In September 1952, the full-line tactical counterattack began, and we studied the experience of previous attacks against the US army. When the Fifth Campaign was about to end in 1951, Comrade Chen Geng reported to Chairman Mao on the operations in Korea. On the basis of our past experience in fighting the US army, Chairman Mao felt that the current method of warfare could not deal with the enemy. It is not enough for us to destroy the enemy in a single way, even if we destroy them in groups. You surround him in groups, and the enemy uses armored vehicles and tanks to block the mouth, and the movement speed is fast, and there are aircraft support in the sky, and he defends without attacking. Although you surround him, because the battle is relatively slow, you often fail to achieve the goal of annihilating the enemy completely. After all, we were infantry, with only two legs, the "No. 11 car", always not moving as fast as his armored car.
When studying why the enemy could not be annihilated, Chairman Mao also talked about the experience of the civil war, and believed that Korea might also learn from this experience. He talked about how we played from 1947 to 1949 when we fought the five main forces of the Kuomintang. What object to select? At that time, we felt that the most difficult to deal with on several battlefields were the New 1st Army, the New 6th Army, the 5th Army, the 18th Army, and the New 7th Army of the Gui Clan. Chiang Kai-shek called him the "Five Main Forces." At that time, these "five main forces" were all American equipment, not to mention the training of the United States, and even the military uniforms were American. Our equipment is far worse than his! Under such circumstances, how can he finally get rid of his "five main forces"? At first, we also thought about opening our mouths a little wider, for example, at the beginning of the Liberation War, when we fought other equipment of the Kuomintang troops, we did fight a lot of annihilation battles. Erye ate so many of Yan Xishan's troops at the Shangdang Campaign, and the Pinghan Campaign brought out the three Kuomintang armies, and of course, Gao Shuxun revolted later. But in the future, the war will not be easy to fight, because the United States intervenes, from infantry to artillery, to tanks, the Kuomintang American equipment is complete sets, so the enemy's movement speed is relatively fast, even if it is caught, it will always be impossible to eliminate all.
At this time, Chairman Mao summed up the experience: Change the strategy, when you beat him, you can eat one bite at a time, one battalion and two camps first, and when I cut off one or two battalions of you, I can quickly eat the enemy. At this time, the combat effectiveness of the enemy's unit has declined, and then eating him one regiment, two regiments, and then eating him a division, and finally being able to quickly eat the enemy all. Chairman Mao called this tactic "zero knock brown candy." The metaphor means that the brown candy is sticky together, and the more you want to chew it, the more you can't chew it, so it's better to throw this candy on the table, it breaks, and you can pick it up and eat it. At that time, the "five main forces" of the Kuomintang were eaten in this way. According to the chairman's operational arrangements, we specialized in attacking weak places, one battalion, two battalions to a regiment, knocking him in this way, concentrating our absolute superiority forces, eating him at once, and fighting back and forth to beat his morale and confidence down. This is the process from this small annihilation war to the big annihilation war.
Fighting the US military in Korea is the same, don't think about annihilating how many troops he has at once, we need a process of making the US army from strong to weak, the specific way is to knock him in a small mouth, a small mouthful, knock to a certain extent, he will become weaker. From September to November 1952, as a result of our three-month operation in the Korean theater, we wiped out more than 110,000 enemy troops, including more than 40,000 American troops. The Battle of Shangganling was also fought in the form of a "zero-knock candy" operation, in which a small annihilation war was fought, and small victories were accumulated into big victories.
Chairman Mao's idea was put forward in the Fourth and Fifth Campaigns, but it was not fully implemented at that time. Because everyone has a process of understanding and a process of practice in fighting the US military. After four battles, our old volunteers fought very well. However, we can also see from the battle that in most cases, our army surrounds a whole division of the US army, or even a whole regiment, but it is difficult to achieve total annihilation of the enemy. There is a very important factor in the chairman's analysis of the reasons, that is, the US military still has a relatively "tenacious" will to fight and self-confidence in combat. So as soon as you hit, he resisted. And his strength is mechanized, it will come right away, the guns will come, the tanks will give you a turn, and it will be difficult for you to annihilate him! In order to defeat this self-confidence of the US military and achieve the goal of finally fighting encirclement and annihilation, Chairman Mao proposed to adopt the method of "zero knocking on the candy of the cow skin" -- to fight a small war of annihilation.
