The great Communist Party of China was founded in Shanghai in 1921, and after 28 years of arduous struggle, it won victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation, and established the People's Republic of China in 1949. Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, served as state president and Zhou Enlai served as premier of the State Council.
At the beginning of its birth, the Communist Party of China was extremely fragile, and it was a weak organization that needed the "care" of international communism at all times, both economically and politically. As the leader of the Chinese revolution and the soul of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong never entered the core leadership of the CCP in the early stages of the revolution.
From the birth of the Communist Party of China in 1921, it was not until the Zunyi Conference in 1935 that Mao Zedong was recommended by Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian to enter the politburo standing committee of the Communist Party of China, after which he led the Communist Party of China all the way through thorns and thorns with amazing talent and super perseverance, and finally won the revolutionary victory.
Therefore we often say: "The Zunyi Conference was a turning point in the Chinese revolution, and it saved the Red Army and saved the Party at a moment of vital importance." It is a sign of the Chinese Communist Party's progress from infancy to maturity. ”
Chairman Mao was able to smoothly enter the leadership of the CPC after the Zunyi Conference, and a long conversation between Zhou Enlai and Bogu, the top Chinese leader at the time, played a crucial role. Zhou Enlai said to Bogu: We are not suitable to be commanders.
< h1 class = "pgc-h-arrow-right" > the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression failed, Bogu's command was wrong, and the Red Army suffered heavy losses</h1>
In 1930, Chiang Kai-shek, who had won a great victory in the Central Plains, nominally unified the entire Central Plains. But he did not feel at ease about this, because the Chinese Communist Party continued to establish a base in the Jiangxi region, and it was strongly supported by the local people, and its number was increasing, and there was a great potential for sparks.
In the autumn of the same year, he mobilized 100,000 troops to launch an offensive against the central revolutionary base areas.
The intention was to annihilate the living forces of the Communist Party of China in one fell swoop, and it was a great trouble for its confidants. In the face of the enemy's fierce attack, the Central Red Army, under the wise command of Mao Zedong and Zhu De, adopted the principle and tactic of "enticing the enemy to go deep and making a breakthrough in the middle," and finally successfully won the first victory against encirclement and suppression.
From October 1930 to December 1932, the Kuomintang used a large number of troops to carry out four large-scale encirclement and suppression campaigns against our army, while the Red Army of the Communist Party of China, under the command of Mao Zedong and Zhu De, won four consecutive victories in counter-encirclement and suppression, crushing the enemy's attempts and severely damaging the enemy's confidence.
In September 1933, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 1 million elite troops and adopted the new strategy of "fortress doctrine" to carry out the fifth encirclement and suppression of the revolutionary base areas.
This time, Bogu (formerly known as Qin Bangxian), the top leader of the Communist Party of China who parachuted into the central revolutionary base area, refused to adopt the guerrilla warfare methods before Mao Zedong and Zhu De, and instead made a serious left-leaning adventurism mistake together with Li De, a military adviser sent by the Comintern.
He ordered the Red Army to replace guerrilla warfare with trench warfare and the so-called regular war instead of people's war. This erroneous command line made the Red Army fall into passivity, and the Central Soviet Army stubbornly resisted the Kuomintang army in order to maintain the revolutionary base area, and the war lasted for a whole year, and the Red Army suffered heavy losses and had to make a strategic transfer.
More than 80,000 people embarked on an uncertain road and began a long and arduous twenty-five thousand-mile long march.
< h1 class= "pgc-h-arrow-right" > the Zunyi conference reflected on the lessons, and Zhou, Wang, and Zhang Li recommended Mao Zedong to enter the Standing Committee</h1>
The Long March departed from Ruijin, Jiangxi on October 10, 1933, with 86,000 people at the time of departure. In the face of the encirclement and blockade of the Kuomintang troops, Bogu, as the supreme leader of the Chinese Communist Party, did not show the wisdom and courage of a leader in times of crisis.
