the Eighth Route Army in Hebei
Seventh, the third phase of the first phase of the operation (May 16-25) and the jizhong military region's anti-Qing suppression failed
However, at this time, there was a saying within the Jizhong Military Region that "the Japanese army's great purge was about to end", and in the information received from Tianjin, Baoding and other large and medium-sized cities, rumors of the assassination of the Japanese emperor appeared. Coupled with the misjudgment of the international situation, the Jizhong Military Region had the illusion that the main force of the Japanese army in North China had retreated. Hebei Provincial CPPCC Literature and History Data Research Office: Hebei Literature and History Materials, Vol. 1, "Memories of the 'May Day' Anti-Sweeping in Hebei", Hebei People's Publishing House, 1980, p. 44.
On May 15, the Jizhong Military Region issued an anti-Qing and suppression order, saying that "except for one part of the main force that still remains in the basic area and a small number of organs have not been able to jump out, most of them have been released from the encirclement, and our counter-encirclement has achieved initial results." "The German summer offensive against the Soviet Union has begun, and there is a possibility that the Japanese and the Soviet Union may launch a northward advance to cooperate." Therefore, there is a more urgent and rapid trend of 'sweeping' against me." The key to proposing the anti-Qing and suppression lies in "preserving cadres, preserving local lower-level organizations, and preserving young and middle-aged people" and "strengthening rural unity"; "The main force on the outer line is not scattered activities, but concentrates a certain number of troops to attack important towns and lines of communication." On the other hand, the Jizhong Military Region remained vigilant against the Japanese army. Considering that the Japanese army "may return to the outer line to regroup and encircle the air because of its joint encirclement," the Jizhong Military Region positioned the current stage as "in the period when the enemy is preparing to encircle again and turn into a 'clearance and suppression'" and reminds all military sub-districts to "prepare to oppose the enemy's re-encirclement and 'clearance and suppression'". The Research Office of the Party Committee of Hebei Province of the Communist Party of China, ed., Selected Historical Documents of Central Hebei (Part I), in Instructions of the Party Committee of the Central Hebei Party Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Region of Hebei Province on The Anti-Enemy "Liquidation and Suppression", May 25, 1942, pp. 647-649.
The Japanese began the first phase of the third phase of operations on May 16. Judging that "the Chinese Communists intend to hold on to the end and disperse and lurk and try to resist strongly," it was decided to concentrate the main force on "sweeping" the core area of the Hebei Central Military Region in an attempt to capture the main forces of the Hebei Central Military Region and completely destroy the base areas. Its body is arranged as follows:
1, the 41st Division (with the same unit as the former) 'swept' the triangle of the Tuotuo River, long (Fu) Yang River and Shide Railway; The Shiretaki and Ogawa troops used the Gaoyang and Raoyang lines as the ground line to 'sweep' the area north of the Tuotuo River."
2, the 27th Division searched for enemy groups expected to flee from The Qiu side (southeast of Baiyangdian) and tried to annihilate them in a hurry.
3. Moreover, the Japanese army judged that the Eighth Route Army in the triangle was compressed to the southeast of Shenxian County, and the 41st Division was planned to launch an attack on the 23rd.
On May 20, the Japanese army "swept through Qingxian and Jianguo areas outside The Central Hebei District. Beginning on the same day, the units of the Eighth Route Army in western Hebei and the southern Hebei Military Region carried out all-round attacks on various parts of Beijing, Han, and Shide to cooperate with the Jizhong Military Region in combat. However, due to the full preparation of the 110th Division, no important results were obtained.
On May 23, the troops of the Sixth Division, which had returned to the base area, were attacked by the Japanese in Shennan. The Eighth Route Army skillfully used the tactic of "clutch distribution" to comprehensively disperse the lurking, and flexibly and maneuvered to block the enemy with the tactics of three strikes (attack, flank attack, tail attack) and three speeds (quick battle, quick retreat, and quick decision). The history of the Japanese army said: "The enemy's action was agile, and it was not easy to capture it at the beginning, but there were unexpected encounters everywhere, and there were also strongholds to defend the enemy, which carried out stubborn resistance, and the 'sweeping' battle on the 24th achieved considerable results." After several days of bitter fighting, it was compressed into the southeast region of Shenxian County. Also on the same day, the large area of Renhe, which is located on the outskirts of the core area of the Jizhong base area, was also "swept up" by the Japanese army, and suffered a lot of losses. The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part II), pp. 158-159.
