On December 21, 1212, the imperial court sent to Guizhou to prepare for Wu Sangui's withdrawal of wu Sangui's clan, Wailang Samha, rushed to Beijing on horseback and reported to Kangxi the details of Wu Sangui's rebellion. When the news came, the people were shocked.
Therefore, as we said earlier, many ministers who originally opposed the withdrawal of the domain, fearing Wu Sangui's forces, demanded that a small number of ministers who advocated the withdrawal of the domain be dealt with in order to apologize to Wu Sangui.
But the withdrawal of the domain was something that Kangxi had already made up his mind, so why should he change his mind in the middle of the way? In the face of public opinion, he did not retreat, took the initiative to fully assume the responsibility of making the decision to withdraw the domain, and protected a small number of ministers from attack.
The debate over whether the decision to withdraw the domain was correct or not was settled, but the imperial court was still deeply divided on whether to send the Eight Banners to quell the rebellion. Han officials were worried that the long-distance transfer of troops would be "voluminous in military supplies", and they were afraid that the imperial court would be overburdened, so they suggested that "the troops should be transferred to the nearest place" to oppose the transfer of troops from Beijing to Yungui in the far southwest.
Zuo Jindu Yushi Wei Xiangshu held this opinion, and for this reason he said: When ancient saints fought with troops, they often used local materials, so why should they work hard to move the masses and cut them down? Before the thieves reach our positions, our army can quell their rebellion with ease.
In contrast to the Han ministers, the Manchu ministers, although at one point had major disagreements over whether to withdraw their domains, were completely consistent in their attitudes on sending troops to quell the rebellion. Hubu Manchu Shangshu Misihan said: The arrogance of the thieves is too strong, and the non-Eight Banners soldiers cannot subdue them, so they should also send the Eight Banners To attack them.
As for the issue of military supplies, the coordination and mobilization of the central and local governments is enough to support ten years, and there is nothing to worry about.
Finally, Kangxi decided to send the Eight Banners Army to suppress wu Sangui's rebels.
At first, Kangxi tried to control the war in Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, and Hubei, and to minimize the coverage. Therefore, he sent the forward commander Shuo Dai to lead a large army to the throat of Jingzhou day and night to defend, on the one hand, to stabilize the hearts and minds of the military and the people, on the other hand, to further occupy Changde, Hunan, and curb the rebel offensive.
He then ordered the Xi'an general Varkha to lead the deputy commanders, as well as all the cavalry, to march from Shaanxi to Sichuan, holding on to the dangerous pass from Yunnan to Sichuan, in case the army entered Yunnan, and cooperated with the admiral to negotiate.
In Guangxi, because it was a necessary place for Yunnan to pass to the east, the relationship was very important, and he awarded Sun Yanling the title of Fuman general and Luo Guoan as the capital, and jointly strengthened the defense. In order to concentrate his forces on fighting the Wu Sangui rebels, Kangxi issued a timely order to stop the dismantling of Geng and Shang Erfan, and recall Liang Qingbiao and Chen Yibing, who had traveled to Erfan.
On December 24, Kangxi also ordered The King of Doro Shuncheng Commandery,Le'erjin," to be the general of Ningnan Jingkou and command various generals to garrison Jingzhou. Eight counselors, including Dorobelechani and Du tongjue Luojuman, and fourteen generals, including Du Tong Fan Da Li, Wang Guozhao, and Deputy Governor Rusi Batulu, went with him.
In this way, each leader of the Eight Banners of Manchuria and Mongolia had a forward, seven escorts, and ten horsemen, and each leader of the Han army had five horsemen, and there were also some corresponding officials, and the military posts were fully equipped.
Kangxi's military action against Wu Sangui can be described as resolute and thorough, and there is no room for turning back, because he has already seen through Wu Sangui's wolf ambitions, and he can either conquer or surrender until he is eliminated, and he cannot back down. He insisted on his views until he finally put down wu Sangui's rebellion.
In the military attack on Wu Sangui, Kangxi adopted a variety of strategies and tactics, focusing on finding fighters to cut off the enemy's rear road and block their grain routes, so that the victory on the frontal battlefield had a greater certainty.
For example, when attacking Yuezhou, Kangxi asked for more warships to be prepared at Dongting Lake, and Dorobelechani, fearing the wind and waves in the lake, requested the removal of the warships, but Kangxi insisted on his correct decision-making, demanded that he must overcome various difficulties and resolutely carry out the order, and finally achieved the purpose of blocking the enemy's rear road and preventing them from colluding with land and water, and soon took Yuezhou.
It is not easy to uphold one's correct position in military operations; first, it is easy to be troubled by the illusion of the enemy; second, it is easy to be disturbed by the emotions of its own generals; and third, it is easy to question itself. In the process of Kangxi's personal conquest of Gardan, there were similar examples, but Kangxi always adhered to the correct strategic decision-making and never gave up easily until the goal was achieved.
In February of the 35th year of the Kangxi Dynasty, Kangxi led the Zhonglu army on a second personal expedition, when he went up the Krullen River in order to find the traces of Kaldan and confront him.
However, for a long time, Kaldan's soldiers and horses did not appear, and some ministers thought that the enemy had heard that the emperor had personally marched, and they had already been frightened far away, plus they felt that the emperor was far away from the desert and the desolate area, and the holy bow was important, and the little hairy thief of Gardan only needed to appoint another general to lead the conquest, so they asked the emperor to withdraw his troops. Kangxi firmly believed that the emissaries we sent, horses and camels, were all detained by Kaldan.
