Why open up the Soviet Union?
Before the three main forces of the Red Army, the Huining Division, the Central Committee made a comprehensive consideration of the future and destiny of the Red Army, and the general strategic tasks formulated at that time were:
First of all, it created an anti-Japanese situation in the northwest, forced Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan, and established a national anti-Japanese national united front.
In order to create an anti-Japanese situation in the northwest, one of the most important links is
Open up the Soviet Union
。
The opening up of the Soviet Union was of great significance to the Red Army in at least three aspects.
First of all, after the three main forces of the Red Army met the division, they actually fell into a very embarrassing situation, that is, they were caught in the four-fold encirclement of Chiang Kai-shek, Ma Bufang, Ma Buqing, Ma Hongkui, Ma Hongbin, Japanese Kou, and Mengfu, and they were attacked by the enemy on their stomachs and backs, and they were in a dilemma.
Only by opening up the Soviet Union can we have a strategic backing and a stable anti-Japanese strategic rear.
Second, the Red Army at that time traveled a long distance, not only suffered a relatively large loss in combat effectiveness, but also faced serious problems in terms of supply (economy and equipment).
If you want to win a battle, it is not enough to rely on strong spiritual strength, but also to have material strength as a support, for an army, this is a matter of life and death. The Soviet Union was the only country in the world at the time that was willing and able to provide us with material assistance.
Third, consolidate the Northwest Alliance. From many of today's materials, we can see that the reason why Zhang Xueliang is willing to cooperate with the Red Army is to a considerable extent because he has taken a fancy to the Soviet Union behind the Red Army - relying on Chiang Kai-shek has no hope, and he hopes to return to his hometown in the northeast by obtaining Soviet support.
If we can open up the Soviet Union, the alliance between the Red Army and friendly forces such as the Northeast Army and the Northwest Army will be more stable, the pro-Japanese faction will suffer a major blow, and the entire anti-Japanese national united front will be changed.
It is precisely for these reasons mentioned above that the Central Committee has formulated a strategic policy with the opening up of the Soviet Union as the basic starting point, and it should be said that there is no problem with this strategy itself.
Stop the enemy! Crossing!
So, how can we break through the Soviet Union? The capture of Ningxia is the key to the realization of this strategy. Ningxia is not only the hub of the entire northwest region, but also has a population of more than 1.2 million, which is the richest city in the northwest region, so the central government quickly formulated a plan for the Ningxia Campaign.
The general idea of the Ningxia Campaign was: first cross the Yellow River west with one of the Red First and Fourth Fronts, and then follow up with the main forces of the three fronts to capture Ningxia in one fell swoop. If it is not possible to cross west, it will fight a decisive battle with the enemy's various units in the east of the river, wait until the Yellow River is frozen before crossing the river, and continue to carry out the plan of the Ningxia Campaign.
Two things directly determined the success or failure of the Ningxia Campaign: one was whether the Red Army could withstand Chiang Kai-shek's large-scale attack on the southern front, and the other was whether it could control the yellow river crossing.
After mastering the boats crossing the river, the Central Telegraph ordered the Four Fronts to cross the river with 2 armies and 3 armies to block the southern enemy.
With Chiang Kai-shek's personal visit to Xi'an, nearly 300,000 enemy troops launched a fierce attack on the Red Army, and Luo Nanhui, deputy commander of the Fifth Red Army, died heroically in the blockade battle, and then Hui ning lost.
At dawn on October 28, Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao led two corps of the Four Fronts and the commander-in-chief of the Front Army to cross the river.
On October 30, Guan Linzheng led his troops to Jingyuan, and the Red Fifth Army, which was responsible for guarding the ferry, could no longer move closer to the friendly forces in Hedong, and could only be ordered to retreat to the Triangle City area in Hexi and rest and stand by.
