Speaking of the film and television works on the theme of the Battle of Songhu on August 13, there are now nearly 10 hand indexes, but careful students may find that most of these films tell the two familiar stories of "Eight Hundred Heroes" or "Blood Splash Baoshan City", and the Jinshanwei Anti-Landing Battle, which is crucial to the impact of the battle situation, has not yet been mentioned in any film and television works, even if the film and television blockbuster "Eastern Battlefield" only uses a few conversations between senior generals to explain the results of the Jinshanwei battle.
Stills of "Eastern Battlefield", Xie Jinyuan, the leader of the Eight Hundred Heroes Regiment
Students familiar with the history of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression know that the defeat of the Jinshanwei Anti-Japanese Landing Battle can be regarded as the beginning of the overall collapse of the Battle of Songhu, and after the Japanese army landed on Jinshanwei, it quickly captured Songjiang City within a few days, threatening the flank and rear flank of the main force of the Chinese army that was fighting in downtown Shanghai, and there was a danger of cutting off its only retreat railway, and the main force of the Chinese army was forced to retreat in a hurry without a predetermined plan, and finally the retreat even evolved into a rout.
So why is it that when the Japanese army landed at Jinshanwei, the Chinese army's coastal defense forces in the local area were powerless? That's what we're going to explore next in this article. At that time, the 8th and 10th group armies, which covered the main left wing of the Chinese army and defended the vast area south of Suzhou Creek and Pudong, were commanded by Zhang Fakui, commander-in-chief of the Left Wing Army.
Responsible for the coastal defense of the northern part of Hangzhou Bay were the 62nd and 63rd Divisions of the 28th Army of the 8th Group Army, of which Chen Guangzhong's 63rd Division was stationed at key points along the coast from Zhapu to Wangjiawan, and Tao Liu's 62nd Division was stationed at key points along the coast from Jinshan to Zhapu. These two divisions were non-main divisions under the Hunan warlord He Jian, and their combat effectiveness could only be regarded as the second-rate of the Chinese army, especially the 63rd Division, where the division commander Chen Guangyuan was a giant bandit who killed people and crossed the border in the western Hunan region, and was later incorporated by He Jian and obtained the title of a regular division.
Chen Guangzhong, commander of the 63rd Division
The 63rd Division nominally had three brigades and six regiments, but one of the brigades belonged to Chen Quzhen, a native of western Hunan Province, and Chen Guangzhong could only command two brigades, 187 and 189. Unlike He Jian's other four divisions, Chen Guangzhong's unit was quite independent, with its own system of personnel, weapons, and supplies, and of course its combat effectiveness did not dare to be complimented, and it was defeated by the Eighth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army commanded by General Xiao Ke in two battles in Jiuduchong and Tangshi in the Xianggan Soviet District, and was also killed by the brigade commander.
Let such an army take on the heavy responsibility of coastal defense, then the result is naturally very dangerous, and zhang Fakui, commander of the Left Wing Army, is not completely unaware of this matter, so he let the 63rd Division defend the relatively low-importance of the Zhapu-Haiyan-Pupu-Wangjiawan line, and the crucial Zhapu-Quangongting-Jinsiniangqiao-Jinshanwei line was defended by the 62nd Division. However, by the beginning of November, the situation at the Battle of Songhu was becoming increasingly unfavorable, and the Central Group of the Chinese army had shrunk its position to the south bank of the Suzhou River, and Zhang Fakui had no reserves in his hands, so he could only transfer the 62nd Division to fill the gaps in the defensive line and order the 63rd Division to take over the defense. Interestingly, In his reminiscence article "Heroic Soldiers, the Great Wall of Flesh and Blood", Zhang Fakui did not mention the operation of mobilizing a division's coastal defense troops.
Seeing this, some people will definitely ask, how dare Zhang Fakui leave only a miscellaneous division in the coastal defense front of tens of kilometers on the north shore of Hangzhou Bay, is it accurate that the Japanese army does not dare to land here? I'm afraid that's true. As early as the Ming Dynasty, the Wokou first department had landed in the north of Hangzhou Bay, and in 1933, the Nanjing Army University also studied the defense of this area, and on the eve of the War of Resistance, two opinions were formed, that is, one side thought that the Japanese army would come, and the other side thought that it would not.
