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Fan Mingfang Zhao Peng: Song Jiaoren's understanding of Tsarist Aggression before and after the Xinhai Revolution

author:Ancient
Fan Mingfang Zhao Peng: Song Jiaoren's understanding of Tsarist Aggression before and after the Xinhai Revolution

Before and after the Xinhai Revolution, Song Jiaoren paid great attention to the aggression of the imperialist powers against China's frontiers, and published a series of articles analyzing Russia's six demands in the spring of 1911, putting forward the Chinese side's countermeasures, exposing the conspiracy of Japan and Russia to invade the three northeastern provinces, pointing out the trend of Japan and Russia colluding with each other to invade the three northeastern provinces, and exposing the Tsarist Russia's aggressive ambitions against China's Mongolian region. These articles show a strong national consciousness of anti-aggression and are full of patriotism. Some of the suggestions he made were relevant and pertinent, but some of them could only be used for political propaganda and could not stand up to scrutiny in doctrine.

Song Jiaoren was a famous revolutionary in modern China and one of the main leaders of the early Kuomintang in China. Before and after the Xinhai Revolution, while campaigning for the cause of China's democracy and republicanism, Song Jiaoren also paid considerable attention to the situation of the imperialist powers' aggression against China's frontiers, maintained a high degree of vigilance against Tsarist Russia's activities of invading China, worked hard to collect information on Tsarist Russia's invasion of China, fully exposed Tsarist Russia's ambitions to invade China, seriously studied Tsarist Russia's tactics of aggression against China, actively provided tactical opinions on dealing with Tsarist Russia's invasion of China, and made certain efforts to oppose Tsarist Aggression and safeguard national unity and sovereign independence.

One

When discussing Song Jiaoren's understanding of Tsarist Russia's invasion of China, the first thing to mention is his exposition on the "Russian storm" in the spring of 1911. This storm is related to the revision of the Sino-Russian Ili Treaty, which began with the six requirements of the Russian Minister on February 16, 1911 concerning the commercial provisions of the Ili Treaty, and ended with a note of satisfaction expressed by the Russian Minister on March 29 of the same year, which lasted more than 40 days.

In 1881, China and Russia signed the Ili Treaty, and the provisions of the Ili Treaty and its annexes on trade between China and Russia mainly include the following: the Russian people trade in Mongolia is tax-free, and trade in Xinjiang is temporarily exempt from taxation. "In the future, commerce will flourish, and the two countries will agree on tariff rules, and the exemption will be abolished." In Kobdo, Ulyasutai, Hami, Urumqi, and the ancient city, Russia had the right to negotiate the establishment of consuls after the prosperity of commerce. Within 100 miles on each side of the border line, the chinese and Russian peoples "trade at will and do not pay taxes." Russian businessmen have the right to sell goods into China by land as usual, go to Tianjin via Zhangjiakou and Tongzhou, and transport them to other ports and the mainland market for sale. Two trade routes were added from Nebuchu to Tianjin via Zhangjiakou and Tongzhou, and from the Russian border to Tianjin via Kobdo and Naturalization City. Russian businessmen who transport goods to Tianjin by land still reduce taxes according to the tax rules. The above provisions stipulate that "from the date of replacement, after ten years, it may be discussed at its discretion; if no commercial reform is requested six months before the expiration of the ten-year period, it shall still be carried out for ten years"[1].

The Treaty of Ili was signed by the Qing Dynasty to give Tsarist Russia the most privileges and the greatest damage to China on the issue of land trade. Before 1911, the Ili Treaty expired twice, but due to Tsarist opposition and other reasons, the treaty was not amended, resulting in Huge Tariffs and other losses for China. As the third expiry of the treaty approached in 1911, the demand for amendment by Chinese officials and people grew louder. The Qing government decided to take this opportunity to negotiate with Tsarist Russia and revise the unequal content of the original treaty in order to recover some of the rights and reduce China's losses. The Tsarist government, for its part, was reluctant to amend the unequal commercial provisions of the Ili Treaty, and preemptively presented Russia's demands to China with an ultimatum before negotiations began, and backed them up with military threats. Thus came the "Russian Storm" of the spring of 1911.

