Rousseau's enlightenment attempt: to transcend reason with compassion

This article is based on the Philosophical Gate

Author = Huang Xuan

Source = Social Science Front

According to Rousseau, compassion is "a natural disgust that we develop when we see sentient beings, especially our kind, die or suffer." His strong nostalgic tendencies made it impossible for him to study the problem of sympathy according to the empiricist and utilitarian paths of hume and Smith of his contemporaries. Thus Rousseau was willing to risk becoming an outcast of the Enlightenment family, abandoning the rational method of analyzing historical facts and using an incomparably rich imagination to explore the origins of human compassion in order to carry out "the experiment of man who understands nature." Although Rousseau was not the only one in the 18th-century Enlightenment who emphasized the importance of sympathy, his theory of sympathy was often seen as the most powerful weapon to strike at the rational spirit that was dominant at the time.

I. Rousseau's opposition to "Enlightenment Reason"

Rousseau did not oppose the rational spirit in general, and even emphasized that the rational spirit is very important for the development of the human mind. He said that people should not punish reason or reason wherever they are. What Rousseau opposed was actually enlightened reason, the rational authority established by the philosophes as the highest standard of judgment in all judgments.

The rational spirit of the 18th-century Enlightenment, whether seen as the establishment of practical reason or as a continuation of technological reason, inevitably had limitations. Rousseau not only concluded that the Enlightenment thinkers had misplaced reason, but also clearly saw the limitations of Enlightenment reason:

First, enlightenment reason is not only an expansion of knowledge, but also a spread of the spirit of doubt. On the one hand, this spirit of skepticism casts doubt on its natural face, in favor of believing in the dogmas of knowledge and wisdom that philosophers have instilled in them, and to pursue science and technology that provide certainty to the world, thus creating a false understanding of human nature. Thus Rousseau constantly emphasized his task: "To discern in human nature what is the original and what is man-made, and to be able to portray well the state in which it no longer exists, and which may not have existed in the past and will never exist in the future." Rousseau, on the other hand, did not approve of the idea that the rational skepticism of the Enlightenment thinkers could liberate the human mind from the superstition of nature and of God. On the contrary, he emphasizes, it is precisely this spirit of skepticism that makes human social emotions weak and prone to the dilemma of lost faith.

Second, reason is not human nature, and therefore people love reason weakly than love for other natural things. Although people have the ability to attain reason, the need for reason to enlighten the validity of this hypothesis means that ignorance is the original state of human beings. This was the consensus of thinkers in almost every camp of the Enlightenment. People need external forces such as knowledge, experience, etc., to promote the generation and function of reason, but uncontrollable external forces will cause its instability. When people lack the necessary knowledge and experience, reason becomes a distant object. In fact, reason is supported by a deterministic attitude in the veins of Enlightenment thinkers. Rousseau criticized Enlightenment rationality precisely for this attitude. He believes that if people rely too much on reason, they will inevitably lose their free will and the possibility of living an autonomous and natural life. Reason is suitable only for the establishment of an artificial political society, not for the cultivation of natural habits and virtues. This is also the reason why Rousseau, in his exposition of natural thought, has always emphasized that natural emotions as the inner conscience are the main driving force for people to form free will, and in the discourse on the political community, he constructs the ideal political society in his mind with an unusually rational posture.

Third, as an external determining force, the instability of reason derives its fragility. Reason can be generated by external forces, or it can be instantly deprived by external forces. That is, when the existing knowledge system is impacted, the value system is subverted, and the life experience is frustrated, people's rational concept system is also prone to collapse in an instant. Therefore, reason is more fragile than the inner human nature of emotion. Reason can be taken away, but emotions cannot. And when reason meets ideology, this vulnerability becomes even more pronounced. Ideology is a powerful conceptual force supported by knowledge, dogma, and shaped by the familiarity of political experience. When a fragile rational concept is confronted with a strong ideology, the former is not only easily distorted by the latter to distort its value and connotation, but also assimilated by the latter. When reason becomes an ideology, the horrific consequences are even more unimaginable. Historian Himmel Fab defined the French Enlightenment as an enlightenment marked by the ideology of reason, and pointed out that the ideology of reason created the fanatical worship of reason in that era, which was partly responsible for the subsequent Revolution and its subsequent Reign of Terror.

