In modern warfare, in addition to carrying out front-end military operations, whoever occupies the commanding heights of intelligence warfare will grasp the initiative in war. On the Korean battlefield, the United States used almost all of its intelligence agencies and intelligence resources, in addition,
The U.S.-led "United Nations Army"
Intelligence agencies and intelligence personnel were also involved in intelligence gathering on the Korean War.
In China, in addition to the army reconnaissance unit of the Volunteer Army, the only one who could provide intelligence support at that time may be yu
An intelligence service under the direct leadership of Zhou Enlai
finish.
Tough choices
In fact, until July 1950, Mao Zedong had not yet determined whether to place his attack on Taiwan or North Korea.
But one thing is very certain -
The challenge, or threat, in both directions, comes from the United States
。
He had made up his mind to fight the Americans who were everywhere against him.
According to his strategic thinking of being good at concentrating superior forces to fight a war of annihilation, the most urgent task at the moment is to make a choice between the north and the south as soon as possible.
As U.S. troops got involved in the Korean War, Mao's attention shifted from the south to the north.
On August 11, the Central Military Commission decided to postpone the campaign to liberate Taiwan until after 1951. At the end of September, Mao Zedong even personally instructed that the slogan of promising to liberate Taiwan within a limited period of time be abolished in the National Day celebrations.
Actually
At the beginning of the Korean War, Mao Zedong did not know it
。 Because Stalin and Kim Il Sung coincided at that time, they both blocked the information and intelligence of the war against him.
Even before the outbreak of war, all soviet aid to North Korea arrived in Korea by sea, not through the Chinese railway.
Kim il sung
When we are full of confidence and full of ambition, we certainly do not want China to meddle in North Korean affairs. whereas
Stalin
Then to this new ally
Some other scruples
Will Mao Zedong oppose Moscow's decision beforehand? Will Mao withdraw from the situation when the situation is difficult and not obey Moscow's command?
As a "
The supreme responsible person for the revolutionary cause in East Asia
Mao Zedong certainly did not want to see a war in a neighboring country that would enable the United States to interfere in Asian affairs, but his country had not yet completed reunification, and he could only repeatedly stress to the North Korean side that only after China resolved the Taiwan issue could it provide military assistance.
When it was learned that Stalin and Kim Il Sung were already in May
When an agreement was reached on "military means to resolve the issue of Korean reunification"
Mao Zedong had no choice but to agree to help Korea solve the reunification problem first, and expressed his willingness to give all kinds of assistance to the DPRK.
Now that the Korean "revolution" was in real trouble, Mao Zedong naturally had to think about how to fulfill his promises and obligations. Especially after Moscow demanded that China intervene in the war, Mao Zedong
There is no reason to back off
After the U.S. army entered the war, Stalin immediately thought of letting Chinese to fight with the United States
。 First, China and the DPRK are neighbors, and the national security of china, an ally, may be threatened again, and we must plan in advance; second, if China sends troops, it will help the Soviet Union contain the US military deployment and sphere of influence in Asia.
Mao Zedong
Not necessarily unexpected
Stalin wanted to make his own way out of the Soviet Union, but at that time a new Sino-Soviet alliance had just been established, China
It also depends on the Soviet Union
Provide assistance in economic recovery and construction work. There is no need for China to threaten the Sino-Soviet alliance because of the issue of sending troops. Therefore, on the issue of the choice of two battlefields in the north and the south, Mao Zedong made a quick decision.
If only from the perspective of "defending the family and defending the country"
At that time, North Korea was not yet defeated in the military confrontation, and China only needed to raise troops on the north bank of the Yalu River.
There is no need to send troops to North Korea
but
Taking into account the assumption of internationalist responsibilities and obligations for the socialist camp
If China stands idly by while the Korean regime is threatened, the position of New China in the socialist camp and the CCP's image as a Marxist-Leninist party will inevitably be greatly damaged.
Roshin
On July 4, Chinese director of the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army
Zou Dapeng
He was ordered to go to the Soviet Embassy in Beijing
The ambassador described the battle plan and elaborated on specific ideas for sending Chinese military experts to the South Korean battlefield to provide tactical support.
For China's proposal, Stalin immediately called back to express his support, also
China was urged to send representatives to the DPRK as soon as possible in order to strengthen contacts and resolve issues
Senior "Old Intelligence Officer"
At this time, the Chinese ambassador to North Korea
Ni Zhiliang
Still recuperating at Wuhan Union Hospital, Zhou Enlai temporarily reassigned him to work in East Germany as early as June 30 in order to maintain contacts with the North Korean side
Chai Chengwen
In the name of the political counselor, he rushed to North Korea.
