Author: Mo Guyan
General Huang Kecheng had always been grumpy about the defeat in the Siping Defense War in 1946, and had made it clear to Lin Zong during the battle that he did not understand this practice of fighting for one city and one place at any cost. Until 13 years later, he and the chairman still debated the two issues of "whether to fight" and "how to fight" this battle, even if the chairman clearly said that "I decided to fight this battle", Huang Kecheng still said unceremoniously: "What you decided is also wrong!" "
In 1940, Huang Kecheng, commander and political commissar of the 5th Column of the Eighth Route Army (third from right in the front row), was with some cadres
On the question of whether the Siping Defense War should be fought, there has been great controversy over the years, and on the whole, most of them hold negative opinions. For example, Han Xianchu held that the Siping Defense War was a concentrated reflection of the "war and problems" in the northeast that the leadership of our army at that time was inaccurate, and that our army was competing with the superior enemy forces for one city and one place under inferior conditions, and that "it was strategically a mistake to engage in a decisive battle with the enemy under unfavorable conditions."
For another example, Liang Biye, who served as the political commissar of the 1st Column and 1st Division of the Northeast People's Autonomous Army during the Siping Defense War, also held that judging from the comparison of the forces of the enemy and ourselves, it was "not appropriate to fight such a position war" at that time, and he believed that the reason why the superiors must fight this battle was "to cooperate with the negotiations and is the need of the overall situation."
However, there are also positive opinions. For example, Li Yunchang, who was then the deputy commander of the 2nd Column, said at a meeting many years later that it was precisely because of the Siping Defense War that the Northern Manchuria base area could gain a firm foothold. As for the heavy price of 8,000 casualties in the battle, Li Yunchang asked: "Which major battle did not have casualties?" Without their casualties as a price, where do you retreat? "
Li Yunchang
In the end, it was Huang Kecheng who gave a summative answer to this question. In his later years, when he commented on the Siping Defense War, his views were different from those when he first debated with the chairman. He is not opposed to fighting this battle, believing that it is necessary and necessary to fight this battle strategically, but it is very problematic in tactics, especially when the situation is no longer favorable to us and it is impossible to hold Siping, and it is unwise to fight hard at any cost.
Huang Lao's view has basically become the consensus of people in the defense of Siping.
[On October 10, 1940, the 5th Column of the Eighth Route Army and the Northern Jiangsu Headquarters of the New Fourth Army met in victory at Baiju Town, Dongtai County, Northern Jiangsu Province. The picture shows Huang Kecheng (center) and Han Zhenji (first from left), Liang Xingchu (second from left), Zhang Aiping (fourth from left), and Wei Guoqing (fifth from left)
Since there is no need to discuss the issue of "whether to fight or not", the focus of the debate is naturally focused on the issue of "how to fight". In hindsight, the key to our army's defeat in this battle was at the two key points of Benxi and Weiyuan Fort.
When Chiang Kai-shek launched an offensive against our army in the northeast, the tactic of Du Yuming, commander of the Northeast Security Command, was to attack Siping and Benxi at the same time. Where the attack is always divided into priorities, it is impossible to be the main direction of attack in every place, so it is necessary to immediately make an accurate judgment on the focus of the enemy's attack. Lin Zong speculated that Jiang Jun might "first go south and then north", that is, first fight Benxi and then fight Siping, but the chairman believed that the enemy's main attack direction was in Siping, and Benxi was the auxiliary direction. Under this instruction, Lin Concentrated on Commanding the Siping Campaign and Making Combat Arrangements.
Du Yuming, who embarked on the northeast battlefield
The chairman was right to regard Siping as the most important thing, and Lin Zong also felt the importance of Benxi, and heavy troops were also deployed in Benxi. Benxi was close to Shenyang, threatening the command center of Chiang Kai-shek's army, so Du Yuming, who was pinned down, did not dare to advance north with all his might, and the New 6th and 52nd Armies attacking Benxi were also repelled. In such a situation, Lin Zong suggested that 2 brigades of the Southern Manchurian Army be drawn from Benxi to the north to fully support the Siping Operation. The Chairman fully agreed and stressed that "all troops who can be transferred must be redeployed early".
