What is history: it is the echo of the past to the future, the reflection of the future on the past. - Hugo
On January 31, 1947, Chen Cheng, chief of staff of the Kuomintang, personally went to the Xuzhou area to command three men and horses to attack the Shandong Liberated Area to the north, and at the same time ordered Wang Yaowu, who was stationed in Jinan, to lead his troops to the south to intercept the East China Field Army. Chen Cheng's move was an attempt to strike from north to south, encircle and compress our East China Field Army in Shandong, and wipe them all out.
Photo: Chen Cheng
However, Chen Cheng's idea was good, but it was too contemptuous of the strength of the East China Field Army, which led to a great strategic mistake later.
01 Abandon Linyi
The Kuomintang came prepared this time, and its spearhead was directed at Linyi, the capital of the Shandong Liberated Area and our army at that time. In the face of the enemy's pressing step by step, if it continues to cling to Linyi, the East China Field Army will become more and more passive. To keep or to abandon? While the generals were deliberating, on February 4, Mao Zedong sent a telegram instructing Huaye to lure the enemy deeper "to prepare to abandon Linyi if necessary."
Mao Zedong's telegram made General HuaYe unload his ideological baggage and prepare to wipe out a large number of effective forces of the Kuomintang army with a large number of backward steps. Chen Yi proposed to send a small part of the team to Linyi to create an illusion to confuse the three-way army commanded by Chen Cheng, and to transfer the main force to the northern front and eliminate Wang Yaowu's southbound troops in one fell swoop.
Photo: Wang Yaowu
At the order of huaye's command, the four columns of the main force were ordered to move secretly northwards in preparation for an annihilation battle in the Laiwu area. The remaining columns disguised themselves as Hua Ye's main force, pretending to carry out the Linyi Defense War, trumpeting houses, collecting grain and grass, and digging fortifications, showing the momentum of a decisive battle with Chen Cheng's three-way army. The Intelligence Department of the Kuomintang also really believed that our army would stick to Linyi, so it made a wrong judgment.
On February 12, the three-way army on the southern front invaded Linyi, and the Kuomintang troops were also considered to be obedient, refusing to rush and fight, and the three-way army advanced more than ten miles a day, not allowing a single unit to risk the tip, so as not to be intercepted by Huaye. Hua Ye retreated while resisting, and when the Kuomintang artillery fire was fiercer, he retreated faster, and this cooperation made Chen Cheng mistakenly think that Hua Ye's troops were just like this.
02 Wait for the right moment
On February 15, with the perfect cooperation of our army, the 83rd and 74th divisions commanded by Li Tianxia and Zhang Lingfu marched into the empty city of Linyi. The Kuomintang side was ecstatic as if it had received a treasure, and the Nanjing side issued a high-profile announcement that "the New Fourth Army led by Chen Yi has lost a total of 16 brigades and 7 columns, accounting for about two-thirds of the total strength." ”
Chen Cheng was also excited by the "good news" on the front line, so he quickly sent a telegram to wang Yaowu's three armies on the northern front to march south at once to achieve his expected goal of attacking from the north and the south. As early as the beginning of the campaign, Chen Cheng told Wang Yaowu to hurry south, but Wang, considering that the south was too fast to replenish the army, refused to obey the order, or on February 1, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram asking him to take into account the overall situation before launching the three armies to go south.
In order to let Wang Yaowu hit the iron while it was hot, Chen Cheng also designated a route to the south: "Take the tusi mouth out of the east side of Taishan, and go straight down to Xintai and Laiwu." Wang Yaowu's face was pale with fright after he knew it, and he should know that this route was indeed fast, but the high mountains and valleys on both sides were easily ambushed, and if they did not know it, the whole army would be destroyed. However, Chen Cheng could not manage so much, and asked Chiang Kai-shek to personally give orders to Wang Yaowu, urging Wang Yaowu to send troops south and garrison Laiwu and Xintai. This gave Hua Ye's main column to the north a big chance.
03 Siege of Laiwu
Wang Yaowu had difficulty riding a tiger, so he had to send Li Xianzhou as a front-line command officer and command the 12th, 73rd, and 46th armies to garrison Laiwu. Since Li Xianzhou did not have his own backbone troops, this battle was actually just a name, and wang Yaowu had to be consulted for all actions. The three armies set out on February 15 and walked slowly every day, and the line was particularly long, resulting in a particularly long supply line.
On the same day, Huaye's headquarters issued operational orders: the first and sixth columns attacked Laiwu and Tusikou on the left side; the fourth and seventh columns attacked Yanzhuang on the middle road; the eighth and ninth columns were on the right road and attacked Hezhuang; and the tenth column ambushed on the north side of Laiwu City, cutting off Li Xianzhou's northward escape route.
Photo: Zhang Lingfu
Everything is ready. On the morning of February 20, the Eighth and Ninth Columns successfully reached the outskirts of Hezhuang and launched an attack at one o'clock in the afternoon, and after a few hours of fighting, they occupied all the commanding heights outside Zhuang, and on the morning of the 21st, the 77th Division of Hezhuang was completely annihilated, making a good start to the Battle of Laiwu.
At dusk on February 20, the first column responsible for attacking Laiwu, under the command of Ye Fei, launched an attack on laiwu's outer positions. Due to the failure of the fourth column responsible for blocking the attack to arrive in time, the 46th and 73rd armies retreated into Laiwu City. If these 50,000 people were to die in Laiwu, Huaye's main force would not be able to annihilate it, but history was such a coincidence that Li Xianzhou gathered the generals of the two armies, discussed it for half a day, and decided to retreat north.
Photo: Li Xianzhou
After obtaining this important information, all the columns quickly assembled in the north and laid out a pocket waiting for Li Xianzhou's 50,000 men and horses to drill inside. On the 23rd, Li Xianzhou led his troops to retreat, and as soon as the city gate was opened, the troops ambushed on both sides launched an attack on the Kuomintang in a situation of overwhelming mountains and seas, and the Kuomintang troops did not react for a while, and they were immediately chaotic and scattered. By 5 p.m., the battle was almost over.
In the Battle of Laiwu, at the cost of sacrificing 1,459 people, our army killed and wounded 10,000 Kuomintang troops and captured 46,000 people; captured more than 300,000 rounds of ammunition and 56 cars, and won a great victory! After this battle, the Kuomintang was forced to shift the strategy of all-out offensive to a key offensive.