Even the thinkers who spared no effort in defending the emotional position in the Emotional-Rational Struggle of the Enlightenment were opposed to the importance of the rational spirit. In the case of Rousseau, he never declared his opposition to reason, but instead called for a rationality in society that obeys an inner conscience. But in order to show a position different from that of the Enlightenment philosophers, Rousseau never advocated the spirit of reason positively, and always put the emotionally motivated conscience above reason. In particular, he rejected the Enlightenment reason, which was admired by the Enlightenment philosophers as the authority of all judgments, and turned his attention to the natural human emotions—"the judgment of happiness is a matter that is less rational than from the point of view of feelings."

Enlightenment with Compassion: A Romantic Appeal

Rousseau's enlightenment of sympathy seems to be an attempt to get rid of the intervention of reason, to restore the original state of sympathy with a galloping imagination, thus forming a political romantic complex. It is the suffering and ambition of a lonely person, a complex of the path to salvation, and a complex of creating a picture of peace and reproduction that can be sketched without relying on society. Rousseau's appeal to enlightenment through sympathy has the following characteristics of romanticism: First, simple and natural sympathy has the power to transcend and even change facts. In the face of conservative, computationally and analytical reason, radical compassion has a powerful impact on the unequal, suffering-ridden reality. Therefore, people do not need to seek the help of enlightenment from the outside, but can do so through the innate power of compassion. Second, it's more of a creative whimsy than a feasible initiative. It's even possible to "go against normal causation in order to seek risk.". Third, the enlightenment with sympathy is an imaginary reconstruction of social civilization, and there must be a pre-designed overall framework, and the facts that conform to this framework can be retained and used, while those that do not conform will be denied and abandoned. In other words, reality serves the idea, not the other way around. Fourth, it is a moral ideal, and it is more important to pay attention to the value of morality than to the value of reason.

"For Rousseau, the meaning of reform far exceeded the appreciation of virtue", and although he had come into contact with and profoundly influenced these typical philosophers, he could not accept their relaxed and cheerful reform of freedom" He needs more strength to unleash the heroism complex to satisfy the desire to protect and pride in supporting the weak and fighting injustice. Obviously, reason and wisdom, which have been refined by reason, are difficult to meet Rousseau's requirements. Only a sympathetic feeling closer to nature, without any mannerism, can be the real impetus for radical social reform. The pursuit of the pleasure of attaining nirvana in suffering, the renewal of beauty in anticipation of being rebuilt after destruction, is typical of Rousseau's Romanticism. When Rousseau tried to transcend reason with sympathy and give sympathy the burden of enlightenment, it was a reminder that philosophers who considered themselves social elites were not suitable to be the leaders of the wave of Enlightenment reform, they were too far away from the general public. And "the weak in the world mean a lot to him, they are the source of his strength ... Love the feeling of integrity that protects the weak." More importantly, Rousseau's identification with the weak reminds him of his own position and the fact that he came from humble origins. He felt that he knew more about the real state of society than the enlightened philosophers. For the French society in which he lived, he had a "clear vision peculiar to strangers" who were strangers. With the exception of Rousseau, most of society, especially those reformers who need the support of the people at the bottom, tend to believe that only romantic reforms that emphasize sympathy and unite people can have a powerful impact on the unfair and corrupt current social system, and that "warm-watered" rationalism can only be a plaything for the elites to entertain themselves.

In fact, if Rousseau's Romanticism is understood not only as romanticism in the literary sense, but also as a romanticism in the philosophical sense, then this romantic complex is inextricably linked to the rational spirit. Romanticism in this philosophical sense has the following characteristics: First, it is the root of free will. Because Romanticism appealed to a position of self-determination and self-expression. It heralds the ability of people to be who they want to be, to decide their own future. In this position, the ability to be rational is a prerequisite for the realization of this demand. Second, it presents an objectivity in a way that is close to nature. Taking nature as a flaunt of human life and action enables people to try their best to get rid of all kinds of unreasonable shackles and prejudices in the demands of romanticism, and to try to discover the various possibilities of the most humane historical situation. This approach to the truth is a way of practicing reason. Finally, it can present a kind of self-reflection and self-improvement authenticity. Rousseau's dialogue with himself in "The Dream of a Lonely Walker" and "Rousseau's Judgment jean-Jacques: Dialogues" is actually a manifestation of authenticity. Justice that emphasizes the authenticity of self-worth and concern for the values of others is reconcilable in a liberal political community that embraces differences. This means that it is entirely possible to achieve a rational appeal to the self and others in the authenticity of Romanticism.

