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After the failure of the "general offensive" of the US army on the Korean battlefield in November 1950, MacArthur called Chiang Kai-shek on the 28th, asking him to still send an army (the 52nd Army) to the Korean battlefield to assist in the war, and informed Chiang that he had sent aircraft and ships from Okinawa and the Philippines to Taiwan to load the weapons and equipment of the supplementary 52nd Army, and at the same time to take the army from the air and sea to the Pyongyang area, and asked Chiang to quickly send a delegation of staff commanders to Seoul to meet with The Commander of the US Eighth Army Walker and The Chief of Staff of the "United Nations Army" Headquarters, Lauris Norstad agreed on matters relating to the arrival of the 52nd Army.
At the same time, MacArthur suggested to Washington:
"Authorize the commander of this theater to negotiate directly with the Taiwan authorities on the transfer of available and necessary Kuomintang troops to the north and their integration into the United Nations Command in order to strengthen our position in Korea."
On the same day that Chiang Kai-shek received the telegram from MacArthur requesting support, he convened an emergency military conference and decided to still send the 52nd Army to aid the US troops and complete the preparations for departure within 24 hours; Jing demanded that the air force strengthen its reconnaissance of the mainland, that the navy and the defense forces in Kinmen and Matsu strengthen their combat readiness and be ready to cope with the plaster's attacks; and that the navy and air force strengthen ties with the US Seventh Fleet and the US Air Force stationed in Taiwan. In addition, the meeting also conducted research on Taiwan's defense and the equipment of the 52nd Army, and assigned Hou Teng, "vice minister of national defense," and Guo Yong, commander of the 52nd Army, to fly to Seoul to get in touch with the US military.
On November 30, 7 transport ships and 3 cargo ships sent by MacArthur arrived at the port of Keelung in Taiwan, 30 C-47 transport aircraft also landed at Hsinchu and Songshan airports, and the 52nd Army newly acquired more than 200 vehicles of various kinds, about 1,000 artillery pieces, and nearly 20,000 tons of various equipment, making its equipment militarized.
On 1 December, the various parts of the 52nd Army marched to the designated location to assemble and set off on standby. However, MacArthur and Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to fight for the Nationalist army in Korea were once again frustrated.
On November 29, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by Truman, instructed MacArthur to:
"We must take into account the possibility of the unity of the United Nations and the countries we cooperate with to break down, thus leaving us isolated. Commonwealth countries may not agree at all to their forces fighting alongside Nationalist forces; hostilities may therefore extend to Taiwan and other regions, and our leadership in the Far East and the United Nations will be seriously undermined. ”
The Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded MacArthur: "It is of particular note to avoid divisions in the unity of allies within the United Nations." On December 3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again telegraphed MacArthur that his priority was to hold his position and preserve his strength.
As in the past, U.S. policymakers continue to believe that the political cost of using nationalist forces in North Korea far outweighs any military benefits the latter can provide.
On December 27, 1950, the CIA produced a study that comprehensively analyzed the various drawbacks that might arise from the use of Kuomintang troops in Korea:
(1) The majority of countries in the United Nations are opposed to this; (2) it will further "irritate" China, increase its "sense of fear", and provide an excuse for its large-scale increase in troops in Korea; (3) it will greatly increase the risk of an all-out war with China; (4) Western European countries may strongly feel that the United States has been caught in an expanded war in Asia and undermine the priority of defending the European continent; (5) the use of Kuomintang troops will alienate Asian countries, which will "power" the Kuomintang. It will be seen as a reactionary regime that has been spurned by its own people; (6) it will lose any opportunity for a political settlement of the Korean conflict that still exists; and (7) the Soviet Union will benefit from it: it will allow the United States to become more deeply involved in the war with China without intervening, to divide the United States and its allies, and to provide a propaganda outlet for international communism to accuse the United States of aggression and support for a reactionary government.
Contrary to MacArthur's view, the CIA believed that throwing Nationalist troops into the Korean theater, given their low morale, poor equipment, and inadequate training, would not do much to the "United Nations Forces" in holding a defensive line across the Korean Peninsula. The CIA report concludes by saying that the use of Kuomintang troops in North Korea would give other countries the impression that the United States would continue to support the Kuomintang "regime" and would inflex its policy of "neutrality to Taiwan," especially for the use of Kuomintang navy and air force in North Korea and North Korean waters.
