After the Japanese army was disillusioned with the quick battle to solve the Chinese problem, it set up many institutions to lure down Chinese military and political leaders, such as the "Mei Work" of luring Wang Jingwei. After the Japanese army captured Guangzhou and Wuhan, the number of troops spent on the Chinese battlefield reached more than 1 million, and the military expenditure was huge, and the national strength could not be supported. China did not have the iron ore, rubber, oil and other resources that the Japanese army wanted. The Japanese army was anxious to open up the Southeast Asian battlefield and expand to Indochinese. Therefore, the Japanese army hoped to end the war in China through means other than war, and carried out the "Tong work" of seducing Chiang Kai-shek.
Song Ziliang and his family
1. Contacts between China and Japan
At the end of 1939, Nakasaki Shōrō of the Japanese General Staff headquarters was sent to Hong Kong as the head of the agency to implement this plan. Through Zhang Zhiping, a professor at the University of Hong Kong, he contacted Song Ziliang, who was then the chairman of the Southwest Transport Company in Hong Kong. Soong Zi-liang has a special status, is the younger brother of Soong Mei-ling and Soong Zi-wen, and the Japanese think that they can catch Chiang Kai-shek through this line. Song Ziliang refused Suzuki's request to meet in the name of getting Song Ziwen's consent, but a few days later Song Ziliang took the initiative to ask for a meeting.
This led Suzuki to believe that Song Ziliang's actions were approved by Song Ziwen and even the Nationalist government.
On the night of December 27, the two sides met for the first time. According to the Japanese cable records, at this meeting, Song Ziliang proposed:
If Japan respects China's reputation and sovereignty, China is prepared for peace.
At the same time, he asked: "Can we reconsider the statement that the national government is not an opponent?" Can we restore the state before the July 7 Incident? Can you send Chiang Kai-shek a personal letter on the peace issue to ensure the sincerity of the Japanese side? ”
On January 22, 1940, the two sides held their second meeting. Soong said Chiang Kai-shek had no intention of cooperating with Wang Jingwei and was even working to undermine his plan to organize the government. He also said that he could have the opportunity to meet Chiang Kai-shek often through his sister Song Meiling. The two sides later made three more contacts, and Soong Claim claimed that he returned to Chongqing on February 10 to report the incident to Chiang Kai-shek. In view of the fact that Japan and China have sent Takeo Imai, senior staff officer of the General Headquarters of the Army, to Hong Kong to participate in the negotiations, the Chongqing side will send representatives of the same status to participate in the negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek's letter of appointment, and Soong Mei-ling will also secretly arrive in Hong Kong to assist from the side. The two sides agreed to convene the Japan-China RoundTable in Hong Kong. Takeo Imai then returned to Tokyo to report to The Minister of War, Shunroku Yan.
Takeo Imai
2. Hong Kong talks
On the evening of March 6, China and Japan held formal talks at Hong Kong's Tofei Foreign Firm. The Japanese delegates attended the meeting were Takeo Imai, Takeo Usui, and Tsuru Nakasa Suzuki. Present at the meeting were Song Ziliang, Chen Chaolin, deputy director of the Chongqing Xingying Staff Office, Zhang Yousan, secretary and director of the Supreme National Defense Conference, Zhang Hannian, deputy chief of staff, and Zhang Zhiping, liaison officer. The Chinese delegates did not bring Chiang Kai-shek's letter of appointment, and only the next day of negotiations did they present an identity card issued by Zhang Qun, secretary general of the Supreme National Defense Council. The Japanese representatives showed the identity certificates of The Minister of War, Yan Shunroku, and the commander-in-chief of the Chinese Dispatch Army, Nishio Shouzakukai.
During the talks, Japan proposed eight articles of the Book of Jue, the highlights of which include:
China recognized "Manchukuo", abandoned the policy of resisting Japan and accommodating the Communist Party, allowed Japan to garrison troops in north China and Inner Mongolia, and cooperated with Wang Jingwei.
The Chinese representative said that after asking Chiang Kai-shek for instructions, he would put forward eight additional "peace proposals," which mainly included:
Agree in principle to consider the recognition of "Manchukuo", the manner
Alternative
The issue of cooperation with Wang Jingwei is an internal affair of China and cannot be used as a condition for peace; And Japan has withdrawn its troops from China as soon as possible.
The Chinese side suggested that the two sides sign each other's documents, but the Japanese side objected.
Wang Jingwei
On March 23, three days before Wang Jingwei was scheduled to establish a puppet government in Nanjing, Song Ziliang made an urgent appointment with Suzuki. He said that Chiang Kai-shek had generally no objection to the Japanese Jueshu, but admitted that "Manchukuo" was opposed by the northeast generals and was persuading the Japanese side to postpone the establishment of the Wang regime. Suzuki asked Song Ziliang to give a reply 25 days ago, but Chongqing did not have any reply when it expired. Wang Jingwei held a "return ceremony" in Nanjing on the 30th, but the Japanese government did not recognize its regime for the time being.