There is no doubt that Rousseau's experience of casual creation, with his diverse writing genres and passionate literary style, has left a deep impression of romantic Platonism. But in fact, Rousseau's Romanticism embodied an ability to reduce and construct things rationally in the imagination. That is to say, when Rousseau tried to enlighten with sympathy, he not only vividly presented sympathy in a romantic way, but also attached great importance to how to achieve enlightenment rationally. This can be seen in his attempts to approach nature, to reveal the true face of human beings, and to "tell the truth" and "restore the facts". However, Rousseau did not realize that when he tried to describe a romantic and beautiful and exciting new picture of society in a rational way, he often contributed to irrational results in reality. Because the average reader can intuitively accept the passionate picture presented in his writings, it is also easiest to grasp the core problem he wants to explain—the important role of emotion, especially sympathy, in changing social inequality. Rousseau's rational explanation seems to provide a justification for the supremacy of passion, and people's "emotional affairs" in political life have the best defense. His emphasis on conscience and reason is often obliterated by the urgent desire to change the status quo and the excitement of hope. The necessary link between sympathy and reason is thus severed by the "good wishes" for the sake of purpose and at no cost. When romanticism stemming from the beauty of art encounters a politics centered on cold power, the combination of the two does not necessarily lead to aesthetic results; Rousseau's beautiful political ideals do not necessarily produce the so-called "holy alliance" in the realpolitik involving the redistribution of benefits. The romantic appeal of sympathy to enlightenment, although trying to get rid of the rational hegemony of the Enlightenment and issue a more impactful revolutionary call, is in fact more likely to produce unstable and uncontrollable political results, and the results that backfire will cause a huge gap in psychological expectations in society. It can be said that practicing the romantic appeal of sympathy for enlightenment is like picking a "thorny rose", and if there is no rational risk assessment and the necessary caution and conservatism, it will pay a blood price.

Third, the moral personality and political ideals of enlightenment and sympathy

Enlightenment sympathy refers to the sympathy that was proposed by thinkers to enlighten people's minds and promote social development during the Enlightenment period in order to make up for the shortcomings of the enlightenment rational spirit and correct the cognitive misunderstandings of rational appeals. Rousseau was clearly unwilling to remain at the level of describing sympathy to the most simple state of sympathy. He had high hopes for compassion— the expectation that it would provoke acts of kindness. By giving sympathy to the meaning of action, Rousseau sketched to people the ideal grand plan of enlightening sympathy to achieve the demand for justice. This ideal has two specific goals: One is to shape a moral personality with natural conscience endowments and independent will, Emile. Emile's innate feeling of sympathy is the basis for the formation of conscience, and compassion can also counteract the dependence on interests developed by self-love; the second is to build a political community based on the general agreement of the members of society. The corrupt and degenerate reality of society had completely disappointed Rousseau, so he tried to theoretically pave another ideal path from the state of nature to civilized society. The general will is the enlightening light for people on this path. The source of this common will is sympathy. For compassion is the first primordial emotion that connects people to other kinds other than themselves and their kinship, and it is also the first step for the human mind to identify with and care for others.