How to fight a small annihilation war? This refers to the fight against the US military, not to the ROK army. Syngman Rhee's army could take him, because his will to fight and self-confidence were poor. The American army, including the brigade of the British army, and even the brigade of the Turkish army, must be included, and a small tactical encirclement must be carried out, and each army must carefully select a battalion or slightly more of the enemy at a time, and carry out a total encirclement and annihilation. In this way, the entire battalion of the American division and the British brigade was wiped out in the third and fourth battles, and their self-confidence must be shaken! This is a profound implication.
Later, when it came to the stage of defensive campaigns, everyone consciously accepted Chairman Mao's operational thinking. It turned out that it was not very acceptable, and indeed considering that our troops were larger than his, and that mobile combat was our best trick, we could take him down at once through roundabouts and interspersed. But this move is okay to hit the ROK army, and we feel a little difficult to fight the US military ourselves. Therefore, after the fifth battle, when everyone summed up the experience, it felt that our open mouth should indeed be smaller. The materials and logistical support needed, whether it is food or ammunition, we do not have an advantage in terms of equipment, so everyone is in favor of fighting a small war of annihilation.
Small annihilation warfare was originally a tactic used in motion, that is, in the process of attack. In 1951, all units gradually implemented Chairman Mao's thinking on defensive operations. By 1952, every unit had done a good job, and whenever there was a chance, it adopted the strategy of fighting as much as it could. The cold guns and cold cannons in the process of building the fortifications mentioned above are the concrete embodiment of the "zero knocking brown candy" tactic. That is to say, we will accumulate a lot of small amounts, and when we have the opportunity, we will rely on our positions to touch the enemy to fight, and if a company attacks, we will first eat one company of him. It's nice to be able to eat a company! This style of play has indeed caused the enemy to suffer a lot, and the attack of a platoon or even a company may be eliminated by us little by little.
By July and August, the volunteer troops attacked each other and took out all kinds of skills. There are many ways to destroy the enemy, such as ambushing positions, guerrilla attacks, eating small groups of enemies, etc., or the enemy sending meat to an anvil. "Anvil" Now, it is the board for chopping meat, how can our knives do everything, plus cold guns and cold cannons, this battle is very cheap. Some troops began to choose a position for the enemy and knock him out when they had the opportunity. Like the 39th Army, immediately next to the troops west of the 38th Army, once the enemy attacked and occupied our surface position, the 39th Army that unit held in the tunnel for 7 days, and finally they fought back, making the enemy suffer. On the first day of the 12th Army's position, the ROK army launched an attack on them and occupied their surface positions. The 12th Army held out in the tunnel for 12 days, and finally fought a beautiful counterattack. The list goes on and on.
The machine gunner moved the machine gun to the vantage point and fired it violently to cover the activities of the small troops
In the defense of our positions, we have experienced various combat tests of the enemy's attack, and all units of the Volunteer Army attach great importance to it and make efforts to study how to better apply the "zero-knock candy" tactic to our attack in actual combat. On 18 September, the Volunteers launched a tactical attack first. How to get ahead? That is, when the enemy is not moving, we will act first. We selected 60 offensive points in Korea from the east coast to the west coast, all of which were well prepared by the volunteer troops and pre-war reconnaissance. We focused our offensive on the Soongyeong, Kimseong, and Wenden-ri areas, which were to the east of the central Korean defensive line. During the battle, the front-line troops in other areas also actively cooperated, and the various units of the Volunteer Army took these 60 points as the target of our attack, adopted the tactic of "zero knocking on the candy", and prepared to hit the enemy little by little. If we knock on the enemy, he will repeatedly compete with us for positions - what is good for me, I will fight with you; if there is no profit, I will take it back. This method is broken by each one, and the effect is very good. From corps to corps to divisions, all levels are studying, and everyone has a very consistent understanding, and they all feel that smashing the enemy's offensive is of great significance to the defense of our positions, because this is a big offensive after we have formed such a front. It was also recognized that we had carried out a series of tactical sorties, playing well and badly, which also had a direct impact on our autumn attack. By October, the volunteer army had roughly annihilated more than 27,000 enemy troops, gained experience in defending positions and seizing the enemy's strong fortified companies and platoon positions, and also improved our own ability to coordinate infantry and artillery and stubbornly continue to fight, the command ability of commanders was also improved, and the troops won a major victory in tactical attack.