After the arduous Battle of the Xiang River, the Red Army had only more than 30,000 men left.
In January 1935, the Central Red Army finally occupied Zunyi, Guizhou under the leadership of Mao Zedong.
The Politburo of the CPC Central Committee then held an enlarged meeting on January 15 to summarize and reflect on the lessons of the "failure of the Fifth Anti-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign", criticize Bogulid's left-leaning adventurism mistakes, and discuss the reorganization of the central leadership. History: Zunyi Conference.
The meeting lasted for three consecutive days, and was attended by Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Wang Jiaxiang, Bogu, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, and so on.
The meeting began with Bogu's summary report on the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign. In his report, he overemphasized objective causes and ignored them. The main reason for the defeat was attributed to the strength of the enemy, and never mentioned the mistakes he and Li De had made in military command.
When Zhou Enlai spoke, he said in a serious tone that the failure of the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign was mainly a military failure. He took the initiative to engage in self-criticism at the meeting, but also criticized Bogu and Reed. This was followed by Zhang Wentian's speech, in which he systematically criticized Bogu and Li De from a political standpoint.
Finally, Zhou Enlai invited Mao Zedong to make a long report, which not only criticized the mistakes of Bogu and Li De, but also systematically expounded his judgment of the current revolutionary situation and his plans for future operations for the Red Army. Many comrades spoke one after another, expressing their agreement with Mao Zedong's views.
In fact, it was an elaborately prepared meeting that Zhou Enlai had carefully prepared for Mao Zedong. The Zunyi Conference was a meeting of the leadership of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, and according to common sense Mao Zedong could not attend, because his position at that time was that of the political commissar of the Red Army.
It was Zhou Enlai, after seeing Mao Zedong's military command ability, who invited Mao Zedong to the meeting with Zhu De. Moreover, he had already discussed with Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang in advance, and through this meeting criticized the mistakes of Bogu and Li De, and elected Mao Zedong to the Politburo Standing Committee.
The Zunyi conference finally decided to abolish Bogu's leadership status and elect Zhang Wentian as the supreme leader of the new CCP.
<h1 class= "pgc-h-arrow-right" > Bogu abdicated and did not abdicate, Zhou Enlai once said a long time: We are not suitable to be commanders</h1>
Born in 1907 in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, Bogu, whose original name was Qin Bangxian, joined the Communist Party of China in 1925.
Because of his friendship with Wang Ming while studying in the Soviet Union, he was later appointed by the Comintern as the supreme leader of the CCP. However, its empty theory lacks revolutionary experience. In leading the Chinese revolution, he blindly copied the revolutionary experience of the Soviet Union and ignored the particularities of the Chinese revolution.
After the failure of the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign, Bogu was already deeply overwhelmed and no longer trusted Li De's operational proposals. At the beginning of the Long March, Li De also had no intention of commanding the battle, and only complained all day long. The reason why the Red Army was able to persist until the Zunyi Conference was entirely because Zhou Enlai took on the heavy responsibility of commanding the whole army at a critical juncture.
In the process of leading the Red Army to break through, he gradually admired Mao Zedong's strategic decision-making and military ability, so he came up with the idea of electing Mao Zedong to lead the revolution.
After the Zunyi Conference, Mao Zedong entered the Standing Committee of the Central Committee. But Zhou Enlai knew in his heart that he was still far from the situation he wanted. Before the Zunyi Conference, there was a conversation about Mao Zedong, namely: Zhang Wang Tangerine Talk.
After the Liping Conference, Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang talked about Mao Zedong in the orange grove, and Zhang Wentian said that after several experiences, Comrade Mao Zedong was very capable of fighting wars, and his ability was above you and me, and we should ask Mao Zedong to come out and let him lead the Chinese revolution.
After the conversation spread, many people agreed. This is equivalent to laying the foundation of public opinion for the Zunyi conference.
