Located in the central part of China, Henan Province is a major grain-producing and population-producing province in China. However, due to its geographical location and climate, since the beginning of the Qing Dynasty, it has often suffered some natural disasters, coupled with some historical reasons caused by man-made disasters, the local people's life can be described as miserable.
The domestic situation and background at that time
In modern history, Henan is geographically located in the monsoon fringe area of China, which is not conducive to precipitation, and drought often occurs. Moreover, located in the middle and lower reaches of the Mother River, the yellow river breach is another historical occurrence for many years, and there is a locust plague, whenever it occurs, the crops are basically grainless, and everywhere they go, they are destroyed. After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, China entered a period of warlord chaos, and various warlords fought several rounds of large-scale scuffles in order to compete for the "fat meat" of Henan, and the war caused Henan's economy to be seriously damaged. At the same time, due to the war, Henan and other places still had hundreds of thousands of troops stationed for a long time, and at that time, China's railways and other transportation were not yet developed, in order to reduce the loss of military food and personnel transportation, they chose to "take firewood on the spot", and the huge grain expenditure and conscription were pressed on Henan's head.
When the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression broke out in 1937, hundreds of thousands of Chinese anti-Japanese troops were stationed in Henan, and the supplementation of grain and grass for these hundreds of thousands of people was naturally solved by Henan Province itself. In the next five and a half years, Henan Province's contribution to military food ranked first in the country, and Li Peiji, chairman of the Henan Provincial Government, Jiang Dingwen, commander of the First Theater, and Lu Yuwen, director of the Grain Administration Bureau, were respectively responsible for the responsibilities of Henan Province's political, military, and grain administration. However, such a long period of heavy taxation and military service has gradually dried up Henan's people's and material resources, and in the years when the wind and rain are smooth, many peasants have to use wild vegetables and miscellaneous grains to survive after paying the public grain, and as for the grain reserves, it is even more impossible to talk about, even so that every year some peasants go bankrupt and flee or starve to death.
When disasters broke out in Henan in 1942, the people's lives were even more difficult to maintain. Originally, after the people of Henan at that time paid wheat as public grain, they could still rely on autumn grain to survive. However, when the second stubble of wheat was in bloom that year, the weather suddenly changed suddenly, and in the autumn, the drought and no rain led to a very poor harvest, only the second and third layers of previous years, and some areas were severely affected (locust attacks) or even no grain harvest. However, Li Peiji, the government of Henan Province at the time, did not report the matter to the government at the first time, which led to a further deterioration of the subsequent disaster.
In June 1942, Chiang Kai-shek, who knew of the drought in Henan, did not rescue Henan, but only reduced the amount of tax levied in Henan. At this time, the drought in Henan had already occurred, but the disaster had not yet broken out on a large scale, and Chiang Kai-shek did not receive any reports on the disaster in Henan during the meeting. By October, winter was approaching and temperatures were getting colder, and many victims were already on the run. The death toll has also risen sharply. If the National Government at this time began to rescue, it would be an important juncture to prevent the spread of the disaster. However, at this time, the Nationalist army began to investigate, and it was not until the end of October that the Henan disaster victims ate Guanyin soil and ate tree bark and grass roots to the National Government, and only then did they begin to provide relief to the disaster victims.
Response
At that time, the central government issued three emergency relief funds, and the Henan government raised 5 million yuan by itself, while buying 3 million kilograms of bran in Shaanxi and 10 million yuan in other places. Later, it also carried out work-for-charity in Henan. It also borrowed a lot of grain from many front-line theaters to help the victims, such as: Tang Enbo's troops borrowed 1.6 million catties of grain, and the army dieted 3 million catties. After the grain was collected, it was distributed separately, and it was required that all of them be distributed before the wheat harvest for the next year; the granaries of some large grain stores were sealed, porridge shacks were set up, and donations were organized; and relief points were set up on the way for refugees to receive them; all these measures were carried out at the same time. According to statistics, more than 558,000 refugees were rescued, 4,289 porridge factories were set up, and as many as 1.89 million disaster victims were adopted.
The Henan famine actually has little to do with the "soup disaster"
Many articles, when talking about the causes of the henan famine, attribute many reasons to Tang Enbo's atrocities in henan, such as hoarding grain, price gouging, organized adultery and a series of crimes, but the authenticity of these descriptions has yet to be examined.
1. Many people will mention the "water drought locust soup" when talking about the disaster in Henan, thinking that the soup is Tang Enbo, one of the four major harms in Henan, but it is not.
As for the tang in the "water drought locust soup", in the 1930s, Zhu Xinfan's "China's Rural Economic Relations and Its Characteristics" pointed out that the Henan people had a tradition of calling bandits "old soup", and it existed long before Tang Enbo garrisoned Henan. Moreover, the commander of the First Theater of the Henan Nationalist Army at that time was Jiang Dingwen, and Tang Enbo was only a deputy commander, and he did not know why he said "water drought locust soup" instead of "water drought locust Jiang".
Moreover, the bandit plague in Henan was still serious after the rout of the Nationalist army."
Our party has been all over China, bandits and bullies are rampant, and I am afraid that there is no one who has surpassed Henan... There were three night sentries in our station, gunshots wounded sentries, and the most recent case was solved by the landlord. After several cases of cadres being killed in the dark of night, the soldiers did not dare to go alone, and it was easier to attract bandits' plots with a single barge gun.
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"Chen Yi's Report to the Central Committee on the Comprehensive Situation in the Central Plains"
"After the founding of the People's Republic of China, 4,565 large and small battles were fought in Henan and other places, and 78,774 people were handled." -- The struggle against bandits in Henan began and ended
2. Regarding many phenomena in which the military discipline of Tombaugh's army is particularly poor, it is said that everywhere he went, he burned and plundered, and did all kinds of evil, (some say that it was to retaliate against the Red Army at that time).
It is said that Tang Enbo had a violent personality, often killed people, and the military discipline of the troops was particularly poor, basically referring to the "Memoirs of Li Zongren". But according to Chen Baoqi (who went to Tangbu in 1942 to participate in the special cadre training class, the class teacher was Tang Enbo. Later, when he joined the Communist Party of China, he was promoted to the rank of deputy director of the Guizhou Provincial Electronics Bureau, and was treated at the level of a full-time official) recalled, "During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, I was in Henan for a year and a half, and as far as I can see, the military style and discipline of Tang Enbo's troops were strict, and Tang Enbo was extremely strict, because he committed the crime of embezzlement, and in one day he shot a colonel regimental commander and a major general Gao Shen, which I saw with my own eyes" ("Review of the Years of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression", The Ninth Series of Tieling Literature and History Materials). Moreover, there are many deviations in the "Memoirs of Tombaugh" and are different from the memoirs of other generals of the National Army, so the author prefers to think that this view is mostly rumored. Moreover, it is also said that Tang Enbo was disarmed by the peasants, but in fact, Jiang Dingwen's troops were also disarmed, and it was not necessarily the peasants who disarmed, and many of the bandits in Henan at that time were also "half peasants and half bandits." At the same time, Tang Enbo has been stationed in Hubei, Henan, Shanxi, Jiangsu, and other regions, why only Henan has a "soup disaster", other regions do not have this statement.
Therefore, the Great Famine in Henan and Tang Enbo's troops actually have little to do with each other, and it is more the concealment of Li Peiji, the governor of Henan Province, that has led to the expansion of the disaster, and it should bear the main responsibility.