Seeing the title, many friends will immediately appear in their hearts "three eight lines". In fact, the "38th Line" is only a geographical dividing line, and it is not a military strategy.
The appearance of the "three-eighth line" is relatively sudden. Because North Korea was not the focus of the world's political landscape before and after World War II, the major powers did not look at it. The Yalta and Potsdam conferences, which reshaped the world pattern, considered many issues, but there was no North Korea issue.
At that time, the United States and the Soviet Union had their own priorities in the Far East, the Soviet Union's focus was on China's three northeastern provinces and Mongolia, and the United States was Japan.
However, the U.S. army fought against the Japanese in the Pacific was very hard, and the losses were very large. Japan also announced to the outside world that it would crush the country's jade, and even women and children issued bamboo guns, which made the United States feel that it was really impossible to solve the Japanese problem with the army, so in order to take shortcuts, they suddenly cast "little boys" and "fat people" in Japan, and immediately destroyed the courage of the god Amaterasu.
Stalin, a brilliant strategist, suddenly sensed that Japan would soon surrender after the Toss of the United States, and he immediately ordered a million Soviet troops in the Far East to march south at once. Stalin's decision-making was quite wise and decisive, and his timing was very good, because the so-called Japanese Kwantung Army, which confronted him with millions of Soviet troops, was only an empty shelf, no longer the elite Kwantung Army before the outbreak of the Pacific War, but a group of old, weak, sick and disabled.
Japan's elite Kwantung Army had been crippled by the Americans in the Pacific.
The Soviets, fighting against the Kwantung Army on the empty shelf, were so aggressive that they soon entered northeastern China, and as they approached the Korean Peninsula, Japan announced its surrender.
When Japan announced its surrender, the Soviets had reached the gates of Korea, but the Americans were still in the Pacific. After entering Korea, the Soviet army went all the way south, and soon reached Seoul, and if it continued, the Soviet army would liberate all of Korea, but the American army was still on Okinawa.
At this time, due to the intervention of the Soviet army, the US military suddenly realized the importance of Korea, because once the Soviet army occupied the whole of Korea, it would directly threaten the strategic focus of the US military, Japan.
However, the battlefield, the political field and the shopping mall are all the same thing, they are all doing business, and at this time the United States has nothing in Korea, what is it doing business with the Soviet Union?
Although there was nothing, Truman and the U.S. Department of Defense had brains, and they played with an empty glove white wolf, and they threw out the proposal that the two sides should accept Japan's surrender together with the "38th Line" as the boundary. That's why, because Truman and the U.S. Department of Defense have a bottom line, and their bottom line is that as long as the Soviet Union doesn't occupy all of Korea, anything is easy to say.
The reason for the "38th Line" is because from the map, it seems that the only thing that can divide North Korea into two is the "38th Line".
According to the principle of doing business, the Americans thought that the Soviets who had crossed the "38th line" would not accept their proposals, and then they could take a step back and bargain with the Soviet Union, and finally achieve their own share of the Korean Peninsula.
But to the surprise of the Americans, the Soviets completely accepted the "38th Line."
So Americans can't understand, how can it be so easy? Before the Americans could figure it out, the Soviet Union sent another letter asking for the extension of the "38th Line" to Japan.
Now the Americans understood, and the Soviets were shrewd.
Because Hokkaido was mostly north of Japan, the Soviets wanted to land in Hokkaido, which would make the Soviet Union a big cake in international strategy.
The Americans certainly don't. The Americans did not want to, and the Soviet Union did not want to resist hard, because at that time, after the Soviet Army entered Europe with a million troops, the Soviet soldiers witnessed the advancement of Europe, and the ideas they brought back had made the Soviet Union begin to understand the world, coupled with the continued treatment of war trauma after the war, the Soviet Union did not intend to resist the United States again, but hoped to jointly manage the post-war world with the United States.
As a result, the "38th Line" was officially established. Speaking of a thousand ways and ten thousand, the establishment of the "38th Line" is actually the most important thing that North Korea is not the favorite of the two giants of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Therefore, the meaning of the "38th Line" is only the geographical dividing line between North and South Korea, and since it is a geography between countries, it is of course also a political dividing line. However, once the two sides of the South and the North are to be more real, the attention will not be on the "38th Line", because this line does not have military strategic significance, and it is an important other line.
In order to make my friends understand, I first gave them a map of North Korea.
I. Before the volunteers entered the DPRK, the enemy and us simultaneously saw the strategic priorities
After the Inchon landings, MacArthur considered that the 10th Army would be incorporated into the 8th Army after the capture of Seoul, and would advance north from land under the unified command of walker, commander of the 8th Army. But then MacArthur overturned his idea.
