The Russian-Ukrainian conflict spawned the EU's "diplomatic revolution"? It's too early to say

The Paper's special contributor Zhang Yaning

On February 24, a military conflict broke out between Russia and Ukraine. The next day, the European Union announced sanctions against the Russian president, foreign minister and other government officials. Four days later, the European Union announced a second round of sanctions, including banning financial transactions with the Russian central bank, closing all of the EU's airspace to Russia, and providing weapons and other equipment worth 500 million euros to the Ukrainian armed forces through the European Peace Fund. Six days later, the European Union announced a third round of sanctions, including the exclusion of seven Russian banks from the Global Interbank Financial Telecommunication Association (SWIFT) system, and the prohibition of Russia Today and Russian Satellite News Agency from conducting news operations in the EU. Eight days later, the EU launched the "Temporary Protection Mechanism" to provide more than 2 million Ukrainian refugees entering the EU with visas, work permits, health insurance and educational opportunities for more than one year.

These measures have changed the impression that the EU has left on the outside world as inefficient decision-making, internal discord, and cowardice and incompetence in diplomacy. In a speech to the European Parliament on March 1, European Commission President von der Leyen stressed that "this crisis is a watershed for the EU". Similarly, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Borrell wrote on March 3 that "the Russo-Ukrainian war marked the birth of a geopolitical Europe ... The EU must become a coercive power." Even U.S. Secretary of State Blinken, who visited Brussels on March 4, had to admit that "the EU's moves over the past few weeks have been unusual, and the efficiency and intensity of its decision-making are quite historic."

The recent new development trend of EU diplomacy has led many Western scholars to exclaim that EU diplomacy has "completed the transformation that has not been achieved in the past few decades in one week", and the EU's "diplomatic revolution" has arrived. In response to these assertions, this article argues that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has indeed triggered some significant changes in EU diplomacy that deserve attention. Fundamentally, these changes have largely been triggered by the foreign policy transformation of Germany, the EU's core power. But while we pay attention to these changes, we should also recognize that the underlying logic that determines EU foreign policy has not changed. Therefore, it is too early to shout that the EU will usher in a "diplomatic revolution".

EU Diplomacy "Today is different from the past"

Objectively speaking, eu diplomacy has indeed seen a series of significant developments in eu diplomacy over the past week. In short, the scope and intensity of economic sanctions is unprecedented; political solidarity bridges long-standing divisions among member states on some sensitive issues; and eu security policy takes on a more pronounced offensive character.

First, the degree of weaponization and coercion of EU economic sanctions has increased significantly. The EU is essentially a unified market of 27 member states. With its huge economy and trade scale, economic sanctions have become an important starting point for the EU to achieve its diplomatic strategy. But economic sanctions will undoubtedly hurt the EU's own trade and investment interests. Therefore, for important economic and trade partners or important international actors, the EU tends to be more restrained in its use of economic sanctions tools.

But this time, in the face of Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and the EU's fifth-largest trading partner, the EU has resorted to unprecedented and costless economic sanctions. These sanctions not only target Russian heads of state and leadership in a rare way, but more importantly, almost completely cut off the Russian economy from the world's advanced economies. For the negative impacts such as soaring energy prices, supply chain turmoil and inflation that such an intense sanction will inevitably trigger, the EU, member states and even economic and trade groups know it but also have no scruples.

Second, the "fire at the gates" gave birth to a political unity and mobilization capacity rarely seen in the history of the European Union. Looking back at the history of European integration, member states tend to cooperate deeply in the economic and trade fields, but stagnate in cooperation in core national capacities such as social welfare, taxation, and national defense. The refugee policy is the epitome of the latter. The influx of refugees will not only have an impact on the labor market and social welfare policies of the importing countries, but also objectively require the governments of the importing countries to increase their investment in social integration and other aspects, and improper handling can easily lead to social differentiation and political extremism. The political divisions within the European Union caused by the 2015 European refugee crisis are a striking example of the resulting east-west European antagonism and the rise of far-right parties.