The Japanese landing at Jinshanwei required a difficult wading
The Chinese side had organized the Military Statistics Bureau to conduct a systematic survey of the long coastline from Chuansha to Hangzhou Bay, especially the geological terrain, tidal flats and harbors, the depth of the waters and other geological and hydrological data related to the Landing of the Japanese Army, and finally Director Dai Kasa reported that in general, the northern part of Hangzhou Bay was not suitable for landing by large corps and mechanized troops because there were no excellent ports, plus there was more silt on the beach, but if the other side had to land, then Jinshanwei, which had relatively little silt, deep harbor water, and convenient transportation in the rear, would be the preferred location.
Unfortunately, until the middle of October, the Chinese army command did not pay enough attention to this report, although some intelligence shows that after the failure of the Japanese army to encircle Wusongkou, it is very likely to carry out another roundabout operation in the north of Hangzhou Bay, but the relevant intelligence personnel mistakenly believe that due to the environmental restrictions of the landing area, the Japanese army can only send the strength of one division to the shore. The paper strength of two divisions of the Chinese army was able to completely suppress the battle line within 5 kilometers of the coastline (at this time, the 62nd Division had not yet been transferred by Zhang Fakui).
According to the order, the 63rd Division should take over the coastal defense positions in the Quangongting to Jinshanwei area with the strength of two regiments of the 187th Brigade, but from November 3, the order was issued, and the main forces of the 62nd Division were transferred until midnight on November 4, and the receiving troops of the 63rd Division were delayed. Tao Liu, commander of the 62nd Division, was also big-hearted, leaving only two infantry companies in Jinshanwei, another infantry platoon in Zhujia Village, east of Jinshanwei, and no troops at Jinsiniangqiao, only a township office of more than 10 people.
German 75 mm Bofors Hill Gun of the 2nd Gun Brigade
Dozens of kilometers of coastline are almost guarded by infantry, is it reasonable? Although the author has not yet read this battle report, Hu Xiaohua, who served as an official correspondent at the headquarters of the 63rd Division, later wrote a reminiscence article entitled "Recalling the 63rd Division's Jinshanwei Blockade Battle and Its Before and After", in which the record of the deployment of troops along the coastal defense of coastal defense from the 4th to 5th was roughly based on the war report.
Why mention this memoir? Later, we will also mention that in black and white writing in "Before and After", the 187th Brigade is stationed in the area of Jinshanwei-Jinsiniang Bridge, and it is also "building fortifications day and night", is it a conflict with what we mentioned above? People have been waiting for you for more than a day, and they have not seen half a shadow, and the 187th Brigade actually said that it had already built fortifications there, so who is lying?
The "History of China's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression" (author Feng Zichao), published in 1946, has long been mentioned in the book: "On the 5th of the 11th, when our Hangzhou Bay garrison was just changing its defenses, the Japanese army ...", In the article "Summary of the Battle of Songhu in the Third Theater" published in the "War History" published in the 1970s, It was pointed out in detail: "Quangongting and Jinshanwei were only garrisoned by 62D..." This is actually an announcement of a ruthless fact, that is, the 63rd Division's war report is being blindly compiled! Considering that this is a bandit division, it is not surprising that the war report was compiled blindly, and we will mention it later.
The culprit of the Jinshanwei landing, Tsukada, was later killed by Chinese soldiers and civilians
Since the frontal front line of the Battle of Songhu could not be broken, according to the "Operational History of the Chinese Incident Army", the General Staff of the Japanese Army Headquarters decided as early as early October to land in the north of Hangzhou Bay with the strength of a corps (under the jurisdiction of the 6th, 18th, and 114th Divisions), and the scheduled landing time was at the end of October. Although the Japanese army also debated this operation, it was decided to put it into action at the insistence of the Third Minister Tsukada Anda, the chief of the Operations Section, and others. On October 25, the Japanese revised the landing time to November 5, interestingly, the day before, Zhang Fakui just transferred the 62nd Division, whether this is a coincidence or how to leak intelligence, it is not known.