The CIA report essentially summarizes the prevailing views of the U.S. military and state departments. In Washington, U.S. policymakers' estimates of the role of Nationalist forces on the Korean battlefield were not as optimistic as MacArthur's. They were skeptical of the morale, combat capabilities, and value of use of the Kuomintang army. In their view, even if the Kuomintang army is thrown into Korea, its role is insignificant and will not have much impact on the war situation.
But this well does not mean that Washington is not considering using the Kuomintang army at all.
In fact, when MacArthur again demanded on December 30, 1950, that the war be extended to China, "lifting the ban on the use of Kuomintang troops in Korea and allowing them to carry out diversionary attacks on weak areas of the Chinese mainland," the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States once suggested that the National Security Council revise its policy of "neutrality" to Taiwan, cancel the order not to allow Kuomintang troops to invade the mainland, and even provide logistical support for the Kuomintang offensive to contain China's forces on the southeast coast.
Another question closely related to the use of the Kuomintang army is whether the "neutralization" of the Taiwan Strait should continue to be "maintained." The U.S. military was skeptical from the beginning of this policy announcement. The State Department had wanted to pass a UNITED Nations resolution to gain international support for the US "neutral" Taiwan policy, but it was resolutely opposed by the military. In a memorandum to Vice Defense Secretary Lovett, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that Taiwan's strategic position and solutions are extremely important to the United States; from a military point of view, "neutral" Taiwan is greatly "beneficial to the Chinese Communists", which can enhance its status and enable it to redeploy troops across the Taiwan Strait to other places with confidence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that such a policy would weaken the strategic position of the United States in the Far East and would limit the freedom of future military action without any benefits to compensate for. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposes the practice of considering "neutral" Taiwan by the United Nations.
The military's comments were echoed at the State Department. In a memorandum to Acheson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Austin also suggested postponing discussions on "neutral" Taiwan in the UN General Assembly.
In his view, it would be "unwise" to discuss the issue in the General Assembly at this time, on the grounds that:
(1) U.S. domestic politics is sensitive to this issue, and the Republican Party will oppose this policy. (2) Military disadvantage to the United States. The United States should use the Kuomintang army to contain a large number of Chinese troops to protect the flank of the "United Nations Army" fighting in Korea, so that the Chinese Communists are always worried about the Kuomintang attack. (3) It can reduce policy differences with the UK.
Due to the difference of internal opinions and the lack of support from allies, coupled with the successive defeats of the US military on the Korean battlefield and its unfavorable situation, the US State Department decided to temporarily abandon the idea of "neutralizing" Taiwan through the United Nations and continue to pursue its original Policy toward Taiwan.
At this time, the US Government's Taiwan policy has become more and more rigid. When Truman announced that he would send the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, Senator Smith gleefully wrote in his diary: "Taiwan's salvation is providence." Indeed, in the eyes of the Kuomintang, the Korean War was undoubtedly a "life-saving grass."
Speaking at a press conference on December 3, Chen Cheng declared: "The Communist Party's actions in Korea must be stopped, and any temporary solution will not help." On the 8th, Chiang Kai-shek also proposed in his speech: "If the United Nations assists the Kuomintang troops in counterattacking the mainland with navy and air force, the coalition forces in South Korea can turn defeat into victory." ”
Apparently, the Kuomintang intends to use the Korean War (which would better turn into a world war) to realize its dream of "returning to the mainland."
But Washington was reluctant to support the Nationalists in doing so. Although John Emerson of the Far East Division of the U.S. Department of State, Livingston McCant, assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs, Wallace Stuart of the China Affairs Section, and others have all suggested withdrawing from the Seventh Fleet and allowing the Kuomintang to invade the mainland, believing that this would not only reduce the pressure on the "United Nations Army" in Korea, but also not be responsible for the consequences of the Kuomintang's actions without direct troop intervention by the United States; even Bradley once proposed to "tell Chiang Kai-shek that he can do whatever he likes." The United States will neither support nor block the Kuomintang's actions", and in the end, because the risks of doing so are too great and the results are minimal, so that American policymakers are afraid to act.