On February 16, 1911, the Russian Minister to China, Kosovitsz, sent a long note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Government, unreasonably accusing China of not abiding by the Ili Treaty and having erroneous interpretations of the treaty, and using this as an excuse to demand that the Chinese government confirm the following six Russian privileges: 1. The Seven-Year Treaty of Guangxu and other treaties did not restrict the Russian government from traveling alone outside the border limit of 100 miles and establishing tariffs for the import and export of goods. Within a hundred miles of the border between the two countries, zeng xing agreed that merchants and civilians of the two countries would be allowed to transport goods into each country without paying taxes. (2) The residence of the Russian people in all parts of China shall enjoy extraterritorial jurisdiction and shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Russian officials, since all cases of litigation by the Chinese and Russian people shall be handled by the Chinese and Russian judges in conjunction. (3) Russian merchants in Mongolia and in the north and south of the Tianshan Mountains outside the Guanwai Shall enjoy the convenience of living and buying and selling goods from various countries, and shall not be directly or indirectly taxed, as well as monopolies and other prohibition restrictions. (4) The Russian Government, in addition to having consular officers, shall have the right to send consular officers to Kobdo, Hami and the ancient cities. Although it should be conducted in advance with China, it is now proved that the government of its own country cannot delay the implementation of this right because of the lawsuits involving Russian and Chinese businessmen in the above places. (5) The consular officers of Russia shall be treated by a Chinese magistrate in accordance with his or her official position in the areas under his jurisdiction, and the magistrate shall not prevaricate that the cases of The Russian-Chinese proceedings shall be tried in conjunction with each other. (6) The Russian Government shall have the right to establish consuls in Mongolia and on the north and south roads of the Tianshan Mountains, namely Ili, Tacheng, Kulun, Ulyasutai, Kashgar, Urumqi, Kobdo and the ancient city, and allow Russian merchants and civilians to buy land and build houses in all parts of the country and in Zhangjiakou.

The note concluded by threatening that the Chinese government "does not recognize the above six paragraphs or one of its non-desires, that is to say, China does not want to abide by the former covenant and to be good to its neighbors." In this way, the Russian Government is free to proceed in order to affirm the competence of the treaty"[2]. In order to force the Qing government to obey, Russia dispatched troops along the Sino-Russian border in the northwest, which caused an uproar for a while. More than 10 years later, in the early 1920s, a Chinese patriotic literati wrote in an article: "The Russians demanded six paragraphs and declared war, which is the big problem of splitting heads in the last year of the former Qing Dynasty, and it is still hanging in the minds of ordinary people." [3] This sentence clearly points to the historical importance of this event.

The "Russian storm" made the whole Chinese people excited, but the people's true situation of this incident was clear and dark. At this time, Song Jiaoren was the chief writer of the Minli Bao in Shanghai, and he made a serious study of the Sino-Russian treaty, and wrote articles such as "The Troubles of Russia in the Past Two Hundred Years" and "Discussion on Russia", which were successively published in the Minli Bao.

"The Russian Troubles of the Past Two Hundred Years" was serialized in the Minli Bao from February 20 to March 4, 1911. The full text is more than 20,000 words, divided into two chapters, a conclusion, and two supplementary theories. The article lists the main contents of the 18 important treaties signed between China and Russia since the Treaty of Nebuchu in 1689, especially the provisions related to Russia's interests in China's Xinjiang, Mongolia, Northeast China and other frontier regions, classifies these treaties, and then analyzes the six demands put forward in Russia's February 16 ultimatum article by article in the main pages, and proposes countermeasures. In the "Conclusion," Song Jiaoren said: "The Russians' deliberate and huge plan for Mongolia and Xinjiang's move this time is nothing more than to grasp the political and economic forces of Mongolia and Xinjiang, in an attempt to show the strategy of their Far East policy and Middle East policy (Central Asia). He hoped that the Qing government would make up for the lost east and harvest the mulberry elm.

More than 4,000 words of "Discussion on Russia" were published in the "Minli Bao" on March 21, 1911. Song Jiaoren shouted loudly in the text: "Whoops, the actions of the Russians today are arbitrary and unreasonable, and Gai can be said to have not seen any examples since there have been international negotiations!" ...... Its contempt for international law, its contempt for treaties, its toying with our Government and insulting our people have become a fire in sight. This time, the result is that he lets him fly and fly, and without a little calculation, it is my people who are willing to be the people of the dead, willing to listen to their influence, and cause the disaster of the melon and not give up. Whoops, it's tolerable, it's intolerable." Song Jiaoren said: "The reason why the Russians are out of the right, in order to revise the treaty issue also. ...... The privileges which he has been granted, fearing that they will be taken back by me by reason of the revision of the covenant, are pre-emptive measures, and they are demanded by them before the expiry of the term. Most of the conditions they want violate the law and violate the law, that is, the form of their demands is already an illegal act, and the deception is too much, which is enough to make people heinous, and those who are blinded are also broken. ”