Because of north Korea's topography, there is a north-south, rarely visited Taebaek Mountain in the center, which divides Korea into east and west, and the only way to connect between east and west is from Pyongyang to wonsan port in the east, and two railways from Seoul to Wonsan. That is to say, after the United Nations Army crossed the 38th Line, it would have to be divided into two separate forces, the East and the West, to fight independently, so there was no need to assign the 10th Army to the 8th Army.
Logistically, the land supply lines from South Korea to North Korea are far away and very easily cut off, and the unloading capacity of the port of Incheon is only 5,000 tons per day, which can only meet 1/5 of the needs of the troops stationed in North Korea. Logistical support for the United Nations forces fighting in North Korea was therefore very difficult.
This led MacArthur to look favorably on a new port, the port of Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea, which, once used, would solve the logistical problems of the United Nations forces.
Therefore, MacArthur considered that in order to go north to defeat the North Korean army, it would have to fight in two stages:
First: first occupy the West Coast, then attack the East Coast. However, only the west coast will be attacked, and until the logistical supply problem is solved, the right side of the attacking force will be constantly threatened, and a large number of troops will be needed to serve as guards and cover. If you want to draw so many troops, it is better to use it to attack the East Coast.
Second: When Pyongyang on the west coast is captured, I am afraid that there will be a great showdown with the North Korean army. Rather than attacking Pyongyang only from the south, it would be easier to capture Pyongyang with a single force from Wonsan to the north side of Pyongyang, and it would be easier to capture the main force of the North Korean army.
Based on these two considerations, MacArthur ordered the 8th Army to advance north to Pyongyang and the 10th Army to land at Wonsan.
Thus, the occupation of Pyongyang on the west coast of Korea and Wonsan on the east coast became the general strategy of the United Nations forces to occupy the whole of Korea, and the straight line drawn between Pyongyang and Wonsan was exactly the narrowest part of the Korean Peninsula.
As the UN forces pressed closer, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission were also paying attention to the Korean issue, and on the one hand they organized the volunteer army to enter the DPRK, and on the other hand, they also needed to consider the strategic issues after the volunteers entered the DPRK, that is, how to fight.
Six days before the volunteer army entered Korea, in the face of the fierce United Nations army, in fact, it was mainly the US army, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission decided that in the first period, the volunteer army would build a defensive position north of the Pyongyang and Wonsan railway lines to ensure that Pyongyang and north of Wonsan could establish a base area.
At this time, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission also saw the strategic focus of the Pyongyang and Wonsan fronts, but at this time MacArthur wanted to take this strategic key line, and our army wanted to ensure that the enemy army stopped at this strategic key line.
Before the first battle, the strategic changes between the enemy and us
Before the first battle began, the Un army, based on MacArthur's established vision, the 10th Army landed at Wonsan and the 8th Army attacked Pyongyang, guaranteeing the capture of Pyongyang and the Wonsan line.
According to the deployment of Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission before the volunteer army entered the DPRK, since our army could not change the action of the United Nations army to take Pyongyang and the Wonsan line, our army could only use the defensive positions set up north of this line to block the enemy. However, Mao Zedong's greatness lies in his understanding of power change, so-called
"Soldiers are impermanent and water has no long form",
Take one of his own phrases
"Straw shoes are not like, they look like while playing."
The United Nations army was still advancing north after crossing the Pyongyang and Wonsan lines, and there was a large gap of 80 kilometers between the enemy forces on the eastern and western fronts, which allowed Mao Zedong to see a good opportunity to annihilate the enemy with movement, so the volunteer army abandoned the established defensive battle and annihilated the enemy with movement.
Iii. Changes in the strategy of the enemy and us in the middle of the second campaign and beyond
In the first campaign, the U.S. 8th Army, which had advanced victorious on the Western Front, was suddenly found to have stopped the attack after 13 days of attacks by the volunteers, and the volunteers who had attacked them had suddenly disappeared.
MacArthur thought that only a small number of Chinese troops of 60,000 or 70,000 people had appeared before, and the purpose was only to protect the hydropower station on the Yalu River, and ordered the United Nations army to continue north.
A very important reason why MacArthur had the courage to issue orders to continue north was that he believed that he had firmly controlled the Pyongyang and Wonsan fronts, and with this strategic bottom line, even if the UN forces going north encountered a strong enemy, they could use the Pyongyang and Wonsan lines to gain a foothold.
That said, MacArthur's bottom line is the Pyongyang and Wonsan lines.
Relative to MacArthur's bottom line, the Volunteers also had a bottom line.
