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Defending Mao Zedong in Sichuan and seeking reuse, and supporting Wang Ming in Yan'an, Wang Jiaxiang: No drama

author:Zhang Bingzhen

In the Fifth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" campaign of the Red Army, Li De, the so-called military adviser of the Communist International, with the support of Bogu, vigorously rejected the successful guerrilla warfare methods that Mao Zedong and Zhu De had previously formed that were suitable for the Red Army's operations, and instead transferred some outdated combat examples learned from books to the Chinese battlefield, which brought fatal damage to the Chinese revolution and the Red Army.

Perhaps because of an original lack of self-confidence, Li De's rejection of Mao Zedong was always very fierce. So much so that whenever someone mentioned Mao Zedong in front of Li De, he would appear unusually irritable. For that period of history, it can be seen in the memoirs of witnesses, and Li De has used the word "rough" more than once to describe Mao Zedong.

Defending Mao Zedong in Sichuan and seeking reuse, and supporting Wang Ming in Yan'an, Wang Jiaxiang: No drama

Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and Bogu after the Zunyi Conference (from left)

Fortunately, when the Chinese revolution was the most difficult and on the verge of defeat, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other leaders tried their best to turn the tide, and the Zunyi Conference was held in a timely manner, which put an end to the erroneous "Left" line adhered to by Li Debogu and revived the Chinese revolution and the Red Army.

After the Zunyi Conference, Li De heard and witnessed Mao Zedong's superhuman strategy and foresight, and in the face of ironclad facts, he seemed to be painfully determined and gradually realized his mistakes. Whether sincere or false, at least on the surface, his new central leadership with Mao Zedong at the core has gradually changed from dissatisfaction and confrontation in the past to support and support.

Especially at the crucial moment when Zhang Guotao was engaged in splittism, Li De actually stepped forward to resist the split and protect Mao Zedong with his special status and identity, and also performed a wonderful play of "Li De catching Li Te."

By the time the Red Army's Long March to the Brazilian region of Sichuan, Li De had been transferred to the newly formed Red Army University as a teacher. At this time, Zhang Guotao's split party and the Red Army occurred.

Defending Mao Zedong in Sichuan and seeking reuse, and supporting Wang Ming in Yan'an, Wang Jiaxiang: No drama

Li De (stills)

In the early morning of one day, Li De felt that things were not good, and he urgently informed Comrade Mo Wenhua, secretary of the party branch of the Red Army University, asking him to immediately organize everyone to go north with the Central Committee, and instructed him to pay close attention to the movements of Li Te, chief of education of the Red Army University and former chief of staff of the Fourth Front, to prevent him from taking the troops away and reorganizing them.

When it was almost dawn, the red masters and students had gathered to prepare to leave, when the education chief Li Te really came with people on horseback. He loudly conveyed Zhang Guotao's order, asking the comrades of the former Fourth Front to follow Zhang Guotao south and not to go north with the central authorities.

In order to demagogue people's minds, Li Te even framed Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to his face, saying that he was fleeing north and wanted to take them to the Soviet Union and surrender to imperialism. These disturbing words caused a great commotion among the troops who were ready to go, and several cadets of the Four Fronts shouted that they would not leave and wanted to go back with Li Te.

This Li Te, who dared to directly call out to the central leaders, was a student in the Soviet Union, who had studied in Leningrad, who was grumpy, liked to swear, and used to carrying a large revolver.

Since Li De also studied in the Soviet Union and had the status of a military adviser to the Communist International, the two had a good personal relationship and generally conversed in Russian when they met.

Seeing that Li Te was very arrogant, Li De stepped forward and grabbed Li Te's horse's head and reprimanded him for his divisive words and deeds. But without saying a few words, the two of them began to move. Li De was tall and strong, and he pulled Litt off his horse, and then the two quarreled fiercely in Russian.

Li Te called Li De a "red imperialist" and Li De called Li Te a "hooligan," saying that the Central Committee's policy of going north was completely correct and that no one could pull the troops away without Mao Zedong's consent.

At this time, most of the onlookers did not understand Russian, and when they saw that the two people were quarreling fiercely, they could only surround them tightly, not knowing what to do. Just as they were pestering and fighting, Mao Zedong heard the news.

