During the period of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea| Mao Zedong summoned Deng Hua three times to teach the tactic of "zero knocking on the candy of the cow skin."

Deng Hua served as the first deputy commander and first deputy political commissar of the Volunteer Army, assisting Peng Dehuai in organizing and commanding the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. Later, he took over Peng Dehuai as the commander and political commissar of the Volunteer Army. During the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Mao Zedong summoned Deng Hua in Beijing three times to learn about the war situation, deploy tasks, and give face-to-face instructions.

The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea lasted for more than 7 months, and the Volunteer Army and the Korean People's Army annihilated more than 230,000 enemy troops, advancing and stabilizing the front line in the vicinity of the 38th Line, and the war entered a stalemate stage.

In April 1951, U.S. Army General Ridgway took over as commander-in-chief of the United Nations Army. He found that the Volunteer offensive generally lasted only a week or so, because the Volunteers' dry food bags could only last for a week. Through analysis, he believed that this was caused by the insufficient logistical supply of the volunteer army, and called it the "dry food bag offensive". So Ridgway invented the "magnetic tactics" against the volunteers. The characteristic of this tactic is that during the 7-day offensive period of the volunteer army, avoiding its sharp edge, taking the initiative to withdraw, but maintaining contact with the volunteer army, when the volunteer army's dry food bags and ammunition need to be supplied after 7 days, the combined tactics of rapid penetration of armored mechanized troops, parachuting of airborne troops and "advancing in tandem" with the main ground troops were used to counterattack the volunteers.

In response to "magnetic tactics", in early June 1951, when the fifth campaign was at the end, Mao Zedong decided to summon front-line commanders. Peng Dehuai sent Deng Hua to lead the main leaders of the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies of the Volunteer Army, who had joined the Korean War, to Beijing to report to the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong on the actual situation on the battlefield.

As soon as Deng Hua stayed at the Beijing Hotel, Mao Zedong first received him. At the Zhongnanhai Juxiang Bookstore, Mao Zedong shook Deng Hua's hand and looked at him for a long time: "Comrade Deng Hua, you are much thinner. Labor expedition, hard work! Deng Hua was deeply moved.

After taking his seat, Deng Hua gave a report on the situation of the war in Korea and his views on the establishment, equipment, and military production of the volunteer army. Mao Zedong listened carefully, nodded his head from time to time, and made some notes in a small book.

At this time, Mao Zedong told Deng Hua about the operational policy of dealing with the "United Nations Army": "Dehuai and you are both hunan people, do you know what 'zero knocking brown candy' is?" For the Us and British troops, it is now necessary to implement the policy of tactical small encirclement, fight a small war of annihilation, and knock him out of the candy. He said to the point: "Our strategic approach is to fight protractedly and actively defend." It is necessary to talk while fighting, to combine talks with each other, to promote talks, and to strive to resolve the Korean issue on a fair and reasonable basis. ”

Listening to Mao Zedong's image metaphor, Deng Hua had a bottom in his heart. He once again suggested that the Central Military Commission should consider arranging for the rotation of troops and cadres of the whole army into the DPRK in stages, so as to learn the experience of fighting against the enemy with highly modern equipment through actual combat. Mao Zedong affirmed and praised this.

After returning to the Beijing Hotel in the evening, Deng Hua's thoughts were fluttering, and he could not sleep at night, so he began to write "On the Protracted War of the Korean Battlefield" with his pen.

On June 15, Deng Hua returned to the Korean battlefield with Mao Zedong's instructions and finished articles. Later, Deng Hua gave a report entitled "On the Protracted War in the Korean Battlefield" at a meeting of senior cadres of the Volunteer Army, which was praised by Peng Dehuai and other senior cadres of the Volunteer Army.

This was the second time Mao Zedong had received Deng Hua over the issue of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and there had been another one before.

On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out. In October, the CPC Central Committee made a major strategic decision to resist US aggression and aid Korea. When electing the first deputy commander and first deputy political commissar of the Volunteer Army, Mao Zedong thought of Deng Hua, who was then the commander of the 13th Corps.