At the same time, the external counterattack of the Jizhong Military Region was not smooth. After May 15, the Seventh Sub-district of the Jizhong Military Region concentrated some troops to attack the Japanese army's towns and communication lines three times, and the result was that the first "unsuccessful attack on Dingxian County and the destruction of a bridge over the enemy's Chengguan" were carried out; the second time, it was attacked by the enemy garrisons of Handan, Dongchangshou, Zhaili, and Nanmeng on the same day. Guild Wars Day... After dusk, he was forced to return to my original central area"; the third time was also attacked by several Japanese strongholds, "fierce fighting until dusk... Forced to retreat back to my original central area." Pages 67-68 of the 24th issue of "Materials on the Anti-Japanese Struggle of the People of Jizhong" contains "Review of the May Day Anti-"Sweeping" of the Seventh District of Jizhong District.
On May 25, the second phase of the third phase of the Japanese army was completed. The second phase of operations began on the 26th.
The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency compiled "The North China Public Security War" (Part 2) contains illustrations of the operations in Hebei
VIII. Phase III Phase II Operations (May 26-June 20)
The Japanese army in North China decided to "take into account that there are still remnants of the enemy lurking in the triangle and continue to swim, and at the same time the enemy on the outskirts has also responded to the situation of foolish movements," and decided to mainly attack "the enemy forces in the central Hebei region, which is mainly south of the line of Cangxian, Gaoyang, and Wangdu, especially to carry out the work of clearing the base area facilities in the triangle zone, and at the same time to build stronghold bunkers, partition trenches, and other facilities, and vigorously carry out various construction work closely integrated with this", and planned to carry out 15 days. To this end, the Japanese army set up the "Zhenbo Special Administrative Region", which had jurisdiction over 22 counties in Jizhong, and the 41st Division regiment guarded the area; the Shirataki unit and the Ogawa unit were restored to the establishment and the 110th And 27th Division regiment was reassigned to participate in the battle.
The 41st Division "swept" the area south of Shide Road, repelled the troops of the Ji'nan Military Region near Zaoqiang on June 11-13, claiming to be "the result of 172 corpses of the enemy army", and then returned to the area north of Shide Road to continue "sweeping". In addition, the independent mixed 8th Brigade repulsed the troops of the Jizhong Military Region in the area north of Wei County on June 12. In this battle, the puppet army also participated in the battle. Most importantly, on the 15th, 400 guards from ZhendingDao participated in the operation near Wuji. The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part II), pp. 159-160.
In the third phase of the operation, another important purpose of the Japanese army was to carry out political clearance and suppression of the base areas in order to undermine the organization and influence of the CPC, the government, the military, and the civilian organizations at all levels. To this end, while building roads and pillars on a large scale and dividing up the base areas, the Japanese army vigorously searched for cadres of the Eighth Route Army and hidden weapons and materials, and established pseudo-organizations. He also divided the Eighth Route Army and the common people under the slogans of "only attacking the Eighth Route Army, not the common people," "the Eighth Route Army in the wilderness, and the ordinary people in the villages," and "it is the ordinary people who participate in the rallies and the Eighth Route Army that hides at home." Due to the lack of ideological, organizational, and political preparations in Jizhong District, it has caused great damage to the grass-roots organizations of the CPC in Jizhong District. On June 4, the Party Committee of Jizhong District instructed the local party committees that "the most dangerous thing today is that many of our district and village cadres are crawling alone in the kiln (the masses have generally returned to the village), shouting struggle in vain, or ignoring the consciousness and practical difficulties of the masses, but only cursing the masses, while the village is in a situation of being leaderless." The Research Office of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee of the Communist Party of China, ed., Selected Historical Documents in Central Hebei (Part I), in Preliminary Summary of the Eighth Route Army and the Hebei Central Military Region on the May 1st Anti-"Sweeping", July 1942, p. 697.
Soon the Jizhong Military Region was in trouble. According to Yan Jingbo, then secretary of the Wuqiang County CPC Committee in the Jizhong base area, he recalled: "The maintenance of the notice to send intelligence, some came to intercede: 'The devils know that they will kill and burn the whole village, and the common people will suffer, and you will not bear it in your hearts.'" "In the face of a strong enemy, some comrades lost confidence in the victory of the War of Resistance, some of them hid in their strongholds or went home to hide, and some led their troops to surrender to the enemy." Li Bingxin, Blood In The Middle, pp. 137-138.