U.S. Vice President Auburn Buckley argued that the use of Nationalist troops would put the U.S. government in the "most embarrassing position," while Special Assistant to the President, Harriman, suggested an in-depth study of the possible impact of U.S. support for Chiang Kai-shek on Chinese mainland and other parts of Asia.
In May 1952, after Clarke had followed Li Qi's transfer as commander of the United Nations Army, he had also suggested to Washington that an army should be drawn from Taiwan to the Korean battlefield in order to draw the corresponding US troops from the DPRK to strengthen Japan's defense, and he also informed Chiang Kai-shek to make preparations. Chiang Kai-shek knew that he would not succeed, but he still informed Sun Liren of the third time to make preparations for the 52nd Army to go to Korea.
Clark's proposal was supported by the U.S. military, arguing that it "could somehow lighten the burden on the U.S. military that has been providing so much combat power to North Korea for more than two years." But the State Department is adamantly opposed to this, fearing unpredictable consequences around the world. Truman also felt that "there is no fact that the two divisions of troops sent by the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan (although they were partially trained) would have changed the situation in Korea in 1952."
Given the high political and military costs of using Nationalist forces in Korea or invading the mainland, and even risking getting involved in a war on Chinese mainland, U.S. policymakers finally did not dare to act rashly.
The shift in U.S. Policy toward Taiwan was accomplished by the newly elected Eisenhower administration. The "pro-Chiang faction" was ecstatic about Eisenhower's election, believing that this was a good opportunity for the United States to dare to abandon the Truman administration's limited commitment to the Kuomintang, and the new government might give the Kuomintang full support.
On February 2, 1953, in his address to Congress, Eisenhower proposed a famous policy known as "letting Chiang out of the cage." He said with a sullen voice:
"I have issued an order that the Seventh Fleet is no longer used to protect Communist China ... This directive does not mean that we have aggressive intentions, but we really have no responsibility to protect a country that is fighting us in Korea. ”
To add a sense of realism to the imminent intention of invading the mainland, the U.S. government asked Chiang Kai-shek to deploy a division of regular troops on Dachen Island, more than 200 kilometers from Taiwan, to pressure the Chinese government to make concessions to the volunteers in the Negotiations in North Korea, and Eisenhower said in his memoirs that the new government's action was intended to tell the Chinese Communists that "the stalemate will not last long in North Korea, and that the Korean War will either end or extend beyond North Korea." He self-righteously believes that this U.S. action has played a role in urging China and north Korea to accept the terms of the armistice proposed by the United States.
The Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan were also elated. Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement praising the United States for "being the most reasonable and brightest measure of the United States in terms of politics and military as well as in the international morality." When meeting with Lan Jin, THE "chargé d'affaires abode" of the United States in Taiwan, Ye Gongchao, proposed that if the United States intends to adopt a more "active" policy in the Far East, it should reconsider the quantity and type of military assistance to Taiwan, because the Kuomintang's naval and air forces are in urgent need of strengthening, and even defense is still insufficient. Gu Weijun, the Kuomintang "ambassador" to the United States, also felt that this step by the United States could exert more pressure on the mainland and force them to disperse their forces and draw their troops from other parts of China to strengthen their coastal defense positions facing Taiwan.
However, the attempt of US policymakers to "deter" China by "releasing Chiang Kai-shek" did not succeed. In a speech on 5 February, Premier Zhou Enlai solemnly pointed out that this action by the Eisenhower administration was a conspiracy by the United States to "direct and assist the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's bandit gang in their attempt to disturb us in order to facilitate their military campaign to expand their aggression." Zhou Enlai demanded that the Chinese people" should, on the one hand, continue to strengthen the struggle to resist US aggression and aid Korea, and on the other hand, they should strengthen their national defense forces and be ready to deal crushing blows to the enemy who dares to attack at any time. ”
In response to possible war provocations in the coastal areas, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai inspected China's naval fleet and submarine force in mid and late February, respectively. During his inspection, Mao Zedong pointed out:
"In the past, imperialism mostly invaded us from the sea, and now the Pacific Ocean is not at peace. We must build a strong navy, and we must build our coastline into a great wall of steel. ”
Mao Zedong also issued a Directive on the Issue of Armistice Negotiations in North Korea on February 19, harshly attacking Eisenhower's policy of "releasing Chiang Kai-shek." The document says:
"Based on recent events, it is generally certain that the United States will not be able to do any tricks on the battlefield. Lifting Taiwan's neutralization is only a trick of self-deception, the blockade cannot be carried out, and amphibious landings are even more difficult. Eisenhower wanted to scare people, but he did not know that people did not frighten themselves. But now that the face is on the table, it is not time to turn around, especially whether his Policy of Asians fighting Asians works or not, "Mao Zedong concluded that "it is better to move than to remain still, to drag the status quo on until the United States is willing to compromise and let it act." ”
In fact, this policy of Eisenhower does not show that the United States really "loosened" Chiang Kai-shek's shackles and supported his "counter-offensive on the mainland." This is just a power-seeking measure and does not indicate that the US policy toward Taiwan has undergone a major change.