The purpose of our army is to resolutely defend Siping
Du Yuming judged that although the Northeast Democratic Coalition Army had strong troops in both places, from the perspective of combat effectiveness, the Siping defenders were obviously stronger than the Benxi defenders, not to mention that Lin Zong himself was sitting in Siping, so Benxi was the weak point. In view of this, Du Yuming was determined to avoid the real attack and attack the false, first concentrating his forces to take Benxi, and then attacking Siping. And that's exactly what Lin was worried about at first.
When Chiang Kai-shek concentrated the strength of 5 divisions to attack Benxi for the third time, because the main force of the 3rd Column was ordered to go north, the defenders only had 11 regiments of the 3rd Column, 9 Brigades, 3 Brigades of the 4th Column, etc., and could not resist the onslaught of the enemy's superior strength and equipment, and Benxi was quickly lost.
Lin Zong was originally alert to the danger of the enemy troops in Benxi, and this was fully taken into account in the initial deployment. However, after the Benxi defenders repelled the main attack of Chiang Kai-shek's army twice, they relaxed their vigilance in this direction and were overly optimistic about the situation. The battlefield sensitivity of Lin Zong, who had been in the battlefront for a long time, seemed to have deteriorated slightly during this period, and as a result, he had come out of the defeated move of dispatching 3 columns to the north. This was an important reason for the defeat in the Battle of Siping.
Lin Zong held a combat meeting
In addition, there was a serious misjudgment by the top level of our army on the combat effectiveness of the main force of Chiang Kai-shek's US ordnance, which was also an important reason for the passivity of the war situation.
Chiang Kai-shek's New 1st Army and New 6th Army, which were the elite of the elite, received modernization and training in India during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and experienced brutal and vicious warfare in the Jungles of Burma.
In April 1945, after the Burmese campaign, the New Sixth Army was waiting to be airlifted to the Zhijiang Battlefield
The troops of our army that have invaded the Kwantung are also veteran units that have fought for many years, but they have never had experience in fighting a strong enemy with modern US weapons and equipment; what is more, our army has absorbed many armed forces from unknown sources after entering the northeast, and although the number has increased quite a lot, the military and political quality of these units is not high, and there is a marked gap compared with the main force of Chiang Kai-shek's army.
In the Battle of Weiyuan Fort, the New 6th Army first prepared an artillery fire, and then the infantry followed the barrage to charge, and rushed to our position in the blink of an eye after the artillery extended. This tactic is very risky, the infantry risk being killed by their own shells, so the artillery shooting technology, the psychological quality of the infantry, and the coordination between the arms are very demanding, and it is impossible to do without a strong tactical level.
The well-equipped New 6 Corps
It was surprising that the New 6th Army had repelled the main force of the 3 columns with only 1 regiment. This battle greatly increased the morale and confidence of Chiang Kai-shek's army - since 1 regiment could defeat 1 column, it was certainly not a problem for the New 6th Army to win Siping with one army. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek's offensive was fiercer and more tactically flexible, entangling with a small number of troops and the main force of the 3 columns, and dispatching 600 vehicles to transport large troops on a motorized march and implementing a rapid detour. When our army found out, it was too late to intercept it with artillery fire. In this way, the main force of the New 6th Army quickly broke through the 3-column defense line, entered the southeast side of Siping, and directly attacked Tazi Mountain.
Soldiers of our army built fortifications on the Siping front
After the fall of Tazi Mountain, the Siping defenders were in danger of being cut off and encircled. In this situation, Lin Zong also had to order the withdrawal of the whole army from Siping.
In the early stage of the War of Liberation, our army was still in the stage of transition from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare, and suddenly entered the stage of defensive warfare in positions; both tactical thinking and training level were insufficient; in addition, when it first arrived, it had not yet gained a mass base, so the defeat in the siping defense war was almost inevitable. However, even in such a difficult situation, our army persisted for a month, and it was extremely difficult to inflict heavy casualties on Chiang Kai-shek's army. As Li Yunchang later said: "The glorious deeds of the heroic martyrs in the Siping Defense War are immortal!" "
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