On October 10, 1934, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission led the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Armies of the Central Red Army and the direct subordinate units of the Central Military Commission, totaling about 86,000 people, from Ruijin, Gucheng and other places, leaving the Central Soviet Region and embarking on an arduous 25,000-mile long march.
The Long March of the Red Army
The reason why the Central Red Army left the Central Soviet Region, which had been operating for a long time, and embarked on the road of the Long March with an uncertain future, was also very simple. Because, with Chiang Kai-shek's million-strong army encircling and suppressing the Soviet zone, it was no longer able to break the central committee of the 5th encirclement and suppression of the Kuomintang, and in order to preserve the revolutionary fire, it had to withdraw from the Soviet zone and carry out a strategic shift.
In fact, in order to break the 5th anti-encirclement and suppression campaign, the Central Red Army made many efforts at that time. For example, as early as April 1934, the Central Red Army fought a decisive battle against the Kuomintang army in Guangchang, but this battle was not won, on the contrary, heavy losses, making the situation more critical.
In July, the Red Seventh Army was ordered to form a northward anti-Japanese advance team, under the leadership of Xun Huaizhou, Su Yu and others, began to approach Fujian, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi and other regions, trying to establish a new Soviet zone and mobilize the enemy's encirclement and suppression forces. However, this action to reduce the pressure on the Central Soviet Zone has not achieved significant results.
It was precisely for this reason that in October, as the Kuomintang encirclement and suppression circle was further narrowed, more and more base areas were occupied by the Kuomintang, and the room for maneuver was getting smaller and smaller, and without the opportunity to break the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression of the Kuomintang, more than 86,000 Central Red Army had to hastily leave the base areas and embark on the Road of the Long March.
Central Soviet District
However, as the old saying goes, it is easy to go out at home, it is difficult to go out, as an individual to go out, and the huge central Red Army team with more than 86,000 people wants to embark on the road of the Long March, which is even more complicated and complicated.
86,000 people left the base area and embarked on an unfamiliar journey full of enemy-occupied areas, not only to consider how to break the enemy's encirclement and blockade along the road, but also to maintain a team of more than 86,000 people is extremely difficult.
For example, on such a large scale, how can you maintain communications? How to solve the problem of eating? How should the consumption of weapons and ammunition in combat along the way be replenished? How to obtain military uniforms, cotton clothes and other clothing?
Such a myriad of difficulties lie ahead. Then, under the circumstance that the war was extremely critical and the 5th anti-encirclement and suppression operation was very unfavorable, how did the Central Red Army quickly make a strategic transfer decision, get rid of the encirclement and suppression of the enemy's absolute superiority in troops, and successfully leave the Central Soviet Zone?
All this has a lot to do with Chairman Mao's farsightedness and many preparatory work.
In fact, with his genius-like strategic vision, as early as the beginning of the anti-encirclement and suppression operation, Chairman Mao already had his own plan for how to break the enemy's fifth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign. At that time, Chairman Mao believed that because the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression of the enemy adopted a new mode of operation of advancing step by step as a battalion and a fortress, and the Kuomintang also had a superiority of more than 5 times the strength of the troops, Chairman Mao believed that the most effective method was:
Use the main force of the Red Army to break through the enemy's siege line and turn to our outer line, that is, the enemy's inner line, to solve this problem.
Obviously, Chairman Mao did not approve of the method of concentrating the Red Army's forces and fighting a war of attrition against the Kuomintang army, which had absolute superiority. The best way to break this fifth encirclement and suppression is to leave the Soviet zone and carry out guerrilla warfare in the enemy's vast hinterland, thus making the Kuomintang's fortress advance useless.
Based on the reality that the enemy is strong and we are weak, Chairman Mao's plan is obviously the most effective and the least costly. However, in the face of this correct plan proposed by Chairman Mao, Bogu, who actually presided over the Provisional Central Committee, and Li De, the military adviser, did not hesitate to refuse.
Chairman Mao in the days of the Red Army
Ignoring the huge disparity in strength and equipment between the Red Army and the Kuomintang, they insisted on a duel with the enemy's main force, and thus caused heavy losses to the main Red Army. Worst of all, after the Red Army had paid a huge price, it still did not break the enemy's blockade line, but on the contrary, the anti-encirclement and suppression situation in the Central Soviet Zone further deteriorated.
Why has Chairman Mao's correct suggestion not been adopted? This actually has a lot to do with the bad situation that Chairman Mao faced before the Long March.
At that time, Chairman Mao, who single-handedly created the Jinggangshan base area and the Central Soviet Region, had already left the leading post of the Party and the Red Army because of his exclusion and attack. However, even so, Chairman Mao still endured humiliation and burdens and took into account the overall situation. Despite his illness and frailty, he did his utmost to plan for the party's cause.