Second, the Japanese army simultaneously "swept up" in the hinterland and periphery of the base area, which greatly reduced the space for the activities of the troops of the Jizhong Military Region. In its post-war summary, the Jizhong Military Region said that after the end of the second phase of the Japanese army's operation, it "launched a joint attack on the outer line, established temporary strongholds everywhere, and used continuous attacks and dragnet-style combined attacks against the main force that transferred us out of the outer line in an attempt to echo with the strength of its internal encirclement and suppression... The conspiracy has no place for our army to gain a foothold inside and no respite from the outside." The Research Office of the Party Committee of Hebei Province of the Communist Party of China, ed., Selected Historical Documents of Central Hebei (Part I), in Preliminary Summary of the Eighth Route Army and the Central Hebei Military Region on the "May Day" Anti-"Sweeping", July 1942, p. 696.
At the same time, there were difficulties in the logistics supply of the troops of the Hebei Central Military Region. In addition, the ammunition distributed before the war was extremely limited, and there were not many bullets left in the Battle of Lee Ka Kok on 23 May, and the soldiers had to fight with bricks. In addition, the topographical environment in Jizhong has been unfavorable to the large-scale mobile operations of the Eighth Route Army. "Since late May and below, our base area has been gradually divided by the enemy's pillbox ditches, and the enemy's pillboxes have gradually formed an infantry firepower connection. Our army is thus surrounded by enemy tactics." Moreover, "the enemy destroyed most of the trenches I dug in 1938." In addition, the intelligence and communication system of the Jizhong Military Region has been laid down, and communication between superior and subordinate levels has been often interrupted, seriously affecting operations. Even radio communication is difficult to guarantee. Telegrams were often not sent and received on time, resulting in command at all levels being completely unaware of the battle situation. The Research Office of the Party Committee of Hebei Province of the Communist Party of China, ed., Selected Historical Documents of Central Hebei (Part I), in Preliminary Summary of the Eighth Route Army and the Central Hebei Military Region on the "May Day" Anti-"Sweeping", July 1942, p. 696. "Materials of the People's Anti-Japanese Struggle in Jizhong", no. 42, page 141, contains "Memories of the Intelligence Work of the 7th Sub-district of the Jizhong Military Region during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression".
The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency compiled the "North China Public Security War" (Part 2) contains a map of the deployment of the Japanese army's combat troops in Hebei
Nine. The Jizhong Military Region completely retreated, and the Japanese army stopped "sweeping"
In the face of the crisis, the leading organs of the Jizhong Military Region finally made it clear that "Jizhong is the base behind the enemy's northward advance, and the enemy wants to ensure that it has the determination," that the Japanese army "has repeatedly attacked our main forces and organs, leaving me with no foothold and no chance to breathe," and that "the seriousness of the current situation is beyond the short-term opening up, so our policy, in addition to not giving up everything that may be used to struggle against the enemy, must do everything possible to preserve our strength and wait for the opportunity." The Research Office of the Party Committee of Hebei Province of the Communist Party of China, ed., Selected Historical Documents of Central Hebei (Part I), in Instructions of the Party Committee of the Central Hebei Region of the Communist Party of China and the Central Hebei Military Region on Upholding the Work of Central Hebei Province, May 31, 1942, pp. 650-651.
On June 1, 1942, the Jizhong Military Region sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, and the main forces of the Jizhong Military Region were ready to be transferred. On June 4, the Jizhong Military Region ordered that "the troops of all military sub-districts should be transferred to the south of Hebei and the west of The Road" and that "they should draw up their own routes and set their own time for movement." However, on June 8, the headquarters of the Eighth Division was attacked by the Japanese army in the village of Xue in Suning, and the commander Chang Deshan and the political commissar Wang Yuanyin were killed. On June 12, the head organ of the Jizhong Military Region was surrounded by the Japanese army in The history of Ji'nanwei County, and insisted until night to successfully break through the Japanese encirclement at night and turned to the Taihang Mountains. Other troops also suffered significant losses. The Research Office of the Party Committee of Hebei Province of the Communist Party of China edited: "Selected Historical Documents in Central Hebei" (Part I) contains "Instructions of Lü Zhengcao and Others on Insisting on the Preservation of Living Forces in the Region", June 4, 1942, pp. 655-656. Lu Zhengcao's Memoirs of Jizhong, p. 219.