Song Jiaoren justified China's request to revise the commercial provisions of the Ili Treaty in accordance with international law, exposing that Russia's "far-fetched pre-treaty blames us for the need for a basis after the expiration of the term" is "self-imposed in an unethical gaffe." He analyzed what Russia had done and held that "the Russians are not really able to think that they are fighters with us, that they accuse me of disturbing diplomatic relations, that they declare freedom of action, that they demonstrate in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang, and that they are all cunning schemes that they are vainly intimidating." And put forward the upper, middle and lower three strategies. The best policy: "To use tough means as a legitimate defense, as if to reject all its demands, and not to back down a little"; if Russia invades the northeast, Mongolia, and xinjiang along the border, it will defend itself. Zhongzhi: Reject Russia's demands on the issues of duty-free trade between Russian businessmen in Mongolia and Xinjiang, and the right of Russians to purchase land and build houses in Mongolia and Xinjiang; they will agree to the other four russian demands. The next policy: not to amend the "Ili Treaty" and extend it for another ten or three or five years; the Chinese side will make great efforts to govern, strengthen its strength, consolidate its national defense, and after the next revision period comes, it will negotiate with Russia on the backing of strength and completely abolish the unequal provisions of the treaty on commerce. [4]

Two

Song Jiaoren paid great attention to the Tsarist invasion of northeast China. In May 1905, he wrote the article "Liangshan Po of the 20th Century", which was published in the first issue of "20th Century China". This article discusses the problem of illegal armed "horse thieves" in the three northeastern provinces at that time. Song Jiaoren believes that after the Russian invaders invaded the three northeastern provinces, the local Chinese people were devastated, and the people spontaneously organized civilian armed forces in order to protect themselves and save their lives. These civilian armed forces "gathered a large number of people, good and bad, and could be used to plunder and kill people" and became "horse thieves". Song Jiaoren pointed out that during the Russo-Japanese War, the warring sides separately used "horse thieves," resulting in the "horse thieves" being divided into the Japanese faction and the Russian faction, and the two factions were not inferior. He was saddened by the phenomenon. [5]

From February 8 to March 27, 1911, the Minli Bao serialized Song Jiaoren's "Theory of the Situation in East Asia in the Last Twenty Years" on six occasions, which analyzed the contention and collusion between the great powers in China since the Sino-Japanese War, holding that when the Eight-Power Alliance signed the "Xinugu Treaty" after the Eight-Power Alliance's war of aggression against China, Britain, Germany, and France realized that the division of China was unfavorable to them, advocated the formal preservation of China's independence and integrity, and opposed "the sinister and majestic Russia and the day of arrogance and greed"; after the Russo-Japanese War, Some Chinese mistakenly believed that Japan had no ambitions to invade and occupy China, calling Japan a "preservation faction." Song Jiaoren used facts to argue: Japan and Russia are fighting in northeast China to compete for northeast China, russia is certainly a "true invading faction," And Japan is only a "pseudo-preservation faction." And those who have the heart to preserve China can do it? ”[6]

After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia took the northern part of the three northeastern provinces as its sphere of influence, and Japan took the southern part of the three northeastern provinces as its sphere of influence. Both sides believed that a protracted confrontation with the other side would be detrimental to the realization of their aggressive goals in China, and they invariably adjusted their policies and coordinated their relations on the basis of mutual use and joint aggression against China. In 1907 and 1910, Japan and Russia signed two secret treaties, roughly delineating the spheres of influence of the two sides in the three northeastern provinces, Outer Mongolia, and Korea. The Second Japan-Russia Secret Treaty in 1910 even led to an alliance between Japan and Russia on the issue of the three northeastern provinces, and the two sides began to join hands to resist the expansion of the United States and other countries to the three northeastern provinces, and the competition between the great powers in China's three northeastern provinces intensified.

On July 22, 1911, Song Jiaoren published an article entitled "The General formation of the Japanese-Russian Alliance" in the Minli Bao, analyzing the situation in which Japan and Russia invaded the three northeastern provinces for adultery. The article argues that in the face of competition between the United States and Britain in the three northeastern provinces, Japan and Russia "perceived the necessity of joint defense", and the second Japan-Russia secret treaty in 1910 "was similar in spirit to the offensive and defensive alliance, and recently the economic forces of the United States and Britain and other countries had invaded Manchuria, and they tried their best to seek a common and consistent approach,...... Although the truth of the two governments is not known, it is extrapolated by the situation in all respects, and it can be said that it is close to the truth, and it can be said that it is close to the truth, even if it is not realized at the moment, and will become a fact in the next few years. [7] Song Jiaoren expressed deep concern about the dangerous situation facing China in which the great powers were competing for the three northeastern provinces, and lamented at the end of the article: "The situation in all directions is gradually tightening, and day by day, the storm clouds of east Asia's heaven and earth have sprung up in a corner of the mainland. belch! I don't know what the owner of the uninvited force will be entrusted with? ”[8]

