The Chinese Expeditionary Force's operations in Burma have always been talked about, but one of the cases is very strange - who will command the expeditionary force? Why is there constant friction between Stilwell and the top brass of the Nationalist army? In fact, the story here is very intriguing.
On February 25, 1942, Chiang Kai-shek went to Yunnan to deploy Chinese troops into Burma, and on the 27th, Chiang Kai-shek issued an order to give specific instructions on the command system for operations into Burma, "The 56th and 6th Armies are temporarily under the unified command of Commander Du, and Commander Du is under the command of Commander Hu Dun. However, later Chiang Kai-shek believed that China's participation in the war in Burma far exceeded that of Britain, and that the division of responsibilities for Burma at the Meeting of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Britain, especially the British generals' command of the burmese war, had not been discussed with Chiang Kai-shek in advance, which was a disregard for China's status as a great power, which made Chiang Kai-shek very angry.
Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek strongly opposed the Command of the Chinese Expeditionary Force by the British, and Chiang Kai-shek also knew that it was not easy to require Chinese generals to command the Burmese operations, so he also assigned Stilwell to command the operations of the Expeditionary Force into Burma. Since Stilwell was his chief of staff and was under his control, this arrangement was tantamount to commanding the expeditionary force for China itself. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek strongly advocated that Stilwell command the Chinese army.
In March 8, 1942, on the day of the Japanese capture of Yangon, Chiang Kai-shek formally appointed Stilwell as the chief of staff of the Chinese theater and was responsible for commanding the Chinese army in Burma, and Chiang Kai-shek also called Roosevelt: "The British army in Burma has only two remaining divisions, and all the armies sent by our Chinese to Burma are under the command of Stilwell, and their total strength is more than four times that of the British army, then the British army should also be under the command of Shi Jun." ”
However, Roosevelt was still cautious, deeply afraid of British opposition, and on the 13th, Roosevelt replied to Chiang Kai-shek, "Please do not raise this issue to Britain, so as not to cause difficulties." At the same time, Roosevelt wanted to establish a Chinese chain of command in northern Burma, under the joint responsibility of Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell, while the British defended southern Burma.
Although Chiang Kai-shek gave the command of the Chinese Expeditionary Force to Stilwell, he was very uneasy about him, and repeatedly told him in every conversation, and Chiang Kai-shek did not stipulate the authority between Stilwell and Luo Zhuoying, the commander of the Expeditionary Force, and all orders issued by Stilwell were to be transferred to Lin Wei and then to another liaison officer, who reported to Chiang Kai-shek. This led to a growing disagreement between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek and his generals, and although Chiang Kai-shek promised to give Stilwell free command, he repeatedly revoked Stilwell's orders to carry out offensive strategies.
On 5 April, Chiang Kai-shek went to Burma with Stilwell and his wife, where Chiang Kai-shek told Alexander that "General Stilwell commands the Chinese army", and the next day Chiang summoned Chinese commanders and told Stilwell in front of him that they must obey Stilwell's orders absolutely, and chiang kai-shek promised to issue him with a large stamp to determine his power.
A week later, Stilwell received the stamp, but far from what Chiang Kai-shek had promised, with the inscription "Chief of the General Staff of the Allied Forces" instead of "Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force", and the stamp engraved with the words Chief of Staff indicating that Stilwell was an adviser rather than a commander. Stilwell's command is not "real and unnamed", but "nominal and untrue".
According to Chennault, if Stilwell had been a Chinese general, Chiang Kai-shek would have ended his performance with a firing squad. Stilwell was also very disgusted with the chairman of the committee, privately calling him "peanut rice" and complaining that Chiang Kai-shek was completely fooling him, "making it impossible for me to do some work." But Stilwell also knew that his command "was limited, and of course I might be able to get rid of these limitations, I might not be able to get rid of them." Nine times out of ten you can't get rid of it. ”
From Chiang Kai-shek's attitude toward Stilwell, we may be able to understand why the generals of the Nationalist army are constrained in their battles and look ahead.
Resources
[1] [Beauty] Barbara Tuchman: " . Stilwell and the U.S. Experience in China (Part 2)