Chai Chengwen, formerly known as Chai Junwu, was born in 1915 in Suiping County, Henan Province. From 1941 as a staff officer and chief of the intelligence unit of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 18th Army Group, to 1949 as the chief of the intelligence department of the Southwest Military Region, he became forged from the melting pot of war
And when the country was just liberated, the unexpected Korean War transformed the old intelligence officer into a diplomat.
On June 25, 1950, the day Kim Il Sung's 80,000 troops crossed the "38th Line" and launched a large-scale attack to the south, Chai Chengwen was ordered to leave Chongqing, the seat of the Southwest Military Region, and rush to Beijing to report.
Because intelligence is characterized by timeliness, so
His mission was closely linked to this sudden outbreak of war
On June 30, Truman ordered U.S. troops to intervene in the Korean War.
Truman
Late at night on the same day,
Zhou Enlai
Chai Chengwen was received at the West Flower Hall in Zhongnanhai, and there was also a person who was then vice minister of foreign affairs
Zhang Hanfu
, and deputy director of the Intelligence Department of the Central Military Commission
Liu Zhijian
This emergency summons caused Chai Chengwen to change course,
As a result, his life has become more prosperous and more legendary
"I obey the decision of the organization"
Immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States announced its participation in the war, sent the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, and openly stated that it would vigorously assist France in the colonial war in Indochina, thus completing the deployment of the next military operation in Asia.
In this way, the war provoked by Kim Il Sung on the Korean Peninsula is closely linked to Taiwan, Vietnam, and the entire Far East.
Zhou Enlai told Chai Chengwen that the central authorities considered that if they wanted to accurately grasp the dynamics of the battlefield, they must
Send your own military observers to Pyongyang as soon as possible
"Nie Laozong suggested sending you, and Comrade Bo Cheng also felt that it was appropriate, what is your own opinion?" ”
At this time, Chai Chengwen, who had already received a notice to go to the Berlin Embassy to work, never expected to be suddenly reassigned to the war-torn Korean battlefield.
But as a PLA officer, he replied without hesitation: "Prime Minister,
I obey the decision of the organization
。 ”
Zhou Enlai said to him:
The United States has pointed the spearhead of aggression at us, and we must make corresponding preparations
。 Someone needs to keep in touch with Comrade Kim Il Sung now. But Comrade Ni Zhiliang is still recuperating in Wuhan, so I sent you to Pyongyang first with a few cadres who understand military affairs. ”
After a slight pause, Zhou Enlai added: "The opinion of the General Staff is that you go to Korea in the name of the Military Observation Group. I consider it still
The identity of the embassy staff
Go better. This matter is so fixed, try to start as soon as possible. ”
After urgent preparations, he completed the preparations for going to the DPRK in a few days.
In addition to Chai Chengwen, the final decision to go to North Korea was also decided to go with Counselor Ni Weiting and Xue Zonghua, first secretary Zhang Hengye, military attaché Zhu Guang, deputy military attachés Wang Gang and Liu Xiangwen, and four other radio workers. Chai Chengwen served as political counsellor and chargé d'affaires a.i. at the Embassy in North Korea.
In the early morning of July 8, 1950, Zhou Enlai again received the chai chengwen working group that was about to leave, and gave specific instructions on their work tasks.
Zhou En: "When you went this time as a senior military attaché and political counselor, you stayed by Kim Il Sung's side, and what happened was reported to the central authorities as soon as possible." Now that the Korean people are at the forefront of the struggle, we must express our support to the Korean comrades, see what we need to do, ask them to bring it up, and we will do our best to do it.
The main task of the embassy at present is to maintain the ties between the two parties and two armies, to understand the war situation in many aspects, and to report changes in the battlefield situation to the central authorities in a timely manner.
”
A Chinese intelligence officer who was "fooled"
Chai Chengwen's team arrived in Pyongyang on the morning of July 10.
Kim Il-sung received them on the same day, then arranged for them to stay at a high-level guest house of the Workers' Party Central Committee, provided good food and lodging, and designated Xu Hui (the "Yan'an faction"), then deputy director of the General Political Bureau of the People's Army, to brief Chai Chengwen on the battlefield situation every day. He also specifically instructed the relevant departments,
A dedicated telephone was installed in Chai Chengwen's room
Kim Il Sung said to him:
You pick up the machine, the phone in my office rings, and you tell me directly about something
Not only that, Kim Il Sung also instructed the General Staff of the DPRK Army to appoint special personnel to send the latest war reports to Chai Sung-moon's group every night.