But in the face of the largest wave of refugees in Europe since the end of World War II, Poland and Hungary have changed their previous staunch attitude of rejecting refugees, receiving about 1.2 million and 200,000 Ukrainian refugees, respectively. For the first time, EU member states have even launched the EU Interim Protection Mechanism, which has been in place for 20 years. The mechanism contains refugee apportionment schemes among Member States and requires Member States to provide adequate legal protection and welfare benefits to refugees. Because some member states have previously criticized the mechanism as too "generous", it has not been activated since its establishment in 2001. For the EU member states to activate the mechanism in a unanimous manner, the UNITED High Commissioner for Refugees Grandi praised it as an "unprecedented decision". As of March 8, according to UN data, the EU has accepted more than 2 million Ukrainian refugees in the past 13 days, more than the total number of refugees admitted by the EU in the 2015 refugee crisis (1.3 million) in the whole year.

Third, the EU's security and defence policy has shown a more obvious offensive character. Since the EU is essentially a political and economic union, and the vast majority of member states rely mainly on NATO on security and defense issues, security and defense policy has always been a shortcoming in the development of European integration. The only security and defense cooperation focuses on joint weapons research and development and market-oriented reform of military procurement. In addition, the vast majority of the EU's overseas military deployments are mainly responsible for defensive tasks such as peacekeeping and national capacity building in the host country.

From another perspective, the defensive character of the EU in its security and defence policy is also determined by the limitations of the EU's legal framework. Under Article 41 of the Treaty on The European Union, the REGULAR TREASURY OF THE EU IS PROHIBITED FROM SPENDING IN THE MILITARY OR DEFENCE FIELDS. As a result, the provision of military equipment to belligerents has become a no-go zone in the EU's security and defence policy. This time, the EU chose to break this forbidden area, and for the first time, through a non-recurring fiscal expenditure, the "EU Peace Fund", provided Ukraine with 500 million euros worth of lethal weapons and equipment, which almost exhausted the entire budget of the fund in 2022. The EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Borrelli called the move a "historic moment".

In short, in the face of the geopolitical security crisis occurring "in front of the bed", EU diplomacy has shown a rare mobilization ability and coercion. But how to explain this transformation requires us to re-look at the level of member states, after all, the key to launching the EU's diplomatic transformation is still in the hands of member states, especially the EU's political and economic center of gravity - Germany.

German diplomacy says no to "Merkelism"

Germany has the largest population, size of trade and economy among EU member states. The European debt crisis in 2010 and the subsequent reform of the EU's economic governance system further strengthened Germany's leadership in EU politics and economics. As a result, the turmoil in Berlin could cause terrifying waves in Brussels, thousands of miles away.

In the face of this Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the linkage between German diplomacy and EU diplomacy is extremely obvious. On February 23, Germany announced the termination of approval of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, which is connected to Russia, and announced the German gas and coal strategic reserve plan the next day, followed by a meeting of EU energy ministers to prepare for the relevant measures to reduce the EU's energy dependence on Russia on February 28. Similarly, the German government finally agreed on February 26 to exclude major Russian banks from the SWIFT system, after which the European Union announced sanctions on SWIFT on March 2. In addition, on February 26, the German government historicly announced the supply of 1,000 sets of anti-tank weapons and 500 sets of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine, and the European Union immediately announced the supply of military equipment to Ukraine two days later. The above diplomatic linkage shows that any discussion of the EU's "diplomatic revolution" cannot bypass the German factor behind it.

But before making a concrete analysis of recent changes in German foreign policy, we should first return to the starting point of change – "Merkelism". Since being first elected Chancellor of Germany in 2005, Merkel has been re-elected three times for a total of 16 years. Under her leadership, Germany rose from the "sick man of Europe" to the "engine" of Europe's political economy. Given Merkel's deep imprint on German politics and diplomacy, European scholars have dubbed her governing style "Merkelism." In terms of diplomacy, "Merkelism" is embodied in the following three characteristics:

First, it prefers stability and diplomacy and dialogue. For Germany, whose economic development is heavily dependent on foreign trade, a stable and open international environment is the foundation of its existence. Naturally, in the face of disputes and conflicts, Merkel's government not only tends to ease tensions through dialogue and diplomacy, but will do everything possible to avoid German involvement in any military conflict. Moreover, based on the lessons of Germany's history in World War II, Merkel's government believes that military deterrence is not a viable solution to political differences. As a result, Merkel's government has been lukewarm about raising Germany's military spending to 2 percent of ITS GROSS Domestic Product.

