The Philippines is acting as a pawn of the United States in the Taiwan Strait, and China has been advised not to play with fire! Why did it choose China's train instead of Japan and South Korea, Indonesia's reasons are irrefutable! Why is Vietnam still struggling in an economic quagmire because it has been vigorously touted by the West?
The Philippines is playing with fire in the Taiwan Strait, and China has warned by name
In January this year, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. took the initiative to send a congratulatory message to Lai Ching-te, the successor of "Taiwan independence" who won the election of the leader of the Taiwan region, which caused an uproar and met with strong opposition from the Chinese side. At that time, Shinobayashi believed that Marcos Jr.'s action was more of a temptation, and the Philippine side's playing with fire on the Taiwan Strait issue could never stop there.
Sure enough, on February 6, the Marcos Jr. government in the Philippines began a new death on the Taiwan issue:
According to Philippine media reports, on 6 February, Philippine Defense Secretary Teodoro personally inspected the Batanes Islands, which are less than 200 kilometers away from Taiwan, and instructed the Philippine Navy to increase the number of troops stationed there and build more military infrastructure.
According to Shinobayashi, the Batanes, also known as the Batanes, are composed of 50 islands with a total population of only 16,000, and even in the Philippines, they are one of the poorest provinces.
Why did such a small and poor archipelago welcome the Philippine defense secretary's visit? During the inspection, Teodoro gave the reason that "in terms of the northern baseline, the Batanes Islands are the vanguard of the Philippines."
Yes, the Batanes Islands are economically and culturally inconspicuous, but geographically, they are extremely important:
The archipelago is the geographically northernmost territory of the Philippines and is stuck almost halfway between Taiwan and the Bass Strait with the Philippines. It can be said that as long as the Philippine military controls the Bataan Islands, it can completely block the Chinese Navy's access to the western Pacific from the Bass Strait, and must detour in the direction of Okinawa, which is more risky.
What's more, the central point of the Batanes archipelago is less than 200 kilometers away from the southernmost point of the island. With such a close distance, its military significance does not need to be introduced by Shinobayashi, and you should already know it.
But the most dangerous thing is that the Americans have long noticed the great value of this geographical distance to their own "military defense" strategy, and have already started to take practical actions:
In 2018, the Duterte administration of the Philippines announced the establishment of a military base on Yami Island in the Batanes archipelago, and by 2023, the Marcos Jr. administration announced that the base would be opened to the U.S. military along with three Philippine military bases elsewhere.
The base of Yami Island is only 142 kilometers away from the mainland of Taiwan Island, and only 98 kilometers away from Orchid Island, an outlying island of Taiwan Island in the Bass Strait, which is even closer to the mainland of the Philippines.
Last year, Chinese mainland, fully aware of the danger of this move by the United States and the Philippines to the Taiwan issue, clearly warned the Philippine side that it was best for you not to get involved in the Taiwan issue, and not to think about it if you followed the US military to intervene in the Taiwan Strait by force.
But now the Marcos Jr. government actually dares to defy the wind and protect the presence of the US military here under the pretext of strengthening its own homeland security defense capability, that is, to support the US military in disguise to use the Bataan Islands as a base to implement the strategy of "military protection of Taiwan".
Hasn't Marcos Jr. been repeatedly emphasizing in public that the Philippines has no intention of getting involved in the Taiwan issue? Why is it so enthusiastic about this kind of practice?
This is because, on the Taiwan issue, the Philippine government does have great interests, and it is worth jumping into the fire pit itself:
The Marcos Jr. administration dared to jump so much in front of China on the issue of sovereignty over islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and the biggest source of its courage was the US government. So in return, on the Taiwan issue, which is of the utmost concern to the US government, shouldn't Marcos Jr.'s side also show some substantive sincerity?
Shinobayashi believes that allowing US troops to be stationed at the Yami Island base is precisely a manifestation of the Philippine side's sincerity, and now that he has personally joined in it, this is an even greater manifestation of sincerity.
In addition, the Philippines, as a small country right next to China, has always had an instinctive fear of China's rise, which is the main motivation for the Philippines to rely on American power to protect itself. But now the Philippine top level has further realized that wouldn't it be a better way to "defend itself" if they could preemptively strike at Taiwan, a key issue that determines whether China can succeed in its rise, and support the US military in successfully "defending" Taiwan and forcing China's rise to fail?
