The Battle of Changping was one of the several decisive battles of the Warring States Period, and at first glance, the Battle of Changping was known to Zhao Kuo's absurdity because of "talking about soldiers on paper".
However, with the deepening of historical research, there is another interpretation of Zhao Kuo. At that time, the national strength of the Zhao State was no longer able to support a protracted war, so it could only replace Lian Po and use rapid warfare to get rid of the huge war consumption.
As the other party, the Qin army still belonged to the labor expedition, but why was it able to withstand the pressure of logistics supply? This has to mention the perfect logistics system of the Qin Dynasty.
First, the economic account of the Battle of Changping
Some people are accustomed to using the distance between the capitals of the two countries to measure the difficulty of supply in the Battle of Changping. But what is easy for many people to overlook is that the State of Qin has occupied the 400-mile hedong land of the former State of Wei for 30 years.
The land of Hedong refers to the area east of the Yellow River and the southwest of Shanxi, which is a vast grain producing area. This was the main logistical supply base for the Qin Army to fight against Han and Zhao, and from here, the supply distance was comparable to that of Handan.
There is also a mode of transportation, they have a large distance to use the waterway, that is, the Weihe, Yellow River to Fenhe route, also known as Hedong Road.
When the Jin Dynasty was still alive, there was a great famine one year. The ally Qin state then delivered a large amount of life-saving food to the Jin state through Hedong Province, which is known as the Battle of Panzhou. That is to say, whether it is the river east or the water transportation capacity of the Qin State, it has been tested.
Including the early days of the war, The Emperor Zhao Bao of Pingyang opposed the Zhao State's acceptance of the Shangdang, on the grounds that the Qin State had waterway supplies, and the logistical pressure was much smaller than expected.
Let's talk about the gap in national strength. With the change of the martingale, the Qin state's policy of "emphasizing agriculture and suppressing commerce" made the grain reserves solid enough. On the other hand, the Zhao state practiced attaching equal importance to commerce and agriculture, and the state's grain reserves were not much, and it simply could not withstand the long-term war consumption.
Coupled with the refusal of the State of Qi and the State of Chu to aid grain during the war, the logistics of the State of Zhao were even worsened.
Second, the amazing consumption
Successive history books have different records of the logistical consumption of war, and it is difficult to have a standard considering the production conditions in different periods. However, the author believes that the description of military logistics by Shen Kuo, a famous scientist of the Song Dynasty, can still be referred to.
Shen Kuo said that a logistics supply personnel can carry up to 6 buckets of grain. 1 bucket of grain equals 10 liters, which is 60 liters of supply. According to the ancient dietary standards, 1 person eats two liters of grain a day, and 6 buckets of grain are enough for 30 days.
Soldiers themselves can carry up to 5 days of dry food for the march, that is to say, when fully loaded, 1 logistics personnel supply 1 soldier, and can transport up to 35 days of marching food.
But is that really the case?
First of all, the supply staff is not a robot, but also needs to eat and drink. So 35 days need to be divided by 2. Let's just leave it at 18 days. In the 18 days, not only to move forward, but also to eat on the way back, and to divide the 18 days in half.
If you replace it with 2 supply personnel to add 1 soldier, the duration becomes 26 days. For 3 supply personnel, the march time becomes 31 days, including 16 of them on the way home.
What about the increase in supply staff to 4, 5, or even 6 people? Isn't the combat distance getting longer and longer? That's almost impossible. If 300,000 troops are dispatched, it means that there are 1 million logistical supply troops.
For a general, it is a very difficult job to take into account both the huge war consumption and the huge number of non-combatants. The above is still the supply efficiency of the plains operation.
If it was fought in the northern steppe, considering the vast territory and poor transportation conditions, when Mengtian attacked the Xiongnu in the north, it was basically 30 minutes to 1 stone. It is known that 1 bell equals 6.4 stones.
Translated into the data we are more familiar with, for every 1 kilogram of grain eaten by front-line soldiers, nearly 200 kilograms of grain are consumed during transportation. How staggering the cost of such a war can be.
It is no wonder that the warlike Zhao State will have a food crisis, and without a strong mobilization ability, it is impossible to ensure the continuous consumption of a huge army.
Third, the mobilization system of the Qin State
Since the Shang martingale transformation method, the Qin state has a uniform war mobilization ability. First of all, the bosses of qin guo's logistics were Situ and Sikong.
Situ was equivalent to the later Hubu Shangshu, in charge of land and population, and the people's service and military service were all planned by him. Sikong is equivalent to Shangshu of the Ministry of Works, in charge of engineering and technical personnel.
In other words, Situ is responsible for paying money, grain, and troops; Sikong is responsible for the classification of personnel. Cooks, medical officers, veterinarians in the military, transporting grain and grass, and even migrant workers who set up camps are all idle jobs.
With this subdivision, coupled with a perfect system, the Qin Army's logistics support system was the absolute head at that time. According to Qin Jian unearthed in Yunmeng County' Sleeping Tiger Land, military uniforms and military food were all equipped by the state and had detailed standards.
In contrast, in other countries, people often bring their own food for military service, and some armor has to be self-funded. No wonder they couldn't defeat the Qin State.
Fourth, a solid hardware foundation
In ancient times, there were only two ways of transportation: one was by land and the other was by water.
Overland involves cars and horses. First of all, the car, judging from the cultural relics unearthed in the Qin Dynasty, the design of the Qin car was very reasonable at that time. For example, there are up to 30 spokes on wheels, which means that the wheels are light and strong and can carry a lot of weight.
The straps of the tethered horses were located on the chest and shoulder blades of the horses, and the European chariots of the same period were directly strangled to the horse's neck. This frees up the horse's function and can also pull heavier cargo.
And then there are the horses. The State of Qin established the first state-run horse farm in Chinese history. No way, their ancestors started raising horses, and naturally knew the importance of raising horses.
The system of state-run horse farms is very strict. If more than 3 horses die in a year, the owner of the horse farm will be held accountable; if 1 person feeds 10 female horses, and more than 3 horses cannot be born, the feeding personnel will also be held accountable.
This system ensured the supply of warhorses during the frequent wars of the Qin Dynasty.
In addition to cars and horses, there are also roads.
In order to destroy Bashu, the Qin Dynasty built thousands of miles of trails. The whole world saw the mobilization ability of the Qin State's terror and felt deeply afraid. There is also the Qinchi Road, which radiates the whole country with Xianyang as the center, which also proves the perfect road facility construction capacity of the Qin Dynasty.
Without going into too much detail, the aforementioned Battle of The Rafting is enough to say it all.
Fifth, the gap in the Battle of Changping
Whether it is from the economy, agriculture, or infrastructure construction, the Qin state has thrown zhao guo a few streets. Coupled with the fact that the "military god" of the Qin Dynasty made the qin state attribute +1 overall, and the Zhao state caused the attribute -1 because of the confused king, the battle of Changping was a mistake from the beginning.
Or rather, this is a big assist from Korea to qin.
Author: Our special guest author Kan Dashan
References: "Yan Zhao Lamentations: The Battle of Changping", "Great Qin Legion"