At this time, the Japanese command system also found that "the enemy's decline was significant, so it was judged that the enemy army would leave the base area to carry out swimming, and was now facing a comprehensive dilemma", so it extended the second phase of the third phase of the operation to June 21. After June 20, some Japanese troops began to withdraw, and the 41st Division was transferred to combat alert in the Central Hebei region, fully dispersed, repairing pillars, building roads and digging trenches. The "May Day anti-sweeping" ended this time. The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part 2), p. 161.
10. The results of the "May Day Anti-Sweeping" campaign and the controversy over the Songzhuang battle
In summary, the japanese army in North China made very good preparations for the "May Day Sweep" before the war, not only deciphering the secret code and obtaining a large amount of intelligence from the Jizhong Military Region. Large partition trenches and bunker strongholds were also built. It has seriously hindered the support of the Jizhong Military Region in the jidong and western hebei base areas. At the same time, in order to prevent the Eighth Route Army from jumping to the outside line to counterattack and the counterattack of the Eighth Route Army in western Hebei, the 110th Division and the 27th Division regiment were deployed to conduct a garrison operation. As a result, the counterattacks of the Hebei Western Military Region and the Hebei Central and Outer Fronts failed to meet expectations.
Tactically, the dual military and political offensive was adopted, which caught the Jizhong Military Region by surprise; it lost the support of the people. At the same time, the communication between the various departments of the Eighth Route Army was cut off. Coupled with the influence of blindly optimistic erroneous ideas and wartime misinformation within the Eighth Route Army before the war. As a result, the "anti-sweeping" policy of the Hebei Central Military Region has been repeatedly wrong, resulting in the entire operation being completely at a disadvantage.
The Japanese combat strength reached more than 17,000 people, plus the total strength of the cooperative operation was about 20,000 people. In contrast, the regular troops of the Jizhong Military Region only had 14,000 people, and there was a shortage of ammunition before the war, and in the repeated "crusades" of the Japanese army before the war, the losses were not small, and its combat space was also compressed. Totally at a disadvantage. However, fortunately, in order to support the Battle of Zhejiang and Gansu, the Japanese army was under-invested, and the Jizhong Military Region always insisted on dispersing and evading, waiting for opportunities to attack and harass, so that the Japanese army never captured the main force. This was summed up by the chief of staff of the 110th Division of the Japanese Army after the war, and proposed that "although the 110th Division and the 27th Division are equipped with 1-2 independent mixed brigades, the Jizhong Military Region has always occupied the middle area." The above two units are unable to expand the "sweeping area" due to insufficient troops and the vast area occupied. The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part II), p. 164.
Shigeo Suzuki, a staff officer of the 41st Division, recalled: "The Battle of Jizhong was an authentic political war. The enemy "sweeps" our armed forces, focusing on evasion, striving to preserve strength and waiting for an opportunity to attack or ambush. On the other hand, underground party members were sent to secretly infiltrate the New People's Association, the organs of the new government, the railway bureaus, and schools, etc., to win comrades from them, and deliberately create incidents of corruption and bribery, so as to undermine the prestige of the new government and alienate the people's hearts. Or in school education, on the one hand, the Xinmin textbooks are taught, and on the other hand, the anti-Japanese ideology and communism are extremely cleverly and stubbornly propagated. What's more, leaflets were distributed to the Japanese troops in our watchtowers or used loudspeakers to carry out anti-war work. The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part 2), p. 166.
Therefore, in addition to constantly carrying out crusades and political construction, our side also launched the New People's Movement by exposing and denouncing infiltrators of the communist work class, and carrying out the work of separating the bandits, and through the activities of the propaganda class. However, it is not easy for us to expand the circle of influence around the 'points and lines' it occupies." pp. 166-167.
In terms of the results of the "May Day anti-sweeping campaign," there is a big gap in the history of the Sino-Japanese war. Japan's war history declares that the enemy army "in addition to the Baiyangdian, Wen'an area still has a slightly more powerful group of bandits swimming, in the Third Combat Zone there are only a few remnants (at most 100 people)", "9098 corpses were abandoned, 5197 prisoners, and 20568 suspects", "the number of engagements was 286 times, and the enemy's strength was 58338". The Japanese army only "killed 161 (including 9 officers) and wounded 323 (including 14 officers)". That is, the Eighth Route Army suffered more than 14,000 casualties, and the Japanese suffered nearly 500 casualties. Obviously mixed with the number of casualties among the people, Japan's war history also deliberately concealed the massacre of the people in the base areas of Hebei. The War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, ed., North China Public Security War (Part II), pp. 161-162.