The Chinese-Mongolian region is located in the northern frontier, where Outer Mongolia borders Tsarist Russia. As early as the early Qing Dynasty, the Russian government had deliberately seized Outer Mongolia for itself. From the 1850s onwards, Tsarist Russia gradually stepped up its economic and political penetration into mongolia, continuously expanded Its influence on Mongolia, especially Outer Mongolia, and co-opted and incited local feudal elites to cultivate pro-Russian forces. After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia stepped up its expansion into Outer Mongolia. Under the meticulous cultivation of Tsarist Russia, on the eve of the Xinhai Revolution, a pro-Russian faction led by Jebtsundamba Buddha had been formed in Outer Mongolia. Shortly after the Wuchang Uprising, the feudal upper echelons of Outer Mongolia, with the support of Russia, declared Outer Mongolia's independence from China. In November 1912, the Russian government signed the Russian-Mongolian Pact with the upper echelons of Outer Mongolia, which stipulated that Russia would help the Kulen authorities to achieve substantive independence in the name of "autonomy", which seriously undermined China's national unity and territorial sovereignty.

Song Jiaoren was very concerned about the invasion of Mongolia by Tsarist Russia. On February 10, 1911, minli bao published his paper "The Source of the Curse of Mongolia". The article pointed out: "The Russians have been spying on Mongolia since recent days, and their specialty and urgency are especially important in recent days." The threat of this business agreement issue is only one end of the opportunistic action, and now its step by step is pressing, when there is no Ai Ye. Song Jiaoren analyzed: Russia was defeated by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War, and "the policy of going east out of the Pacific Ocean cannot be realized, but it is even more necessary to turn its front to Mongolia. "If the Russians grasp Mongolia, they can resist Japan in the east, and sweep across the Central Plains in the south across the Great Wall. This was the first reason why Russia intensified its invasion of Mongolia.

The second reason was that Russia was competing with Britain for Central Asia, and Russia was also trying to expand into India and China's Tibet, so it first controlled Mongolia and Xinjiang as a base for southward expansion.

Song Jiaoren believes: "The aspirations of the Russians are not only in Mongolia, but must gain Mongol power to implement the Policy of Central Asia and the Policy of the Near East, and this Moscow politician is also racking their brains day and night." ...... Now, the desert will travel north and south to see the ravages of cossack horseshoes not far away. [9] The Russian-Mongolian Entente has provoked strong repercussions across China. Politicians and masses in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other places held meetings one after another to condemn Russia's aggression against Outer Mongolia. Hunan Province set up a preparatory committee with the purpose of "preserving territory and supporting sovereignty", and Huang Xing, Song Jiaoren and others were elected honorary presidents. On January 11, 1913, the Hunan Provincial Preparatory Committee held its inaugural meeting in Changsha, at which Song Jiaoren delivered a speech saying: "For the sake of the present, the only way to build a complete government is to form a complete government, and the people will contribute to the death force for support." WenKulun now has only three thousand troops, the commander of the army is the horse thief Tao Shitao, and does not understand civilized tactics, if they can work together and solve it by force, they will reclaim the territory, deter strong Russia, and also plan the responsibility of the kings, and the brothers really have high hopes. ”[10]

On February 10 and February 19 of the same year, Song Jiaoren delivered speeches at the kuomintang Hubei Provincial Ministry of Communications and the Shanghai Ministry of Communications, repeatedly mentioning the Issue of Outer Mongolia. He believes that Tsarist Russia supports the "independence" of Outer Mongolia, Britain supports Tibet's "exorcism of Han", and if other great powers follow suit, "the result will be extremely dangerous." Therefore, if you want to solve the Tibetan affairs, you should first solve the Mongolian affairs, and if the Mongolian affairs are not solved for one day, that is, the Tibetan affairs will not be resolved for a day. [11] On March 9, he repeated the above views at a welcome meeting of the Jiangsu branch of the Kuomintang.

Three

In an article published after the Xinhai Revolution on the issue of Tsarist Russia's invasion of China, Song Jiaoren strongly demanded the defense of the territorial integrity of the motherland, the preservation of the state's tax sovereignty and judicial sovereignty, and the safeguarding of the economic and political interests and national dignity of the Chinese nation.

