Professor Li Yitian studied moral psychology, over the past ten years, sharpened a sword, and wrote "The Heart of Virtue" (Commercial Press, 2021), which became a family statement. "The heart of virtue", according to the author's experience, is one and two meanings: at the formal level, it means the core problem of virtue ethics, and at the substantive level, it is the moral psychology of virtue ethics. There is no doubt that these two meanings are intrinsically related. The rise of virtue ethics challenged the dominance of rule ethics since the modern era of the West by questioning the basic position of the concept of obligation (or, in Williams's words, "a special concept of obligation") and instead seeking to re-establish ethics from moral psychology. Moral psychology became central to the ethics of virtue. Professor Yitian cites Anscomm's Modern Moral Philosophy (1958) criticism of rule ethics: rule ethics is far removed from human experience, especially psychological experience, and meaningful moral philosophy research must be premised on "a proper philosophy of mind" (p. 4). Perhaps we can say that the significance of virtue ethics is not to provide a third form of modern moral philosophy besides deontology and consequentialism, but to provide a contemporary ethical form of modern morality that is different from the modern morality represented by deontology and consequentialism. In this sense, contemporary ethics needs to be based on an appropriate moral psychology—in the terminology of traditional Chinese philosophy, the science of mind.
The Study of The Mind: The Foundation of Contemporary Ethics
In terms of the Heart of Virtue, it is a systematic review of Aristotle's moral psychology (the study of Acetose's nature of mind). Yasch has undoubtedly been universally accepted as an ancient model of virtue ethics, with its meticulous observation of human moral psychology. Through the careful analysis of concepts such as reason, cause, motivation/intention, etc., "Heart of Virtue" draws a basic framework in which mental processes such as reason, desire, emotion, intuition, and impulse take their place (part one). Using this as a reference, the author identifies the main psychological issues of Aristotle's ethics of virtue: reason, desire, perception, emotion, empathy, and intention, and outlines a moral psychological explanation of how the virtuous actor acts (parts II and III): the practical rational model that relies on the intrinsic qualities of the actor, the practice of the deliberative structure through the "end-means" constructed by desire and perception, and the practical wisdom is inseparable from appropriate emotion and empathy. Further, the author explores and responds to the modern challenges facing him by "reading the past" to "analyzing the present" (Part IV): whether practical wisdom has the flaws of instrumental rationality and whether it can provide effective guidelines for action; and whether sensory-based emotions and empathy can ensure that the actor obtains accurate information about the current situation and takes the right action.
Through Heart of Virtue, we enter Aristotle, into the complex moral psychology of mankind. Reflect on the modern moral philosophy of the "rationalist perception of reason" (Williams) fallacy. Professor Yitian pointed out: "The practical rational model of Aristotle virtue ethics is not a pure application of reason, but a process that integrates various psychological elements such as reason, emotion, desire, feeling and will. (p. 336) In contrast, modern rule ethics presupposes a moral actor who is sufficiently rational. Yasch emphasizes that the human capacity on which moral action depends is irrational, giving a distinct contemporary significance. Professor Yitian also reminds us to rethink the complexity and possibilities of moral life, pointing out that the key to ethics is to "prepare sufficient countermeasures for future ethical practice according to the complexity of daily life" (p. 337). Given the complexity of moral life (both spatially diverse and temporally historical), it is unlikely that we will find ethical principles that are universal once and for all.
The Contemporary Situation of the Study of The Mind: Technology and Ethics
Moral psychology takes "having a mind" as a logical premise, so "The Heart of Virtue" examines the conceptual shift from the ancient "soul" to the modern "mind" in the West, and explores the challenge of modern psychological science to the independence and reality of the human mind (Chapters 1 and 12). The contemporary development of ethics cannot avoid the relationship between science and technology and ethics, including the complex relationship between modern psychological science and moral psychology. The complexity is reflected in the fact that the relationship is both two-way (mutually influencing) and both two-sided (both positive and negative). From the perspective of moral psychology, it is necessary to absorb the positive results of modern psychological science and to deal positively with the challenges posed by modern psychological science, and at the same time, it is possible to provide meaningful insights for modern psychological science in the process, rather than blindly succumbing to the "scientific nature" of modern psychological science, because philosophical conceptual speculation actually helps to clarify the assumptions and working methods of modern psychological science, review its limitations and problems, and reveal some non-scientific nature in its scientific nature.
Heart of Virtue discusses in detail the challenges of physicalism in modern psychological science to moral psychology. Physicalism reduces mental phenomena and mental activities to the physiological activities of the brain, and its logic is as follows: "When mental activity A appears, brain region R will produce corresponding neural activity; when brain region R is damaged and cannot produce corresponding neural activity, mental activity A will not appear." Thus, mental activity A is attributed to neural activity that is even equivalent to brain region R. (p. 300) Professor Yitian pointed out that the premise here proves at most that the neural activity of brain area R is a necessary condition for mental activity A, and it does not prove that mental activity A is attributed to the neural activity of brain area R, let alone that mental activity A is equivalent to the neural activity of brain area R.
