"This is the eternal shame and scars of our American military and american nation."
This was the heartfelt remark made by a mainland reporter in 2015 when he interviewed a West Point military academy officer. At the time, a reporter who was visiting West Point asked the officer: "Why do you rarely mention the Korean War, it seems to be a war that you have forgotten?" ”
At the same time, the officer's colleague also sighed faintly: In fact, after carefully analyzing this war, I personally do not think that the defeat of the US army to the Chinese army with a commander like Mao Zedong and a commander like Peng Dehuai is a shameful thing.
The top echelons of the U.S. military, who are still secretive about the Korean War, really should listen to these West Point officers.
In fact, in that battle for the founding of new China, it was the perfect cooperation of Chairman Mao, Peng Dehuai, and other front-line generals that made the indomitable Americans suffer terribly.
In the previous issues, the author has already told you a lot about President Peng's presence on the front line, and what I am telling you in this issue is Chairman Mao's foresight in this war.
We can see this from a conversation between Chairman Mao and Kim Il Sung in December 1950. Recalling this conversation, I hope that our young people can understand a very practical question: How Chairman Mao and his old people viewed Americans back then!
One: Kim Il Sung hurriedly arrived, and Chairman Mao woke him up with a word
On December 3, 1950, Kim Il Sung rushed to Beijing at great risk.
Why did he come at this time? The reasons are many, but one thing cannot be ignored. At that time, the Chinese Volunteer Army had already won the first battle of entering the DPRK, and the Battle of Chosin Lake, an important part of the second campaign, had also been carried out until the 7th day.
These two great battles caused MacArthur, who had always been arrogant, to suffer a defeat that had never been seen before.
For Kim Il Sung, who had been beaten extremely badly by the US military earlier, he had too many problems at this time and needed Chairman Mao himself to solve his problems.
That evening, Chairman Mao received him at the Juxiang Bookstore in Fengze Garden, Zhongnanhai, and Premier Zhou was also present. In addition to Kim Il Sung's sincere thanks and Chairman Mao's response that "our family should not speak two words", the discussion between the two on many specific details of the war situation now seems to be of great significance:
First, on macArthur's clamor that "we will use nuclear weapons."
Everyone knows how powerful the atomic bomb is, which is also an important reason why Kim Il Sung rushed to come. To be honest, he was a little flustered.
Since the defeat of the first campaign, coupled with the fact that the U.S. army at Chosin Lake was suffering heavy losses, MacArthur was increasingly willing to use the atomic bomb, and Truman had publicly stated that it was possible.
Chairman Mao's reply to Kim Il Sung's concern was: "Truman did not dare to risk fighting an atomic war, and even if he wanted to use him, he had no obligation to inform the other side, so let the other side make preparations first!" ”
It has to be said that Chairman Mao's analysis was indeed to the point, and Truman's approach was nothing more than intimidation. Not to mention that the Soviet Union also had atomic bombs, that is, Britain and other US allies would not agree to expand the war.
The second thing Kim Il Sung and Chairman Mao talked about was about the right to command the army.
After more than 200,000 volunteers entered the DPRK, the Chinese and Dprk armies have always had differences on the issue of command. Out of national feelings, Kim Il Sung said at the beginning: "I hope that both armies will be commanded by North Korea." But after peng Dehuai learned about the combat capabilities of senior North Korean generals, he said bluntly: "I am responsible for the lives of more than 200,000 soldiers!" ”
However, when he saw Chairman Mao this time, Kim Il Sung, who had already seen with his own eyes the command ability of General Peng Lao, took the initiative to propose: Not only should the command of the volunteer army be dispensed with, but also the command of the Korean People's Army should be handed over, and all of them should be under the unified command of Peng Dehuai. Chairman Mao smiled and said, "Then we will not give in!" ”
The third thing Kim Il Sung and Chairman Mao talk about is exactly what this article focuses on discussing with you.
In a tentative tone, Kim Il Sung asked Chairman Mao: "If the enemy demands a negotiated truce, what should we do?" ”
Kim Il Sung said this, of course, not out of thin air. By then, he had heard the wind in North Korea: many people in the top of the U.S. military were already discussing the armistice. Among those AMERICAN frontline soldiers who are eager to return home as soon as possible, there are also quite high calls for an armistice.
yes! You read that right. Although the armistice was finally signed on July 27, 1953, the issue was discussed as early as the end of 1950.
Moreover, at that time, the 13 Asian and African countries led by India, out of their own interests and desire for peace, were not willing to break out a major war in Asia. The 13 countries are preparing to submit a bill to the United Nations Security Council to facilitate negotiations between the United States and China.
Listening to Kim Il-sung's question, Chairman Mao was obviously more excited. He stood up, walked over to the map, and said something like this:
"Like Chiang Kai-shek, US imperialism's promises and agreements are not credible, so we should prepare for the worst."
This answer is a firm reminder to Kim Il Sung, that is, to tell him: You don't fall for the Americans! Don't trust them!