However, Chairman Mao's proposal was repeatedly rejected by mistake, and even so, Chairman Mao was still not discouraged, and in November 1933, after Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai led the 19th Route Army to launch the Fujian Incident and openly play the banner of anti-Japanese resistance and anti-Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman Mao keenly discovered this golden opportunity.
Fujian Incident
He once again proposed that after the outbreak of the Fujian Incident, some kuomintang troops began to turn to Fujian, and made full use of the enemy's internal contradictions to lead the main force of the Red Army to break through the enemy's blockade line and go north to carry out guerrilla warfare in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Gansu, and other areas.
"Running between Hangzhou, Suzhou, Nanjing, Wuhu, Nanchang, and Fuzhou, it transforms strategic defense into a strategic offensive, threatens the enemy's fundamental stronghold, and seeks to fight in a vast area without fortresses."
On the one hand, these areas do not have the dense fortresses established by Chiang Kai-shek, which are far easier to fight than the enemy's blockade line, and the results of the Red Army will certainly be even more fruitful. At the same time, under the influence of the Great Revolution, these areas still had a rather deep revolutionary foundation, and the Red Army could make full use of the support of the masses, give full play to the advantages of strong mobile combat capability, and achieve greater victories at a smaller cost.
On the other hand, the Suzhou-Zhejiang-Anhui-Gansu region centered on Zhejiang is Chiang Kai-shek's old lair, and it is also the core territory that he never dares to give up; once the Central Red Army conducts a large-scale guerrilla operation here, in order to protect the old lair, Chiang Kai-shek is bound to draw out the main Kuomintang forces used for the 5th encirclement and suppression, so that the 5th anti-encirclement and suppression will be won without a fight.
Chairman Mao
However, Chairman Mao's excellent proposal to fully consider the situation at that time and change the strategic passivity into a strategic initiative was once again ignored.
However, although the proposal was ignored many times, Chairman Mao knew very well that the only correct way for the Central Red Army to break through the enemy's encirclement and suppression at this time was for the main Red Army to jump out of the Soviet zone and fight on the outer front. Therefore, Chairman Mao began to make preparations in advance.
First of all, what needs to be determined is the breakout route. After the enemy launched the 5th encirclement and suppression, strong troops were deployed on all sides of the Central Soviet Zone and dense fortresses were established, which made it very difficult for the Central Red Army to break through the enemy's blockade line.
Faced with this situation, Chairman Mao, after a thorough analysis of the situation, held that the best direction for the Central Red Army to break through the enemy's encirclement was to the south. Because the Kuomintang troops that blockaded the Central Soviet Region in the south were the Guangdong warlord Chen Jitang.
As we all know, warlord forces are actually private forces with independent territory, so it is almost the instinct of warlords to preserve their strength. Naturally, Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of China's largest warlord at the time, was at odds with Chen Jitang, who occupied Guangdong.
Chen Jitang
Therefore, the Red Army could make full use of the contradiction between Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Jitang and break through the enemy's encirclement with those garrisoned by Chen Jitang's Cantonese army as a breakthrough point. Therefore, from April 1934 onwards, Chairman Mao did a great deal of work. If you want to use the southern front as a breakthrough, the most important thing is, of course, to stabilize the southern front.
However, although there are many contradictions between Chen Jitang and Chiang Kai-shek's two major warlords, after all, they are both warlords, and they have a natural hostility towards the Communist Party and the Red Army, so seeing the Red Army showing weakness, even if there are many contradictions with Chiang Kai-shek, Chen Jitang probably does not mind taking the opportunity to eliminate the Red Army.
Therefore, how to dispel Chen Jitang's idea of taking advantage of the fire and looting has become a key issue in stabilizing the southern front. At this time, Chairman Mao personally sat down, and on the one hand instructed the Guangdong provincial party committee to draw down the main force for rectification and training, and the small troops, in coordination with the local armed forces and the Red Guards, with the help and support of the local party government, adopted the method of guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare with a guerrilla nature, led the enemy's nose in circles, and dragged him down with fat and thin.
On the other hand, it concentrates its absolute superiority to strike at the enemy's weaknesses. Chairman Mao even went to the place where the 22nd Division was stationed and personally commanded the Red 22nd Division in combat.
Under chairman Mao's correct command, the Red 22nd Division and other Red Army units on the southern front achieved a series of victories, thus attacking the Guangdong army, eliminating Chen Jitang's idea of rapidly advancing northward, and stabilizing the southern front.
However, dispelling Chen Jitang's idea of continuing the offensive is only the first step; "fighting" is for "peace," making full use of contradictions within the enemy, building a united front, and strengthening the revolutionary forces are the principles that Chairman Mao has always implemented.
Therefore, after liang muscles let Chen Jitang see the strength of the Red Army, Chairman Mao took a multi-pronged approach to negotiate with the Guangdong army led by Chen Jitang to establish an anti-Chiang Kai-shek national united front. Chairman Mao said of this:
Like the dogmatists, we must not only know how to fight hard to resist the enemy outside the gates of the country, but we must also take advantage of the contradictions between the reactionaries to strengthen the work of the united front.
