Editor's note
Will friction in the South China Sea lead to conflict? How should we view the impact of the growing proximity of the United States, Japan, and the Philippines on regional stability? Will new military technology change the balance of deterrence between China and the United States? What are the common interests between China and the United States? How can China and the United States transcend competition, build mutual trust, and achieve coexistence?
From April 12th to 14th local time, the 27th Harvard China Forum was held at Harvard University in the United States, and Phoenix.com was the media partner of this forum. During the period, Phoenix.com's "Dialogue with the World" interviewed Michael J. Brown, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and a professor at the National War College of the United States. Michael J. Mazarr. He has worked at research institutes, on Capitol Hill, and as a special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His research interests include U.S. defense policy and power structure, East Asian security, nuclear weapons and deterrence, and judgment and decision-making under uncertainty.
Core feed
1. In order to transcend competition and achieve coexistence, China and the United States need to seek reconciliation, not unilateral ambitions. China and the United States need to take concrete and practical actions to build mutual trust and direct perception, and both sides seek to avoid war. Technology alone is often not enough to completely change the military balance or weaken strategic deterrence. New technologies may have other implications, such as the possibility of disrupting relations and changing the nature of conflict. But technology alone is not enough to provoke war.
2. China's concern about being surrounded by potential or already hostile countries is understandable. On the South China Sea issue, China, the United States and the Philippines should take the initiative and respond to each other, showing a positive attitude towards negotiations. AUKUS will not turn into a small Asian NATO. A NATO-like security apparatus does not exist in Asia and is unlikely to emerge anytime soon.
3. The United States cannot avoid its role as a global power, and the United States is trying to find a balance, while recognizing that peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region is the primary strategic challenge. China and the United States can work together to manage differences and uphold the international order, but effective cooperation in these areas has stalled due to a lack of trust. The degree of cooperation between China and the United States can only be 20 or 30 percent, and there is still a lot of room for improvement.
Dialogue丨Hou Yichao, editor-in-chief of Phoenix.com International
Editor丨Zhuo Wei
How can China and the United States establish a new model of coexistence?
Dialogue with the World: Hello, Professor Magyar. Welcome to the "Dialogue with the World" column of Phoenix.com. You envision a scenario in which the United States withdraws from the Western Pacific. (In a previous geopolitical sub-forum, Professor Mazar argued on "How China and the United States Can Coexist": the U.S. needs to stop openly discussing containment strategies, accept China's significant political and economic influence in many countries around the world, and scale back its military activities near China. —Editor's note)
Magyar: My basic view is that in order to move beyond competition and coexistence, both sides must be willing to seek reconciliation and be more willing to establish this new model of coexistence than to pursue unilateral ambitions. Such transformations have often been difficult to achieve historically, and often take a long time. Sometimes, conflicts between opponents do not stop until a war has been experienced. Of course, we hope to avoid this. So part of my argument is that both sides, especially China, need to do something to curb their ambitions while pursuing reconciliation. This will be a long-term process, but we can start with some specific issues and select a few topics to see if China and the United States can reach consensus on these issues. This could lay the groundwork for more far-reaching progress.
Dialogue with the World: Okay. I've read articles that say that the most important thing in the future is perception and trust. So how can we now build mutual trust and direct perception between China and the United States?
Magyars: Obviously, the situation is extremely serious. There is a zero-sum mindset and a considerable degree of suspicion on both sides. Both sides have legitimate concerns about some of the other's actions, and the United States in particular. Therefore, I believe that confidence-building should not be based solely on pleasant dialogue or general creeds, but on practical actions. It is necessary for either party to take some positive actions to earn the trust of the other party.
This challenge has existed historically, and it is a risk to the U.S.-China relationship today. Competitors can be caught in a spiral of negative perceptions, and even if one party takes action in the hope of taking a new direction, it may not be taken seriously because of a serious misunderstanding by the other side. Therefore, it is crucial that the leaders of the two countries maintain dialogue and that senior security officials meet frequently to have the necessary communication. Next, we should explore concrete steps, not only for the U.S. government, but also for Beijing, about what we can do to ensure that not only the U.S., but the entire region moves toward coexistence. The next step must be to take practical and concrete measures.
▎On November 15, 2023, President Xi Jinping held a China-US summit with US President Joe Biden at Philorian Manor in San Francisco, USA. (Photo source: Xinhua News Agency)
Dialogue with the World: Can you give us some examples of what the United States and China need to do?
Magyars: In the area of trade, we can do a lot of different things. While I don't have specific proposals based on in-depth research, for example, the U.S. adjusts some tariffs, and China adjusts some subsidies or export practices. In the area of security, for example, the United States agreed to restrict certain "freedom of navigation" operations near the South China Sea, while China pledged to stop interfering with Philippine resupply operations and the activities of other countries involved. Such mutual actions can show that both sides want to reduce the level of tension in the current situation.
