Author: Zhong Yi
On November 25, 1945, Huang Kecheng led more than 35,000 people from the Third Division of the New Fourth Army to the Jinxi region in the northeast, preparing to establish a base area in the northeast and lay a good foundation for the liberation of the northeast.
In March 1946, the Soviets retreated from the northeast. When the Soviet army withdrew from Shenyang, Huang Kecheng, then commander of the Western Manchuria Military Region, transferred the 10th Brigade of the 3rd Division of the New Fourth Army to the area around Siping. After the Soviets withdrew from Siping, the Tenth Brigade immediately took Siping and captured thousands of puppet troops.
In mid-to-late April of the same year, the Soviet army withdrew from Changchun, Harbin, and Qiqihar. The Third Division, with the cooperation of the Eastern Manchurian forces, took Changchun and Qiqihar and captured tens of thousands of puppet troops. On April 28, the 7th Division of the Shandong Army and the 1st Division of the 359th Brigade liberated Harbin. Under the good situation, Huang Kecheng began to establish a base area.
Soviet troops withdrew to the northeast
However, the situation soon changed, and Jiang's army marched north from Shenyang, and after Kaiyuan was once blocked, the army then attacked Siping in three ways. At that time, Lin Biao, the main commander of the northeast region, consulted Huang Kecheng's opinion on how to fight this battle. Huang Kecheng's advice to Lin Biao was: Choose the weakest attack of Jiang Jun's three-way troops, which can annihilate some of the living forces.
Lin Biao accepted Huang Kecheng's suggestion and concentrated his forces to annihilate Chen Mingren's 87th Division of the 21st Army, and Chiang's first strategy of dividing and attacking Siping failed.
Soon after, Chiang sent 8 armies to attack Siping. Chairman Mao believed that out of the needs of the overall situation, it was necessary to fight a defensive war at Siping, so as to win the soviet union's armed assistance. Subsequently, Chairman Mao instructed Lin Biao to organize the Siping Defense War.
After the Siping Defense War began, Huang Kecheng did not participate in the battle. When he learned that Lin Biao commanded 100,000 troops to engage in a fierce battle with Jiang Jun, he felt bad, and he thought:
At that time, our side had just entered the northeast, the strength of the troops was about 100,000, the base area had not yet been established and consolidated, the weapons and equipment were relatively backward, and Chiang Kai-shek's troops had the advantage in number and equipment. Even if our side wins, it will be a temporary victory, because the defensive war is also a war of attrition, and our side obviously cannot afford to withstand attrition at that time.
Resolutely defend Siping
When the West Manchurian Sub-Bureau moved from Zhengjiatun to Baichengzi, Huang Kecheng sent several telegrams to Lin Biao in Baichengzi. The main content of the telegram was to let Lin Biao stop at the right time and not to fight hard with Chiang Kai-shek's troops. Huang Kecheng also suggested that Lin Biao take the initiative to let Siping and other big cities out and let Chiang's troops in. In this way, our army can go to small and medium-sized cities and the vast number of rural areas to build base areas and accumulate strength. When the force is strong enough, it can turn back to annihilate Chiang's troops in the big city, which is to change passive into active, and unfavorable to advantageous.
After Lin Biao received Huang Kecheng's telegram, he did not pay enough attention to it, neither returning the call nor withdrawing his troops. When the situation in siping was gradually unfavorable to our side, Huang Kecheng sent several telegrams to Lin Biao in succession, suggesting that he immediately withdraw his troops. At this time, Lin Biao was a little shaken, because he also began to feel that sticking to it would only make our side more and more unfavorable.
Battle of Siping
However, Chairman Mao sent more than ten telegrams to Lin Biao, asking him to stick to Siping. Even if Lin Biao wanted to withdraw, he did not dare to withdraw. Therefore, Lin Biao could only ignore Huang Kecheng's telegram, and obeying orders was the duty of a soldier.
When our side became more and more passive in Siping, Lin Biao put forward his opinions to the organization on the defense of Siping:
If the fight continues for a long time, Siping and Tokimura will be completely lost, and the main force will be exhausted and unable to continue fighting. I intend to give up sipping in order to buy time, rest the main force, and consolidate the base areas to cope with the future decisive battle.
But Chairman Mao did not immediately call back. Two days later, Chairman Mao replied: "Please consider whether it is beneficial for the overall situation to continue to fight." Soon after, Chairman Mao sent another telegram to Lin Biao: "If you feel that it is impossible to continue to hold Siping, you should take the initiative to abandon Siping, delay the enemy in the front, withdraw the main force to the two wings to rest, and prepare to change from position warfare to mobile warfare." ”
In the end, Lin Biao led his troops to evacuate Siping, and Jiang's army entered Siping. From the overall situation, our choice at that time was correct and favorable. It was more suitable for our side to destroy the enemy in the movement, and it was not the right time to fight position warfare.
Founding General Huang Kecheng
Chairman Mao never forgot the Battle of Siping. Thirteen years later, in 1959, Chairman Mao invited Huang Kecheng to dinner with him. When talking about the Siping War, Chairman Mao asked: "Is it true that the Siping Defense War was fought wrong?" ”
Huang Kecheng replied: "When the enemy began to advance towards Siping, we hit it, and there was nothing wrong with that. However, the enemy gathered heavy troops to fight a decisive battle with our main force at Siping, so we should not hold on to Siping. ”
Chairman Mao said: "Sticking to Siping was my decision at that time. ”
Huang Kecheng said frankly: "You decided, and that is also wrong." ”
Chairman Mao listened to Huang Kecheng say this and was silent for a long time. In the end, Chairman Mao seemed to say to Huang Kecheng, and as if to say to himself: "Then let future generations comment!" ”
Huang Kecheng later worked on the discipline inspection front, and bluntly said that he would never change his mind. In his eyes, right is right, wrong is wrong, telling the truth, telling the truth, is the greatest respect.
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