Before 1910, the Korean Peninsula, like old China, was a feudal centralized rule country, although it was "called a tribute to the Qing Dynasty", but it was The Koreans themselves who were emperors and a country with independent sovereignty.
However, after the signing of the Treaty of Annexation between Japan and Korea in 1910, the entire Korean Peninsula became a colony of the Japanese, and the entire administrative system on the peninsula was Japanese, which marked that the Koreans at that time became "slaves of the country", and the Japanese later went even more excessively, openly including the entire Korean Peninsula in Japan's national atlas.
Therefore, it is conceivable that after the Surrender of the Japanese in 1945, Koreans who had been "Japanese" for more than thirty years were eager for national liberation.
It was also in this year, in 1945, that Kim Il-sung was chosen by the Soviet military junta as the leader of North Korea.
One thing is certain here is that although the United States and the Soviet Union were divided and ruled by the "38th Line" at that time, the two sides had no intention of dividing the Korean Peninsula.
However, at that time, the Korean Peninsula was in a mess, and after the Japanese left, the entire government management system almost collapsed, and the Koreans themselves would not elect, so the United States and the Soviet Union initially thought that it would help the people on the peninsula elect a president and then establish an independent government.
The problem arose from this point, the election process was quite bumpy, the ideology of the United States and the Soviet Union was completely opposed, which led to the fact that North and South Korea were also very incompatible, and they established two political parties or regimes with the "help" of the United States and the Soviet Union, which was completely incompatible.
After the outbreak of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1947, the situation on the Korean Peninsula became even more confusing, and it was basically impossible to peacefully reunify the peninsula, and then the following year, under the "manipulation" of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Democratic Republic of Korea was established in North Korea and the Republic of Korea in South Korea, and the Korean Peninsula was completely transformed into two independent countries.
It was also at this time that a military conflict on the peninsula was inevitable, and both Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee wanted to be the "great men" who changed the history of Korea, so they were very active in promoting the reunification of the peninsula by force. It's just that in this process, Rhee is openly shouting, and Kim Il Sung is secretly preparing.
In early March 1949, under the pretext of signing an economic treaty, Kim Il Sung personally went to Moscow and met Stalin, with a very clear purpose, to report to Stalin his military plan of action, expressed his urgent desire to unify the peninsula, and sought Soviet military assistance.
However, to his disappointment, Stalin's idea at that time was that it was absolutely impossible to take the initiative to provoke war, and that you could engage in more political propaganda, create favorable public opinion, fight more guerrilla warfare, and in case a war came from the south, you would counterattack again and then win victory.
To put it simply, it means that in the international context of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union at that time, the Soviets did not want to mix this matter at all, fearing that it would provoke a "third world war", and Stalin's tendency can also be proved from several aspects.
One is that as early as the end of 1948, the Red Army simply withdrew from North Korea completely, leaving only some military advisers to North Korea, and when the Soviets withdrew, they took almost all heavy weapons, such as tanks, aircraft, artillery, etc., but left some light weapons and equipment, such as patrol boats, guns, etc.
The meaning is clear, that is, they do not want to leave Kim Il Sung with the possibility of provoking a war, and the Soviets do not want to be the "evil man" who provoked the war, so when they retired from the army, they did a very "resolute" job.
The second is that the strategic center of the Soviet Union at that time was in Europe, and the Yugoslav side was already very upset, and in the "Berlin Crisis" incident, the Soviets also chose to back down, in other words, at this time, the Soviet Union did not want to openly oppose the Americans.
If Kim Il Sung is allowed to go to war on the peninsula, it is very likely that a new conflict will be provoked between the United States and the Soviet Union, and this will not be worth the loss.
Thus, in the first half of 1949, Stalin did not support Kim Il Sung's plan for unification by force.
But dramatically, just over half a year later, at the end of January 1950, Stalin's attitude took a 180-degree turn, not only accepting Kim Il Sung's idea of unifying force, but also personally "summoning" him to Moscow, where the two discussed the operational deployment.
In other words, this matter still has a lot to do with Chinese.
In general, Stalin's "sharp turn" in attitude toward Kim Il-sung can be explained in several ways.
First, it was related to the Sino-Soviet negotiations at that time. In December 1949, Our Party Chairman Mao Zedong and his party set off from Beijing in a mighty way, and it took more than ten days by train to finally arrive in Moscow. The name was to wish Stalin a happy birthday, but in fact it was to sign a contract with the Soviet Union.
The negotiation process between China and the Soviet Union will not be elaborated on, it is very long, complicated and arduous, and the two sides once "quarreled" in the middle, in short, Mao stayed in Moscow for two months before finally signing the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance."
But the problem is that the Soviets are unhappy, they are extremely reluctant to sign, because after signing this treaty, the Soviet Union completely lost its political and economic privileges in the northeast of our country, such as the port of Dalian, the port of Lushun, the middle and long railway, the Soviet Union because of geographical, climatic and other restrictions, is very much in need of a sea outlet to the Pacific Ocean, Lushun, Dalian and several other "ice-free ports", is quite red-eyed and very dependent.
But at this point, the Soviet Union could only look elsewhere and look for other outlets to the sea, and the Korean Peninsula was a very good choice, such as Wonsan and Inchon in the middle of the peninsula, Busan and Jeju Island in the south of the peninsula, and so on.
Therefore, Stalin's sudden change of attitude toward Kim Il Sung at this time has to be said to have a lot to do with this matter.
Second, it has something to do with the revolutionary situation in China.
We all know that at the beginning of 1950, the whole country was basically liberated, except for a small number of Kuomintang remnants in the southwest, and in addition to the coastal areas, there were still several islands that had not been liberated, and the CCP's reunification of the whole country was already the general trend.
The excellent situation of the victory of the Chinese revolution gave Stalin a great deal of "face" and "confidence" to a certain extent, and at the same time created an excellent atmosphere in the international arena favorable to the socialist camp.
Third, it is related to a series of actions by the United States. After the Soviet Union withdrew from the soviet army at the end of 1948, the US army also retired in 1949, and by the end of 1949, the US army completely withdrew from South Korea, and the United States also followed the example of the Soviet Union, taking away all heavy weapons when it retired, leaving only a few hundred advisers to Syngman Rhee.
What made the Soviets feel "a stone fell to the ground" was that around January 1950, from President Truman to MacArthur to Secretary of State Acheson, they all publicly stated on different occasions that the U.S. defense line in Asia did not include North Korea.
Therefore, Stalin can boldly speculate at this time that the Americans will not intervene in the war on the Korean Peninsula, so as long as the US military does not intervene and "allows" The North and South Korea to fight on their own, Kim Il Sung is still very likely to win, after all, he has three divisions under his command, all of which have experienced China's War of Resistance Against Japan, and are all troops trained by Lin Biao, so the combat effectiveness cannot be underestimated.
Therefore, the combination of these aspects prompted Stalin to change his original opposition and support Kim Il Sung's battle plan.
On January 30, 1950, he commissioned the soviet ambassador to Korea at the time, a man named Shtekov, to convey to Kim Il Sung, "I am ready to receive him and meet with him." Please tell Kim Il Sung about this and tell him that I am ready to help him in this matter. ”
In early April 1950, Kim Il-sung rushed to Moscow, held close talks with Stalin, negotiated a military battle plan, and two months later the Korean War officially broke out.