On the night of November 4, the Japanese Fourth Fleet carrying tens of thousands of landing troops quietly sailed into Hangzhou Bay, and the time to change defenses was the best time to launch an attack, which was the most common military common sense, not to mention that the Japanese army also caught up with the 63rd Division's great opportunity to take over the defense, I am afraid that they themselves did not expect it. At three o'clock in the morning of the 5th, the three detachments of the Japanese 6th Division and the 18th Division changed into landing boats and took advantage of the diffuse morning fog to land at several locations along the line from Zhapu to Zhujia village, and Jinshanwei was only one landing site of the Kunisaki detachment of the 6th Division.
Garrisoning Zhujia Village was a 24-man infantry platoon left behind by a battalion of the 372nd Regiment of the 186th Brigade, and this platoon was only 3 people left after being attacked by the Japanese army, but fortunately, the battalion commander Wang Zilong did not go far with the troops, and after receiving the correspondent's request for help, he immediately returned to the original position with the troops, actually blocked the Japanese landing force, and repelled the three landing attacks of the Japanese army in six hours, and the Japanese army saw that they could not take advantage of this place, so they gave up the plan to land in Zhujia Village. During the battle, The commander of the Prince Long Battalion died heroically. Compared with Xie Jinyuan and Yao Ziqing, Wang Zilong's deeds were buried for a time because he was not a concubine of Chiang Kai-shek, and it was not until the end of the 1980s that he appeared in the article "The Deeds of Prince Long In Resisting the Japanese Kou" in the "Fengxian County Literature and History Materials", and was not awarded the title of martyr until 2014.
Oji Takashi Image
In Zhapu, the westernmost part of the landing area, was the 63rd Battalion of the 377th Regiment of the 187th Brigade (by the way, the battalion's military doctor was the grandfather of the writer Xu Jinglei), under the command of the battalion commander Long Peng, the troops calmly responded to the battle and also repelled the Japanese landing troops. Why was the Zhapu Anti-Landing Battle victorious? Ms. Xu's grandfather recalled: "The troop position is strong and condescending, the Japanese army has to trek hundreds of meters of muddy beaches ashore, and carries a weight of up to 30 kilograms, which is difficult to move and cannot be hidden, and can only be reduced to a living target for infantry and mortars. ”
Of course, our focus was still on the Jinshanwei anti-landing battle, because of the heavy fog, the coastal defense post was not discovered until the Japanese army landed, fortunately, the 62nd Division's remaining troops were prepared in time, the infantry immediately entered the position to block the attack, and the artillery also quickly fired fiercely at the Japanese landing site, and successfully delayed the frontal landing of the Japanese army. However, due to the small size of the garrison infantry and the heavy casualties, they collapsed under the two wings of the japanese troops at multiple landing sites.
The four mountain guns, which could not be covered by infantry, continued to use zero-line submunitions that could kill targets about 500 meters ahead for close-range direct aiming, and dispatched all miscellaneous personnel to fight the Japanese with pistols, but after all, they were outnumbered, and finally suffered more than half of the casualties and had to withdraw from the position. Here again, the 63rd Division's battle report is to be brought out, which actually reads"The garrison troops of the 63rd Division at jinsi niangqiao and Jinshanwei have been fighting bloody and bitter battles all day long, and even short hand-to-hand combat...", is it not very out of thin air? Obviously, the division had never been to Jinshanwei, but boasted that he was fighting hard in Jinshanwei.
Brigade Commander Li Bojiao of the 187th Brigade
So where was the 187th Brigade of the 63rd Division on november 5, the decisive morning of the Battle of Songhu? In fact, the author does not know that in view of the suspected falsification of the division's war report, a lot of information about the deployment and operation on the 5th is not credible, but Chen Guangzhong claimed that the brigade commander Li Bojiao was shot and killed in the battle of Jinsiniang Bridge during the day on the 5th, and it can be inferred that the first part of the 187th Brigade should be in this area. Incidentally, Li Bojiao was Chen Guangzhong's brother-in-law when he was a bandit, and he caused the famous "Wutang Massacre" in the Xianggan Su District, where he was killed at jinsi niangqiao and was awarded the honorary title of anti-Japanese heroic martyr by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in September 2014.
