The British Legion of Gloucester is an ace army of the United Kingdom, with a history of hundreds of years, and once followed during World War II
Montgomery
General (one of the most prominent allied generals of World War II) ever commanded
Normandy landings,
Dunkirk evacuation
and other battles
He also fought against Nazi German Field Marshal Rommel on the battlefields of North Africa. During the British colonial period, he also expeditioned egypt, invaded China, suppressed Indian rebellions, etc., and made great contributions to British expansion.
Man-sea tactical misunderstandings
However, such a well-equipped and brilliant team was surrounded and annihilated by volunteers whose military strength was far inferior to its military strength on the Korean battlefield (only a few more than 30 people broke through). There were even 63 captured by our army's Liu Guangzi soldiers, all of whom were armed with weapons at the time. So how did the volunteer army at that time do it, defeating the enemy under such a large armament gap?
For Chinese army,
Many people have a misunderstanding, that is, we rely on the tactics of the sea of people to fight wars
In the Korean battlefield, the US military was also hit two hundred kilometers away by relying on the tactics of the sea of people. To be reasonable, those who have such thoughts are either an insult to the vast number of generals of our army or an insult to the armaments and weapons of the US army.

In the Battle of Songhu, Japan's blitzkrieg and fire tactics caused the Kuomintang to suffer 330,000 casualties, while the Japanese only killed 20,000 people and wounded 40,000 people, so that many soldiers of the Nationalist army at that time were killed without seeing the enemy. In today's era of hot weapons, the use of human sea tactics to counter the fire sea tactics is undoubtedly to hit the stone with pebbles.
The so-called "man-sea tactics" of many people are actually our army's powerful company and platoon combat command capabilities
And this is also an elite unit trained in countless anti-sweeping, counter-encirclement, and surprise attack operations. Even so, our army still relies more on frontal feints, attacks on both sides, and cuts off the rear road to fight the encirclement tactics.
Even the official history of the U.S. Marine Corps at the time records that:
Chinese soldiers in patched cotton uniforms are superior to soldiers of any country on earth in this matter; They were always able to infiltrate the enemy's positions extremely secretly under the cover of night, which was unbelievable... Chinese rarely attack with the strength of a regiment at a time... Rather, it is because they are good at using deception tactics to achieve the purpose of surprise attacks
--The Korean War in the Eyes of Americans, Contemporary China Press, 2006, pp. 78, p. 79.
The "three-three system tactic" has never been used before, and there is no one after it
In fact, on the Korean battlefield, the tactic used the most by the volunteer army to defeat the enemy was the "three-three system," which originated in the period of resistance against Japan, matured in the War of Liberation, and only shined in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
During the period of anti-Japanese resistance, due to the lack of heavy fire cover of our army, we often attacked the strong positions of the Japanese army in dense formations, resulting in serious casualties.
In view of this situation, Lin Biao put forward the principle of strategically focusing on concentrating superior forces (that is, the famous "one point and two sides") in the middle and high-level commanders, and that low-level commanders should pay attention to appropriately dispersing the density of troops, avoiding the killing and injury of the enemy's dense firepower, and emphasizing close coordination, advancing layer by layer, and alternately covering the offensive.
The tactic is to divide the squad into three groups,
3 people per combat team
, directly to each other. When fighting, it is generally divided into three echelons, squad leader, deputy squad leader, and group leader, each with a combat team to operate.
The 3 soldiers in each group have a clear division of labor
, one attack, one cover and one support. When attacking, two soldiers were in front and the group leader was behind, attacking in a triangular formation, and it was very scattered, and a grenade could not blow up two people, which greatly reduced the casualties of our army.
And
Three combat groups are one squad and three squads are one battle group
On the battlefield, you can change the formation according to the spoken language, sign language, and military trumpet at will, which can be said to be extremely flexible. A 27-man battle group can cover a defensive line of about 1,000 meters.
The "Three-Three System" in Practice
For example, during the Battle of Shangganling, U.S. troops fired at our positions
More than 300,000 shells, more than 500 aerial bombs
The entire head of Shangganling was cut down by two meters, and there was no grass left, but it still did not capture Shangganling. Most of the time, the number of our army in Shangganling remained at only 1 company (about 120).
The volunteers also dug countless tunnels in Shangganling as positions, stored enough ammunition in them, and set up fire points at each pit entrance, each of which was held by one or two soldiers. Although the warriors at the fire point are easily killed when the enemy attacks, only in this way can casualties be minimized.
The warriors at the fire point are killed, and the subsequent warriors will replace them and continue to fight. This allowed the firepower at each point to be uninterrupted, and the position was held with minimal casualties. In the end, the Battle of Shangganling ended with the loss of more than 25,000 Un troops and the casualties of nearly 10,000 volunteers.
In addition, in the Sino-Indian War of 1962, Ran Fulin, Pang Guoxing, and Wang Shijun of our army lost contact with the large troops during the war, so they temporarily set up a combat group with Pang Guoxing as the leader. During the battle, Wang Shijun and Ran Fulin copied bread from the side to attract Indian firepower, and the leader of the group, Pang Guoxing, attacked from the front. In this way, the three of them had to fight from an unknown height to the West Pass. The three men penetrated the Indian army 15 miles deep, fought 5 battles, destroyed an Indian artillery battalion, captured 2 artillery battlefields, several machine gun positions, and captured a total of 7 artillery pieces, two cars, and 4 radios.
As a result, when the Ninth Company launched a general offensive at that time, the Indian army did not fire a single cannon, which made the commander of the Ninth Company very confused, and when they reached the high and low, they found that all the high and low had been occupied by our army, and found the note left by Ran Fulin under the captured weapons:"
Today, we have received 3 cannons and 4 radio stations from the Indian invading army... "The chinese border defense forces have nine company of Pang, Wang and Ran three soldiers." On the morning of November 18, 1962.
”
Later, the troops held a celebration banquet for them, awarded Pang Guoxing first-class merit, Ran Fulin and Wang Shijun second-class merit, and were later received by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and others. When writing the summary of the battle, Pang Guoxing wrote down the shocking words:
Instead of surrendering, the enemy dared to return to me
hit! ”
In addition, there are five tactics such as one point and two sides, three fierce, four fast and one slow, four groups and one team, three situations and three ways of playing, which are collectively called "six tactical principles" with the three-three system.