During the Liberation War, the Nationalist army still had a lot of miscellaneous cards, and its combat effectiveness was very weak. In fact, the miscellaneous cards also look at the faction, and the strong ones can be compared to the main force of the Central Army.
After the Northern Expedition, there were originally four major warlords. After the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Gui Army and the Jin Sui Army were the most powerful, and the Northeast Army, the Northwest Army, the Dian Army, the Qian Army, the Sichuan Army, and the Zhensong Army were no longer in the climate.
1. Gui Jun. The Battle of Songhu, the Battle of Taierzhuang, and the defense of Guangxi all performed well. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, he was in charge of Anhui and incorporated some miscellaneous armies, which were strong in strength.
2. Jin Suijun. At the Battle of Qikou, the Battle of Taiyuan was fought tenaciously, and during the War of Resistance, Yan Xishan only controlled the western Jin region. Later, Fu Zuoyi ruled Suiyuan and became a faction of his own.
3. Northwest Army. There was Han Fuyu, who was shot by Jiang, Zhang Zizhong, who died on the battlefield, Song Yuanzhe, who died of depression, Shi Yousan, who was killed by throwing himself into Japan, Sun Liangcheng, who first surrendered to Wang Jingwei and then to the CCP, and Liu Ruming, who had been following Chiang Kai-shek. Fragmented, most of them fought tenaciously.
4. Northeast Army. In 1937, after the February 2 Incident, there was Sun Mingjiu, who defected to Wang Jingwei, Yu Xuezhong, who was in the Lusu guerrilla theater, and Lü Zhengcao, who was in the Eighth Route Army.
5. Sichuan Army. There are many warlord factions within the Sichuan Army, and they are tenacious during the War of Resistance, but their combat effectiveness is also the worst.
6. The Dian Army. The combat effectiveness was very strong, and in 1945, it was absorbed by the Central Army.
7. Cantonese Army. In the later period, it no longer existed independently and was part of the Central Army.
8. Zhejiang Army, Xiang Army. Both of these were incorporated during the Northern Expedition and belonged to the Central Army.
9. Ma Jiajun. The number of people is small, the equipment is poor, the style is strong, and it is mainly active in the northwest battlefield.
10. Yu Army. Reorganized into the 15th Army, the style of the War of Resistance was tenacious, with few troops and poor weapons, only two divisions.
Among these miscellaneous troops, the Jin Sui 35th Army, the 60th Army of the Yunnan Department, the 7th and 48th Armies of the Gui Dynasty, and the 82nd Army of Qingma were superior in strength and could be compared with the aces of the Central Army.
Let's take a look at the comparison between the two battles.
Battle of the Shangdang
Period: September 10 to October 12, 1945.
Conductors: Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Yan Xishan, Shi Zebo.
Strength of both sides:
Jin Army: The 68th Division of the 19th Army, the Provisional 37th Division, the 69th Division of the 61st Army, the 2nd and 6th Columns of the Advancing Army, a total of more than 17,000 people.
Reinforcements were 2 corps and 6 divisions, and 4 regiments of the 3rd Army of the Shanxi Provincial Defense Army, with about 23,000 people
Our army: Taihang, Taiyue, and Ji'nan Military Regions each have 1 column and local armed forces, a total of more than 31,000 people.
Course of the campaign:
In August 1945, the Jin army entered and occupied the Taiyuan and Tongpu railways under the support of the Japanese puppet army. The puppet army and some Japanese troops were reorganized, expanded their own troops, and then sent multiple troops in an attempt to occupy the whole territory of Shanxi and drive our army out. The Jin army of more than 17,000 men entered and occupied Changzhi and the counties of Xiangyuan, Changzi, Tunliu, Lucheng and Huguan, and built fortifications to strengthen garrisons.
Liu Bocheng analyzed the characteristics of the Jin army and pointed out that the Jin army was "good at defense, constructing glyph-shaped stronghold bunkers, controlling powerful reserves, and carrying out counter-assaults" and "equipped with peripheral strongholds to form a trend of cornering"; its characteristics were "heavier than defending the city" and "extremely bad at field warfare.". By attacking the weakly defended county towns around Changzhi, our army lured the Jin army to attack and annihilated them in the field battle. In terms of tactical means, it is manifested in the form of "siege and reinforcement". Our army first captured a number of county towns, isolated the Changzhi defenders, and then besieged the reinforcements of the Jin army.
The besieged reinforcements of the Jin army fell into a desperate situation of lack of food and water, relying only on killing mules and horses to fill their hunger, and people's hearts were floating. The reinforcements of our army have arrived on the battlefield one after another, and the morale of the Jin army has been even more shaken. Liu Bocheng ordered the troops to adopt the tactic of "encircling three ques and one one", leaving a gap in the north, luring the enemy to break through to the north, and annihilating the Jin reinforcements on the way through the breakthrough.
On the night of October 7, the Yan army trapped in Changzhi took advantage of the rainy night to abandon the city and break through and escape, and one part of our army entered Changzhi, most of which followed and pursued, and on the morning of the 12th, various large armies launched an attack on the fleeing Kuomintang troops, and after more than two hours of fierce fighting, most of the Yan army was wiped out.
Battle Results:
Jin army losses: 11 divisions and 1 advancing column totaling more than 35,000 people, 31,000 prisoners, 27 captured officers, captured 24 mountain guns, more than 2,000 machine guns, and more than 16,000 guns of various types.
