This article is a direct translation of rand corporation's latest January 2022 report: "Modernizing the U.S. Nuclear Triad: The Rationale for a New Intercontinental Ballistic Missile." Interested parties can search the original text directly.
Write before reading
This article is a continuation of the description of the U.S. land-based nuclear force renewal program, in which we can get a glimpse of the current tortuous update plan of the United States' land-based nuclear forces after the Cold War.
Partial translation of the original text:
Deferring a Decision to Replace the Minuteman III
Over the past half-century, several major components of the Militia III (referring to subsystems of the system) have been upgraded or extended. In the 1980s, the U.S. Air Force initiated an activity (known as the Revert MILE) to repair or maintain infrastructure and underground equipment associated with missile silos and launch command centers, which were originally built in the 1960s for militias 1 and 2 to serve. The campaign also modified the missile command and command system to help the launch command center ( known as REACT ) aim more quickly at targets. The decision to retire the Dwarf ICBM and the Peacekeeper missile meant that in the early 1990s, the Minuteman III would be the only INTERCONTINENTAL missile in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. More needs to be done now to ensure that missiles that have been extended for a decade compared to the original design remain reliable and on duty. The potentially serious effects of aging are already being felt; regular inspections, for example, show that all three-stage solid propellants of the missile have hardened, cracked, and peeled off the lining of the housing.
Unlike liquid rocket engine fuel and rockets, solid rocket engines are formed in one piece and stored in the rocket body for a long time
The Air Force has therefore shifted its focus from designing, developing, and deploying new ICBMs for successive generations to maintaining and refurbishing its existing stockpile. In 1992, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney instructed the Air Force to "upgrade and extend the militia's three service years." The service began to remanufacturing all three-stage solid rocket engines; upgrading missile navigation systems; refurbished post-propelled vehicle boosters or "fourth stages" (officially known as rocket engine propulsion systems; and upgrading command, control, and communication systems referring to safety and ground support systems. All projects are required to ensure that Militia III remains on duty until 2020.
Militia 3 Life Extension Program
While these life extension programs are ongoing, Air Force officials are constantly considering how best to maintain the land-based portion of a Trinity nuclear strike. In 2001, the George W. Bush administration instructed the Air Force to begin identifying the needs of a future intercontinental missile force in parallel with the Militia's Three Life Extension Program. An Alternative Scenario Analysis (AoA) for Maintaining an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force Beyond 2020 was conducted at the Intercontinental Missile Systems Program Office at Hill Air Force Base in Utah. Due to other needs in the defence budget, the Panel recommends continuing to refurbish The Minuteman III's hardware as needed and to make incremental upgrades rather than starting development to replace icing ballistic missiles. The Air Force Space Command, then the Intercontinental Missile Force, agreed to the move to ensure that the system would remain available by 2030, as Congress had stipulated in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007. Air Force Space Command also suggested that the Air Force should consider a replacement plan for Minuteman III given the time required to design, develop, and deploy a new missile system by 2030.
The Air Force did not begin reviewing alternatives until the Release of the Obama Administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Assessment. In addition to announcing that all Militia Three will deMIRV, the nuclear posture review also said "research shows" that "decisions on follow-up ICBMs are needed now." As part of this effort, the Air Force asked RAND researchers to evaluate the expected ICBM design, location, and procurement options. Although the report was not published until 2014, the RAND Research Group recommended that the Air Force's alternative program analysis in fiscal year 2011 should include three incremental modernizations and maintenance for the militia in addition to including the development costs of alternative projects. The authors warn that "new challenges may require future delivery tools beyond the capabilities of today's militias".
The warheads of the future will be different from the current warheads
Meanwhile, the Air Force's Global Strike Command, the department directly responsible for ICBM missions, began a capability-based assessment of future ICBM systems in January 2011. In the years that followed, the Air Force began a new alternative to future INTERCONTINENTAL missile forces. The study was completed in 2014 and confirmed that alternative projects for ICBM will have to meet existing and post-2030 mission needs. As Gen. Rand, then commander of the Air Force's Global Strike Command, later described, the continued life extension program would be "more expensive than a system-wide reorganization, and the Joint Needs Oversight Committee has verified that it is impossible to address the gaps in combat capability." Based on the above conclusions, the Ministry of Defense decided to develop a new type of intercontinental missile, known as a land-based strategic deterrence program.
Wind power stations were not expected by the U.S. military at that time
Translator's Epilogue
For the United States, the choice of land-based ICBM projects to extend their lives when they need to start new projects is based on the interpretation of its military's invincibility. Indeed, before the new generation of Intercontinental Missiles between China and Russia entered service, the Militia III, which entered service in the 1970s and continued to upgrade, still had extreme capabilities. Even in the 2000s, when the Poplar M and Yars began entering service, there was not much pressure to renew. What directly contributes to the renewal is the impact of severe expiration of life on combat effectiveness, such as the problems mentioned above in the engine. Although it has been mentioned several times above that the replacement of militia3 was determined in the 2010s, reading this article shows that this replacement plan has encountered great problems. And due to the service of Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapons, the original technical indicators will be adjusted. That is to say, the mission requirements for 2030 mentioned above are likely not to consider hypersonic weapons, or at least not to be the primary consideration of the first batch of mass production, but more as a sequel to the "Guardian of Peace" project. So it might be a more cost-effective way for the United States to do it all over again.