Chairman Mao obviously did not say this indiscriminately. He then gave his reasons for this view, saying: "After the Landing of the American Army at Inchon, the large army crossed the 38th Parallel and advanced north, so why didn't you propose an armistice at that time?" Now that the war is defeated, but it must be stopped, what is the intention? ”
I have to say that Chairman Mao's analysis of the problem was really to the point! Since then, it has been proved that the Americans released the wind of peace at this time, which is nothing more than their "smoke bomb", and its real intention is not here.
Second: The "trick" of the Americans to pretend to have an armistice
Chinese do things, there is often a principle, that is, first salute and then soldiers!
Long before the volunteer army entered the DPRK, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou gave the Americans the opportunity to truce.
On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out. Although China established the Northeast Border Defense Army at the first time, and hundreds of thousands of troops rushed to the northeast region one after another, at that time, our side did not receive Kim Il Sung's "distress letter" and did not directly make the decision to fight in Korea.
But then the Americans and their "allies" became more and more arrogant, and MacArthur was even more mistaken that Chinese would not enter the war under any circumstances. Even, until a few days after the volunteer army entered Korea, he did not want to believe this.
Under the influence of the arrogant thinking of the US military from top to bottom, the US 7th Fleet sailed into the Taiwan Strait, and China's northeast region was frequently invaded by its air force.
In response to this situation, Premier Zhou had already called US Secretary of State Acheson several times in late August 1950, asking the US military not to invade China's airspace.
However, the US military at that time still thought that New China was the China of decades ago, and could not listen to this at all. Then, Premier Zhou had to call unannounced President Malik to lodge a solemn protest and demand that the Americans end the war.
However, none of this had any effect at the time. On September 30, Premier Zhou issued a final warning to the Americans, a resounding statement that is still outdated to this day. The Prime Minister said:
Chinese people love peace, but in order to defend peace, they have never been and will never be afraid to resist the war of aggression.
After receiving Kim Il Sung's "distress letter" on October 1, Chairman Mao began to seriously consider the matter of joining the DPRK. For several days and nights that followed, Chairman Mao often stayed up at night and made the most difficult decision of his life: to send troops.
After entering the DPRK, the volunteer army completed a perfect transformation that was "ignored" and even looked down upon. During the Battle of Chosin Lake, the Americans panicked.
The first to show uneasiness was the president of the United States: Truman.
Truman was the 33rd President of the United States from 1945 to 1953.
Unlike most presidents in the United States, Truman came from a poor background, and his "history of ascension to the throne" can be described as "cutting through thorns" and painstaking efforts. After years of "struggle" in the political arena, Truman's character is both cautious and "fierce".
After the outbreak of the Korean War, Truman regarded this war as an extremely important part of his "political career.". Therefore, there are obviously many contradictions between him and MacArthur, who is trying to lead the battle on the front line. When MacArthur contradicted him on the front lines several times, Truman scolded: "He's a political idiot!" ”
But no matter how much Truman and MacArthur were at odds, one thing was certain: the embarrassment of the U.S. military in the Korean War left him in the United States as humiliated as MacArthur in the Far East.
Voices against him came from all directions, and many Americans even accused him of making a decision to go to war, which was inherently problematic.
For this reason, on the one hand, he was anxious to throw the "pot" to MacArthur, and on the other hand, he had to think of other ways. This politician understands that his future is at stake.
Thus, the voice of the peace talks came out from within the Truman administration under such circumstances. So, does this "old and treacherous" president really have the intention of truce?
We can see this in a speech in mid-December 1950:
At that time, he directly expressed his willingness to negotiate a ceasefire by radio. But turning around, he announced a series of measures that peaceful people could not understand: an expansion of 1 million troops. Although the people did not say that they would send these people to the Korean battlefield, the discerning people knew what was going on.
At the same time, the Tru government also stressed that it will take one year to increase the output of aircraft by 5 times and the production of tanks by 4 times.
Sima Zhao's heart is well known to passers-by.
Under the guidance of Truman's seemingly "contradictory" behavior, the US military in this period can be described as quite "funny". One day, as long as they won a local battle, the officers in front of them would never mention the negotiations; on another day, when they were beaten to the point of no confidence, they would have another face of peace.
Chairman Mao, who saw the problem early on, made a decisive decision on all kinds of behavior: We must not trust the Americans, and we must still fight the battle steadily!
On December 22, two days before the end of the Battle of Chosin Lake, Premier Zhou also issued a special statement that unceremoniously exposed the sinister intentions of the US military, saying:
"It is clear that yesterday's opposition to peace was so that the United States could continue to expand its aggression; today it is in favour of an armistice so that the United States can gain respite and prepare for another war, at least to maintain its existing aggressive positions and prepare for further advance."
Facts have proved that Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou's judgment was not wrong.
Just over a month after Premier Zhou's statement was issued, Ridgway, commander of the US 8th Army, led more than 230,000 people to launch a large-scale offensive against our volunteer army. Fortunately, we did not believe in its ruse of pretending to be peace talks from beginning to end, and we completed the defensive task and laid the foundation for the final victory.
Nowadays, many young people, when studying many major international events in recent years, often do not understand why a country as large as the United States will always make some "international jokes" with us in many things, such as today and tomorrow.
