<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="4" > Four Field General Series 30: Huang Yongsheng (III</h1>).
Author: Mast
It is often more difficult to evaluate the military ability of a general, because military ability is a comprehensive concept, including military command (commonly known as fighting), organization, mobilization, logistics and so on. However, as far as military command capabilities are concerned, we can only study and give an evaluation opinion on specific combat examples, from the factors of the enemy and our forces, firepower, and so on.
But the situation in war and the battlefield is ever-changing, and there can be no two identical examples in the world, nor can it be assumed that different people commanding the same campaign will be the result. Therefore, most of the evaluation of the military command ability of generals is based on the history of the war, and the study draws conceptual conclusions. For non-military professionals, such conclusions are often not well understood and easily debated. For example, there is a lot of controversy over the issue of who has the stronger military ability of Lin and Su. Today, let's talk about Huang Yongsheng's military command ability.
(1) Fighting a war is on the cusp, and the first battle of the 6 columns is transferred to play a classic example
Among the many generals of the Four Wilds, two were generally recognized for their military command ability: one was Han Xianchu, and the other was Huang Yongsheng. Why? Because it can be compared before and after.
The foundations of Higashino's 3rd column and 6th column are all old eight roads in Kannai, with old seniority, hard style, and high tactics, but since its establishment, the battle results have not been ideal. Before Han Xianchu became commander, the 3rd Column had not fought any battles. After Han Xianchu took office, he soon played the prestige of the "Whirlwind Column". Similarly, before Huang Yong was qualified as the commander of the 6 columns, the record of the 6 columns was not ideal. Huang Yongsheng's first battle after taking office, the 6th Column fought the classic Lijia shack blockade battle. In fact, the command ability of Liu Zhen, commander of the 2nd Column, should not be under Han and Huang, but because he has been serving in the 2nd Column, his performance is also very stable, and the result is not as good as Han and Huang's fame.
In March 1948, Huang Yongsheng was transferred from the commander of the 8th Column to the 6th Column, succeeding Hong Xuezhi as the commander. By November 1948, after the liaoshen campaign, Huang Yongsheng had left the 6 columns, and it was only 9 months to complete the calculation. After Huang Yongsheng arrived at his post, he led the 6 columns to carry out a six-month large-scale military training, and then participated in the Liaoshen Campaign. In fact, Huang Yongsheng led the 6 columns to fight only one battle, that is, during the Liaoshen Campaign, he blocked the retreat of Liao Yaoxiang's army to Shenyang in the Lijia shack. The Blockade and Interception of the Lijia Shack was the key to encircling and annihilating the Liao Corps in western Liaoning, and if it were not for the timely arrival and interception of the 6th Column, the Liao Corps would have retreated to Shenyang.
This battle fully demonstrated Huang Yongsheng's outstanding military command ability:
The first is to act decisively and block the Liao Corps in time. At about 18:00 on October 24, Huang Yongsheng received a telegram from the Eastern General And ordered his troops to force the army. By 3:00 a.m. on the 26th, the 6th Column had been forcibly marching for 33 hours continuously, with a journey of 250 miles. It is said that the record of forced marching of this non-mechanized military unit has not been broken. In order to hurry, the 6th Column lightly loaded all items other than weapons in the second half of the journey, and even saved the time of setting up a radio station to contact Dongzong. During this period, because the 6th Column could not be contacted, Liu Yalou, chief of staff of Dongye, was so angry that he shouted to "shoot Huang Yongsheng." It was precisely because of Huang Yongsheng's scheming that the 6th Column Vanguard and the vanguard of the Liao Corps reached the Lijia shack area almost at the same time.
The second was to correctly judge the enemy's situation and immediately deploy a blockade plan. After the 6th Column Vanguard arrived at the Lijia Shack, it immediately engaged in a fierce battle with the enemy. Based on the report of the vanguard troops, Huang Yongsheng immediately judged that he had encountered the main force of the Liao Corps, and ordered the vanguard troops of 2 divisions (16th and 18th divisions, and 17th divisions to be transferred to participate in the Jinzhou offensive) to deploy on the spot and intercept the enemy. At the same time, the general report to the East and the determination to fight. After confirming from the captives that the Liao Corps had "turned the whole army into Shenyang" and that its vanguard had arrived at the Lijia Shack and the Banlamen area, Huang Yongsheng immediately ordered the second echelon to immediately seize the Banlamen area and block all the passages for the Liao Corps to retreat to Shenyang.