But Shinobin wanted to ask the Philippine side: If you don't want to be bullied by the big countries around you, wouldn't it be a more cost-effective choice not to provoke this big country, establish all-round good relations with it, and let the big countries rest assured of themselves?
Xiao Lin noted that at the regular press conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 8, in response to the new actions of the Philippine side in the Bataan Islands, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said this:
The Taiwan issue is the core of China's core interests and a red line and bottom line that cannot be crossed, and the Philippines should have a clear understanding of this, and should not play with fire on the Taiwan issue to avoid being used by others and causing harm to itself.
If the Philippine side still insists on going its own way, it is indeed no wonder that China has taken concrete actions to make it understand what the consequences will be if it offends China on such a bottom-line issue.
Choosing China over Japan and South Korea, Indonesia explained why
In the face of China, the Philippines cannot stay sober, while Indonesia, which is also a Southeast Asian country, has encountered some minor troubles from anti-China forces in its railway cooperation with China. However, it is gratifying that the Indonesian authorities have remained sober enough in this matter.
Just recently, Indonesia's state-owned commuter train company announced that it had reversed its initial plan to import from Japan and instead signed a contract with CRRC Sifang Co., Ltd. to supply three sets of commuter electric vehicles.
However, as soon as the news broke, rumors spread in Indonesia, linking the deal to China's loan for Indonesia's Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail project, claiming that the purchase of Chinese companies' products was "pressured by China".
The so-called Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway refers to the first high-speed railway in Indonesia's history from Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, to Bandung, the capital of West Java Province. In October 2015, China defeated Japan and officially won the project, and it is not until October 2023 that the railway officially opens for operation.
In fact, technically, the 142-kilometer-long Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway is nothing to China, but politically, China's acquisition and completion of the high-speed railway is of great significance to both China and Indonesia:
For China, this is the "first order" for China's high-speed rail system, all factors and all production chains to go abroad, the number one infrastructure project of the "Belt and Road", and the proof of friendship between China and ASEAN countries.
However, for Indonesia, which already has many anti-China forces, this high-speed railway is interpreted as a signal that the Indonesian government intends to move closer to China politically, which is a deep stimulus to these anti-China forces.
In addition, it should be made clear that the current train procurement contract has nothing to do with the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway, which is now operated by the Indonesia-China High-Speed Rail Co., Ltd., which is not the same thing as the Indonesian commuter train company in the news.
In the eyes of these anti-China forces, since they are all trains from China, they should of course take the opportunity to hype up and smear them.
But it is gratifying that the Indonesian government, which has already tasted the sweetness of cooperation with China on the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail project, has indeed stood up in time to speak fairly:
On February 7, local time, the heads of Indonesia's Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises came forward to the public to say that the choice of Chinese products was purely because the Japanese side participating in the bidding raised prices without authorization, and the South Koreans' plan did not meet the bidding requirements - Indonesia's requirements for the train body are made of stainless steel, but the train that the South Korean side used to bid for is aluminum.
In this case, in addition to choosing a Chinese train that still insists on not raising prices, and the technical indicators in all aspects perfectly meet Indonesia's requirements, who else can Indonesia choose?
Of course, to tell the truth, Shinobayashi was somewhat unhappy to see that China's offer for these projects was always lower than that of the Japanese side.
Because when the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway was built, Japan quoted Indonesia at $50 million per kilometer, while China pushed the price down to $30 million per kilometer. Coupled with the negative bonus of too short mileage, the cost of the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway actually can't make much money at all.
So Shinobayashi is really worried that this time Indonesia also chose China for the commuter train, and it may be possible to put forward a price that China can't make much money at all, and Japan and South Korea can be shortlisted, but Indonesia deliberately put it in to reduce the price.
But Shinobayashi's above concerns are only from the perspective of commercial interests. We are now willing to make Indonesia, the de facto leader of ASEAN, willing to continue to choose our products, and this trust itself sends a positive signal that cannot be exchanged for commercial interests.
From Indonesia's own point of view, it can not only obtain China's high-quality infrastructure services at a fairly favorable price, but also take the opportunity to win China's favor, which should indeed be worth learning from the Philippines.