Mental activity A is equivalent to the neural activity of brain region R, which is a very strong proposition, which directly abolishes mental activity and the independence of the human mind, and at the same time completely dissolves the freedom of will and the human dignity based on freedom of will. Even if the neural activity of brain region R is a sufficient requirement for mental activity A, it does not mean that the two are equivalent. The fact that a mother gives birth to a child does not mean that mother and child are indistinguishable. There can still be qualitative differences between mental activity A and the neural activity of brain area R, that is, mental activity A has characteristics that the neural activity of brain area R does not have.
To prove that mental activity A is attributed to neural activity in brain region R, it is also necessary to prove that neural activity in brain area R necessarily produces mental activity A. However, "at present, the experimental evidence for neuropsychology in this regard is insufficient" (p. 301), especially psychological phenomena such as willingness and belief cannot find peer-to-peer counterparts in brain regions (see p. 306). "Even if the experimenter can observe the psychological response of the subject in the process of stimulating the brain area, it is not enough to conclude that the former is the 'cause' of the latter." Rather, this experimental process just shows that the brain organs are only the physiological carriers of mental activity, and the "cause" that really triggers mental activity is the projection or stimulation from the outside world (in this case, precisely the experimenter and some kind of information or signal he exerts). (pp. 301-302) This is a very fine argument, but it is still possible to add a little, a little correction, a little extension. A little addition: the discovery of a link between neural activity and mental activity in a certain brain region (even if the former is a necessary condition for the latter), the achievements of neuropsychology in this regard can not be ignored, the effectiveness of psychotropic drugs (such as antidepressants), the effectiveness of deep stimulation of the brain depends on this (naturally, and thus also raises ethical questions that need to be further investigated). A little correction: if the experimenter can observe the subject's psychological response A in the process of stimulating brain area R, then we still have a legitimate reason to call the neural activity of brain area R "cause" of mental activity A, although it is more accurate to say that it should be "one of the causes". Brain organs are stimulated by external stimuli to produce neural activity and mental activity, this external stimulus is the cause of neural activity, but it is not advisable to skip neural activity and directly call it the cause of mental activity. By extension: many mental phenomena and mental activities cannot find a peer-to-peer counterpart in the brain region, which may enlighten us that the material basis of the mind may not be limited to the brain. Other parts of the body (such as "heart" in the sense of the heart), or even the entire body is the birthplace of mental activity?
Further thought
"The Heart of Virtue" is rich in righteousness and thought-provoking. In terms of research methods, Professor Yitian advocates "reading the past and analyzing the present", arguing that "not only should the ancient classics of virtue ethics (especially Aristotleism) be carefully sorted out, but also the modern issues of virtue ethics and the modern challenges they face need to be taken seriously" (p. 3). Such an approach is generally presented as a tendency from ancient times to the present. However, after "reading the past and analyzing the present", it may be necessary to further "analyze the past and read the past": from today's problems, problems and challenges back to the classics, and activate its ideological potential to respond to contemporary problems. Here we also encounter some kind of problem and ism dispute. The Heart of Virtue, which argues that "based on the basic views of Aristotleism" confronts contemporary problems (p. 74), seems to be more ism than problems. However, the problems raised by contemporary problems, the contemporary living world, and the solution of these problems were not up to the task of anyone in ancient times. Therefore, to solve contemporary problems, it is still necessary to have a problem greater than ism, and it is not appropriate to first maintain a certain ideological turf (such as Aristotleism).
"The Heart of Virtue" advocates that modern scholars shoulder the dual task of "reading the past and analyzing the present". However, in addition, contemporary scholars are in different academic traditions at home and abroad, and there are also tasks to survey China and foreign countries, to see their understanding, and to seek super victory. For example, Aristotle's happiness of "stopping at the highest good" is based on nature/nature (physis), which has something in common with the Confucian concept of the benevolence of life. In the Confucian view, the individual needs to expand the good in order to fulfill his own nature, and Aristotle also acknowledged the dynamic development of the personality, "with a special emphasis on the education and cultivation of the practical reason of the actor" (p. 339). Confucianism thus developed a subtle theory of self-cultivation. The implication for us is: Should contemporary ethics also develop its own theory of work? If so, contemporary ethics undoubtedly requires a revision of self-perception. The "study" of ethics is not only an object study of ethical life, but also a study of one's own state of existence. How people should live is not only a universal theoretical question of "practice", but also a practical question of "putting it into practice". Moreover, the "practice" here includes individual self-cultivation at the level of self-cultivation and counselor education at the level of adulthood. In this sense, the ethics that come from studying ethos will inspire people to react to ethos.