At this point, the three armies crossing the river (namely the Red 30th Army, the Red 9th Army, and the Red 5th Army, a total of 21,800 people) and the large hedong army were completely cut off, and this Hexi army was the famous "West Road Army" in history. This is a heroic army, a glorious army, and a lone army that has disappeared into the long river of history.
Three reasons
Marshal Xu Xiangqian, who was the commander-in-chief of the Western Route Army at the time, wrote a book "Review of History" in his later years, in which Xu Xiangqian showed us many decision-making processes that were unknown at that time, as well as the entire process of the defeat of the Western Route Army.
The book concludes that the fundamental reason for the failure of the Western Route Army was not that the Western Route Army was isolated or that the Majia Army was too strong, but because there were problems with some of our important decisions at that time.
First of all, as a lone army fighting on the outside, the Western Route Army lacked a clear strategic task. During the whole process (during the Xi'an Incident), in order to deal with the Red Army in Hedong and contain the enemy, the Western Route Army suddenly went east, suddenly went west, suddenly marched, suddenly stopped, the task kept changing, and repeatedly missed the fighter.
Although the actions of the Western Route Army need to be subordinated to the overall situation, how to be more conducive to the overall situation needs to be seriously studied.
Second, our army's operations on the outside front have always emphasized relying on the base areas and making quick decisions. With the loss of its base area, the Western Route Army fell into a state of fierce battle with the enemy.
Under the circumstances of obvious disadvantages, the Western Route Army lost its initiative, failed to adopt the tactic of "fighting if you can win, and leaving if you can't win", abandoned the tactics of rushing, melee, ambush, and detour that we have always been good at, and was repeatedly attacked and harassed by the enemy's cavalry without any way.
Third, in terms of battlefield command, on the one hand, "the superiors are too deadly," and on the other hand, "Chen Changhao, the number one leader of the Western Route Army, has ideological baggage, suffers from gains and losses, and constantly breaks." "As a result, the Western Route Army failed to act according to the most correct method."
These three points are the three reasons for the failure of the Western Route Army summarized by Xu Shuai in his later years.
If you hesitate, you will lose
In Xu Shuai's view, the Western Route Army was not a force doomed to failure, it could have won victory because of some mistakes in the decision-making process that led to its final demise.
So, what does the right way to play look like?
After the Western Route Army crossed the river, the Central Committee sent a telegram on November 11 informing them of the situation in Hedong: due to the failure to defeat Hu Zongnan, Mao Bingwen, Wang Yizhe and other troops as originally planned, the Ningxia campaign plan was blocked, and the Central Committee was considering a new battle plan.
The Central Committee asked the Military and Political Committee of the Western Route Army:
"Is it certain that the Western Route Army will advance to the west alone and connect to Xinjiang?" What are the difficulties in returning to the East? ”
Xu Xiangqian said in his speech at that time that it was entirely possible for the Western Route Army to advance westward alone, and that as long as it was connected to Xinjiang and received Soviet aid, it would not only solve the problem of the Strategic Backing of the Western Route Army, but also "turn around and fight the Ma family army again, and it would be as easy as a slap in the face."
Xu Shuai believes that the westward expansion is completely achievable, but it is needed
"Taking advantage of the fact that the weather was not too cold, the enemy troops in the Hexi Corridor were empty, and they interjected with a drum." As long as you get but ask for weapons, "To tell the truth, as long as the Western Route Army has an artillery regiment, the Western Route Army will double, and it will not be enough for us to fight." ”
(People's Publishing House, 16th edition, page 306)
"If the Western Route Army had turned its back on Xinjiang in time, opened up the war situation, and controlled the Hexi Belt, it would not only be a matter of temporarily responding to the situation in Hedong, but would also have a positive impact on the entire course of the War of Resistance Against Japan." The Eighth Route Army has more than three divisions. (I, p. 326)
However, for various reasons, the Western Route Army failed to firmly carry out the plan to advance westward.
"Slowly, stop and go, as later, in the Hexi Corridor, fighting alone." If this is the case, who wouldn't advocate a return to the east! ”