Recently, when we talk about the Battle of Tashan Andong and the Battle of Dongye Entry Pass, we will emphasize that the Northeast Field Force was full of troops, strong weapons, and extremely high command and tactical capabilities.
After the Northeast Nationalist army was annihilated in the Liaoshen Campaign, Du Yuming said to Fu Zuoyi:
The Northeast Communist Army is nearly a million, and it will soon enter the customs, and its strategy, tactics, weapons and equipment, and combat strength far exceed those of the Guannei Communist Army. Militarily, the Communist Party will unify China within a year.
Although Fu Zuoyi pretended to be calm, his heart was actually turning the river upside down. It was only Fu Zuoyi's judgment that Dongye would take a break in the short term and would not enter the customs immediately, which made him feel a little relieved. Under this judgment, Fu Zuoyi "obeyed" our mobilization and used the 35th Army to aid Zhangjiakou in the west.
Fu Zuoyi was horrified when he learned that Dongye had taken Miyun, but it was too late, and his 100,000 concubine troops had been divided and surrounded by the People's Liberation Army. The panic of the main general was also "contagious" to his subordinates, and as a result, Fu Zuoyi's elite troops were all solved by the People's Liberation Army at a small cost, which directly promoted the peaceful liberation of Peiping afterwards.
From Liaoshen to Pingjin to Huaihai, we can now see the various strategic deployments and decisions of both sides before and during the campaign.
Looking at our deployment, we know from the very beginning what we want to do; but if we look at the national army, you will find that it is always in the "mobilization" and prediction of our army. Moreover, in the three major battlefields, no one battlefield of the national army can be effectively deployed, and it is always fighting in a chaotic manner.
Therefore, after many generals of the Nationalist army were captured after the three major battles, they were not convinced, and they also felt confused, how could they be defeated in a vacuum?
However, after these generals were captured, they saw our army's campaign deployment materials, and they were not convinced. So instead turned to attacking his teammates, this scolding that did not save him, that scolding this is not righteous, until the final full exchange, finally reached a consensus: the National Army is like this, and the People's Liberation Army is like that, can they not be defeated?
In particular, after the outbreak of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the Volunteer Army drove the US-led multinational coalition army back from the Yalu River to the 38th Line. These captured Nationalist generals were even more completely convinced, some were writing tactical materials about the US army, and some were busy making Kung Delin brand fried noodles, and their work was also in full swing, and they felt quite honorable.
Why did these captured generals of the Nationalist army change?
Because we not only defeated them on the battlefield, but also used sufficient facts to make them understand why they had failed.
Returning to the subject, let's talk about the professional ability of the Nationalist Army, that is, the topic of judging the strength of our column mentioned in the title of this article.
In the three major battles, the command of the Nationalist army has always been chaotic, and the basic premise of this kind of hectic chaos is that there has been a serious miscalculation of the strength perception of our army, and at the same time, there has also been a serious deviation in the assessment of its own capabilities.
Sun Tzu's Art of War says that "knowing oneself and knowing the other, never losing a hundred battles", in fact, before the Great Armageddon in 1948, it can be said that it did not know the other or itself.
For example, at that time, the strength of the Northeast Nationalist Army against our army was estimated to be 700,000 to 800,000 people, but in fact, the total strength of our army at that time had exceeded 1 million.
What is more crucial is that the Nationalist army not only underestimated the number of our army in the northeast, but also seriously underestimated the quality of our army.
Wei Lihuang, commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Suppression General", held that at least 300,000 of the 700,000 or 800,000 Northeast People's Liberation Army were guerrillas and had little combat effectiveness. Moreover, there are also many new recruits and few weapons in the regular army, and the ability to attack strong points is seriously insufficient.
Wei Lihuang's plan at that time was to hold Shenyang with more than 20 divisions, wait for the equipment of 10 mechanic divisions to arrive, change the equipment of the main force, and expand the new troops to wait for the timing to change.
In the assessment of Lao Jiang and Nanjing, it is even more outrageous.
Old Chiang himself believed that a column of the Northeast Field Army at that time was only equivalent to a division of the Nationalist Army.
For example, when old Chiang Kai-shek was formed in the EastWard Advance Corps on Huludao, he gave a lecture to officers at or above the garrison level:
This time, we have concentrated the superior troops of the United States armament and equipment, and we have a large number of air force assistance and naval coordination, and all ammunition and food can be shipped by sea and air to supply.
Later, when old Jiang gave a dinner to officers above the chief of staff of the various divisions of the Huludao garrison, he said:
This time the enemy attacked Jinzhou, there were up to 7 columns, equal to the strength of 7 divisions, we sent 5 armies from Shenyang, 2 armies from North China, 1 army from Yantai, 1 army originally stationed in Huludao, a total of 9 army strength, enough to aid Jin, if not enough, you can also draw troops.
Fan Hanjie, deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Suppression Command" and director of the Jinzhou Command Post, also mentioned in his recollection:
The Nanjing Ministry of National Defense and the Northeast "Suppression General" estimate the strength and movement of the Northeast People's Liberation Army, holding that there are still 10 columns, each column is equivalent to 1 independent division or reinforced division, and the strength of each detachment is equivalent to 1 brigade or reinforcement regiment.
In fact, in connection with the intelligence of the National Army, the number of troops in the northeast of our army is known, and the so-called column behind it is equal to the strength of a division of the National Army. That is to say, the actual combat strength of one column of the Northeast Field Army is equal to one division of the Nationalist Army, otherwise it would not be right to simply count the heads.