Mao Zedong walked up to Li De and Li Te and said loudly, "What? The water washed away the Dragon King Temple, and the family did not recognize the family? Whether it is the Red Army or the Red Fourth Front, they are all surnamed Red! Why should a family fight? Save some effort to fight the enemy! Mao Zedong's words made everyone's nervous mood suddenly relax, and there was silence below.

Defending Mao Zedong in Sichuan and seeking reuse, and supporting Wang Ming in Yan'an, Wang Jiaxiang: No drama

Li De and his second wife Li Lilian

Perhaps, it was precisely because of this performance that Li De was reused by Mao Zedong once after the Red Army entered Gansu. The central authorities decided to reorganize the First Front Army into the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment, and Li De was a highly talented student who graduated from the military academy, so the important task of implementing the establishment was handed over to Li De. With the direct participation of Li De, the remaining Red Army was reorganized, and the original Central Column and the First and Third Armies were merged, and Li De finally took up the staff work matching his moral position.

For a long time, many people have been struggling with the failure of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, as well as the major mistakes in the early days of the Long March, should this Li De be responsible? In fact, this issue has been debated for a long time, both in theoretical circles and among ordinary people in society, and the opinions of all parties can stand up.

I thought that Li De was certainly responsible, but he should not be responsible, as Li De has repeatedly argued: "I am just a foreigner." "Indeed! As a foreigner, Li De was entrusted to the Cpc Central Committee, and he was doing his best to work for the Chinese revolution, and if he had selfish intentions, he just wanted to realize his life ambitions. However, his ability was really limited, and instead of helping, he led to the Red Army being forced into the Long March. And throughout history, haven't we chosen our own paths and leaders in this kind of failure after failure?

Mao Zedong was also not a natural leader. If we had not personally experienced those failed experiences, if we had not been good at summing up lessons, accumulating strength in these lessons, and perfecting and revising our military thinking, we would not have been able to avoid one major defeat after another and win one great victory after another after the Zunyi Conference. Who says it's not?

Defending Mao Zedong in Sichuan and seeking reuse, and supporting Wang Ming in Yan'an, Wang Jiaxiang: No drama

Mao Zedong and Zhu De were in Yan'an

Many people are wishful thinking that if what happened at that time would have been what would have happened, it would be a process of backwards historical development with the results, and history cannot be assumed. If we want to understand history, we must first respect history and become a true historical materialist.

In October 1935, when the Red Army triumphantly arrived in wuqi town in northern Shaanxi, Li De was also rejoicing in the victory of the Long March of the Central Red Army, recalling:

On October 20, 1935, about the first anniversary of Jiangxi's breakthrough of the blockade line, we drove into Wa Yao Fort. From this point on, what people called the Long March or Expedition was over as far as the Army was concerned. The Long March, which was originally envisaged as a large-scale strategic transfer, became a strategic retreat from a military point of view, and this retreat was only turned into a forward in the final stage. The Long March paid a huge sacrifice. When the army reached northern Shaanxi, there were still 7,000 or 8,000 people left, of which 5,000 or 6,000 soldiers were regular troops. All these cadres, tempered by struggle, of course, became the backbone of the Party and the army in the subsequent War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the subsequent War of People's Liberation.

After reaching northern Shaanxi, Li De was naturally no longer highly valued by the Party and the Red Army headed by Mao Zedong, which made Li De feel very painful. But he was still waiting and looking for an opportunity to turn the tables, and such an opportunity was finally waited for by Li De, but he was hit in the face by reality.

In Li De's own view, he had three opportunities to turn over and be reused again when he was in Yan'an.

Defending Mao Zedong in Sichuan and seeking reuse, and supporting Wang Ming in Yan'an, Wang Jiaxiang: No drama

Lin Yuying

The first time was at the end of the Long March, when the Comintern sent Lin Yuying back to China to Wayao Fort in northern Shaanxi.