History is a mirror, the answer to this question, I believe everyone will see the answer here. After all, a country's style of doing things is not so easy to change.
Three: The Americans in the negotiation process are equally cunning
In mid-1951, the Americans, who had never been able to bargain on the Korean battlefield, were finally willing to resume peace talks. On July 10, the real armistice negotiations officially began.
This is destined to be a difficult negotiation. From start to finish, it lasted more than two years. In the whole process, the various "postures" of Americans can be described as overwhelming.
At that time, Chairman Mao personally appointed generals, and our side sent to preside over the negotiation work: Li Kenong, the founding general who was later awarded the title in 1955.
Li Kenong took Qiao Guanhua and a group of new Chinese diplomats to form a working group and went to north Korea.
Since then, Li Kenong and Peng Dehuai have become the "two swords" in Chairman Mao's hands: one article and one weapon, the martial arts can fight beautiful battles, and the literary ability can withstand the temperament.
From the very beginning, Li Kenong made our request to the US side:
First, on the basis of mutual agreement, both sides simultaneously order the cessation of all hostile military operations;
Second, the 38th Line was determined to be the military demarcation line, and the armed forces of both sides simultaneously withdrew 10 kilometers from the 38th Line;
Third, withdraw all foreign troops in the shortest possible time.
However, the Americans were perfunctory on one side, undermining the agreement in everything. Therefore, Li Kenong often encountered various dangers in the 58 congresses and 733 small meetings since then.
Once, the jeep in which Li Kenong and others were riding was clearly parked in the neutral zone of negotiations, but the Americans maliciously broke the tire. Fortunately, our drivers responded calmly, and they did not dare to imagine the consequences.
In addition to threatening the safety of our negotiators, there have also been such "embarrassments" in the negotiation process:
It was a small negotiation in which our representative Chai Chengwen and others talked with the Americans. But at the scene of the negotiations, there was an impasse. The Americans just won't speak, and we have no choice but not to speak.
As you may not imagine, the two sides were silent for 132 minutes. Finally, Chai Chengwen really didn't know what to do, so he walked out of the tent of negotiation and came out and asked Li Kenong what to do? Li Kenong did not speak, and tore a small note from the notebook with 3 big words written on it: Sit down. So the two sides sat down again and continued not to speak.
Later, everyone said: This is probably the longest silence in the history of military negotiations.
By June 1953, everything was almost over, and the cunning side of the Americans was exposed. At that time, the COMMANDER of the US side, Clarke, had clearly communicated with our side, but he was hesitant to inform South Korean President Syngman Rhee of the details.
So much so that Rhee, who finally learned the news, jumped like a thunderbolt. After that, he was reluctant to cease war, and he instigated various kinds of incitement among the "allies", and then called on the South Korean people to take to the streets to protest, and even finally made things to embarrass the prisoners of war of the North Korean People's Army.
This series of acts made Chairman Mao and Peng Dehuai very angry, and they both proposed that the US side take good care of Rhee. And what about the Americans who are the leading big brothers of the "United Nations Army" at this time? But he didn't care about himself, as if everything had nothing to do with him.
Finally, Chairman Mao sent a direct secret telegram to Peng Dehuai, saying: "It is extremely necessary to annihilate more than 10,000 puppet troops again." As a result, the famous Battle of Jincheng broke out, and our volunteer army only took a few days to make Syngman Rhee's clique repent.
Some netizens may feel strange when they see this: The US military in the real negotiation link has obviously sat down to talk, why do they have to put so many "moths" out? In this regard, military historians judge that there are no more than two reasons:
First, not willingly. The U.S. military after World War II was so arrogant that it could not win an Asian country at all. Front-line combatants and negotiators are not reconciled, which makes them capricious.
Second, they are also trying to put the hat of reluctance to negotiate peace on our side. Peace talks are the common aspiration of peace-loving people in the world, and the US side is well aware of this, so they are doing their best to create public opinion pressure on our side.
After the Battle of Jincheng, the Us side finally had to sign it. But at this point, we can no longer trust them. In order to protect the safety of Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung, Li Kenong proposed a brilliant solution:
The commanders of the two sides did not sign at the scene, and the armistice agreement was signed by the chief representatives of the two sides, and then handed over to their own commanders for signature, and finally the texts were exchanged.
In this way, Peng Dehuai and Jin Il Chengdu did not need to be present. For such an arrangement, the US side also had to agree. Even when the agreement was finally signed, we had to guard against them so much, which shows how much Li Kenong has seen in the negotiations over the past two years.
End:
More than 70 years have passed since the first batch of Chinese Volunteers entered the DPRK. But there are countless details about this war that are worth thinking about!
Americans see it as a "forgotten war" because their actions are disgraceful from beginning to end. For us in the 21st century, looking back at Chairman Mao's judgment of the Americans in those years, we still feel that we are in three points.
To quote the west point officer at the beginning of this article: We have commanders like Chairman Mao, commanders like Peng Dehuai, and countless soldiers who are not afraid of sacrifice, and americans lose too normally!