<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="1" > Mao Zedong's "half friend" Li Lisan, the crazy idea of occupying a big city, people are very helpless! </h1>
In early 1928, Mao zedong was cautious because the warlords were not fighting each other, so he was shocked by the Shanghai side's desire for him to launch an all-out attack. By 1930, he was in favor of bold action, because Chiang Kai-shek was under attack by two warlord forces and Japan was putting pressure on China.
In March 1930, the clumsy Bureaucracy of the Third International played a grotesque note. Its press release published Mao's obituary! Declaring him dead of tuberculosis, he was obituary "the pioneer of the Chinese proletariat." This mistake was by no means the kremlin's most serious of its many mistakes on China.
As the days of 1930 passed, Li Lisan, with the support of Zhou Enlai, began to resemble a toad that blew his stomach wide and then burst. The strange tug-of-war between him and Mao Zedong shook the ground beneath everyone's feet. Ironically, Mao's success in Jiangxi made his problems with Li Lisan and Zhou Enlai worse. Even Li Lisan was impressed by the growing influence of the Red Army. This force of Zhu De and Mao Zedong — formally known as the Red Fourth Army — is unequivocally the most powerful weapon in the hands of the left in all of China. This did not lead Li Lisan to support Mao Zedong's long-term adherence to the idea of rural base areas, and he called the attempt to establish political power "in the mountains" "a joke."
However, Li Lisan did want to use Zhu De's and Mao Zedong's forces to advance his idea of launching attacks on several major cities. He suddenly won the power to do so. General Peng Dehuai marched into Changsha. He barely occupied Changsha for ten days, and then he was driven out. General He Long (whose life will soon be intertwined with Mao's) was sent to Wuhan, but he failed to capture the crucial metropolis. Mao Zedong and Zhu De made a perfunctory march to Nanchang: they occupied the Jiangxi capital for 24 hours, but to no avail. There was no uprising of the workers, no collapse of the Kuomintang, and no mass desertion of the warlord forces. In the sad and fruitless march to Nanchang, Mao Zedong's only consolation was that Li Lisan's line had proved bankrupt.
When the dust of defeat had not yet settled, Li Lisan played another card. A month after Peng Dehuai lost Changsha, Li Lisan asked him to try again and ordered Mao Zedong and Zhu De to join him in the campaign. The Red Army was armed with more than 20,000 men, the largest build-up of Communist forces and a big bet. Mao Zedong obeyed for 12 days. However, the Kuomintang had aircraft, heavy artillery and gunboats...
Mao Zedong gave up the fight. He disobeyed Li Lisan's orders (and took Peng Dehuai and Zhu De with him). He cast a vote to resist the mistake with his foot and returned to the south of Jiangxi. Although Mao Zedong was full of revolutionary optimism in 1930, it was not the optimism of Li Lisan's urban uprising with global significance. In Li Lisan's eyes, Mao Zedong suffered from the disease of "peasant consciousness."
Li Lisan's toad exploded, and within two months he had lost all his party positions. Like Qu Qiubai before him, he was summoned to Moscow to lick his wounds in his mentor's bullpen, and later to their prison. Mao was concerned with the survival and realistic goals of his own troops, and the direction of the wind in Shanghai and Moscow was less important (nor so clear) to him. So, the matter is not a simple antagonism between Mao Zedong and Li Lisan. In fact, Mao's cause had advanced in the chaos of Li Lisan's period; by the end of this period, as Mao Zedong had wished, the countryside, rather than the cities, had become the focus of the CCP's attention.