Since the first battle was fought unexpectedly well, after the first battle, the volunteers' strategic operations made considerable progress. Before the second campaign, in order to fundamentally solve the problem of the volunteer army gaining a firm foothold, Mao Zedong had special instructions for Peng Dehuai's campaign deployment to capture Pyongyang and Wonsan in order to achieve the goal of fundamentally changing the situation of the Korean war. In this way, the Central Military Commission decided to concentrate all 6 armies that had entered Korea before the first battle on the Western Front, and the 9th Corps was urgently transferred to be responsible for the enemy on the Eastern Front.
This was also the reason why the 9th Corps was in a hurry to enter Korea, because the strategy of the volunteer army suddenly changed, from establishing a base north of Pyongyang and the Wonsan line to seizing Pyongyang and the Wonsan line.
The heroes again saw the same thing, macArthur believed that with the Pyongyang and Wonsan lines, the United Nations army could gain a firm foothold, while Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai also believed that with Pyongyang and the Wonsan line, the volunteer army could gain a firm foothold.
Since both sides had to rely on this line to gain a firm foothold, of course, they wanted to fight for this line with all their might, so Mao Zedong demanded that the volunteer army fight one or two major battles on each of the eastern and western fronts within 1 month, and annihilate the enemy to reach seven or eight regiments.
For this strategic purpose, the second campaign was fought, and because the second campaign still achieved the suddenness of the attack of our volunteer army, the interspersed between the 38th Army and the 42nd Army almost led to the total annihilation of the United Nations army on the western front, and the United Nations army on the eastern front also suffered heavy losses under the blow of the 9th Corps. As a result, the Un forces on the east and west lines withdrew in an all-round way, and their purpose was to secure the Pyongyang and Wonsan lines.
To this end, MacArthur organized a 4-hour meeting that concluded with two points:
First: affirmed the official entry of the Chinese regular army into the war;
Second: The UN forces retreated to the Pyongyang and Wonsan lines, stabilizing the war situation first and then making another plan.
The U.N. forces, encircling key points such as Pyongyang and Wonsan, developed a Pyongyang defensive line, which was extremely strategically important.
However, what MacArthur did not expect was that the volunteer offensive was too fierce, and the defeat of his United Nations army was also too fierce, forming a mountain of defeats, such a defeat could not stop at the Pyongyang and Wonsan lines, and it was impossible to establish a Pyongyang defense line. MacArthur had to order the abandonment of the Pyongyang and Wonsan lines.
Abandoning Pyongyang and Wonsan, the UN army no longer had a strategic barrier and had to retreat to the geographical and political demarcation line south of the "38th Line" Militarily, the "38th Line" was not a military strategic line, so Pyongyang and Wonsan were lost, and MacArthur no longer had a military card, and he wanted to play the political card.
The victorious volunteers recaptured Pyongyang on December 6, and the Korean People's Army recaptured Wonsan on the 9th. At this time, the state of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army was the opposite of that of the United Nations Army, and because of the Pyongyang and Wonsan fronts, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army immediately became strategic initiatives.
The party that has gained the initiative in military strategy will never consider playing the political card with the other side.
Riding on the victory of the second campaign, Peng Dehuai believed that he could take advantage of the situation to move south and occupy Seoul. Peng Dehuai's plan was approved by Mao Zedong, and immediately after the third campaign began, the Sino-Korean coalition army recaptured Seoul.
Fourth, during the fourth campaign, the strategy of the enemy and us changed
At the end of the third campaign, the new commander of the 8th Army, Ridgway, a famous general of World War II and a recognized tactical expert in the world, at the end of the third campaign, he had been considering tactical methods against the volunteer army, and in order to change the unfavorable situation of the occupation of Seoul, he launched a counterattack, which led to the fourth battle.
But what is the strategic purpose of Ridgway's counterattack? The United Nations army took advantage of the unstable foothold of the Chinese and North Korean coalition forces, and it was possible to retake Seoul, but what to do after that?
At that time, under the blows of the Sino-Korean coalition forces, the United Nations army, from MacArthur to the front-line generals, suddenly changed from optimism to pessimism. MacArthur's performance was particularly evident, a month ago he was clamoring for an end to the Korean War before Christmas, and a month later he believed that the Chinese army could force the United Nations forces to withdraw from Korea, demanding an expansion of the war, not only demanding an increase in troops and equipment, but also demanding another repetition of the same attack on Japan's Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Korea.
