In 1946, the all-out offensive launched by the Nationalist army was successively contained in the northeast, central China and southern Jin. With the blessing of more than 4 million troops, Lao Jiang blatantly tore up the armistice agreement also swallowed the bitter fruit of defeat. In Jianghuai, the Central China Field Army led by Su Yu won seven battles and seven victories, in southern Jin. The Jin-Ji Luyu Field Army also inflicted heavy losses on the Nationalist armies in North China and the Central Plains. After the failure of the all-out offensive in 1946, the Nationalist army changed the all-out offensive to a focused offensive - to strike hard at the liberated areas of northern Shaanxi and Shandong.
If we say that the attack on the northern Shaanxi region can be understood as the core of our army's leadership, Yan'an is of great strategic significance. So why attack Shandong?
When it comes to strategic significance, the northeast should be more important than Shandong.
It should be known that from 1946 onwards, of the total 212 integrated brigades of the Nationalist Army, 66 brigades were in the direction of Shandong, 37 brigades in the direction of Luyu in Jinji, Hebei, and 23 and 20 divisions in the north and northeast directions respectively (equivalent to the reorganized brigade). That is to say, nearly 30% of the main force of the National Army is concentrated in the direction of Shandong.
In fact, the idea that the Nationalist army focused on attacking Shandong at that time was also very simple - to put it bluntly, compared with the northeast, attacking Shandong was more realistic.
Only Shandong can be selected
Why is it more realistic for the Nationalist army to focus on attacking Shandong?
At that time, in the liberated areas of the whole country, the only thing that could make the Nationalist army both look up to and have a strategic position was the Shandong Liberated Area. Among the major liberated areas at that time, the strategic offensive significance for the Nationalist army could be divided into several: northern Shaanxi, northeast China, Shandong and north China. Northern Shaanxi also mentioned above that it is the seat of the Party Central Committee, and northern China is the heartland of our Liberated Areas, not to mention the northeast, and it is also a strategic place for our army to focus on operation, and Shandong is also an important rear area of our army.
So why did the nationalist army in the other 4 places except northern Shaanxi keep an eye on Shandong and not let go?
First of all, north China, during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, was the evidence of our army's model labor resistance, and the Jin-Cha-Ji, Ji-Lu-Yu, and Ji-Central regions had already formed important liberated areas. In north China, our army has a deep mass base, and after the end of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, although old Chiang Kai-shek instigated Fu Zuoyi to wage war with our army in North China, except for the cities of Jintang and Huanbeiping on the north China coast, the vast base areas in north China were still controlled by our army, and even from 1946 to 1948, our army always controlled the strategic initiative in north China. The Fu Zuoyi clique in North China played a more important role in containing our army.
At that time, North China was also the heart of the Liberated Areas, and if the Nationalist army wanted to focus on attacking North China, it could only increase its troops from the sea route and the northeast, and transportation and supplies were a problem. Moreover, once there is a change in North China, our army can at any time reinforce North China in the four directions of Shandong, Shanxi, Jinji, Luyu, and Northeast China. The "fist" of the key attack on North China may hit sandbags and even be annihilated by reinforcements from several directions of our army. For the top brass of the Nationalist army, in addition to grain and coal, North China is more as the rear and military station of the northeast, and it is enough to maintain stability and not to move chaotically.
If it is said that our army in North China has deep roots and occupies an advantage and cannot be attacked by force, then the northeast, which is also newly entered by the Kuomintang, should be the key direction of attack. In 1946, the Nationalist army did focus on attacking the northeast, when the expeditionary force and the main force of the new 1st, 6th, 94th, 60th and other aces were transferred to the northeast to participate in the war. At first, it did cause some trouble to the Northeast Democratic United Army (the predecessor of Dongye), but after our army stabilized its position in the Battle of Sibao Linjiang in the three lower Jiangnan provinces in the summer of 1946 and regained the initiative in the northeast battlefield in the summer offensive, the northeast battlefield was actually dominated by our army.
Many people will ask, the northeast is so important, why does the national army not conscript the northeast? The Nationalist army also wanted to, but the Battlefield in Guannei has always allowed Huaye and other main forces in Shandong to be contained in Guannei, and if they want to draw out their troop resources in the northeast and other places, they must take Shandong, the base area on which Huaye depends for survival.
Therefore, from the perspective of the overall war situation, in 1947, if the Nationalist army wanted to take the initiative in the northeast and other battlefields, it must solve the hidden danger of "Shandong base area".
Shandong is too important
So why did a "small" Shandong become the hatred of the Nationalist army at that time? The answer is obvious – Shandong's strategic location is too important. If you only look at the national map, Shandong is only a pass between North China and Huanghuai, but if you look at the confrontation between the two sides at that time, Shandong can be described as a "strategic fortress".
To the south of Shandong are northern Jiangsu and central Jiangsu, these places are the old base areas of our army, with Shandong as the rear to pass through these two places again, can threaten the important economic cities of the nationalist army in southern Jiangsu and Shanghai and other places, Shandong to the north can be with the Liaodong Peninsula as each other's horns. In fact, many of the northeast that our army began to march into was entered through the waterways of the Shandong Peninsula, and later the "Dalian shells" mentioned by Chen Shuai in the Huaihai Campaign were also transported to Shandong by waterway. Therefore, while Fu Zuoyi controlled the Beining Line, as long as he occupied Shandong, our army outside Guanwai might fall into a situation of isolation and helplessness.
Of course, in addition to its strategic location, Shandong is also an important rear area of our army, an important arsenal, a source of troops, and a grain producing area.
According to incomplete statistics, in the Liberation War, the number of people who joined the army in each province was 1.7 million (thanks to the results of land reform), which was about 32% of the total strength of the whole army, that is to say, 1 for every 3 soldiers in the Liberation War, 1 was a Shandong person. In addition to providing people, Shandong's grain also effectively supported the people's army in combat, and in the Huaihai Campaign, Shandong Laoxiang Zhiqian grain accounted for 80% of the total Zhiqian grain. From 1946 to 1947, the Jiaodong Arsenal produced 4,330 grenadiers, 327 artillery pieces, 510,000 shells and 4.24 million rounds of ammunition.
Therefore, aiming at the most "stable" rear of our army in Guannei, coupled with the fact that the geographical location is also absolutely high, the key fist of the nationalist army will definitely be smashed into Shandong.
Finally, there is actually another reason why the Nationalist army dared to encircle and suppress the Shandong Liberated Areas with heavy troops. That is to say, compared with north and northeast China, which are not well concentrated and are located in the hinterland, the Nationalist army has controlled the Central Plains and Northern Jiangsu regions, and they can easily mobilize troops to fight from Xuzhou and Central China to maintain the superiority of troops on the battlefield.
Yu Tian Jun said
Of course, although the Nationalist army's wishful thinking played well, but in the key offensive liberated areas, it was still stubbornly blocked by Huaye, as the field army that annihilated the most enemies in the liberation war, many of Huaye's achievements were achieved when the Nationalist army focused on attacking Shandong, such as the Lunan Campaign, the Laiwu Campaign, and the Menglianggu Campaign.
In the enemy's key attacks, Huaye not only did not be consumed, but on the contrary, it became bigger and bigger, and after the end of the key attack on Shandong, Huaye also launched the battles of Eastern Henan, Jinan, and Huaihai, which directly depleted the effective forces of the Nationalist army in Guannei and accelerated the defeat of the Nationalist army.
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