However, its strength in the Dongye Column was indeed seriously underestimated, for example, Luo Qi, the old commander of the independent 95th Division, who was then the governor of North China and later went to Huludao to command chaos, believed:
There are 4 armies in Huludao, 5 corps in Shenyang's westward advance, and 11 corps in jinzhou's 2 armies, plus the superiority of the navy and air force, which has an absolute advantage in both number and firepower.
In the recollection of Lin Weili, the commander of the 62nd Army, Roach believed that this numerical advantage was more than 2 times.
At that time, the Jinzhou garrison plus the East Advance Corps and the West Advance Corps had more than 300,000 people, and they thought they had more than 2 times the advantage, so it was determined that the strength of the 7 columns in Dongye was only 150,000 people, and each column was more than 20,000 people.
Therefore, from a comprehensive point of view, the judgment of the Nationalist army on our army in the northeast is:
The total strength of the army is 700,000 or 800,000 people, the field column is about 10, the field army strength is more than 200,000, and the rest is the local army and guerrillas. At the same time, it is believed that the combat strength of a column in Dongye is only equivalent to that of a division of the Nationalist army. The main reason why the Nationalist army took a defensive position in the northeast was that the troops were broken, and the weapons needed to be replaced urgently, and if the reorganization was completed, it could still take advantage.
In fact, the Northeast Field Army at that time was not the judgment of the Nationalist Army.
In May 1947, our army in the northeast had a total of more than 400,000 people, of which more than 30,000 were directly directed, 207,000 were the main force, and 225,000 were local troops. There were 5 field columns in the main force, of which more than 33,000 people in the 1st column, more than 27,000 people in the 2nd column, more than 20,000 people in the 3rd column, 21,000 people in the 4th column, and 28,000 people in the 6th column, and the rest were independent divisions and security brigades.
At this time, most of The East Field's column was indeed more than 20,000 people, and the main force was more than 100,000 people aside from the independent division and the security brigade.
More than a year later, the national army's assessment of the strength of our army in the northeast was 700,000 to 800,000 people, but it was obvious that its assessment of our main force was not high in number and combat strength.
However, the progress of our army's training in the northeast far exceeded the estimates of the nationalist army, and in the december 1947 army building plan, it was proposed:
Next year, 600,000 regular troops will be built, of which the field army will form 40 infantry divisions, 480,000 people, 12 or 13 column headquarters, 12 artillery regiments, 5 engineer regiments, 2 cavalry divisions, and the independent division cadre regiments of local military districts are still outside.
Please note that the Northeast Field Army's requirement for infantry divisions at this time is 12,000 men. A column with 3 infantry divisions, plus the column's direct subordinate units and artillery, exceeded 40,000 people.
In August 1948, the northeast of our army that could undertake field mobile tasks had 12 infantry columns, 1 artillery column, 1 railway column, 15 independent divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and 1 tank regiment, totaling about 700,000 people, and the remaining 330,000 people were local armed and second-line supplementary corps, with a total strength of more than 1 million.
In terms of the main column of the Northeast Field Army at this time, there were more than 40,000 troops, the column had an artillery regiment, the infantry division had a mountain artillery battalion, the infantry regiment had a mortar company, and the infantry company had 9 light machine guns.
At that time, the nationalist army generally had only more than 20,000 people, and it was good to have a military artillery battalion and a divisional mountain artillery battalion, in fact, except for a few elites, the general troops were not only inferior to the columns of The Eastern Field in terms of strength, but also inferior to the weapons.
The key is that in terms of the quality of the commander and the technical and tactical ability of the soldiers, the national army is not good.
Such a comparison, in fact, is the difference.
Now many friends can't understand why the East Advance Corps and the West Advance Corps do not add up to as many Troops as the East Field Corps, so how dare they advance east and west?
Because now we know the strength of Higashino, but the national army at that time did not know it!
The Nationalist army believed that there were only 7 Dongye columns in Jinzhou, and its own defenders and reinforcements still had the advantage in the number of troops!
Especially in Tashan, the EastWard Advance Corps also had naval and air support, and before the war, it was considered normal to fight in the past.
As a result, on the front of Tashan, there was a 4-column in the East Field, 2 divisions of the 54th Army of the Nationalist Army, 2 divisions of the 62nd Army, and the independent 95th Division directly under the "Suppression General" in North China, which fought for a full 6 days, and could not even beat a single position.
Didn't it say that a column of higashino was only equivalent to a division?
In fact, the total strength of the 4th Column is more than 40,000 people, and the strength of any one division is more than that of the attacking Nationalist Division, and even the 11th Division of its column reserve has not moved much, and you can't even occupy a corner of the other people's position.
The battle was fought like this, and the overall confidence of the nationalist army also collapsed.
Later, when Old Jiang went to Huludao and scolded, the gang also said that the communist army in Tashan was not 1 column, but two or three columns, and could not move at all -- in fact, the 4th column only invested more than 2 divisions in the Tashan position, with more than 3,000 casualties.
It can be seen from the above that this kind of army of the Nationalist Army was rather frenzied before the war, and it was all kinds of contempt for our army, but when it was defeated, it did not admit that it was its own dish, and it was eager to double the strength of our army several times, so that it appeared that they were "proud of their defeat." As a result, this frightened the other troops, and even like Fu Zuoyi's troops in the Battle of Pingjin, they caught sheep in one fight.
So fool around, and finally don't you fool yourself? How can such an army win the war?