In the 50s, Australia repeatedly emphasized the distinction between Papuans and Indonesians, supporting either the Netherlands remaining in West Irian or New Guinea under UN trusteeship. In 1954, Indonesia submitted the West Irian issue to the United Nations, Australia tried to prevent the United Nations from passing Indonesia's proposal, in order to get the support of the United States, repeatedly publicized the importance of West Irian to Australia on various occasions, repeatedly stated that it opposed Indonesia's occupation of West Irian, constantly exerted influence on the United States, and even made other countries vote against, using Israelis to influence the attitude of Latin Americans, when Indonesia changed the basis of sovereignty for the recovery of West Irian, Australia also changed the grounds of its objection to "self-determination of peoples". Australia also sought secret U.S. assistance to the Netherlands, in short, all forms of diplomacy to keep West Irian out of Indonesian hands. Australia's efforts were not in vain, and in the 50s, Indonesia's proposals to the United Nations were not adopted.
However, by the late 50s, the United States had twice provided military assistance to Indonesia and was committed to maintaining friendly relations with Indonesia, which prompted Australia, which supported Dutch sovereignty over West Irian, to soften. In February 1959, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subbandri visited Australia, and Australia issued a statement that the Australian government was willing to accept any agreement between the Netherlands and India on the West Irian issue, and Menzies again expressed the same position when Sukarno special envoy Nasushin visited Australia in April 1961.[2] Nevertheless, Australia's basic position on West Irian has not changed. In 1961, when the Netherlands proposed that it would relinquish sovereignty over West New Guinea if the United Nations could assume oversight responsibility for the administration and development of West New Guinea, Australia immediately expressed its support for this plan.
However, at this time, the United States changed its previous policy of neutrality on the West Irian issue from the perspective of global strategy, tried to persuade the Netherlands and Australia to give up their rights in West Irian, and proposed the "Bunker Plan" in 1962. Australia is very unhappy about this, but she knows that in the context of the global Cold War, she belongs to the Western camp, her own security is closely linked to the global strategy of the United States, and the United States cannot lose Indonesia for the sake of West Irian and turn it completely to the Communist Party, so what Australia needs to seek now is the commitment of the United States to its defense. In this understanding, Australia claims that it will not change its attitude on West Irian unless the United States provides defense assurances to East New Guinea.
On May 8-9, 1962, at a meeting of the Australia-New Zealand-US Council held in Canberra, U.S. Secretary of State Rusk argued that "in the Pacific, the responsibilities of the United States, Australia and New Zealand are completely aligned." In other words, the United States promised Australia that if Australian New Guinea was invaded by Indonesia, the United States would lend a helping hand, and in this case, Australia began to adjust its policy on the West Irian issue and expressed its acceptance of the "Bunker Plan". In this situation, the Netherlands was isolated and changed its attitude on the West Irian issue, and the two sides began negotiations on the basis of the Bunker Plan.
The United States, as the leader of the Western world after World War II, an ally of Australia and the Netherlands, and a major power in the Asia-Pacific region, will undoubtedly intervene in the West Irian issue.
Between 1950 and 1952, the Netherlands and Indonesia held three talks to resolve the West Irian problem, in which the United States believed that it had no major strategic interest in West Irian, as long as West Irian was controlled by countries friendly to the United States. But after the second negotiation, however, in December 1950 the U.S. government decided that Indonesia would become anti-Dutch and ultimately anti-Western if it permanently denied Indonesian sovereignty over Dutch New Guinea.
In this way, it will be difficult for Indonesia to maintain good-faith neutrality in a possible future war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the United States does not want to lose Indonesia completely, so the United States government has since refrained from expressing any substantive views on this issue and has reiterated that the issue should be resolved in accordance with the agreement between the parties involved in the round table.