Second, it is pragmatic and values Germany's economic interests. For merkel's government, mutually beneficial and win-win economic and trade relations are not only in line with Germany's economic interests, but also an important means to promote German foreign policy. Merkel's government hopes to subtly guide its trading partners toward Germany by deepening economic and trade exchanges. At the same time, Merkel's government rejects the use of ideology to guide foreign relations, advocating an objective view of different development models. As for German-Russian relations, since former German Chancellor Brandt's "New Orient Policy", German diplomacy has adhered to the principle that "Europe isolating Russia cannot achieve lasting peace". Because of this, in order to balance a series of EU sanctions against Russia after the Crimean crisis in 2014, the Merkel government launched the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline project despite the fierce opposition of the United States and EU member states.

Third, reactive decision-making, with less agenda setting. In the words of former German Health Minister Span, "Merkel works like a scientist, she reads a lot of material and evaluates the facts, but she doesn't have a lot of pre-conceived ideas". In stark contrast to Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron is more of a thinker of EU diplomacy. Under macron's vigorous promotion, "strategic autonomy" has become a high-frequency hot word and the main guiding strategy of EU diplomacy. In contrast, although Merkel has also demonstrated "arbitrary" decisions in major decisions such as the European debt crisis and the refugee crisis, these decisions are still choices that have to be made under the pressure of the crisis, far from the strategic conception of the future of the EU.

If we take "Merkelism" as a reference, Germany's foreign policy has indeed undergone earth-shaking changes recently. On February 27, German Chancellor Schoerz delivered a speech in the Bundestag that european media called a "turning point in German diplomacy." Among them, Scholz mentioned five times that "Germany is at a watershed in history" and stressed that "the world of the future will no longer be the same as before".

Specifically, Scholz proposed five action plans for the German government: (1) to break the diplomatic practice of "not sending weapons to the belligerent areas" and provide lethal weapons to Ukraine; (2) to support comprehensive and uncapped sanctions against Russia; (3) to increase Germany's military deployment to many countries in Eastern Europe under the framework of NATO; (4) to establish a special defense fund of 100 billion euros to modernize the Bundeswehr and to pledge to increase German military spending to 2% of GDP by 2024. (5) Break down energy dependence on Russia and establish strategic reserves of coal and natural gas.

In contrast to "Merkelism", Scholz's speech is particularly out of place in two respects. First, with the haze of war re-enveloping the continent, the Scholz administration once again saw hard power such as national defense as a necessity to maintain its own and European security. In contrast, Merkel's promotion of diplomacy and dialogue, although still considered by Scholz to be the "direction of efforts" of German diplomacy, he also made it clear that Germany would no longer "naively dialogue for the sake of dialogue".

The Scholz government's courage to make this huge shift in the field of defense comes from the reversal of mainstream public opinion. Germans have been considered passive pacifists for decades, but the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict has awakened ordinary Germans who are immersed in "quiet years." According to a March 1 poll by Germany's Daily Mirror, 78 percent of the population surveyed supported the delivery of weapons to Ukraine and supported an increase in German military spending. In fact, this shift in public opinion was already beginning in last September's German general election, when the ruling Coalition's Greens called on Germany to be more active and promising in the diplomatic and security spheres. According to European media, Scholz's final determination to provide weapons to Ukraine and sanctions against Russian banks were achieved under the strong impetus of Green Party co-chairs Harbek and Belberk.

Second, the Scholz government has repositioned the relationship between economic interests and diplomatic strategy. If "Merkelism" emphasizes that the primary goal of diplomatic strategy is to expand Germany's economic interests, then the Scholz government believes that economic interests must make way for diplomatic strategy under extreme conditions. Because of the close economic and trade ties between Germany and Russia, Merkel's government opposed sweeping sanctions against Russia after the 2014 Crimean crisis. On the contrary, the Scholz government is willing to bear huge economic costs and to impose comprehensive economic sanctions on Russia in line with other EU member states. Even German Finance Minister Lindner, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who has long advocated for Germany's economic interests, argues that government debt from sanctions against Russia should be seen as an "investment in the future."

