During the Liberation War, after experiencing the three major battles in Jiangbei, the Kuomintang army was already facing an overall disadvantage. The lack of elite troops has made Chiang Kai-shek have fewer and fewer cards in his hands. The offensive and defensive momentum between the Kuomintang and the Communists was volatile, and the Kuomintang army could only carry out a comprehensive defensive stage and carry out the final stubborn resistance.
It was only with the advance of the Battle of the Crossing River that the southern defense line of the Kuomintang army quickly disintegrated, so that the basic disk of its control was constantly lost. In the end, only the last enclave of the Southwest Land remained, and the Mainland Land had no possibility of overturning. For the sake of the final resistance and the expectation of the support of the US army, Chiang Kai-shek specially ordered Hu Zongnan to defend western Sichuan and stick to the remaining areas, which became his own luxury, and Hu Zongnan once again failed to live up to his trust.
When he was trapped in Xichang, Chiang Kai-shek was furious, saying that he was a sinner of the party-state and that no one could save him. Why such a situation occurred, can only be said to be Hu Zongnan's own problems, as well as the defeat of the Nationalist army, so that the old Chiang Kai-shek was completely disappointed in the nationalist generals and helpless in anger.
First, the unfavorable situation under the overall situation
The period of the War of Liberation was divided into three stages, in the early stage the Nationalist army occupied an absolutely comprehensive superiority position and was in a state of attack; in the middle period, although the strength of the troops was contracted, it was still in a dominant position and carried out a key offensive; but in the later stage, it was in a passive defense stage that was unable to do so, and the Nationalist army at this time could only be at a relative disadvantage.
In particular, the defeats in the battles of Liaoshen, Pingjin, and Huaihai caused the main force and elite of the Kuomintang to be lost and to lose control of Jiangbei. The Kuomintang can only be in the final passive state of being beaten, the advantages no longer exist, and whether it can hold the existing territory is a problem. Even Chiang Kai-shek actively mobilized the last of his forces to carry out meticulous deployment and defense.
However, the subsequent defeat in the Battle of the Crossing River, the loss of the southern defensive line and areas, the retreat or annihilation of the Nationalist army, or the surrender and uprising, so that the core ruling area of the Kuomintang collapsed and lost the last cost of resistance. Chiang Kai-shek had to retreat to Taiwan in a hurry, but he still did not want to give up the base areas in the mainland region, hoping to have a foothold and the possibility of a final flop.
Second, the strategic betrayal of the loyal generals
It's just that the building will fall, and the performance of the national army makes it very disappointed. In particular, his own loyal generals, against their own will, made the already dangerous war situation even worse. He had to reflect on the loss of mainland rule, and he was also disappointed and suspicious of his own confidants.
In particular, Hu Zongnan, himself, personally promoted the "King of the Northwest". At the time of the greatest superiority in the early stage of liberation, not only did it not completely solve the problem of our army's headquarters organs, but on the contrary, it was pinned down and constantly consumed. In the end, not only did he not fulfill the strategic purpose of old Chiang Kai-shek, but he lost the right to rule the northwest. The consequence of abandoning Xi'an is that our army has become the controller of the northwest.
Even if the northwest was lost, Lao Jiang let him stick to the southwest and put up a final resistance. Relying on the rear superiority of the Great Southwest, we will engage in a long-term battle with our army and give the nationalist army time to buffer and regain a firm foothold. Just did not expect Hu Zongnan to once again betray his trust, and the Sichuan defense line was still not defended.
Not only did chengdu be lost, but in the process of not asking for instructions, the troops were directly ordered to retreat. In the end, because of the uprising of the Yunnan nationalist army, Hu Zongnan's 300,000 northwest army was blocked in the rear road of the south retreat, and eventually his own caretaker troops were annihilated. Hu Zongnan himself could only fly to Hainan before and carry out strategic escape.
Third, the sadness of losing one's rights is not indignant
Hu Zongnan's behavior greatly angered Lao Jiang, who left his troops and fled on his own, and refused to carry out Lao Jiang's strategic deployment in the southwest. The loss of Sichuan, the big rear, is also the base of the last flop hope. Let the Kuomintang completely lose control of the mainland, and can only live in a passive defense.
Old Jiang's anger and sorrow can be imagined, and Hu Zongnan is also aware of his problems. He had to evade Chiang Kai-shek's accountability and did not dare to return to Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek also strictly ordered him to return to the front line, defend and hold firm, and give him the last chance. Hold the last territory of the southwest enclave, wait for the change of the international situation, and wait for the final counter-offensive.
It was only the passive position of the Xichang defense line, with neither strategic advantage nor geographical advantage, but the stubborn resistance psychology of the Nationalist army not willing to accept defeat. Hu Zongnan did indeed collect the remnants of the army, with a total of more than 10,000 people. Taking advantage of the fact that our army did not carry out an attack, we began to operate the consolidation of the Xichang defense line.
Fourth, succumb to the compromise of reality
It's just that all the deployment is in vain. As soon as the forward troops of our army arrived, Hu Zongnan's defensive line was broken. He was also trapped in Xichang, and if he did not flee, he himself became a prisoner. At this critical moment, Chiang Kai-shek was utterly angry, calling him a sinner of the party-state and asking everyone not to save him.
Why was this so, he lost Yan'an, Xi'an, Chengdu, even the last enclave Xichang could not hold, and all chiang kai-shek's hopes were dashed. It was only after all that Hu Zongnan was a senior general of the party-state, and in the end, under the persuasion of everyone, he could only reluctantly carry out rescue, so that he did not become a prisoner of our army. Only the troops of the Nationalist army on the mainland were also annihilated, losing the ability to balance the mainland.
Conclusion: The last "King of the Southwest" of the Nationalist Army, in his final moments, still became a fleeing general. The northwest and southwest during his reign were both because they did not implement the overall strategic situation of Chiang Kai-shek in order to protect their troops. In the end, not only did he lose his division and land, but he also lost his last capital, 300,000 troops. In the end, he was also on the verge of being captured, and it is no wonder that Old Jiang was angry and wanted to let him die in battle.