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Dialogue with the World: If these confidence-building measures are not materialized, and there are still many frictions between China and the United States in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, do you think this will lead to war?
Magyars: I'm not worried about war anytime soon. It is very obvious that the cost of war is very high for both sides. From what I know, I can say with certainty that in Washington there is no hope for a war to break out. Everyone is trying to avoid this. There are a variety of theories and approaches to how to avoid war. I'm sure there is a similar understanding in Beijing that the devastating effects of war are so devastating that we all want to be avoided. While we have demonstrated some capability in crisis management, this capability is limited, and there are real problems with crisis communication between China and the United States.
So I think that if there is an event in the South China Sea, for example, the sinking of a Philippine ship, I don't think that will directly lead to war. I think this will prompt the United States to take action and significantly increase its support for the Philippines, but I don't think it will immediately lead to war.
Will new technologies change deterrence?
Talking to the World: You've also written about how new technologies are changing deterrence. Recently, there have been reports that China is expanding its arsenal of nuclear weapons, which should be a cause for concern in the United States. Are there any new technologies that you think are changing deterrence?
Magyars: On the question of whether new technologies will change the balance of deterrence, I don't think so. According to our published research, technology alone is often not enough to completely change the military balance or weaken strategic deterrence. So I'm not overly concerned about that. However, I am concerned about the other effects that the new technology may bring. As we discussed at the conference, cyber intrusions can expose citizens of the opposing country to unprecedented risks. For example, when media reported that U.S. officials confirmed that Chinese cyber hackers were attacking critical infrastructure in the United States, the American public was very uneasy. Therefore, I am concerned that these technologies have the potential to undermine relations between the two sides or exacerbate hostility between the two sides if not properly addressed.
▎On January 31, 2024, Christopher Wray, the director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), who has repeatedly made negative remarks about China since taking office, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives' "Select Committee on U.S.-China Strategic Competition" that Chinese hackers are targeting U.S. infrastructure and are ready to "wreak havoc and cause real harm." (Image source: CNN)
Dialogue with the World: So do you think there are new technologies that can change the balance of deterrence?
Magyars: Well, artificial intelligence (AI) technology. When it comes to artificial intelligence technology, it is already gradually changing the nature of conflict. In the case of Ukraine, we can see the important role of drones on the battlefield, but I think these are issues that military experts need to keep up with, and our military strategy should take this into account. I don't think these technologies themselves could directly trigger a war between the United States and China.
▎ A Ukrainian soldier from the Larog UAV Squadron of the 24th Separate Mechanized Brigade installs shells from RPG-7 grenade launchers to a first-person view (FPV) drone at a location near the town of Horlivka in the Donetsk region of Ukraine on January 17, 2024. (Image source: Reuters)
How to understand the trilateral summit between the United States, Japan and the Philippines?
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Dialogue with the World: Next, we will talk about regional issues. Recently, Japan, the United States and the Philippines held a trilateral summit. How do you understand these initiatives from the perspective of regional stability? From China's perspective, the Philippines is always taking some actions, and Japan is also aggressive, how do you view these actions?
▎On April 11, 2024, the heads of state of the United States, Japan and the Philippines held their first trilateral summit at the White House. From left, Philippine leader Marcos Jr., U.S. President Joe Biden, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. (Image source: Lianhe Zaobao)
Magyars: I can understand China's position. Empathy between competitors is reflected in understanding each other's positions. I can understand the concerns of a country like China, which sees itself as surrounded by countries that may or have become hostile. From the perspective of the United States, Japan, and the Philippines, we are responding to what we have observed as China's increasingly assertive actions over territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. I have a shred of optimism about coexistence because I genuinely believe that China has no intention of threatening the Philippines militarily, beyond these specific disputes in the South China Sea.
I don't think China has aggressive intentions towards Japan. At the same time, I am aware that the United States has no aggressive intentions toward China, unlike those adversaries who have military expansion or aggressive ambitions. Actually, there is a lot of consensus between us. At the moment, I understand the position of the United States, the Philippines and Japan on the South China Sea issue, after all, there is an award on international arbitration (China has clearly stated that the so-called international arbitration is a political farce in the cloak of law and violates the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – editor's note), and we hope that every country will respect this ruling. Of course, China has a different view of its sovereignty in the region. We can accept these differences of opinion.
I believe that the key to achieving a better relationship and coexistence is that both sides can avoid actions that pose a threat to the other, and both the United States and China can do that. I very much look forward to seeing a positive attitude from China. For example, even if Beijing states that it does not accept the 2016 ruling in The Hague, it would be a positive signal if they could announce a moratorium on interfering with Philippine vessels in operations in the South China Sea, such as at Second Thomas Shoal. We want to negotiate peacefully and without pressure with other claimants, and even if China still insists on its territorial claims, we are willing to respect certain limits in advancing those claims.