For the most part, as Eisenhower himself later argued, the move was intended to exert psychological pressure on China to make more concessions in the Korean armistice negotiations and reach a deal in favor of the United States. Like his predecessors, Eisenhower was afraid of seeing an expanded war, so while announcing this policy, the United States Government made it clear to the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan through various channels that the United States had no intention of supporting Chiang Kai-shek's invasion of the mainland and wanted the Kuomintang troops to control their actions.
Eisenhower's "sensationalist" speeches during the election campaign convinced the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan that once the Republican Party came to power, they would support Chiang Kai-shek's "counter-offensive" on the mainland. To that end, they were excited about Eisenhower's victory. However, the Kuomintang soon discovered that the new government was not more willing than the former to make a commitment to support the Kuomintang's military offensive against the mainland, and this could not but disappoint the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan.
After Eisenhower became president of the United States, he released Chiang Kai-shek and instigated Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek clique to carry out raids and harassment activities against Chinese mainland in order to shake the determination of the Chinese Volunteer Army to fight in Korea. The Chiang Kai-shek clique also attempted to take advantage of this opportunity to capture two or three counties on the Fujian mainland in preparation for a "counter-offensive on the mainland." First of all, Dongshan Island, located at the southernmost tip of the Fujian coast at the junction of Fujian and Guangdong provinces, was selected to launch a landing attack. The island is separated from the mainland by a 500-meter-wide strait, with an area of 165 square kilometers, which is a barrier off the coast of southern Fujian, and the People's Liberation Army guarding the island has only 1 public security regiment.
On July 16, Chiang Kai-shek's clique concentrated 4 infantry regiments, 22 amphibious tanks, 13 ships, and more than 30 aircraft from Kinmen Island. Another paratrooper brigade set out from Hsinchu, Taiwan, to cooperate in the operation, and adopted the method of "eating the small with the big and making a quick decision" in an attempt to annihilate the People's Liberation Army garrisoning Dongshan Island in one fell swoop. At 5 o'clock on July 16, it boarded Dongshan Island in three ways and surrounded the 80th Public Security Regiment of the People's Liberation Army Guarding The Island.
The Central Military Commission has long been prepared for the Chiang Kai-shek clique's attack on the island, and the General Staff Headquarters and the Fujian Military Region have drawn up an operational plan. After Chiang Kai-shek's army landed on the island, the Fujian Military Region immediately transferred the 272nd Regiment of the 31st Army, the 82nd Division of the 28th Army, and the Howitzer Regiment of the 28th Army to reinforce the Dongshan Island operation according to the predetermined battle plan. The Central Military Commission also transferred the 122nd Division of the 41st Army to Huanggang, Guangdong Province, to reinforce operations. The above units were under the unified command of the commander of the 31st Army. Reinforcements from all sides landed on Dongshan Island from 10 30 minutes to the night of the 16th to participate in the battle. By 18 inches and 30 minutes on the 17th, a total of 3,028 enemy were annihilated, of which 2,258 were killed and wounded, 770 were captured, 2 enemy planes were shot down, 3 small landing craft were sunk, and 1,324 casualties were inflicted. Retake the island all.
Mao Zedong attached great importance to this battle, and personally visited the War Room of the General Staff to inquire about the situation of the front-line operations and gave specific instructions. Mao Zedong spoke highly of the battle, pointing out:
"This counterattack has shattered the Kuomintang's dream of 'counterattacking the mainland,' and US imperialism has also been struck in the head."