As early as July 19, Deng Hua, who was in Guangzhou, suddenly received an urgent telegram from the central government and immediately took a train north from Guangzhou. At the Zhongnanhai Juxiang Bookstore, Mao Zedong praised Deng Hua: "The battle on Hainan Island was well fought! Some things, it really seems to be calculated in advance, if you fight two months late, it is likely to become a second Taiwan. ”

Mao Zedong's words turned sharply and turned to the main topic: "It seems that Truman will not give up in North Korea." Your task is to defend the northeast frontier, but to prepare for war with the Americans, for an unprecedented war, for him to fight the atomic bomb. He hit the atomic bomb, I hit the grenade, grabbed his weakness, followed him, and finally defeated him. Deng Hua said excitedly: "Yes, seize his weakness, he hit his advantage, I hit my advantage, this is a good way for us to deal with the US military." Mao Zedong said: "I am still the old saying, strategically despise him, as a paper tiger; tactically value him, as a real tiger." ”

In the winter of 1952, the Korean War was in a state of confrontation, the armistice negotiations were also interrupted for a long time, and whether the war stopped or continued to expand was at a turning point. Mao Zedong summoned Deng Hua for the third time.

From December 2 to 5, Eisenhower, who had just been elected president of the United States, inspected the Korean front.

Mao watched closely Eisenhower's words and deeds and the situation in North Korea. While Eisenhower was on the Korean front, Mao Zedong sent a telegram ordering Deng Hua to return to China to accept the mission. On December 4, Deng Hua wrote a report entitled "On the Situation of the Korean War Situation and The Principles and Tasks for Next Year" at the Beijing Hotel. On the evening of the 7th, Mao Zedong received Deng Hua.

Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other central leaders were already waiting at the Juxiang Bookstore in Zhongnanhai, when Deng Hua had been appointed acting commander and political commissar of the Volunteer Army half a year ago. After shaking hands with Deng Hua, Mao Zedong said: "Listen to the drums and think of the general." Eisenhower came to power, and it looked like there would be new moves. You were approached to study countermeasures against Eisenhower. I have read the report you wrote on the fourth day and approved a few words, which generally means that the volunteer army should proceed from the judgment that the enemy has landed, that it must land on the west coast, and that it must land between the Cheongcheon River and the Han River, and determine the course of action. The time of landfall may be in the spring, or earlier. ”

Mao Zedong's main intention in recalling Deng Hua was to prevent the second U.S. landing at Inchon. He told Deng Hua: "The enemy will never be allowed to land on the west coast, especially along the HanChuan river to the Yalu River. Deng Hua said: "The west coast command structure is not perfect, originally planned to be concurrently held by the 19th Corps, according to the current situation, it needs to be reconsidered." Mao Zedong immediately stated: "The West Sea Finger should be strengthened and expanded." It's better that you go in person, you go, I'm assured! Deng Hua immediately expressed his position: "Please rest assured Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee that we will guarantee the completion of the task!" The current situation on the Korean battlefield is completely different from the landing at Inchon in September 1950, and if Eisenhower really wants to make this decision, it will definitely be a disaster! ”

In accordance with Mao Zedong's instructions, Deng Hua put forward the operational policy and specific operational arrangements of "protracted combat and active defense" at the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army, demanding that the enemy be resolutely not allowed to land, that the enemy should be resolutely eliminated when he came aboard, and that the enemy should absolutely not be allowed to establish a front behind us. Under the organization and command of Deng Hua, the volunteer army successfully completed the preparations for the anti-landing defense operation in 4 months. Because our army was well prepared, the US military was forced to abandon its attempt to land and resume armistice negotiations with us, paving the way for the subsequent realization of the Korean armistice.

The volunteer army adopted the "zero knock candy" tactic, which completely failed Ridgway's "magnetic tactics", and the volunteers regained the initiative in the war, and finally forced the "United Nations Army" to sign the "Korean Armistice Agreement".

Author: Chen Hui

Editor: Wang Xiaoli