Casualties of our army: 4000 people.
Battle Effects:
1. The Jin army lost soldiers and broke the generals, seriously injured, and was unable to attack for a long time thereafter.
2. In cooperation with the Chongqing negotiations, the expected purpose of the CCP in fighting and talking at the same time was realized in order to promote the talks.
3. Affected by the battle, on October 30, Gao Shuxun led the Kuomintang New Eighth Army and more than 10,000 people of the Hebei Nationalist Army to revolt.
4. Yan Xishan was unable to hold Shanxi alone, so he had to ask the Central Army to enter Shanxi.
Battle of Sixian County
Date: August 7, 1946
Both sides commanded: Chen Yi, Song Shilun, Zhu Nairui.
Gui Army: The headquarters of the 172nd Division of the defenders, the artillery battalion of the division, 2 battalions of the 515th Regiment, and all the 516th Regiments, with a total number of about 5,6,000 people.
Reinforcements 514 regiment and 515 regiment one battalion, 512 regiment, about 6000 people.
Our army: Shandong Field Army, 6 regiments attacked the city, 12 regiments came to the aid. The number is about 50,000.
Before the war, when heavy rain fell continuously, Chen Yi reported: "There is a vast ocean everywhere, the troops can only walk 20 to 30 miles per night, the grenades are wet and cannot be used, the troops are particularly tired, the number of sick people increases, and the villages where the enemy is stationed are full of deep water, and it is not easy to make a surprise attack." Chief of Staff Song Shilun made a mistake in intelligence, mistakenly believing that "the water in the trenches outside Sicheng is not deep enough to be knee-deep," and advocated two regiments of the Gui clan in Si County.
On August 3, the Central Military Commission sent a telegram: "Do not fight a battle that can only be defeated and cannot be annihilated." As long as the main force always has a chance to annihilate the enemy, it is not appropriate to be too impatient. Despite the opposition of many, Yamano Command issued an offensive order. The troops struggled to make progress in chest-high water, the gun trucks could not keep up, most of the ammunition was damp and ineffective, and the troops were quite tired. The 6 regiments that attacked also had to divide their troops to clear the periphery, so there was no absolute superiority in strength.
At midnight on August 7, the eighth division broke through the Great North Gate and the Northwest Gate and entered the city. However, the defenders organized a tenacious counterattack, and the defenders cut off the connection between the inside and outside of the city with fierce artillery fire, and frantically continued to attack. The Eighth Division fought bitterly in the city, with no fortifications to support, heavy casualties, loss of positions, casualties and drowning. The second and ninth columns were blocked by the river, making reinforcements difficult. The soldiers of the Eighth Division in the city fought with the enemy for days, and the blood flowed everywhere, and the river was stained red. Fierce fighting on the night of August 9, had to retreat.
The Gui army suffered more than 3,000 casualties.
Our army suffered more than 7,000 casualties, and the Eighth Division of Shandong was seriously injured.
1. Yamano's plan to attack the Tsupo Line in the west was frustrated, and the morale of the main forces was frustrated. The warriors were indignant, depressed, and complained a lot.
2. The Nationalist army took advantage of the situation to advance north Huaibei, and in early September, it began to prepare to attack huaiyin and Linyi, and the shandong battlefield was passive.
3. After losing Huaiyin and fighting several defeated battles, Chairman Mao once considered sending Xu Forward to Shandong to take charge of the Lunan front.
4. Su Yu was ordered to rush thousands of miles alone in an emergency to take over the command of the campaign, and the war situation gradually improved. However, it had to abandon central China.
Why did our army win a great victory and a bitter battle? Analyzing the opponent, the two armies are clearly different:
1. Yan Xishan is not good at leading troops, or the beiyang warlord's set of models. Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were both generals and commanders, and they were excellent at leading soldiers in battle.
2. The Jin army had 10 armies, as well as columns and many other formations, but in fact, the strength of the troops was only 130,000 people, and the formation was chaotic, like local troops. The Gui Army has 3 corps, with more than 100,000 people, and the establishment is very regular.
3. The Jin army lacked famous generals, and the only Fu Zuoyi was squeezed out. The Gui Army is full of talented people, with long military experience, strong command ability, and rich combat experience.
4. The Jin Army's War of Resistance was in a remote corner, expanding after the war, and the soldiers' ability was poor. Most of the Gui army are veterans of more than 5 years, with the slogan of "death does not surrender guns, do not take prisoners", the equipment is ordinary, the tactical and technical level is more skilled, can fight independently, and the officers have a long military age.
In a comprehensive comparison, the combat effectiveness of the two armies is vastly different.
On the part of our army, Liu Shuai summed up experience and formulated plans for the characteristics of the opponent who is not good at field combat, and his subordinates are all veteran units for many years and cooperate with tacit understanding. Under the command of Chen Shuai, he braved the rain to attack the stronghold, and the siege did not form an advantageous force. The Shandong troops fought bravely, but the mountaintop doctrine was strong and often did not follow. As a result, they were unable to overcome their strongholds and encountered setbacks. In the Liberation War, the Jin army lost consecutive battles, and only the defense of the city had some bright spots. And wherever the Gui Army goes, it is a fierce enemy of our army.