The advent of the Korean armistice has created new anxieties for the Taiwan authorities and made them fearful of their own prospects. First, politically, the Korean War ended in a truce rather than a defeat between China and North Korea. This not only shattered Chiang Kai-shek's dream of returning to the mainland by the flames of the Korean war, but also further enhanced the prestige of New China in the world and once again seriously impacted the international status of the Taiwan authorities. What made the Kuomintang people even more extremely frustrated was that although the ideas and designs spread the war to the Chinese mainland and provoked a sino-US war, they did not succeed in the end.
Second, militarily, the end of the Korean War allowed the PLA to concentrate on strengthening its military forces against Taiwan, posing a greater threat to the survival of the Kuomintang authorities, which gave the Kuomintang a strong sense of crisis after a brief respite.
What also disturbs the Kuomintang authorities is that it is difficult to predict the development and changes in US-Taiwan relations after the Armistice in Korea.
First, as soon as the Korean War stopped, the US Seventh Fleet became unknown and had no reason to cruise in the Taiwan Strait, and the Kuomintang thus lost its "protective umbrella." Second, the Allies of the United States, especially the British, had a great hatred for the Kuomintang and had long lost confidence in Chiang Kai-shek, and had tried to persuade the United States to return Taiwan to the mainland and accept the reality of the existence of the People's Republic of China. Of course, during the Korean War, The British advice did not work, but once peace came, it is unclear whether the United States would accept it. Third, the outbreak of the Korean War did not completely rule out the possibility of the United States sacrificing Taiwan to make a deal with New China out of its own interests. Moreover, whether such a possibility will still exist after the armistice is also difficult for the Taiwan authorities to predict. Fourth, the warm-hearted attitude of the United States on the Taiwan issue has further increased the taiwan authorities' sense of insecurity. Under these circumstances, the Kuomintang authorities considered that the most important thing at present is to adopt a policy of closer proximity to the United States, to further win the support of the United States, and to maintain and develop relations with the United States. This not only has a bearing on the survival of the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan, but also can also use the military strength of the United States to "deter" the mainland, so as to prevent it from taking military action against Taiwan, and to obtain military aid to further arm itself, enhance the combat capability of the army, develop itself economically, and maintain its declining status in the international arena.
In the long run, the Taiwan authorities can also hope that one day when World War III breaks out, it may return to the mainland under the wings of the United States. Therefore, striving to conclude a "Mutual Defense Treaty" with the United States and establishing a solid military alliance has become a dream of the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan, and it is also a central link in their diplomacy with the United States.
Just as the United States wants to use Taiwan to "deter" the Chinese Communist Party, the Taiwan authorities also hope to rely on the United States to maintain their precarious position and avoid the disaster of annihilation. It can be said that to a certain extent, the establishment of some form of military alliance became a common need of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek at that time, but the purposes held were very different and their own intentions were uncertain: In September 1953, the United States and Taiwan signed the "Agreement on Military Coordination and Understanding", stipulating that the reorganization, training, supervision, and equipment of the Kuomintang army were completely responsible for the United States; in the event of war, the mobilization and command of the Kuomintang troops must also be approved by the United States. In this way, the United States and Chiang Kai-shek took a big step toward the establishment of a military alliance.
The signing of this treaty hostile to the Chinese people formally incorporated Taiwan into the US defense system in the western Pacific, and the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan were ecstatic about this.
Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement saying:
"After participating in this security system,...... In the future, it will enable me to counterattack and restore the country, advance in battle, and stand in an invincible position. ”
But in fact, the treaty largely restricted Chiang Kai-shek's actions and allowed the United States to tighten its control over the Actions of the Kuomintang. Dulles made a simple deal with Chiang Kai-shek, and in exchange for a treaty, the Nationalists had to abandon their attempts to return to the mainland.
The Kuomintang had to pledge to limit military action against the mainland to what the United States was allowed to do, and to reject any risky action that might drag the United States into a war with the Chinese Communists. Both sides got what they wanted, and the United States achieved its goal of controlling the Kuomintang's actions, while the Kuomintang received a formal commitment from the United States to "protect" Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. In this way, only a few years after the US government "swore" not to further interfere in China's civil war, the United States "legitimized" its intervention in China's internal affairs through these agreements and treaties.
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