Zhou Fohai wrote in his diary: "The future is not optimistic... We cannot but doubt Japan's sincerity. ”
Since then, the two sides have made several contacts, and Song Ziliang stressed: "Chongqing has the sincerity of peace," but there are huge differences between the two sides in terms of recognizing "Manchukuo" and stationing troops in China, and these issues can be discussed after peace is restored. The Japanese had suspected the identity of the Chinese representative and sent someone to spy on the Chinese representative. However, they found that after each negotiation, No matter how many nights, Chinese representatives would gather in the room for secret talks, and then send liaison officers to fly back to Chongqing in the evening. Coupled with the fact that there was indeed news in the newspaper that Song Meiling had arrived in Hong Kong, the Japanese side finally believed the words of the Chinese representative.
Regarding the identity of Song Ziliang, the Japanese side secretly took a photo from the keyhole and brought it back to Nanjing for Chen Gongbo and Zhou Fohai to identify, Chen thought it was, zhou thought it was not.
Song Ziliang was extremely low-key, and the Japanese spy could not find a photo that could be compared, and ultimately could not confirm the authenticity of his identity.
However, the Japanese side believes that regardless of the authenticity of its identity and the size of its official position, it does not matter, and that Japan's purpose is to have a channel of contact with Chongqing, so it will not be entangled for the time being.
Zhou Fohai
3. The negotiation is over
On the evening of June 4, China and Japan held secret talks again in Macao. This time, the Chinese side presented a letter of appointment from Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese side's attitude has become unprecedentedly fierce.
He refused the request to "recognize Manchukuo and the Japanese army stationed in China", while also saying that "there is No Chiang Kai-shek, and there is no peace in Wang." ”
The two sides broke up in displeasure. On the 6th, Song Ziliang took the initiative to find Takeo Imai and proposed a tripartite talks by Itagaki Seishiro, Chiang Kai-shek, and Wang Jingwei, and the meeting place was in Changsha. Subsequently, the two sides basically agreed to this plan through consultation, but the Japanese side asked Chiang Kai-shek to issue a memorandum on security grounds.
In July, the two sides again held talks in Hong Kong. The Japanese side presented a "Memorandum on the Implementation of the Armistice Talks between China and Japan."
The Chinese also produced a memorandum written by Chiang Kai-shek himself. After research, Suzuki believed that the handwriting was the same as the last time he showed the letter of appointment, but he failed to shoot it all when he tried to shoot it secretly, and only the three words "Chiang Kai-shek" were photographed.
Subsequently, the Japanese side sent the pictures back to Nanjing for review, and Zhou Fohai still believed that it was not Chiang Kai-shek's original after reading it. The meeting set the meeting between Itagaki and Chiang Kai-shek in August, and the Chinese side also proposed that Japan cancel the 1938 statement that "Chiang Kai-shek will not be regarded as an opponent", and that the issue of "Chiang-Wang cooperation" should not be mentioned during the Talks between Chiang Kai-shek and The Japanese-Wang Treaty should be cancelled.
The handwriting of Chiang Kai-shek in the Japanese archives, at a glance at the Chinese characters, knows that it is not the real handwriting
On August 22, Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe wrote to Chiang Kai-shek stating that itagaki's meeting with Chiang Kai-shek "should establish the basis for the adjustment of diplomatic relations between the two countries." On September 17, Song Ziliang returned to Hong Kong from Chongqing and conveyed the Chongqing decision to the Japanese side.
Due to issues such as "Manchukuo" and the Japanese garrison, the two sides could not reach an agreement and should not hold the Changsha talks immediately. "There is no need for China to seek a yielding peace," he said. ”
On September 19, the commander-in-chief of the Chinese dispatch army, Nishio Shouzo, ordered the temporary end of the "Tong Work". In October, sugiyama, the new chief of staff at the General Staff Headquarters, ordered that the peace talks on the armistice of The Chinese dispatch troops should be halted.
It was not until June 1946 that Makoto Sakata, a commissioner of the General Headquarters of the Chinese Dispatch Army who had served as an interpreter in the Sino-Japanese negotiations, found the Chinese representative "Song Ziliang" who had participated in the negotiations in shanghai prison. After questioning, this person claimed to be a member of the Blue Jacket Society under the leadership of Dai Kasa, named "Zeng Guang", and indeed impersonated Song Ziliang to participate in the negotiations that year. At that time, China's victory was in sight, and the members of the Blue Jacket Society went to the Zhejiang area to carry out activities, and he was captured by the Japanese gendarmes. At this time, the Japanese were convinced that the participants were fake, and chiang kai-shek's letter of appointment and handwritten memorandum were also forged. Not only Song Ziliang, but all those involved in the negotiations at that time were impostors.
"Zeng Guang", whose real name was Zeng Zhengzhong, was a Chinese-American who returned to China after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression to participate in the Anti-Japanese Patriotic Movement, and later worked in Dai Kasa's Military Command Bureau. Under dai kasa's planning, the impersonation of Song Ziliang participated in the negotiations on the Kirito work in Japan.
By actively coping with Japan's Tung work, the Nationalist Government spied out the Japanese army's eager attempt to end the Sino-Japanese conflict; at the same time, it delayed to a certain extent the time for the establishment of the Wang puppet regime and its recognition by Japan, which affected the trust between Japan and Wang to a certain extent; the delay in the negotiation process once caused Japan to suspend the offensive. Overall, this negotiation has played a positive role.