The author of the history of domestic warfare found two versions, the main force of the Jizhong Military Region "suffered 4671 casualties, the district and county guerrillas lost more than 5300 people, were killed, and the masses were captured up to 50,000 or 60,000 people", "killed 3891 officers and men below the japanese puppet army Sakamoto wing commander, and wounded 7521 officers and men below the japanese puppet army plus island brigade leader". That is, the Eighth Route Army and the militia, the guerrillas suffered more than 10,000 casualties, and killed and wounded 11,000 Japanese puppet troops. The mention here of the killing of the Japanese puppet army commander Sakamoto is explicitly referred to the Battle of Songzhuang. On page 17 of the 24th issue of "Materials on the People's Anti-Japanese Struggle in Jizhong", Gao Cunxin's "Jizhong Military Region Smashed the Japanese Kou " May Day " Great "Sweep" to Tide Over the Difficulties and Win Victory." According to the Propaganda Department of the General Political Department of the Eighth Route Army, "The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression," people's publishing house, page 156 of the 1953 edition, recorded that the military and people of Jizhong fought more than 270 battles and killed and wounded more than 11,000 Japanese puppet troops in the entire "May Day Anti-Sweeping Campaign."
It should be noted that the domestic announcement of the killing and wounding of more than 11,000 Japanese puppet troops included the puppet army. As far as the Historical Data of China and Japan as far as I have been concerned, the Eighth Route Army was completely on its back in the entire operation, and with the exception of the Battle of Songzhuang, it did not achieve greater annihilation results. Therefore, it is inferred that the Eighth Route Army could not achieve a 1:1.1 result, and the number of Japanese casualties alone should not exceed more than a thousand.
Domestic Songzhuang battle comic strip
Regarding the Battle of Songzhuang, it is worth noting that the Platon War History Materials were used in the War History Office of the Japanese Defense Agency, "North China Public Security War". Among them is the historical record of the battle of Songzhuang (that is, the ambush said): "On June 9, two companies of our army prepared an ambush at Songzhuang, 15 kilometers northeast of Shenze. A few days ago, in the battle of Baizhuang southeast of Songzhuang, more than 400 enemy were killed and wounded, and the captain of the Sugazawa Brigade was killed. On the 9th, about 30 meters in front of the northeast front of Songzhuang, the new commander of the Jibo Special Area, the commander of the Sakamoto Brigade, and 300 guards were completely annihilated. "The people's liberation army of Chinese during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression", July 1953 edition, People's Publishing House.
In addition, the author found another version (repelled): On June 9, 1942, more than 200 people of our army repelled more than 30 attacks by more than 2,500 enemy troops in Songzhuang, Shenze County, killing more than 600 officers and men below the commander of the Japanese Banben Brigade, and killing and wounding more than 200 puppet troops. One squadron leader and 7 morale members of the Japanese army who survived the battle of Songzhuang committed suicide due to depression. This battle is an example of the victory of our army in the plains villages. The Academy of Military Sciences' collection of "Brilliant Guerrilla Warfare" is published in the Songzhuang Battle Detailed Report, p. 233. The Military History Research Department of the Academy of Military Sciences, "The War History of the Chinese People's Liberation Army", vol. 2, p. 321.
However, there was a conflict with the "Materials of the People's Anti-Japanese Struggle in Jizhong" which recorded the killing of the commander of the Japanese puppet army Sakamoto. In addition, I was in the Japanese Defense Agency's War History Office, "North China Public Security War (Part 2)" 1982, 1st edition, pages 133-135, to see the 1942 North China Japanese Army formation, did not find Itamoto or Major General Sakamoto Brigade Commander/Wing Commander. It is certain that the Eighth Route Army did not kill it in Songzhuang, the commander of the Brigade of Major General Itamoto or Major General Sakamoto. Based on the sources of the above two different versions of the Songzhuang battle, I believe that the history of the Songzhuang battle recorded in the "Brilliant Guerrilla Warfare" of the Academy of Military Sciences in the "Detailed Report on the Battle of Songzhuang" and the "History of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" of the Military History Research Department of the Academy of Military Sciences is more credible. However, I doubt that two companies of the Eighth Route Army could achieve a victory in the face of more than a dozen troops in the plains, and under the extreme disadvantage of poor weapons and equipment, lack of ammunition, and no favorable terrain, they could achieve victory in killing and wounding more than 800 Japanese and pseudo-Japanese people. In addition, there is no such record in Japan's war history, but there is no explicit rebuttal to the war history of the People's Liberation Army.