Song Jiaoren's method of studying Sino-Russian relations is also relatively scientific, and he not only explores issues from a historical perspective, but also pays attention to the use of international law theory to analyze problems. From these articles, it can be seen that he had a relatively good understanding of the international situation at that time and had a certain knowledge of international law. Song Jiaoren was relatively clear about the situation of the relations between the great powers and Sino-Russian relations at that time, and his analysis of many issues was accurate or relatively accurate, such as the purpose of the ultimatum note on Tsarist Russia; on the trend of the Japanese-Russian alliance (a year after Song Jiaoren published "The General Success of the Japanese-Russian Alliance", Japan and Russia signed the third Japan-Russia Secret Treaty, and in 1916 signed the Fourth Japan-Russia Secret Treaty); about Tsarist Russia's aggressive ambitions against Mongolia, and so on.

Some of the diplomatic tactical suggestions put forward by Song Jiaoren are quite practical and pertinent, such as the middle policy on the commercial provisions of the Sino-Russian Ili Treaty, which should be the goal that China strives to achieve according to the comparison of the strengths of China and Russia at that time and the international environment in which China is located, and the next policy should be the minimum goal that China can accept. In fact, the Qing government and the government of the Republic of China, which inherited it, also strove to realize the middle policy, and only accepted the next policy as a last resort.

Needless to say, due to the limited depth of understanding of international politics at that time, as an opposition person who did not know much about the internal affairs involved in China's foreign affairs, and lacked political experience, Song Jiaoren also had some incorrect understanding of Sino-Russian relations. For example, he believes that if China announces the abrogating the commercial provisions of the Ili Treaty and proposes to conclude a new treaty with Russia, "I have to take the upper position, and it is not an invincibility opportunity",[12] which would seem naïve. The Qing government made relatively adequate preparations for the revision of the "Ili Treaty," and the policy of handling the "Russian storm" and the revision of the Treaty between China and Russia was basically appropriate. At the time when the "Russian Storm" was in progress, it was precisely during the period of intense preparations for the Huanghuagang Uprising, and uprisings in other places were also brewing, and the revolutionaries headed by Sun Yat-sen urgently needed to arouse the revolutionary enthusiasm of the broad masses of the people. In the above-mentioned article, Song Jiaoren repeatedly played up the imminent crisis of the great powers dividing up China, accusing the Qing government of being stubborn and ineffective, which can only be regarded as political propaganda, which cannot withstand scrutiny in academics. Of course, today we should not be harsh on these secondary aspects.

[1] Wang Tieya: A Compilation of Old Testament Chapters between China and Foreign Countries (Vol. 1), Life, Reading, and New Knowledge Triptych Bookstore, 1957, p. 381.

[2] Wang Shunan, "Xinjiang Tuzhi Negotiation VI", Oriental Magazine, March 1911, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 12.

[3] Lin Weigang: The Beginning and End of the Russian-Mongolian Negotiations, in Zuo Shunsheng, ed., A Preliminary Compilation of Materials on the History of China in the Past Hundred Years, Zhonghua Bookstore, 1938, p. 158.

[4] Chen Xulu, editor-in-chief: The Collected Works of Song Jiaoren (Vol. 1), Zhonghua Bookstore, 1981, pp. 184, 194.

[5] Chen Xulu, editor-in-chief: The Collected Works of Song Jiaoren (Vol. 1), pp. 11-13.

[6] Chen Xulu, editor-in-chief: The Collected Works of Song Jiaoren (Vol. 1), pp. 137-150.

[7] Chen Xulu, editor-in-chief: The Collected Works of Song Jiaoren (Vol. 1), pp. 267-269.

[8] Chen Xulu, editor-in-chief: The Collected Works of Song Jiaoren (Vol. 1), pp. 267-269.

[9] Chen Xulu, editor-in-chief: The Collected Works of Song Jiaoren (Vol. 1), pp. 151-153.

[10] Chen Xulu, editor-in-chief: The Collected Works of Song Jiaoren (Part 2), Zhonghua Bookstore, 1981, pp. 457-469.

[11] Chen Xulu, ed., The Collected Works of Song Jiaoren (Vol. 2), pp. 457-469.

[12] Chen Xulu, editor-in-chief: The Collected Works of Song Jiaoren (Vol. 1), pp. 183-184, p. 191.

Author Affilications:School of Humanities and Economics and Law, Northwestern Polytechnical University

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