The third is determination. In the face of the crazy attack of about 100,000 people in the enemy's 12 divisions, Huang Yongsheng was not afraid, commanded from the front, and "prepared to die here." The officers and men of the 6th Column stubbornly used their super strong will to fight, and used the exhausted division to block the enemy's elite corps with absolute superiority in strength and firepower, until the main force of Dongye arrived, and finally completely annihilated the Liao Corps.
At that time, the battlefield situation, if the 6th Column arrived at the Lijia shack area even 1 hour late, the passage for the Liao Corps to return to Shenyang would be opened. Of course, even if the Liao Corps retreats to Shenyang, it will definitely be wiped out in the end. But if this is the case: first, the results of the Liaoshen Campaign are not so great, and second, the liberation of the entire northeast will be postponed for at least a few months.
In addition, there is a counterexample that proves Huang Yongsheng's command ability: as soon as the 8th Column was established, under the command of Huang Yongsheng, the "three battles and three victories" in Western Liaoning were played, and even Lin Biao praised that "this 8-column is really a bit of a main force." After Huang Yongsheng was transferred to the 6th Column, the 8th Column was under the command of the commander Duan Suquan, and its performance during the Liaoshen Campaign was not good, and it was criticized by Dong Zong three times. Therefore, as soon as the Liaoshen Campaign ended, Huang Yongsheng returned to the 8th Column (45th Army) as the commander (commander).
Of course, this does not mean to compare other generals. The combat effectiveness of a unit is a combination of factors from many aspects, and organization, mobilization, logistics, and so on are all very important, and they do not all rely on command ability. Huang Yongshengqiang's weaknesses in military command ability are also obvious, such as in handling interpersonal relationships.
(ii) With thorns on the body, interpersonal relationships do not seem to be very good
There seems to be a general rule in the war years: most of the generals who can fight wars have strong personalities, Han Xianchu, Wang Jinshan, Zhong Wei, etc. are all such figures, and Huang Yongsheng is no exception. Huang Yongsheng's interpersonal relationship is average, the most typical example of which is his relationship with Deng Hua. Deng Hua and Huang Yongsheng can be described as a pair of "wrongdoers", and have intersected three times:
The two worked together from the time of the Red Army to the early days of the War of Resistance. After the Red Army's Long March to northern Shaanxi, Huang and Deng were the commanders and political commissars of the Red 2nd Division, respectively. In August 1938, after the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, both were initially in the 685th Regiment reorganized from the Red 2nd Division, with Huang as the regimental commander and Deng Hua as the deputy regimental commander and director of the Political Training Office. Since the Eighth Route Army did not have a political commissar at the beginning of the reorganization, Deng Hua's position was equivalent to that of political commissar. Less than a month after the reorganization, the night when the troops crossed the Yellow River in the east to reach Houma, Shanxi, Luo Ronghuan, director of the Political Training Office of the 115th Division, and Xiao Hua, deputy director of the 115th Division, specially rushed to the garrison and summoned the cadres of the 685 Regiment to a meeting, focusing on criticizing Huang Yongsheng.
Huang's main problem was that he could not get along well with tuangan, mainly because he did not have a good relationship with Deng Hua. Luo Ronghuan announced that Huang Yongsheng would be transferred from the 685 Regiment and that another job would be arranged, and Yang Dezhi would take over as the head of the 685 Regiment. The transfer of military officers away because they "have no good relations" with other cadres is extremely rare in the history of our army. Huang's transfer this time is mainly because of his strong personality. In fact, Deng Hua's personality is not weak.
It's not that "wrongdoers" don't get together. In August 1944, Yan'an established the 2nd Brigade of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Jinsui Joint Defense Army, with Huang and Deng serving as brigade commanders and political commissars respectively, and the two partnered for more than a year until August 1945, when they marched into the northeast. It may be that the organizational concept of both of them has improved, and during this partnership, I have not heard of the two "bad relationship" or anything like that. It should be said that the two "bad relations" before are also differences in work, not personal grudges.
About the third intersection of the two, it was actually a misunderstanding. According to this theory, before the establishment of the Northeast Border Defense Army before the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Deng Hua served as commander of the 13th Corps; Huang Yongsheng was the former commander of the 13th Corps, and it was rumored that he was "incompetent" before arranging for Deng Hua to be the commander. This is not true at all. At that time, the decision of the headquarters was to "form the leading organ of the 13th Corps on the basis of the leading organs of the 15th Corps", which was actually the number of the 15th Corps headquarters and the 13th Corps Headquarters. Deng Hua was the commander of the 15th Corps at that time, and served as the commander of the 13th Corps after the transfer of the number, which was equivalent to the position of no change.
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