The large tonnage hull can not only install more shipboard systems, provide a good living space for the crew, but also mean that its long-distance adaptability and wave resistance are very strong. This is of great significance to a navy that aspires to go to the ocean. It should be known that the Navy's far-sea combat capability is not supported by a single ship, a single aircraft, or even a single service, which actually requires a comprehensive and synthetic combat capability. According to the Navy's common quantitative standard, that is, how big is the radius of comprehensive operations, that is, what kind of range can be provided by intelligence and communication support, and what range can be carried out in various types of troops, including aviation forces, surface ship strength, etc. To carry out contractual combat operations, the Navy terminology calls it the comprehensive combat radius. As for what kind of comprehensive combat radius the ocean navy we are building needs to have to meet the demand, it is an interesting topic, and the emergence of the "10,000-ton drive" is closely related to it.
From the most superficial level, the navy should be able to effectively safeguard maritime sovereignty and corresponding maritime rights and interests. This layer alone is already quite high for the Chinese Navy, but this is only the most basic requirement, and if these basic requirements cannot be guaranteed, it is obvious that the country's naval construction is not up to standard. From a more distant perspective, it is necessary to provide a more comprehensive and effective guarantee for national security. Most intuitively speaking, the mainland's energy security problem is quite prominent. Most of the mainland's energy is now imported from abroad, and most of the energy imported from abroad is imported from the sea lanes. Now the most concentrated sea energy channel is the Middle East Gulf region, through the Indian Ocean, through the Strait of Malacca, and then to the South China Sea, which is a fairly long sea passage, and this energy channel known as the sea lifeline is still fully exposed to the threat of military power of some countries. This is not to say how far it can be guaranteed at any stage, but to say that if any point in the entire lifeline has weaknesses, weaknesses, and gaps, it will pose a huge threat to energy security. So from this point of view alone, there is a fairly high demand on the question of how far the Chinese navy needs to go – this is not something that can be solved by building one or several aircraft carriers, but a complex and huge systematic ocean-going naval project. Because of this, whether it is a supporting ship for an aircraft carrier battle group or as a fleet core that blocks the side alone, the "big" of the 055 not only means strong, but also means an ambition to go to the ocean.
In fact, in the official circular, the "10,000-ton drive" is called "an important link in the strategic leap of the Chinese Navy from its presence in the ocean to the strategic leap of ocean-going strikes", which is of great significance. Our current economy is an export-oriented economy, our dependence on maritime lines of communication and overseas trade is very high, and the ultimate purpose of building an ocean-going navy with an aircraft carrier formation as the core is to provide effective protection for overseas trade. However, China's aircraft carrier formation will inevitably face ocean-going combat tasks in the future, but the shortcomings of the small tonnage of supporting surface ships cannot be ignored. The tonnage of the escort ship is too small, which means that the ocean-going self-sustaining ability, firepower and selection flexibility are insufficient. In this regard, the "helplessness" of the 054 series frigates in the "Liaoning" aircraft carrier formation is very telling - although the comprehensive performance of the type of ship is balanced and the cost is affordable, but due to the fact that the ship type is clearly divided as a "base force" in the design, the 054 series frigate is not suitable for ocean operations. The existing carrier battle group is therefore "slope foot" in terms of organization. Obviously, if this short board is not filled, it will greatly affect the ocean-going combat capability of China's aircraft carrier formation. The "055" was developed to solve this problem. The volume of the 10,000-ton class determines that its ocean-going self-sustainability is better and its firepower is more powerful, and it is incorporated into the aircraft carrier formation, and the 052D guided-missile destroyer currently undertaking this task is used as a secondary escort ship, and the 054 series frigates vacated to undertake the coastal defense tasks that should have been done will not only ease the already heavy escort task, but also greatly "upgrade and promote the strength of the aircraft carrier formation" and further improve the ocean combat strength. It should be further pointed out that the size of the "big drive" is not only the volume, but also the development potential in the subsequent use process. Unlike the Air Force equipment that "moves the whole body" - the slightest change will affect the design and construction of the entire fighter, naval equipment still has great potential to be upgraded after the production and construction is completed and put into use. A warship can be understood as a large box containing various equipment, facilities, and weapons, as long as the box is large enough, strong enough, and the overall design is good, electronic equipment, weapons and even power facilities can be upgraded in subsequent use, not to mention software systems. Taking the most famous "Aegis" destroyer "Aegis" destroyer "Arleigh Burke" class as an example, it has been nearly 30 years since the launch of the first ship "Arleigh Burke" in 1991, "Ali Burke" class in order to adapt to the development of the times, constantly integrate emerging technologies, on the basis of the prototype ship has developed Flight I., Flight I.A., Flight II., Flight II.A, Flight III. and other models, in the superstructure, protection capabilities, weapons and equipment, There have been huge updates in various aspects such as the software system, and its latest Flight III type can be said to have undergone a complete change from the prototype ship. In this comparison, the "big" of the big drive is not only "big" in the present, but also "big" in the future.
Intriguing "cruiser" hype
Before and after the launch of the "10,000-ton drive", all kinds of purposeless speculation in the Western world have never stopped. Taking the reaction of the US media as an example, it not only set aside a separate chapter in last year's "China Military Strength Report" to talk about the so-called "055 cruiser", but also listed it as "one of the five major weapons that China has changed the military landscape", "New Americans" said that it can "shoot down satellites", and "generations of Americans will face a warship that dwarfs all ships for the first time". The most exaggerated thing is that after the launch of the 055 first ship, more American media called the 055 "China's dreadnought" - "dreadnought" is synonymous with "revolutionary warship", when it appeared in Britain in 1907, overnight all the battleships in the world at that time were outdated. The taste of this killing is very obvious. You know, although the launch of the 055 is a sign that our army has caught up with the world's most advanced level in the field of large surface combat ships, the ship is not groundbreaking, revolutionary, and epoch-making in terms of the overall technical level in the world. 10,000-ton displacement, a versatile vertical launch system, and a monolith mast have been realized in recent years on the latest destroyers in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. The combat style displayed by the big drive and the combat mission it will carry in the future are still within the scope of the world's existing maritime combat methods. Does the Western media know nothing about this? The answer is clearly not. In fact, not only is the "dreadnought" argument nonsense, but the "cruiser" argument is even more far-fetched. As a matter of common sense, since entering the era of missiles, the difference between cruisers and destroyers is no longer obvious, whether in terms of tonnage, armament configuration, targeting the enemy situation or fleet position are constantly narrowing the difference, in practical applications there have been many overlapping functions. Especially after the Kirov class and the Long Beach class, both the United States and the Soviet Union realized that instead of large cruisers, the functions of cruisers should be split into aircraft carriers and destroyers. This is not only cheap and flexible, but also the overall effectiveness of the fleet is better. Therefore, all this makes the combat effectiveness of large destroyers continue to increase, while cruisers stagnate, and the gap between the two is getting smaller and smaller. Today, a type of destroyer can no longer be called a so-called "cruiser" because of its large tonnage. A prime example of this is the Americans' own DDG-1000 Zumwalt class, a giant ship with a full load displacement of more than 13,000 tons and a tonnage far more than the Ticonderoga class, but the U.S. Navy still classifies it as a "destroyer" rather than a "cruiser." So, what is the Western world's stubborn purpose in calling the 055 a "cruiser"? Is it just a fight for the eyeballs?