What Zhou Enlai wanted to do now was for Mao Zedong to truly grasp the leadership of the Red Army, not an empty shelf for a Member of the Central Committee Standing Committee.
Because although Bogu was no longer the supreme leader of the CPC at that time, he was grumpy about the things that everyone unanimously criticized him at the Zunyi conference, so he always abdicated the throne and did not abdicate his power, and he was reluctant to hand over the work with Zhang Wentian.
Zhou Enlai knew that in order to reach the ultimate goal, he would have to do one more thing. The Zunyi conference formally deprived Bogu of his leadership within the party. Although Bogu verbally recognized his mistake, he also agreed with everyone's decision. But there must be dissatisfaction in the heart.
For the sake of the future of the Chinese revolution, Zhou Enlai decided to have a special conversation with Bogu. This is the famous "Zhou Bo Long Talk".
On January 29, 1935, the Central Red Army crossed the Chishui River to a village called "Jiming Three Provinces", and at the same time decided to further reorganize the Central Committee.
Before this reorganization, Zhou Enlai had a long conversation with Bogu, the purpose of which was one: to untangle the knots in Bogu's heart and let the power transfer smoothly.
At the Zunyi meeting, Bogu was unanimously criticized by everyone, and after that, he was silent all the way, did not think about tea and dinner, and his state was very depressed. Zhou Enlai keenly saw the change in Bogu.
He understood Bogu's bitterness, and he could understand Bogu's approach. Born in 1907, he joined the Party at the age of 18 and was appointed supreme leader of the Ccp at the age of 24. He was only 26 years old when he led the Red Army in the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign.
There is no experience in the rural revolution, nor in commanding operations. Putting the future of the Chinese revolution in the hands of such a young man is both a disaster for the Chinese revolution and a disaster for himself. Because his thin body could not bear such a heavy task.
The conversation began, and Zhou Enlai walked into Bogu's residence one evening. He said in a serious tone:
At the meeting, you should have reflected on behalf of the central authorities on the mistakes made in military command in the course of the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign, and then talked about the Xiangjiang Campaign.
In this way, it is easier for everyone to accept it emotionally.
However, your speech did not examine the errors of the military line throughout the article, and the criticism of Li De was also a dragonfly, but instead pointed the spearhead directly at Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang in the Xiangjiang Campaign.
This has forced me, as the head of the Central Military Commission, to stand up and review the mistakes in the military command line.
In contrast, everyone will feel that your statement is like shirking responsibility, so the accumulated emotions suddenly explode, and eventually turn to concentrated criticism of you.
Seeing that Bogu did not mean to object, he went on to say:
The uprising in Shanghai taught us that if we wanted to win a revolutionary victory, we must have our own army.
The Nanchang uprising also made me understand that the Chinese revolution needs a more talented person than the leader of the Nanchang uprising, especially the military leadership.
The Guangzhou uprising let us know that the hope of the Chinese revolution was in the countryside.
Since these uprisings, I have been thinking that we must find someone who is familiar with the countryside and understands the peasantry, who is good at the rural revolution, to lead the Chinese revolution.
To be fair, you and I are both people who do specific business, and neither is a handsome person.
Mao Zedong was very skillful in engaging in rural revolution and guerrilla warfare, so since the beginning of the Long March, I have been trying to find ways to involve him in military decision-making.
I believe that only he can lead the Red Army out of its current predicament, and only he can lead the Chinese Communist Party to victory.
That's why I strongly recommended him to the Politburo Standing Committee at the Zunyi meeting.
I am doing this for the future of the Chinese revolution, and I hope you will support me.
Bogu listened to Zhou Enlai's words, and there was a long-lost light in his eyes. Zhou Enlai continued:
In fact, as far as the current situation is concerned, it does not matter who will be the general secretary, the key is who will lead the army and who can lead the Red Army to fight a good battle. Only those who have been supported by the army through victory after victory can be qualified to become leaders. ”
Zhou Enlai's words completely untied the knots in Bogu's heart, and the mood that had been depressed for more than ten days finally gained a long-lost release after this conversation.