In fact
Sino-North Korean relations at that time were not very harmonious
Sometimes even nervous enough to ask Soviet Ambassador Shtkov to act as coordinator. Because of this, when Chai Chengwen left Beijing, he also brought a handwritten letter from Zhou Enlai to Kim Il Sung. Interestingly, Zhou Enlai solemnly emphasized to Kim Il Sung in his letter"
This person is reliable
”。
This "special preferential treatment" directly arranged by Kim Il Sung surprised Chai Sung-wen.
According to Chai Chengwen, when he first arrived in Pyongyang, he was very happy.
I think Kim Il Sung's treatment to himself is not low
。 Picking up the phone was Kim Il Sung's voice, and the other party spoke Chinese very smoothly, and there was no need for an interpreter.
And even if the other senior cadres meet in the canteen every day, few people talk to him, and when they see Chai Chengwen, they are like passers-by; he takes the initiative to come forward to greet them, they do not respond, they turn their heads and leave, as if they are a leper.
Later, Xu Hui quietly told him that Kim Il Sung had instructions,
No one is allowed to contact and talk to him
Speaking of the war reports that came to the room every day, Chai Chengwen said that he was very happy at that time, and with ready-made intelligence, his work was much easier.
Later I understood,
The war reports sent to him every day by Kim Il Sung were broadcasts the next day
。 For example, on July 9, he received a war report and immediately sent it to China. The next day, I saw that the war report appeared verbatim in the Rodong Sinmun, the organ newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.
As for the Chinese Embassy's request to send deputy military attaches to the KPA units to visit and study, the DPRK side has also been dragging its feet and not answering.
In his contacts with other DPRK personnel, Chai Chengwen clearly felt that
Military intelligence is basically a forbidden area for Chinese
Nie Rongzhen
At the same time, the staff committee that the Chinese army planned to send to North Korea to understand and grasp the dynamics of the battlefield was also rejected.
Soon after Chai Chengwen returned to China to report for duty, when the Central Military Commission held a meeting, Nie Rongzhen reprimanded him with a Sichuan accent: "Chai Chengwen, what are you doing?"
The prime minister sent you to do intelligence, why do you copy people's newspapers every day?
We've all read the newspaper, and the things you sent back, the newspapers all have them. ”
Chai Sung-moon pleaded with a look of grievance: "This is what Kim Il-sung sends me every day, and the phone I am equipped with is only through Kim Il-sung alone, and the North Korean comrades do not dare to talk to me.
He just made me deaf and dumb!
Accurate judgment
Despite this, Chai Chengwen accurately predicted the landing site of the US military based on intelligence.
On August 12, Ambassador to North Korea Ni Zhiliang rushed to Pyongyang to take office before he could recover. On September 2, Chai Chengwen received a telegram from China asking him to return to Beijing as soon as possible to report on his work.
When consulting with other members on the work of the Central Committee,
Based on intelligence, Chai Chengwen analyzed and put forward the judgment that "the enemy is likely to land in Incheon and other places."
。 After some discussion, others agreed.
On September 4, Ni Zhiliang and Chai Sung-moon met with Kim Il Sung to learn about some of the latest situations ahead, and
He was confronted with the idea that "it is possible for U.S. troops to land at Inchon."
。 According to the war situation at that time, Kim Il Sung
And didn't take it seriously
During the day on September 6, when Chai Chengwen finished sorting out all the situation in the Korean battlefield at hand and writing the outline of the report, he received an urgent call from the Xihua Hall in Zhongnanhai, and the other side ordered him
Immediately return to your home country to report the situation
。 Chai Chengwen immediately set off and flew to Beijing in the early morning of the 7th. On the afternoon of the 8th, Chai Chengwen reported to Acting Commander Nie Rongzhen.
At that time, the war situation between the Korean People's Army and the US and Roksar forces was in a state of stalemate. While making all-out efforts to prevent the KPA from attacking, the US military also stepped up the air blockade and destruction of the KPA rear communication line, and constantly reconnaissance and bombing coastal ports.