This will be a revolutionary change in the perception of the relationship between the two countries. In this way, the United States can also respond, for example, by appropriately reducing some of the proportion in freedom of navigation operations. At the same time, we can launch some new cooperation initiatives with the Philippines on fishing rights or other issues to find compromises. I believe that if China takes such a proactive approach and expects the other side to respond, it can play a leading role in peacebuilding. I am sure that such an action will certainly be widely welcomed in the region.
▎ A statement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to the so-called "South China Sea arbitration". (Image source: Screenshot of the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Will AUKUS turn into an "Asian mini-NATO"?
"Dialogue with the World": AUKUS (a tripartite military alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia) is said to be interested in getting Japan to join. For China, this is very difficult to understand, because the relationship between the United States and Japan is already very close. Why does the United States want Japan to participate?
▎NHK reported that AUKUS is considering cooperation with Japan in the field of advanced technology, and is considering inviting Japan to join the "second pillar" lineup of the AUKUS security framework. (Image source: NHK screenshot)
Magyar: I think you can see in these discussions that I am a strong supporter of coexistence. I believe that the United States and China can coexist peacefully and work together to build a better world. I believe that U.S. foreign policy should not focus solely on competition with China. It is undeniable that some of the actions taken by China in pursuit of its own interests have led other countries to feel compelled to strengthen cooperation to keep them safe. As a result, there is currently no NATO-like security apparatus in Asia, and it is unlikely to emerge anytime soon.
However, there are a range of bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation that are becoming more and more closely linked in different ways. Japan seeks closer cooperation with AUKUS, which is based on the perception of threats. It's inevitable. China is well positioned to reduce this threat perception, but these are all responses to perceived Chinese threats. This provides a real opportunity for Beijing to try to address the issue.
Dialogue with the World: At last year's Shangri-La Dialogue, perhaps at the Munich Security Conference this year, China proposed that East Asia should not establish a security structure similar to NATO, because we adopt different security concepts and theories, and we should not copy this model. What are your thoughts on this?
Magyar: I don't think it's the central issue of whether or not to create a NATO-like organization. In fact, given the great diversity of Asian countries, it is unlikely that such an organization will be formed. For example, ASEAN countries are unlikely to form alliances with Japan and the United States. Countries like Indonesia, India, and Vietnam, in particular, adhere to a clear policy of non-alignment in their national security strategies. Therefore, they will not soon form an alliance with any country. But more importantly, the core dynamics of this scenario are the same: when countries feel threatened by powerful neighbors, they seek alliances and possibly external allies to help defend themselves, which is the common ground in both scenarios.
▎On April 2, the ASEAN Research Center of the Yusof Isa Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore released the "State of Southeast Asia Report: 2024" for the sixth consecutive year, assessing Southeast Asians' views on geopolitical developments affecting the region, key international issues, etc. For the first time this year, more than half of respondents from the 10 ASEAN countries chose China when asked to choose sides between China and the United States. (Image source: screenshot from report)
In my opinion, China, with its deep economic foundation and significant cultural influence, has established very good social relations with many countries. China's position as a leading global power is indestructible. However, certain military actions are actually hindering the "rejuvenation" that China is pursuing from a foreign policy perspective. I try to avoid being too critical or confrontational, but I can't ignore the fact that, while there will be no NATO-like organization in Asia, bilateral and multilateral ties between countries concerned about China's ambitions are deepening.
Dialogue with the World: Yes, from China's point of view, we don't think we should be too aggressive. Maybe the United States is exaggerating, but we can actually maintain good relations with our Asian neighbors. I feel like it's actually a contradiction. Because I read a survey by the Pew Research Center in the United States, the results show that many countries see China as both a trading partner and a friend, and more and more people see us as a technology leader.
Magyar: There are differences. At the moment, Japan, Australia and the Philippines have special responses to certain issues. History and other factors also make Vietnam worried. But you're quite right, many countries are concerned about the potential escalation of the U.S.-China confrontation in the region, and they want to maintain trade and good relations with both China and the United States. This is a striking reality in the region. At the same time, it is true that there are some countries that feel differently at the moment. This provides an opportunity for the United States and China to find ways to reduce tensions. As I said, every country should act to make it clear to everyone that they do not intend to threaten others. Such action is necessary.
How do you view the U.S. "Indo-Pacific" strategy?
Dialogue with the World: Okay, let's talk about the last two questions. The first is about the term "Indo-Pacific," a relatively new concept that may have been around for more than five years. What do you think of this concept? Because I read an article published in Foreign Affairs magazine where the author said he didn't want to move to the Indo-Pacific. But then came the war in Ukraine and other events. The U.S. government still wanted to maintain its global hegemony, but it did not achieve its original goal. So that's not a good thing.