< h1 class = "pgc-h-arrow-right" > the establishment of Mao Zedong's leadership position, the Red Army turned passive to active</h1>
On the evening after the talks, the new Politburo Standing Committee members gathered and held a meeting to discuss future operational tactics and the division of labor within the Party.
Zhou Enlai directly proposed that Mao Zedong take over Bogu's work, and After hearing this, Mao Zedong said that he would let Zhang Wentian take over Bogu's post, on the one hand, Zhang Wentian was a member of the Standing Committee elected by everyone at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Cpc Central Committee, on the other hand, Zhang Wentian had experience studying in the Soviet Union, also knew Russian, and had smoother exchanges with the Comintern.
In the end, everyone agreed to Mao Zedong's suggestion. Zhang Wentian has always admired Mao Zedong's military talents since the beginning of the Long March, and there has also been a famous "Zhang Wang Tangerine Talk" that expressed Zhang Wentian's views on Mao Zedong as the leader.
So although Zhang Wentian became general secretary, in fact, most of his command decisions were left to Mao Zedong.
In addition, in terms of military command, a three-member military leading group composed of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Jiaxiang was also set up, which was fully responsible for military command.
The next day, Bogu handed in the seal and documents of the Party Central Committee. Zhang Wentian and Bogu successfully completed the transfer of power. In this way, under the operation of Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong successfully became a member of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, participated in the decision-making of major issues within the party, and became the de facto supreme military leader.
At this point, after a long and tortuous exploration and a tragic defeat, the Chinese revolution finally found a truly suitable person. Although Mao Zedong did not become chairman of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee until 1943, after this "Zhou Bo Long Talk," a Party Central Committee group with Mao Zedong as the core of leadership was already formed.
After that, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the Red Army of the Communist Party of China thoroughly implemented Mao Zedong's 16-character operational policy of "the enemy advances and retreats, the enemy garrisons us to disturb, the enemy wears us out to fight, and the enemy retreats and we pursue" and won the victory of the Long March by means of guerrilla warfare, and successfully met the division in northern Shaanxi.
In the following three years of civil war, he led the people's army to win one brilliant victory after another, and finally defeated the Kuomintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek and established the People's Republic of China on the land of China to unite the people of all nationalities throughout the country.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" > concluding remarks:</h1>
The Communist Party of China was founded in a special period of turbulent internal and external troubles. It is necessary to resist both the imperialist aggressors who are eyeing the tiger and the Kuomintang reactionaries who wantonly slaughter their compatriots in violation of the cooperation agreement. In the end, the revolutionary victory was won with strong conviction and indomitable will.
Of course, this is inseparable from the wise guidance of the great leader Mao Zedong, but we cannot ignore the important role played by Premier Zhou Enlai in the Chinese revolution, especially in helping Mao Zedong enter the leadership of the Party Central Committee.
Premier Zhou is to Chairman Mao as Zhang Liang is to Liu Bang. We have reason to believe that without Premier Zhou, the Chinese revolution would not have achieved such brilliant achievements. It was his humble and gentle character and selfless character that made the Chinese revolution march forward and made him the greatest prime minister since the founding of the People's Republic of China.
< h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" > references:</h1>
[1] Fei Kanru." Zhang Wang Tangerine Talks"and "Zhou Bo Long Talk"—— The Story Behind the Zunyi Conference[J].Secretarial Work, 2015(02):65-67.
[2] How to understand the great historical significance of the Zunyi Conference[N]. People's Liberation Army Daily, 2021-07-12(007).
Peng Xuebao. Bogu and the Third "Left" Mistake[J].Journal of Shangqiu Normal University,2018,34(05):74-78.
Wang Xinsheng. The Role and Contribution of Zhou Enlai in the Long March of the Central Red Army[J].Journal of Pudong Cadre College, China,2016,10(05):60-70.