On the part of the Un army at that time, no one thought that North Korea could be occupied again. Because the Pyongyang and Wonsan line is already in the hands of the Sino-North Korean coalition forces, and this line can no longer be easily owned by the United Nations army. The Un forces that did not get the Pyongyang and Wonsan fronts, even if they got the "38th Line", it was difficult to defend, because south of the "38th Line", a suitable front had not yet been found, and the front of the "38th Line" was very wide, and there was no natural terrain barrier.
Therefore, Ridgway's counter-offensive at this time was actually only for political purposes, that is, to restore the state of the North and South before the Korean War.
Ridgway launched a vigorous counterattack to the "38th Line," that is, to the political dividing line between North and South Korea. Britain, France and other European countries believe that this can be the end, because their focus is on Europe, so they advocate that a ceasefire can be negotiated. The U.S. State Department also held this idea, but MacArthur did not do it.
MacArthur was originally pessimistic, but now that he saw that the UN army had pushed to the "38th Line", his motivation came up again, and he even concealed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ordered the UN army to continue to attack north across the "38th Line".
MacArthur's attack was indeed unexpected by the Chinese and North Korean armies. In the face of this attack, the Chinese and North Korean armies took the initiative to defend, that is, to annihilate the enemy in motion, they looked for opportunities to annihilate the enemy in the retreat, so they took the initiative to retreat, and as a result, the United Nations army advanced 2-6 miles north of the "38th Line".
By not passing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MacArthur had seriously violated discipline and was fired because of a serious conflict with Truman's ideas. However, MacArthur's "victory fruit" has once again ignited the interest of the US military, and since the United Nations army has crossed the "38th line", it may as well take Pyongyang and the Wonsan line again, so as to win greater initiative.
With the advantage of the political demarcation line, the United Nations army has gained inches and has begun to consider military initiatives again.
As a result, the United Nations Air Force vigorously bombed the rear communication lines and material hoarding areas of the Sino-DPRK coalition forces, the Navy carried out a vigorous shelling of Wonsan Port, transferred 2 US National Guard Divisions, and also formed a new US 16th Army and 3 South Korean Divisions, preparing to occupy Pyongyang and The Wonsan line in one fell swoop.
However, the UN army did not expect that they were suddenly counterattacked by Chinese and North Korean troops, especially in Hengcheng, 3 divisions of the South Korean Army and a battalion of the US 2nd Division were crippled, which made the UN army think that it was impossible to take the Pyongyang and Wonsan front, so they stopped the attack.
However, the UN forces stopped attacking, and the Chinese and North Korean coalition forces stopped doing so.
After the Fifth Campaign, the strategy of the enemy and us changed
Since the Sino-DPRK coalition forces firmly controlled the Pyongyang and Wonsan fronts and had taken the initiative in the Korean battlefield, their strategies were completely different from before. Previously, the Sino-DPRK coalition army used military strategy to survive, but now there is no problem of survival, but for further political strategy, that is, to enter the "37th Line" to achieve political initiative. The "37th Line" also has no military value, but it has political value.
In mid-April 1951, the Volunteer Army added two main forces, the 19th Corps and the 3rd Corps, at which point the Chinese and North Korean troops had reached 1.33 million. After that, the Chinese and North Korean million troops launched a large-scale offensive against the United Nations Army, the fifth campaign.
In the face of the Sino-North Korean offensive, Ridgway, who had replaced MacArthur as the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Army, also threw almost all of his troops into the resistance.
After the fourth campaign, Ridgway discovered a serious logistical flaw in the Sino-North Korean coalition forces, that is, the Sino-North Korean offensive could only last for one week, and he named it the so-called "Worship Offensive". This gave Ridgway the hope of re-planning the North Korean strategy, and he adopted a "magnetic tactic", that is, to let the United Nations army retreat in the face of the attack of the Chinese and North Korean troops, try to kill and injure the Chinese and North Korean troops with aircraft artillery, and then pursue them with tanks and motorized infantry when the Chinese and North Korean troops run out of food and ammunition.
Although Ridgway's strategy was initially effective, it could only last for one to two weeks, because after the Chinese and North Korean armies were replenished, the combat effectiveness was quickly restored, and Ridgway's strategy could only be used once, and it could no longer play a role after being recognized by the Chinese and North Korean troops.
However, Ridgway's "magnetic tactics" did have a certain effect, it made the Chinese and North Korean troops and the United Nations forces have a clearer understanding of each other, and the forces of the two sides have become more balanced, especially the United Nations army realizes that they cannot occupy all of Korea, so they turn to strategic defense.
Although both the Chinese and North Korean sides and the United Nations forces stopped the offensive and turned to the defensive, internally, both sides were still preparing for the offensive.