Magyars: The "Asian axis," or "pivot to the Asia-Pacific," was first proposed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011. The exact meaning of this strategy has never been precisely defined, but rather a broad expression that the United States is ending its long-running global war on terror and refocusing on global strategic issues, and that Asia is a key region of global politics and that the United States will refocus its core concerns on Asia. This was the original idea.
▎On November 18, 2011, Obama attended the U.S.-ASEAN summit in Bali, Indonesia. The next day, the East Asia Summit was also held there. Obama was the first U.S. president to attend the East Asia Summit. (Image source: White House official website)
Since then, as you mentioned, there has been a lot of debate in the United States that we are not turning enough, that we are not investing enough, that we are not deterring in the turn. As you said, the United States is still a global power, and we are facing not only Ukraine, but also the Red Sea and the threat of the Houthis, the conflict in and around Gaza, and so on. In fact, just today, while I was here, I saw a report that Iranian drones were heading for Israel. The United States has been drawn into these tragic conflicts in one way or another. So, at the moment, no matter what, the United States cannot evade its role as a global power, and the United States is trying to balance that. At the same time, the United States recognizes that the main strategic challenge is to promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region or the Indo-Pacific region.
Can China and the United States work together to uphold the global order?
Dialogue with the World: Yes, this question is about the global order. We may have heard that neither the United States nor China alone can maintain the current global order, and that the two superpowers are not currently cooperating. It seems to me that whether Biden or Trump is elected, the United States is likely to retreat from its position of global leadership. So, who can unexpectedly become the new leader in this situation?
Magyar: I think if Biden is re-elected, he's certainly not going to give up U.S. global leadership. As for what Trump's policies will be, I can't predict that the policies he is articulating may differ from the actual US policies. There are many core principles in the international order that has been formed since 1945 that the United States and China have mutually endorsed. Taking sovereignty as an example, China has always emphasized the importance of respecting sovereignty, while the United States has emphasized safeguarding sovereignty in accordance with the principle of non-aggression in the UN Charter. Although the United States and China sometimes violate this principle, it is indeed a basic idea on which American foreign policy can be further developed.
Of course, there are many other similar problems. But there is no doubt that, despite the major differences between our two countries, our common interests remain deep. The key is whether we can effectively manage these differences so that we can continue to work together on a number of other issues to uphold the international order.
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Dialogue with the World: So what are the common interests of China and the United States?
Magyars: To put it mildly, China and the United States have common interests in combating international piracy and counterterrorism, and both countries face potential threats from certain extremist groups. There is also the issue of artificial intelligence (AI) control. Clearly, there are already dialogues taking place on this issue, both multilateral and bilateral between China and the United States. These conversations are designed to control the risks that can arise from runaway AI. International peacekeeping is also worth mentioning. China is one of the largest contributors to international peacekeeping operations. There's a lot of that stuff like that, and if we weren't as focused on areas where we disagree – which are very difficult to achieve, we'd have more time to work together in areas where we have common interests and goals.
In January 2024, Arati Prabhakar, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, said, "We have to try to work [with Beijing]." "The United States and China will work together in the coming months to reduce the risks associated with rapidly evolving technologies. According to the Financial Times, two meetings were held in Geneva in July and October last year, with the participation of North American AI companies OpenAI, Anthropic and Cohere, as well as American scientists, policy experts, and representatives of Tsinghua University and other Chinese government-backed institutions for "secret diplomacy." (Image source: AP)
Dialogue with the World: So how do China and the United States respond to this situation? Can the United States and China, as adversaries and competitors, manage their differences and achieve common goals?
Magyar: To a certain extent. At the moment, these issues receive significantly less attention than controversial ones. A worrying trend over the past few years is that zero-sum thinking in contentious areas has permeated other areas, making it difficult to cooperate in areas such as climate change. The climate is a particularly good example. On climate issues, the United States has legitimately tried to engage with China over the past few years, even as early as the Obama administration, but the overall outcome has disappointed the United States. I am sure that China is facing similar problems in this regard. So the problem now is that effective cooperation on these issues has stalled due to the lack of trust that we mentioned earlier.
Dialogue with the World: If you were to rate it, how would you rate the performance of China-US cooperation, and how would you rate it from zero to 100?
Magyar: If I were to score on a 100-point scale, I would probably give it 20 or 30 at the moment? I think the level of cooperation is very low right now. While there are times when officials get together to coordinate things, it's rare to see that our respective efforts have been strengthened by cooperation on an ongoing and regular basis.
Dialogue with the World: So there's still a lot of room for improvement. We can set a goal, and that's the key.