From the defeat of Sal Hu to the successive defeats of Yuan Yingtai and Wang Huazhen, the Ming army's fear of fullness began to circulate, and even some myths of 'full of invincibility' in order to cover up their incompetence were also developed. No one has ever been able to stand in an invincible position, Han Xin has more soldiers, the better, and he has also been forced to fight a battle; Tang Zong has conquered the four sides and has also been forced to establish an alliance under the city; Xu Dafu Youyun, sweeping away the remnants of yuan, has also been ambushed by Wang Baobao and almost completely destroyed. The root cause is not that these people cannot be defeated, but that more people have difficulty overcoming the fear in their hearts.
At the end of the Ming Dynasty, the reason why the Ming army faced the Houjin army repeatedly defeated, the Houjin army's combat strength was indeed strong on the one hand, but the Houjin army was not invincible. In the fifteenth year of Chongzhen, Zhou Yuji ambushed the retreating Qing troops in Yang Liuqing relying on the advantages of the terrain to achieve a great victory; in the fourteenth year of Chongzhen, the Battle of Songjin, the first battle of the Qin troops led by Hong Chengyu facilitated the defeat of the Qing troops led by Dolgun at Mount Rufeng, and the history records that "the Qing soldiers and horses suffered many casualties, almost to the point of defeat", if it were not for the sudden death of the general Yang Guozhu, the Ming army would almost achieve the goal of the campaign to relieve the siege of Jinzhou; in the eleventh year of Chongzhen, the Qing army retreated to Yongping and was ambushed by the Ming army, and the leaders Ofe Min, Zuo LingBahai, and Una Hai were killed by the Ming army. However, these are basically partial victories, and it is difficult to change the overall situation. Why in the face of repeated defeats of the Qing army and the Ming army, The Battle Song believes that there are mainly the following reasons:
The corruption of the Ming dynasty's military system
From the beginning of chengzu's establishment of three battalions, the Ming army was divided into three parts: the Beijing camp directly under the emperor, the border army in the border defense town, and the Weisuo army that was responsible for maintaining the country. The Jing camp was almost completely lost in the tumu fort, and although it was later restored to some of its combat strength through Yu Qian's supplementary rectification, it was gradually reduced to a logistics unit of the nature of craftsmen and miscellaneous servants in the later period of Emperor Xianzong, and although it had the name of Tianzi's pro-army, it actually had no combat effectiveness. Coupled with the lack of pay, there are often hundreds of thousands of posts, but in fact there are only tens of thousands of people, and even these tens of thousands of people are still mostly coping with things, and even temporary employment to charge the number.
Later, the dynasties of Emperor Xiaozong, Emperor Wuzong, and Emperor Sejong repeatedly tried to rectify it, but the accumulated shortcomings were already deep and it was difficult to revive. Since the late period of Taizu Zhu Yuanzhang, the Weisuo army has already seen a situation of military system corruption, and the officers of the Weishou who have the conditions to make good friends can find another way out, and those who have no conditions can only become the private miscellaneous service of the officers of the Weishou, and there is no salary. Because the border army has been in the front line of the war against the enemy for many years, the situation is slightly better, but they have not left any of the problems above. And in order to start with the border army, the generals of the Ming Dynasty developed the custom of feeding their relatives with empty food. These pro-soldiers were physically strong, well-treated, well-equipped, and well-trained, but they only obeyed the orders of one general. Often these people are the main force of the battle or the excellent defender to cover the retreat of the general. This has created a rather embarrassing situation, don't look at the Ming army in the Guanwai combat often more than 100,000, but the real number is often 70,000 or 80,000 people, and the main force of this battle is still the general's personal soldiers. Therefore, as long as the Qing army concentrated its forces to defeat the generals and soldiers of the Ming army, it was basically a victory in battle.
Internal constraints of the Ming Dynasty
In fact, the Ming Dynasty from Xiong Tingbi onwards had a very correct strategy for dealing with the Guanwai problem, using the four words we are more familiar with, that is, 'the main defense, the rear war'. However, the gang of swordsmen in the imperial court often disregarded the overall situation and had to spray everything and everything. As soon as Xiong Tingbi stabilized the situation, he sprayed Xiong Tingbi, so that Xiong Tingbi could not rest assured that he had to resign after passing through the pass; Yuan Yingtai was defeated, Shenyang and Liaoyang were lost, and Xiong Tingbi was invited out, but he also got a Wang Huazhen to put Xiong Tingbi in the air; the Emperor of the Apocalypse appointed Sun Chengzong and Yuan Keli to perfect the three-way arrangement strategy proposed by Xiong Tingbi, and created a defensive system around the Liaodong that was both offensive and defensive, only to wait for the opportunity to be swept away in one fell swoop, and another castrated party had to take them away because they were afraid of the military power in the hands of the two. As a result, Gao Di was forced to abandon everything outside Guanwai, and several years of efforts were in vain; then Yuan Chonghuan came out, no matter what the controversy was, he could hold the Ningjin defense line and stabilize the situation, and finally he lost Mao Wenlong, Chongzhen let him go to see Mao Wenlong, and the Ming Dynasty's strategy to deal with Guanwai was a complete collapse!
Internal instability and strategic mistakes
During the Chongzhen period, not only did it have to face the increasingly powerful Houjin, but also had to deal with the northwest uprising and the southwest Tusi rebellion in the country at the same time. The northwest and southwest regions, which were supposed to provide military replenishment and logistical support for the imperial court, not only lost their role, but also consumed the imperial court's overstretched human, financial, and material resources. At that time, the few white pole soldiers in the Ming Dynasty who could fight with the Qing soldiers could only stay and defend their homes.
Strategically, during the Chongzhen period, Emperor Taiji had already subdued the tribes of the steppe, and the Guanningjin Defense Line had in fact lost its role, and its continued existence only provided an excellent encirclement point for the enemy to attack and aid. If Chongzhen did not want to negotiate peace, he could give up ningyuan to the east, which could save effort to deal with domestic problems and turn passivity into initiative. However, Ning Jinming in the Chongzhen period could not keep it, and obviously did not have much effect, but still insisted.
Liaodong Wuren Group
When it comes to the Ming Dynasty and the Later Jin Dynasty, it is this gang that absolutely cannot be bypassed. They are represented by Zu Dashou and Wu Sangui, and they have deep roots in Liaodong. Their Liaodong Army was absolutely capable of enemy forces outside guanguan, but in their own interests. The guest soldiers mobilized by the imperial court could never win outside the pass, because then their importance would be greatly reduced. It was also impossible for them to defeat the Qing soldiers, first, the losses were too large to guarantee a stable victory; second, the imperial court would definitely force them to fight when they saw hope. The most important situation for them is that only by relying on them can they hold Liaodong, but the field battle can only be defended by the city. Look at the late Ming dynasty passenger soldiers and the joint operations with them, and then look at their own battles, you can find the secrets.
Generally speaking, the reason why the Ming army has repeatedly lost battles is not only because of its inability to fight, but because of the interaction of various drawbacks.