The article "Report of German Advisers to China on the Presentation of the German Army General Command on the Battle of August 13" published in the March 1998 magazine "Archives of the Republic of China" directly tore open the fig leaf in Chen Guangzhong. The report mentions that the Japanese Kunisaki detachment that landed in the area from Jeongongting to Kanayamawei on the morning of November 5 was actually only more than 1,000 people, and if the 187th Brigade (more than 3,000 people) was on the position at that time, it could be completely blocked. However, when the Kunisaki detachment advanced to the town of Xincang, 10 kilometers from the coastline, it was blocked by a brigade of the Chinese army, which should be the 187th Brigade, that is, according to the German description, the 187th Brigade did not even fight on the coast of jinsi niangqiao, but had been crouching inland, not knowing what it was doing.
By November 7, the Japanese landing force had increased to 3 divisions and marched inland at an astonishing speed, and two days later successfully captured Songjiang County, thus seriously threatening the rear flank of the main chinese army and having an irreversible and decisive impact on the entire situation at the Battle of Songhu.
Changes in the Jinshanwei front on the 5th-9th
Then the question obviously came out, why did Chen Guangzhong delay for more than a day and did not send troops to Jinshanwei in time to take over the defense? Why was the anti-landing war not launched in time along the coast? According to the article "Following Chen Guangzhong for Twenty Years" written by Li Guyu, who was chen Guangzhong's chief of staff, Chen Guangzhong was playing in the rear with his little wife when the Japanese soldiers approached Hangzhou Bay. The author believes that Chen Guangzhong has extremely strong control over the troops, and without his permission, even the good brother Li Bojiao did not dare to move the troops without authorization, which is probably the reason why the 63rd Division did not go to Jinshanwei in time to change defenses.
Li Guyu also mentioned that after contact with the Japanese army, the 63rd Division quickly abandoned its position in its entirety, and in only one day, that is, by November 6, it had retreated to Zhejiang, giving up all the japanese troops' way forward, which was very consistent with the Description of the Germans. In order to escape responsibility, Chen Guangzhong also personally worked with Li Guyu and Zeng Can, chief of staff, to draw up this battle report that is still used as evidence of the 63rd Division's "bloody struggle" at Jinshanwei.
Therefore, in the records of senior Chinese generals in the early days, such as Huang Jie's "Diary of the Battle of Songhu", Chen Guangzhong's battle report was quoted, and he really thought that the 63rd Division had to retreat after the bloody battle strength was exhausted. Of course, Chen Guangzhong deceived other senior generals, but he could not deceive his direct superior Tao Guang and his colleague Tao Liu, and in November Tao Guang reported Chen Guangzhong: "When the enemy army landed, because the troops were not enough to be distributed, but Master Chen failed to stop it, and it was difficult to discern the blame, and where the duty was, he should also be punished." ”
Jinshanwei Ruins of a Chinese Army Bunker
On April 12, 1938, the Third Theater Military Tribunal in Shangrao, Jiangxi Province, also determined the fact that Chen Guangzhong had delayed the fighter plane and dismissed him from his post to investigate and deal with it; Chen Guangzhong, while arranging for Chief of Staff Li Guyu to write an appeal to him, and on the other hand bribing Wang Zhennan (Chiang's cousin), the military law enforcement supervisor of the Third Theater, with heavy money, was sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment, and after sitting in prison for several years, he was able to return to his hometown to continue to be a mighty man.
Finally, if the 187th Brigade of the 63rd Division could take over Jinshanwei in time, or if Zhang Fakui did not transfer the 62nd Division, would the Japanese army still make up its mind to forcibly land at Jinshanwei? If they land, how long can the front last? Of course, history cannot be assumed, after all, with the unreliable nature of the 63rd Division, it had already doomed the fate of the defeat of the Jinshanwei Anti-Landing Battle before the war.