Specifically, Rousseau's moral ideal of Enlightenment sympathy—the formation of an independent, conscientious moral personality capable of following nature to show due care for one's fellow citizens—contains several layers of meaning. First, it is a natural attitude and behavior for people to express or practice sympathy. To deliberately avoid sympathy is to go against human nature. Second, people's compassion does not mean the annihilation of self-love, but an extension of self-love. Therefore, people's expression of due care for their compatriots will not conflict with love for themselves and self-protection. Third, Rousseau emphasized that Emile was a natural person who could adapt to society because he followed his nature, was able to exclude all kinds of prejudices, and was "not controlled by other authorities except his own reason." That is, the sympathetic moral personality is a free and independent rational personality. Finally, sympathy is from self-love, extending to the blood relatives closest to oneself, and then to one's own ethnic and social compatriots, not the fraternity of cosmopolitans. Fraternity is based on great love, replacing the care of a small range of people, including oneself, with a broad concern for the sufferings of the people in the world, which means sacrificing the small self to complete the great self. In Rousseau's view, fraternity is a philosopher's emotion, which is contrary to nature, and sympathy is an emotion that follows nature.

Rousseau painted an ideal blueprint for the moral values derived from Enlightenment sympathy sufficient to serve as the moral foundations of an equal, free, and just political community. First, he sought to construct a social system based on equality. In such a society, the social conventions made by men do not destroy the equality of nature, but replace the biological inequalities caused by nature with the equality of morality and law. The principle of moral and legal convention comes from the slowing and restraining effect of compassion on self-esteem and vanity derived from amour de soi. Compassion enables people to focus on the suffering of others through "empathy", so that people place themselves on the same level as the hearts and minds of others or fellow human beings. At the moment when compassion comes into play, human equality is most fully reflected. Second, the legitimacy of the construction and development of an equal political community lies in the public will. On the basis of the common will, the Community preserves and guarantees the life, property and freedom of each union with great force from all its members. The formation of public will means that people need to start considering the rights and interests of other members of the community. These consensuses are the driving force behind compassion and the source of human altruistic will and behavior. Therefore, it can be considered that Rousseau's "common will" is not only the volitional embodiment of sympathy emotions, but also the regular embodiment of sympathetic emotions. But this rule is only a moral rule that stems from sympathy but does not qualify compassion. Obviously, Rousseau did not intend to impose any restrictions on sympathy with a particular moral connotation. But he fails to consider that the lack of rational limits on sympathy can bring unimaginable moral chaos to the political community. Finally, compassion extends the concern for personal gain to others, creating an appeal to justice. It is also an important condition for compassion to become a universal political virtue. But Rousseau reminds people that sympathy for others is not at the cost of giving themselves free of charge, otherwise it means that people have lost their sound sanity and are crazy. Rousseau clarified that although "justice" is not a pure moral concept imagined through the intellect, it is a true love of the heart inspired by reason. Compassion, as the origin of all human virtues, prompts man to study eternal truths, to love justice and virtue, and to enter the realm of contemplation of the wise. But to prevent sympathy from degenerating into cowardice, it is necessary to "sympathize universally with the whole of humanity." "To love humanity is, in our view, to love justice." Of all virtues, justice is the most conducive to the common welfare of mankind. Thus, although Rousseau despised cosmopolitan sympathy, he had no choice but to admit that sympathy inspired by reason was conducive to the realization of the demand for justice. It is a pity that he failed to further define the boundaries of sympathy with reason, which is a non-negligible link in the formation of universal justice in the political community.

The moral personality of Enlightenment sympathy and political ideals are unified in one ultimate value—freedom. Rousseau emphasized that "freedom is not about doing what you want, but about not being dominated by the will of others." In establishing the goal of moral personality, Enlightenment sympathy overcomes the vanity and self-esteem produced by self-love with natural emotions, thus maintaining "natural freedom"; in drawing a blueprint for the political community, Enlightenment sympathy uses a norm of social virtue to enable people to transcend the self-centered will and achieve equality and justice in mutual union, thus establishing "agreed freedom". It can be seen that whether it is sympathy, reason or justice and equality, in Rousseau's ideological vein, it all serves a value, that is, human freedom. In this sense, Rousseau shared a characteristic with his contemporaries, the Enlightenment thinkers, namely, the elevation of human value to an unprecedented status. In Rousseau's view, "freedom" (liberty) is "the basic endowment of nature." This freedom means that one can neither be bound by the dogmatic authority established by Enlightenment reason, nor can one become willful because of the lack of rational regulation. This is why Rousseau's attempt to achieve freedom through Enlightenment sympathy is both an attempt beyond reason and always difficult to detach from reason.