This offensive forced 8 divisions of the US and ROKs to frequently move and replace the annihilated enemy. The enemy was not willing to accept defeat, and while the tactical attack was still continuing, he preemptively launched the so-called "Jinhua Offensive" and launched a fierce attack on our two positions at the front of the Five Holy Mountains, namely the 597.9 heights and the 537.7 North Mountain highlands, which were less than 4 square kilometers. After the 14th fight, the 15th Corps took a stand. The corps said that the 45th Division concentrated on fighting with all its might, and we will consider what will happen in the future. These two sentences solve the problem. Of course, not only these two sentences were said, but also said a lot. At that time, Deputy Commander Wang Jinshan of the Corps, Deputy Political Commissar Du Yide, and several leading comrades of the Corps talked together. Some said, "Your 45th Division is gone, and it is glorious!" "That means the determination has come to such a point. After arriving in the army, the military also had such an idea. The mood in the division is that it is determined that it must be done well. Positions cannot be lost, and desperate efforts cannot be lost! The chairman's four sentences, "Make up your mind, not be afraid of sacrifice, overcome all difficulties, and strive for victory," are indeed the same idea from top to bottom. Therefore, this battle was won on the basis of such ideas. All the troops involved in the war fought relatively well, dealing a major blow to the enemy militarily and politically. Of course, the gradual improvement of understanding is still during and after the campaign. Chairman Mao's tactic of "zero knocking on the candy" was also an important operational guiding ideology in the Shangganling Campaign, and the Volunteer Army flexibly applied this tactic to the campaign, thus achieving the extremely distinctive characteristics of the Shangganling Campaign. We have been knocking the enemy for more than 40 days, of course, the real repeated struggle of the troops is a month, and it is by relying on this successful tactical thinking that we finally knocked out the stubborn American troops little by little.
With correct guidance, Chairman Mao's operational thinking has been brought to the fore throughout the grass-roots units. You can't just say to a warrior how many enemies you want to fight, because fighting is concrete, you kill an enemy, capture an enemy, or destroy him a company, a battalion, these are concrete victories. In order to boost morale, we analyzed the enemy, despised him, and put forward the slogan: "Strategically he is a 'paper tiger.'" However, if the strategic "paper tiger" is used in battle, it will be found that the enemy's equipment is still quite strong, the cannon is so powerful, there will be casualties if it is not good, and the "paper tiger" in the battle seems to be an "iron tiger". It is good to use "paper tigers" to lay the foundation for everyone's determination to fight the US military, but it is not enough to have determination, you still have a way. Chairman Mao's "zero-knock candy" also has a concrete method for destroying the enemy in terms of combat means.
Some of the soldiers of the US 7th Division captured in the Battle of Shangganling
In mid-July, Li Baocheng, commander of the 8th Company of our 134th Regiment, and Wang Wenyong, an instructor, led a multi-platoon around the enemy's rear, suddenly opened fire on the enemy, fought fiercely for 20 minutes, completely annihilated the enemy, killed more than 50 enemy, took 2 prisoners, and only 3 casualties on our side. After the war, he was praised by Shiji: "The battle was fought very well, and the small price was exchanged for a larger result." At that time, all the units of the 15th Army were adopting the "zero-knocking brown candy" method of warfare, attacking with small units, starting with cold guns and cold artillery, destroying the enemy's squad, platoon, and battalion, until they carried out larger battles, at a very small cost, in exchange for great results. Therefore, whether the command is correct or not, we must determine a unified tactical thinking before the war.
Why were the Shangganling troops able to hold the tunnel unshakable at such a difficult time? This is because our troops, our soldiers, are full of confidence in victory, and the more difficult they feel, the greater the victory! A man who holds his ground, who has this tactical idea and combat action — I am determined to knock little by little, just to win a bigger victory. Every soldier, every company, every battalion can do a good job. This laid a solid foundation for victory and ensured our "correct command."
The practice of later operations also proved that this tactic seemed to be a tactical idea, but in the Battle of Shangganling, the Volunteer Army took it as an important guiding ideology and successfully implemented it and applied it to the entire campaign. To deal with the well-equipped and armed to the teeth of the US troops, the troops who insisted on holding on to Shangganling persisted in relying on the fortifications of the tunnels to repel the enemy's small and medium-sized attacks, and used such active means and flexible tactics as cold guns and cold artillery and small units to attack, which have been knocking the enemy for more than 40 days, accumulating battle achievements, effectively striking at the enemy, consolidating the position, and at the same time pushing the focus of the operation to the forward position, forcing the enemy to always be in a passive position of being beaten.