But they were allowed to return to our army on foot, which showed that he was still in the area of the Krullen River, not far away, and did not know the arrival of our army's soldiers, so he acted recklessly. If you don't return without success, won't you spend military resources in vain and miss the opportunity? Sure enough, a few days later, the malay detectives in the front reported that Gardan was still in Krullen, and Kangxi's judgment was confirmed, so that the courtiers around him had to admire the emperor's wisdom.
In this battle, in order to stabilize Kaldan, Kangxi secretly ordered the western road Toyangu to accelerate forward, and he himself led the Middle Route Army to slow down the marching speed, waiting for the momentum of the attack to form. On May 13, FeiYangubu learned the exact news of Gardan and waited for the enemy in the Zhaomodobu position, and Gardan did indeed arrive in the afternoon, and the two armies entered a fierce battle, regardless of victory or defeat.
Later, Feyangu's attack on the rear of the enemy was successful, and the Battle of Zhaomodo completely annihilated the main force of Gardan, capturing a lot, causing Kaldan to suffer a heavy blow, and if there was no strategic decision that Kangxi insisted on, the enemy would run away in vain, and this great victory can be said to be persistent.
Sun Tzu's Art of War said, "The soldiers are plotting." "Those who yield to others by means of conspiracy will win without fighting, so in war, those who do not move soldiers are the first, and those who can recruit them are constantly recruited, and those who cannot be recruited in the end should also do their best."
This consciousness and advocacy was an important part of Kangxi's military thought and career. Although for any war, Kangxi was fighting with the attitude of fighting with a war and had the determination to fight to the end. But throughout the course of the war, he never gave up on appeasement.
As far as the idea of appeasement is concerned, successive emperors have adopted it when disasters have come, but weak emperors often show weakness and timidity when recruiting rebels.
Kangxi's gestures are closely integrated with the offensive on the battlefield, that is, based on fighting, fighting and seeking caress, which is of course a positive and enterprising posture, which can make him avoid passivity and maintain a state of readiness with both hands.
In terms of its characteristics, Kangxi's solicitation was the combination of soft and hard measures and military and political means that he cooperated with the war.
Kangxi used a clever trick, the main performance of which was:
First of all, when recruiting rebels, it is manifested in softening the other side with a sincere attitude, which is more or less manifested in the treatment of Shang and Geng Erfan in counter-rebellion, the treatment of Zheng in the process of recovering Taiwan, and so on. However, the most prominent is the attitude towards the rebel general Wang Fuchen of Pingliang Prefecture in the counterinsurgency war. At that time, it can be said that Wang Fuchen's rebellion was the result of the Qing Dynasty's suspicion and persecution.
The military operation of Wu Sangui's rebels naturally thought of pulling Wang Fuchen and winning the support and cooperation of Wang Fuchen as much as possible, which was conducive to the extension of Wu Jun's power to the north.
As a Han official, Wang Fuju had no intention of rebelling, so he handed over All the letters that Wu Sangui had instigated his rebellion to the imperial court, which should have been rewarded and trusted, but unfortunately due to ethnic discrimination, Wang Fuchen's actions did not fully trust the imperial court. So Kangxi sent Moluo through Shaanxi to supervise Wang Fuchen.
Mo Luo's excessive restrictions made Wang Fuchen dissatisfied, which was actually contrary to Kangxi's original intentions. Mo Luo wanted to transfer wang Fuchen's elite, which directly caused his rebellion.
Wang Fuchen once said angrily: This is completely putting me to death. After the incident, Kangxi realized that he had mishandled the problem, so he quickly changed his attitude toward Wang Fuchen, from doubting and restricting Wang Fuchen in the past to trying to appease Wang Fuchen.
Kangxi once repeatedly stated that "the blame is in the decay, and the crime is what is wrong with The Er", "Now that the situation has become sudden, the love must be obtained, and the degeneration is only to be resentful, and there is no condemnation".
After Kangxi's repeated persuasion and solicitation, Wang Fuchen finally submitted to the imperial court.
Wang Fuchen's rebellion made Kangxi realize that there was no way out of continuing the traditional ethnic discrimination policy of his ancestors, whether politically or militarily, and that blindly attacking in war was also not a perfect tactic.
After the Shaanxi problem was resolved, Kangxi focused his next crackdown on Fujian.
He believes that the policy toward Geng Jingzhong should be different from That of Wu Sangui. It was precisely because he realized that the cause of Geng Fan's rebellion was "bound to be a moment of ignorance and devout cunning", so when Kangxi brought Wu Sangui's grandson Wu Yingxiong and others in Beijing to justice, Geng Jingzhong's younger brothers were tolerated, and the officers and soldiers to which they belonged were not punished.
This method of handling was actually appropriate from beginning to end, even after Geng Jingzhong's rebellion, Kangxi also dealt with it in a pacificating posture.
At that time, he immediately dispatched The Ministry of Works Langzhong Zhou Xiangxu and Geng Jingzhong's bodyguard Chen Jiayou to Fujian together to send Geng Jingzhong a message to change his mind, and later although he sent the general Jieshu the Prince of Kang to the front line of Fujian and Zhejiang to strengthen military operations, he still did not forget to send people to carry out the work of appeasement.
Kangxi was also mentally prepared for the problem of Shangfan in Guangdong.
He believed that Shang Zhixin's rebellion was not enough to fear, Wu Sangui would not trust him, and there were many contradictions within Shang Domain, and many people opposed him to rebel. Therefore, as long as the recruitment work of Fujian Geng Fan is successfully solved, Shang Zhixin will not be difficult to surrender. Practice has proved that these two aspects of the policy are correct.