There is no doubt that Scholz's speech is a huge departure from the "Merkelism" born out of the Chengping period. But a more crucial question is whether this departure from "Merkelism" is "goodbye" or "goodbye"? As Scholz pointed out in his speech, "Europe is the framework and guide for German action". Therefore, to answer this question, we need to return to the political framework of the European Union to make judgments.

The "change" and "unchanged" of EU diplomacy

In fact, in addition to Germany, the other member states of the European Union have also experienced a significant turn in foreign policy as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. For example, Sweden and Finland, which have held a neutral stance since the Cold War, have been leaning toward NATO by mainstream public opinion. In particular, in Russia's neighbor Finland, local polls show that for the first time in history, more than half (53%) of the population supports Finland's accession to NATO, nearly double the number of dissenters (28%). In addition, on March 6, the Danish government announced that it would allocate about 940 million euros in special military expenditure to strengthen armaments and ensure that the level of military spending will be raised to a NATO standard of 2% of GDP by 2033. More importantly, although Denmark joined the European Union in 1973, it has not been involved in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). But the Danish government announced on March 6 that it would hold a referendum on June 1 to decide whether to join the CSDP.

In essence, the foreign policy changes of both Germany and other member states are mainly reflected in changes in defense policy, concentrated in the heating up of transatlantic security cooperation. Obviously, this is a natural response to geopolitical security threats in the east. But while highlighting the changes in EU foreign policy, we should also be clear that the fundamental factors that determine EU foreign policy remain relatively stable.

First, the unified internal market is still the source of the EU's diplomatic influence, and maintaining the openness and stability of the international order is still the core interest of the EU. The European Community, the predecessor of the European Union, was built on the wreckage of World War II, and member states hoped to establish a trade and economic community by sharing part of economic sovereignty, so as to solve the problem of peace and development in Europe once and for all. Today, the unified market covering 27 member states not only reflects the essential characteristics of the EU, but its derived common trade policy has also become the core means of the EU's diplomatic influence. Maintaining an open and stable international order is therefore the foundation of the EU, and this core interest will not change as a result of a regional military conflict.

Second, the EU's motivation for strategic autonomy has not only not weakened but has been strengthened. The EU's pursuit of strategic autonomy aims to deal with the possible negative impact of Sino-US competition by strengthening its own strength. Objectively, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has indeed brought the EU closer to security cooperation with NATO and the United States, but this has not changed the EU's original intention of seeking strategic autonomy. Even to a certain extent, this geopolitical conflict has highlighted the urgency of strategic autonomy for the EU, and the EU's leading role in economic sanctions and response to refugees also demonstrates the huge potential of the EU's strategic autonomy. As the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Borrelli, pointed out, "the EU should stop the metaphysical discussions around strategic autonomy; whatever you call it, it is important to take our security into its own hands"; similarly, Macron stressed in his televised address to all citizens on March 2 that "the EU must take this opportunity to become a more independent and autonomous force".

Third, structural divergence in the interests of member states remains. While EU member states have been unprecedentedly united in the short term around economic sanctions against Russia and the resettlement of refugees, we should also be aware that the resulting economic and social costs are concentrated in a small number of member states. The latest research shows that economic sanctions against Russia have hit the Baltic countries the hardest on exports; energy price volatility mainly affects Germany, Italy and Hungary. Thus, in the context of a serious imbalance in the cost-sharing of sanctions, the brief political solidarity among member States will gradually be replaced by antagonisms and conflicts of interest.

In summary, whether it is the coercive nature of the EU on economic sanctions, the rare political solidarity among member states, or the renewed focus of member states on defense policy and energy independence, it is a natural reaction due to sudden geosecurity threats. On the one hand, we should be prepared to accept that the diplomatic concepts of the EU and its member states will be more "realistic"; on the other hand, we should also be soberly aware that the core drivers, strategic objectives, and structural flaws of the EU's foreign policy have not changed fundamentally. In short, it is too early to shout about the EU's "diplomatic revolution."

(Yaning Zhang, Visiting Fellow, Jacques Delore Institute)

Responsible editor: Zhu Zhengyong Photo editor: Le Yufeng