Speaking of the judgment on the development trend of the war situation, Chai Chengwen specifically pointed out: "Intelligence shows that the US military has transferred the Marine Corps fighting in the Busan defense circle back to Japan and is actively organizing new Marine divisions. This shows
The U.S. military is already working hard to prepare for a counteroffensive
。 As soon as the time comes, the counter-offensive will begin, and
It is very likely that a landing would be carried out behind the KPA flank to open the curtain on the counter-offensive
Elder Nie interrupted Chai Chengwen's report and asked, "You estimate that if the enemy lands, where is the most likely landing place?" ”
Chai Chengwen replied: "We think the landing site."
Probably in Incheon
。 Since ancient times, Inchon has been known as the western gate of Seoul, and it is of great importance both militarily and politically. As long as in taking Incheon, the enemy can directly attack Seoul,
It can cut off the rear transport line of the KPA in one fell swoop, and can also echo with the besieged troops in the defensive circle of the Luodong River, causing a front-to-back attack on the main force of the KPA
。 It has been learned that in the recent period, small groups of enemy troops have been active frequently on Wolmi Island and Deokji Island along the Incheon coast, as if they were creating conditions for this strategic concept. ”
During the hours of debriefing, Nie Rongzhen asked questions from time to time, and Chai Chengwen talked about it. After Chai Chengwen finished his report, Nie Rongzhen took the outline of the report and said that he would immediately submit it to Chairman Mao.
Chai Chengwen hurriedly said, "My outline is."
Hurried handwriting
Yes, very sloppy, originally planned to copy it again after getting it, Beijing was in a hurry, so it had to take the draft and fly back. Since Chairman Mao wants to read it, it is best for me to copy it and then report it? ”
Nie Rongzhen said: "
Don't delay any longer, just see clearly
Outline of Chai Chengwen's report to the Central Committee
That afternoon, the outline appeared on Mao's desk.
After reading it, Mao Zedong immediately gave instructions: "Please ask Enlai to ask Chai Chengwen to talk about it specifically." ”
Late that night, Chai Chengwen was summoned to the West Flower Hall to report to Premier Zhou on the situation in Korea.
Chai Chengwen held that now that the People's Army is at the end of its strong crossbow, it is difficult to advance again, and it does not have the right to control the air and sea, and it will be very unfavorable to continue to consume it for a long time
Zhou Enlai asked: "In case there is a sudden change in the situation, if we need to send troops to fight in the DPRK, what difficulties do you think we will encounter?" ”
It can be seen from this that the top leadership of the central authorities has foreseen that North Korea will face protracted war, and it is not far off for China to send troops to resist the United States and aid Korea.
A day later, Chai Chengwen specifically reported to Lin Biao.
After lin biao listened, he asked Chai Chengwen: "If the war situation is reversed, we will not send troops and let them go up to the mountains to fight guerrillas. ”
Chai Chengwen replied: "North Korea has a narrow territory and little room for maneuver, so it may be very difficult to fight guerrillas." However, in the mountains near the northern part of the Yalu River, it can be insisted. Put the logistics and hospitals in the northeast, and run to our turf if you can't win the battle. ”
Sure enough, as Chai Chengwen expected, on September 15, the situation of the Korean War brought about by the US landing at Inchon changed.
It is roughly the same as his previous analysis and judgment
This has attracted close attention from China's top brass.
Thus
The strategic vision that had experienced the war was so vicious that it completely predicted MacArthur's amphibious landing strategy
Friends who are familiar with the history of our army know that during macArthur's planning of the Inchon landing, our army had one
More than one senior man saw through MacArthur's plan more than half a month in advance, and some even counted almost all of MacArthur's attack time
In addition to Chai Chengwen, there was also the chief of staff of the Volunteer Army
Solution
, Director of the War Room of the General Staff
Rayingff
Unfortunately, at that time, the KPA thought that victory was in sight
Although the Chinese were able to send their own ambassadors to Pyongyang at Stalin's urging, they remained under Kim Il-sung's deliberate blockade
Accurate and detailed information on the state of the war is not available
。 Moreover, because Kim Il Sung had always resented The Chinese side for intervening in the affairs of the Korean Peninsula, it was almost impossible for Mao Zedong to exchange views with Kim Il Sung on this issue.
So before the battle,
Only one division of the North Koreans, which was not strong in combat, was stationed in Seoul
。 By the time MacArthur launched the Inchon landings on September 15,
The great reversal of strategy was accomplished with almost negligible casualties
The rapid defeat and retreat of the People's Army also left the volunteer army without targeted training and logistical preparations, and could only rush into the DPRK.