The Battle of Chosin Lake played an extremely important strategic role in the Korean War. Many friends thought that the shores of Chosin Lake were a war in which our volunteer army destroyed the decay and defeated the US army. In fact, this war can be said to be very difficult to win, the soldiers of the Volunteer Army united in the Korean battlefield, and were able to severely damage the American army at Chosin Lake, but they also paid countless blood and lives. It was a very hard war. There are also some troops who have suffered unnecessary losses due to errors in war decisions.
One of the most regrettable was the 88th Division of the 26th Army of the Ninth Corps. The 26th Army was the general reserve of the 9th Corps and was a strong force that had been in the battle for a long time. The honor of the soldiers was above all else, but the Battle of Chosin Lake became a hidden pain in the hearts of the soldiers of the 26th Army in the future. At that time, the US 10th Army decided to withdraw across the board. And exhaustion is exactly the only way for the First Marine Division to retreat. Because of the importance of this area, on 2 December the command ordered the 26th Army to march south and arrive in the early morning of the next day to suppress the troops of the 1st Marine Division.
At that time, the divisions and regiments under the jurisdiction of the 26th Army were also 45 kilometers away from the nearest in The Corner, and the farthest was even 70 kilometers, and it was really difficult to march like this overnight, and Zhang Renchu, commander of the 26th Army, had no choice but to communicate with the command, hoping to delay for a day and negotiate to reach the destination on the morning of December 4.
In order to annihilate the First Marine Division, the 20th Army and the 27th Army had been fighting with the U.S. Army for several days, and after Zhang Renchu had won the time, on December 3, before dawn, Zhang Renchu informed the 88th Division and asked them to complete the task, and the 88th Division was very far away from the Exhaustion, as many as 70 kilometers, which was an urgent march.
The commander of the 88th Division was Wu Dalin, and due to the backwardness of the terrain information of the Korean battlefield at that time, the volunteer army often marched at night and got lost. Wu Dalin was too cautious and did not let the troops leave at night, but waited until the next afternoon to set off.
However, the troops marching during the day were undoubtedly exposed to the eyes of the enemy. The 88th Division was soon discovered by the U.S. Army, and dozens of sorties of aircraft took turns to strafe and bomb in the air, and the soldiers of the 88th Division suffered heavy casualties. By the time the division arrived at its destination, the U.S. First Marine Division had already fled.
Although the 88th Division received a difficult marching task, the Volunteer Army units had not recorded rapid marches of more than 70 kilometers before. The failure of this reinforcement is directly related to Wu Dalin's command error. Due to the narrow terrain of the Korean battlefield and the fact that the battles were mainly based on mobile warfare and position warfare, the losses caused by the mistakes of the 88th Division in this battle were also very large from the idea that if the enemy's main forces could be annihilated, they would never let go.
At that time, the war was very difficult to fight, in extreme weather, the volunteer army often had frostbite, and the 88th Division delayed the march, so that many soldiers innocently lost their lives, which was really regrettable.
After the war was over, the command errors of the 88th Division were caught, and the division commander and political commissar were Wu Dalin and Gong Jie. Because of Wu Dalin's passive command and fear of war, he was dismissed from his post as division commander, Gong Jie was also dismissed from his post as political commissar, and the soldiers of the 88Th Army suffered heavy casualties and were cancelled.
Wu Dalin and Gong Jie were middle-aged at the time, and they were both stalwart talents who had grown up along the way with the revolutionary ranks. Wu Dalin was born and died with the Red Army in his early years, and later became the commander of the New Fourth Army, and then was assigned to Hua Ye's command, and after many years of war experience, he was promoted to division commander, and Gong Jie has also been engaged in military affairs in the New Fourth Army, and both have rich combat experience. But the Korean battlefield is changing rapidly, and their single mistake has caused irreparable losses and affected their own great future. Wu Dalin later became the deputy commander of the division, and was awarded the rank of colonel when he was awarded the title, and Gong Jie was also awarded the rank of colonel in 1955.
If the two men had not made this command mistake in the Battle of Chosin Lake, not only would they have saved the lives of many volunteer soldiers, but the two of them might have been able to obtain higher ranks, but history could not be changed. The defeat of local command on the battlefield of Chosin Lake has provided valuable experience for our army's future modernization wars.