Peng Dehuai has a rough personality, is a bold person, and has a very hot temper. As long as you go to the battlefield, you will bring out a wind and clouds. So General Jin Yinan said that he was "like a fire, burning from the inside to the outside, ready to destroy gula at any time."
Because of his hot temper and his usual lack of good manners, everyone was in awe of him. Among the many generals, except for Chen Geng who dared to joke with him, the others were all well-behaved in front of him and did not dare to be casual.
But what is strange is that during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, there was an ordinary general who actually contradicted him again and again.
During the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, there were three deputy commanders of the Volunteer Army, namely Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, and Han Xianchu. They were all Peng Dehuai's right-hand men and assisted Peng Dehuai in planning one major battle after another, inflicting heavy casualties on the US army and retreating step by step.
Since it was a foreign war in Korea, food and ammunition needed to be transported from the northeast. Managing the long transport lines and the large number of transport troops, as well as the distribution and transfer of materials after they arrive in Korea, became a very heavy task, and a deputy commander had to be responsible for it.
When the volunteer army first entered the DPRK, the logistics work was not large, and Hong Xuezhi took the post at the same time, and since the deputy commander was required to take charge of logistics, he was naturally the only one. But he never managed logistics at home, and he has always been responsible for directing operations, and he also wants to direct operations in North Korea. When Peng Dehuai asked him to take care of logistics, he was extremely reluctant.
It was no small matter that he did not accept the task in front of Peng Dehuai, and sure enough, without saying two words, he became angry: "You don't care, then I will take care of it," followed by another "big scolding."
After some "persecution", Hong Xuezhi reluctantly accepted. For Peng Dehuai, this may be the first time he has encountered subordinates who do not accept tasks. He was very angry, but what he never expected was that Hong Xuezhi would later contradict himself in battle.
Being a logistics commander is really a reluctance for Hong Xuezhi. But after accepting the task, he did a very active job.
The logistics at that time were very difficult. The food and clothing of millions of officers and men on the front line, as well as the large number of guns and ammunition needed at any time in war, were transported by a few simple roads and railways, and American planes bombed those routes day and night. The driver of the car did not dare to go on the road during the day and had to hide and defend himself. And even if you are on the road at night, you do not dare to turn on the lights to prevent being discovered by enemy aircraft.
In the dark of night, driving without lights, what is the concept?
Such a transportation efficiency can be imagined!
But Hong Xuezhi completed the logistics transportation with amazing perseverance. He could arrive in time for the food and ammunition needed on the front line. In the fifth campaign, the Chinese and Korean coalition troops participated in the battle nearly 1 million, the artillery reached more than 3,000, and the grain and ammunition needed were almost the sum of the previous battles, but Hong Xuezhi was transported to the front line on time.
The fifth campaign began in late April 1951 and was held in Korea south of Cheongwon and Kimwa. But it was very close to the enemy, far from the gathering place of the volunteer troops, and many of the volunteer troops were still on their way. Therefore, Hong Xuezhi suggested that the battlefield should be moved north, north of Jinhua and Tieyuan, so that the volunteer army could wait for work.
Peng Dehuai certainly knew this, but he got several important pieces of information:
1. The United States has just transferred two divisions from Home to Japan to prepare for reinforcements to Korea;
At least 30,000 South Korean troops are training intensively in Japan
3. U.S. Navy reconnaissance of the east coast of North Korea is becoming more and more frequent.
All indications are that the U.S. military is likely planning a large-scale landing, and the location is, of course, the rear of the Volunteer Army.
Once the U.S. army is implemented, the volunteer army will be attacked on the stomach and back, and even the rear transportation line may be cut off by the waist.
Peng Dehuai wanted to crush the US troops in person before the US troops landed, so that the US landing plan was stillborn.
Peng Dehuai had no doubt about the original plan, and Hong Xuezhi's opposition attitude was also very resolute. After two consecutive objections, he did not give up, and stated his opinion for the third time on the grounds that "staff officers have the right to make suggestions three times".
This was probably the most resolute opposition he had encountered, and no one had ever opposed him in person in his decades of military service.
The subsequent war unfolded according to Peng Dehuai's plan, and the US troops did not land in the rear of the volunteer army. However, just because the US military did not land, it cannot be determined that Peng Dehuai's judgment is inaccurate, or that he is self-conscious and cannot listen to opinions.
Any situation on the battlefield can happen at any time, and any pre-war speculation based on post-war results to judge whether the pre-war speculation is accurate is unfounded. In the controversy between Hong Xuezhi and Peng Dehuai, the Chinese army's concept of modern warfare has already been revealed, and Peng Dehuai only insisted on his own viewpoint when he had sufficient reasons.
Hong Xuezhi's main energy was not on the front line, but on logistics and transportation in the rear. His work has always been so outstanding that Peng Dehuai has repeatedly praised him for "saying that if you want to say the credit, Hong Xuezhi (Hong Xuezhi) should be half counted."
Although Hong Xuezhi's logistics in North Korea are very good, he is still reluctant to do logistics in his heart. It is said that when Peng Dehuai returned to China, he specifically made a request to "stop doing logistics after returning to China."
Contrary to his wishes, he twice served as the general logistics minister after returning to China, specializing in the logistics of millions of PLA troops.
What is even more extraordinary than his two appointments as general logistics minister is that he was awarded the rank of general twice. The first was in 1955, when the People's Liberation Army first conferred the rank; the second was in 1988, when the rank system was restored, and a total of 17 senior generals were awarded the rank of general, and Hong Xuezhi was one of them, and the only person who received the rank of general twice.