Therefore, it was precisely because Chairman Mao used both soft and hard measures and military and political multi-pronged efforts that Chen Jitang began to realize that if he wanted to preserve his strength, the only way out was to sign an anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek peaceful cooperation with the Red Army. Therefore, Chen Jitang began to take the initiative to put forward demands for peace talks.
Thanks to Chairman Mao's previous adequate preparations, the peace talks achieved fruitful results. At that time, the Red Army and Chen Jitang signed a secret agreement, in which the two sides agreed to stop combat operations on the spot, exchange information, lift each other, blockade and exchange, trade with each other, and borrow each other's channels. The signing of this agreement greatly reduced the pressure on the southern front and laid a solid foundation for the central Red Army to break through from the southern front.
However, the direction and conditions for the breakthrough are still far from sufficient, because the breakthrough of the Central Red Army with such a huge number of troops involves all aspects, and one of the most crucial factors is the problem of grain and grass, so the work of expanding red grain is also very important.
The Long March of the Central Red Army
How did Chairman Mao do it? As early as the end of April 1934, Chairman Mao left Ruijin and arrived at Changwenwuba, the seat of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee, to begin a detailed and in-depth investigation and make a series of important instructions on the expansion of red chips and other work.
Under Chairman Mao's instructions, the Guangdong-Gansu Provincial CPC Committee began to correct the erroneous land policy, arouse the peasants' enthusiasm for production, correct the erroneous trade policy of the past, adopt the correct trade policy of the white area, break the enemy's blockade, and thus greatly promote the grain-raising work.
While raising grain, in order to replenish the strength of the Red Army, Chairman Mao successfully completed the task of expanding the Red Army by means of extensive propaganda, strengthening ideological and political education, and clarifying the tasks of responsible persons of various districts. These tasks also laid a good material foundation for the strategic transfer of the Red Army.
With a clear breakthrough line, there are also certain preparations for raising grain and expanding the red, but when nearly 100,000 main Red Army leaves the Soviet zone, it is still necessary to solve everyone's ideological problems, and it is even more necessary to carry out necessary political mobilization.
The main Red Army is undergoing a strategic shift, and many people have concerns. For example, many Red Army soldiers who have not left home in their lifetime, and suddenly away from the Soviet zone and far away from home, will have a strong sense of homesickness and reluctance. For another example, if the main Red Army leaves, the families and masses of the Red Army who remain in the Soviet zone will have an insecurity, and even some people will have pessimistic and disappointed thoughts, and so on.
Chairman Mao had long been prepared for this, and at the end of April 1934, at a surprise meeting on grain raising and red expansion, Chairman Mao, while making arrangements for expanding red grain, also began to carry out political mobilization for the response work after the transfer of the main force of the Red Army. Chairman Mao made clear arrangements for the work of cadres in various regions:
Local Party organizations should be straightened out, the contingent of cadres should be purified, and the local Party and government cadres who had been identified as public could be transferred to the Red Army units or to the guerrilla guerrilla areas. In addition, it is necessary to organize a number of cadres to go underground, straighten out the local armed forces, purge undesirable elements, prepare to carry out guerrilla warfare, defend the fruits of revolutionary victory, strengthen local public security work, prevent the enemy from sabotaging and making trouble, do a good job in supporting the army and giving priority to subordinates, properly do a good job in the relocation and resettlement of disabled soldiers, attach importance to women's work, and mobilize women to join local armed forces such as the Red Guards.
Obviously, although Chairman Mao did not explicitly state at this meeting that the main force of the Red Army must carry out a major strategic transfer, various work arrangements have actually hinted at the inevitable result of the transfer of the main force of the Red Army.
In the work that followed, Chairman Mao, despite his constant physical illness, carried out political mobilization of the Red Army contingent and the masses at many meetings and in his work, thus enabling the military and people in the Soviet zone to have a certain degree of ideological preparation and adaptation work for the upcoming strategic shift of the main force of the Red Army.
At the end of September 1934, after the Provisional Central Committee decided to carry out the political mobilization of strategic transfer, Chairman Mao made further political mobilization. To this end, Chairman Mao once summoned the various government ministries to hold a "Qingshan Conference" on a mountain in Ruijin, and Chairman Mao stressed:
First, the revolution has a future, and we want everyone to strengthen their confidence in the revolution.
Second, it is necessary to do a good job in the aftermath of all departments, so that the remaining comrades can better continue the revolutionary struggle and better maintain contact with the masses.
It can be said that it was Chairman Mao's precautions before the strategic transfer and the completion of various aspects of the work, including the establishment of a united front against the enemy, the raising of grain and the expansion of the red, and political mobilization, that when the 86,000 main forces of the Central Red Army decided on the Long March in October 1934, they could go as they pleased, successfully broke through the enemy's blockade line, and smoothly opened the strategic transfer of the main force.