Li De was very happy when he heard about it, thinking that Lin Yuying would definitely bring him good news from the Comintern, and perhaps regain power in this regard. However, to Li De's disappointment, Lin Yuying did not want to see him at all. It was also at this time that Li De learned that after the Zunyi Conference was convened, the Central Committee had sent Chen Yun to report the situation to the Comintern, and his previous mistakes had already reached the ears of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Li De also learned that the Comintern endorsed and affirmed the convening of the Zunyi Conference, and this was the first basin of cold water poured on Li De's head.

The second time was in November 1937, when Wang Ming and others returned to Yan'an.

Li De thought that the "internationalists" he trusted, and the "internationalists" who trusted him, would rise again, so he had great expectations for this: "I thought that the line of the Communist International represented by Wang Ming would be accurately and truly implemented, and that marxism, which Mao Zedong had successfully defeated, split, and to some extent won over the past— would reunite and play a decisive role."

However, Li De soon discovered that although Mao Zedong and Wang Ming were superficially polite to each other, in fact they still played their own tune on various issues, and Wang Ming also lacked the ability and method to implement his ideas. Li De was disappointed to realize that Wang Ming, whom he had hoped for, was not Mao's opponent at all.

Defending Mao Zedong in Sichuan and seeking reuse, and supporting Wang Ming in Yan'an, Wang Jiaxiang: No drama

Some representatives of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee took a group photo, and Wang Jiaxiang was in the middle of the front row

The third time was in August 1938, when Wang Jiaxiang returned to Yan'an from Moscow.

Li De had thought that after a few years, moscow would always bring him some instructions on his future work, or a few words of relief. Unexpectedly, however, What Wang Jiaxiang brought with him was the advice of Dimitrov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, to the so-called "internationalists": "Tell the whole party that you should support Comrade Mao Zedong as the leader of the Communist Party of China, he is a leader tempered in the actual struggle of the Chinese revolution, and Wang Ming and others should stop quarreling." At this point, Li De's hopes of regaining power in China with the support of the Comintern were completely shattered.

However, after the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Wang Jiaxiang still took the initiative to find Li De, affirmed his painstaking efforts for the Chinese revolution, and sincerely pointed out the mistakes he had made in the past, and hoped that Li De could write a review material to the International Executive Committee and the CPC Central Committee.

Through this conversation with Wang Jiaxiang, Li De realized that his idea of wanting to overturn the disk was completely out of play, and he no longer had any reason to continue to fight wrongly, so after thinking about it again, he agreed to write this material. However, for various reasons, this material has not been made public until now.

In the summer of 1939, Reed flew back to the Soviet Union. After returning to the Soviet Union, Li De was censored for making mistakes in guiding the Chinese revolution, but was not brutally persecuted, but only lost his former political status.

Defending Mao Zedong in Sichuan and seeking reuse, and supporting Wang Ming in Yan'an, Wang Jiaxiang: No drama

Portrait of Li De

The Comintern gave Li De the final conclusion that there were mistakes and that they were exempt from punishment.

The reason for this is that Li De's mistake is that he did not understand the situation in China, and he had some wrong ideas, and Li De had no right to make decisions on China's affairs. The Communist Party of China is an independent party, and Li De's opinions can or may not be adopted. Li De's erroneous opinion was adopted, and this responsibility should be borne by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, so Li De was exempted from punishment.

Many people who have suffered a lot from the Conclusion of the Communist International are unwilling to accept it, but as far as the Chinese revolution as a whole and international politics are concerned, in fact, such a conclusion should be relatively objective and fair.

From then on, the Comintern no longer reused Li De, but only assigned him to do publishing work. Later, Li De also wrote articles with resentment in his heart to insult, distort and attack the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong, but they were all counter-attacked by his former translator Wu Xiuquan, clarifying the truth of history.

In August 1974, both Li De's resentment of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the dissatisfaction of the Chinese Communists and the people with him, came to an abrupt end with Li De's death in East Germany. But in the long history of the Chinese revolution, stories of representatives of the Communist International and military advisers have been widely circulated, have been criticized, and have constantly raised new warnings to us.

There are currently more than 100 articles of the same kind in this issue, if you like my article, please pay attention to it so that you can continue to read and review it.

If you disagree with the point of view of this article, we look forward to seeing your insights in the comments section!

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