The Sino-North Korean coalition forces were preparing for the sixth campaign, but Ridgway was always thinking of seizing the Pyongyang and Wonsan fronts and gaining greater military strategic initiatives.
In early July, less than a month after the end of the fifth campaign, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Admiral Ridgway to consider launching another offensive on September 1, targeting the Pyongyang and Wonsan fronts.
However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had three prerequisites for ridgway's offensive, namely:
First: The combat effectiveness of the Chinese and North Korean armies has been significantly reduced, and it is possible to capture the targets set at the cost of small losses
Second: The Chinese and North Korean armies could not withstand the fierce fighting they were now fighting and retreated
Third: Change the tasks of the 8th Army and strengthen it by transferring the 16th Army to Japan
After receiving the order of the joint meeting, Ridgway also asked Van Vleet to draw up a battle plan, but Ridgway did not approve the plan for a long time, because he could not see the first two conditions met.
After that, Van Vleet retreated to the second place, and he drew up a small plan, that is, to launch an offensive only with the US 1st Army and the US 9th Army, and then carry out another amphibious landing to occupy Pyongyang and the Wonsan line.
However, before Ridgway could react, Van Vleet himself abandoned the plan.
Ridgway did not dare to launch another attack on China and North Korea, in addition to not meeting the two conditions set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also saw the solidity of the tunnel defense positions of the Sino-Dprk coalition forces, and he concluded that it would take at least 200,000 sacrifices to break through the defenses of the Chinese and North Korean coalition forces.
Such a result is impossible for the United States to accept, even if the U.S. military can accept such a sacrifice, but how many troops will be organized? This is something that the U.S. military can't do.
To put it bluntly, Ridgway believes that this battle cannot be fought.
Sixth, the target of the large-scale military offensive of the US military
In May 1952, Ridgway went to Europe to take up his post, and the commander-in-chief of the United Nations army was replaced by Clark. Clark came to Korea to make a big contribution, and he secretly drew up a large-scale military offensive plan, targeting Pyongyang and Wonsan.
Faced with the strong defense of the Sino-Korean coalition forces, even the tactical expert Ridgway was powerless. However, Clark did not believe in evil, he believed that his courage was greater than That of Ridgway, his military operations were large-scale, requiring joint operations by land, navy and air force, and the scale of the attack was divided into 3 stages for more than 2 months, and the tactical operations included large-scale encirclement of the ground, large-scale amphibious landings, and large-scale airborne landings.
In order to support his own large-scale offensive, Clark demanded that in addition to the army in Korea, there would be 3 more US divisions, 1 additional infantry division, 1 airborne division, 1 Marine division, 2 more divisions of the South Korean Army and 2 divisions of the Taiwan Nationalist Army.
On October 15, Clark concentrated six aircraft carriers, four cruisers, more than 30 destroyers, and a unit of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division to conduct a massive amphibious landing exercise off the east coast of North Korea, targeting Wonsan.
The Chinese and Dprk coalition forces did not understand Clarke's plan, but they had judged that the United Nations army had the possibility of launching an amphibious landing in our rear again, so it began to prepare for anti-landing operations, not only mobilizing the 38th Army and other troops to defend the west coast and so on, but also vigorously building fortifications and communication lines to ensure the rapid transportation of the various armies, especially for the weak logistics of the Chinese and North Korean coalition forces, and building many military stations and warehouses.
In fact, Clarke's large-scale battle plan did not have the support of the United States and allies, coupled with the full anti-landing operation preparations of the Chinese and North Korean armies, his plan was not implemented in the end.
7. Summary
Looking at the strategic arrangements and changes between the enemy and ourselves in the Korean War, we can see that in fact, the Korean War has always been centered on two lines, one is the geopolitical line, the so-called
"38 Lines"
This is a dotted line; while the other is a solid line, the real military line
"Pyongyang and Wonsan Line".
The Rout of the UN Army was due to the loss of the "Pyongyang and Wonsan Line", and the Sino-DPRK coalition army turned from passive to active, precisely because of the acquisition of the "Pyongyang and Wonsan Line".
In the game between the enemy and us, the "38th Line" as a political line and the "Pyongyang and Wonsan Lines" as a military line constantly alternate. The Sino-North Korean coalition forces gained
"Pyongyang and Wonsan Line"
The military line can also put forward political demands on the "38th Line" and the "37th Line"; and it is precisely because the United Nations Army has lost it
The military line also had to play the political card of the "38th line."
Therefore, strategically, in addition to geopolitical lines such as the "38th Line", north Korea occupies it
"Pyongyang and Wonsan Line",
Therefore, to this day, it has always occupied a more active strategic advantage than South Korea.