Vietnam is struggling with an economic quagmire
When it comes to how ASEAN countries should develop and handle their relations with China, we must of course mention Vietnam one last time. Because Shinobayashi has noticed that Vietnam, which should be leading the rest of ASEAN in this regard, is now struggling in the quagmire.
Let's take a look at a string of data first:
Foreign investment in Vietnam reached US$2.36 billion in January, up more than 40% year-on-year, and the manufacturing purchasing managers' index (PMI) climbed to 50.3 from 48.9 in December 2023, returning to expansion territory.
According to the United Nations' World Economic Outlook 2024, Vietnam's GDP growth rate could reach 6% this year.
Such a performance is indeed excellent, but last year, the performance of Vietnam's economy was completely different:
In 2023, Vietnam's GDP growth rate will be 5.05%, which is not the original target of 6.5% set by the Vietnamese government.
According to Vietnamese media reports, Vietnam's main export orders plummeted by 80% in the first quarter of 2023, with 42,900 enterprises suspending production and 640,000 workers losing their jobs.
Such a rollercoaster-like performance of economic development is obviously very abnormal, and the reason for this is that it is too dependent on foreign trade.
On the bright side, there's nothing wrong with Vietnam's high reliance on foreign trade to drive its economy. After all, Vietnam is located in the center of East Asia, the most prosperous global economy, next door to China, labor costs are only one-third of China, not to undertake some low-end industries that overflow from China and abroad, to provide high-quality and low-end products for European and American countries, that is the real "crime".
But the problem is that Vietnam's dependence on processing trade with supplied materials is too outrageous:
As early as 2021, the processing and manufacturing industry accounted for 25% of Vietnam's GDP, and the dependence on foreign trade exceeded 50%;
In 2023, despite the decline, Vietnam's merchandise import and export trade volume will still reach US$683 billion.
And you must know that Vietnam's total GDP in 2023 will only be 430 billion US dollars.
At this time, we finally know the reason why Vietnam's economy will suddenly "fall apart" in 2023: when the international market continues to slump in 2023 for various reasons, Vietnam, which has almost pinned its life on foreign trade, will naturally become the first victim.
But in addition, some problems within Vietnam are also another hand that has pushed Vietnam into the economic quagmire.
In June 2022, housing prices in Ho Chi Minh City reached a 10-year high, and the average price of commercial housing reached US$3,300 per square meter. Comparing the 2020 data of Beijing and Shenzhen, Ho Chi Minh City's house-price-to-income ratio is almost equal to 58% of Shenzhen's and Beijing's 61%.
But this over-boom in the housing market only means two serious consequences:
First, housing prices are too high, residents' incomes are too low, and residents are under huge pressure to buy and maintain houses, which in turn leads to a serious squeeze on Vietnam's domestic demand market, and it is impossible to maintain a healthy balance of the entire socio-economic system through internal circulation.
Second, in 2022, the excessively high property market in Vietnam collapsed with the anti-corruption storm carried out by the Vietnamese government, forcing foreign capital to run away frantically, and forcing the Central Bank of Vietnam to cut interest rates several times to save the market. However, due to the slowdown in exports and limited domestic demand, the loan demand of production enterprises is very limited, and the three affect each other, which in turn exacerbates Vietnam's debt risk.
Of course, judging from the current data performance in January 24, the Vietnamese government's desperate economic stimulus policy and the gradual recovery of the international market have still played a very positive role. But the question is, can this development model, which blows the wind from the outside world and catches a cold itself, really help Vietnam get out of the quagmire completely?
In the final analysis, Vietnam is still too small, and its economic structure is too simple, if it does not balance its internal and external dual circulation as soon as possible, and at the same time reduce its dependence on the single market of Europe and the United States, then as the international situation becomes more and more turbulent, Vietnam's development miracle is indeed coming to an end.
Of course, only China, which is close to Vietnam, is very happy to transfer some of its low-end industries to Vietnam to boost the soundness of Vietnam's industrial chain, and at the same time, the huge Chinese market can also enrich the diversity of Vietnam's export market and help Vietnam avoid putting its eggs in the same basket in all aspects.
But is Vietnam willing to believe in China so much and wholeheartedly become an important part of the new international market trading system that China has created?
Xiao Lin felt that Vietnam should indeed work hard to answer this question, otherwise Vietnam would have to pay the price in the future that Vietnam itself simply cannot afford.