In the autumn of 1940, the Japanese army entered the northern part of French Indochina, marking the official implementation of the plan that the Tokyo authorities had been brewing for a long time in a vain attempt to occupy the European and American colonies in Southeast Asia.
The impulse of the Japanese decision-making level to "move south" was precisely decided when most of the armed forces were deeply mired in the quagmire of the Sino-Japanese War. This strategy would have the potential to spark conflict with the colonial authorities in Southeast Asia, or even war with their suzerainty, which meant that Japan would face a situation of simultaneous war against multiple countries.
Even if we bear the huge risk of war and conflict with countries such as Britain and the United States, we must brazenly move south. What exactly made Japan make such an unwise decision?
First, who is behind the war against many countries?
During World War II, there were three ways to influence Japan's foreign decisions, the first of which was the Japanese emperor.
Since the 20th century, the Japanese emperor has gradually broken the limitations of the constitutional monarchy through various means and grasped the military and political power of the country. The Emperor played a large role in Japan's decision to go to war against multiple countries at the same time.
The emperor has always been keen to place Southeast Asia in Japan's sphere of influence, and in his words to his cronies, this is an important manifestation of the legacy of his ancestors.
The Japanese Emperor believed that the reasons put forward by military and political advisers for expansion to the south were justified, believing that the establishment of bases and the stationing of troops in French Indochina and other places would help overthrow the Chinese government and end the war in China.
To this end, the emperor often instructed the Japanese cabinet that if this plan was always delayed, then Britain and the United States and other countries would join hands with China against Japan.
When german warfare on the Western Front in Europe began, he eagerly summoned the Chief of Staff and the Minister of War to ask if they had any plans to send troops to the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. It was the emperor's inquiry into the military plan that eventually prompted the ministers of culture and military affairs to make the decision to march into Southeast Asia.
The second was the Cabinet of Japan, which was identified as the highest administrative body during the Meiji period, which marked the beginning of the establishment of a modern state and bureaucracy in Japan. However, from the day of its birth, under the constraints of traditional political culture, it has embarked on a development path different from that of European and American capitalism.
The Japanese cabinet was never appointed by the majority of the parliamentary party, but was directly appointed by the emperor through his close advisers, so it was not a real house cabinet system.
This also means that the power of the cabinet comes from the emperor, not the parliament.
Therefore, instead of acting as a check on the emperor, the Japanese cabinet must be responsible to the emperor and take it as its mission to serve the emperor's great power. However, as the nominal supreme executive body, the Cabinet also played a role in Japan's decision to determine the strategy of "going south" to go to war with many countries at the same time, and later in the decision to go to war with the United States.
As soon as he took office, Konoe, then Prime Minister of Japan, announced that the diplomatic guidelines for the new cabinet were to "guide the changes in the world and create a new order in the world by our own strength."
In addition, in order to strengthen the authority of the prime minister, Konoe was very active in the "Southward Policy", in an active gesture, expressing the excessive expansion plan that went further than the military department, in order to cater to the emperor's preferences.
The last reason that affected Japan's decision-making abroad was the Japanese Military Department.
From its inception, the japanese imperial army was given the dual mission of resisting the infiltration of European powers, asserting the country's security interests, and serving as an important tool of government to ensure the implementation of coercive laws.
As the command system of the Japanese army, the Japanese military department is the specific executor and defender of the emperor's power, and its power is very huge.
In addition, the Japanese military ministry has also established military-political alliances between different branches of the military and with bureaucrats of different institutions such as the court, the cabinet, the ministry of foreign affairs, and the chaebols.
In this alliance, the Japanese military ministry played a role in providing professional advice for national security, and became one of the main participants in Japan's foreign decision-making by virtue of the fact that military chiefs must be military attachés in active service and the specific executors of the emperor's supreme power.
In determining the decision to simultaneously go to war with multiple countries, the Navy dominated the decisions of the Ministry of War. For a long time, because Of Japan's mainland policy, the Navy has been on the margins. But if Japan could launch an offensive into Southeast Asia, the Navy would surely be able to boost its authority and demoralize and dominate the war.
Therefore, the navy has always advocated the strategy of "going south", and even shouted the slogan of "betting on the war between Britain and the United States". Under the impetus of the emperor, the cabinet, and the military, the "southward" strategy officially became the consensus of Japan's decision-making level, which put Japan on the crazy road of simultaneous war against many countries.
So what is it that makes Japanese policymakers so unanimous in their belief that the "southward" strategy is correct?
Second, the helplessness and ambition behind the madness
As everyone knows, due to the resolute resistance of the Chinese military and people, Japan has reached a stalemate in the war against China, and the war that was expected to be completed in three months has lasted for several years.
The growing strength of the Soviet Union in the north made Japan believe that if it could not end the war against China as soon as possible, China, which was "struggling to change", would form a strong alliance with the international community. That would completely wipe out Japan's hopes of achieving its war goals with China.
Therefore, Japan's decision-makers hope to conquer Southeast Asia as a way to cut off the international community's supply route to China, leaving China in a situation of isolation and helplessness. Moreover, Japan can also establish a strategic material supply base in Southeast Asia, open a second offensive route, and attack China from north to south.
Second, there is a vacuum of power in Southeast Asia. In 1939, Germany launched a war of foreign aggression in Europe, which pinned the British and French armies against Germany and had no time to take care of their colonies in Europe.
The fall of France and the Netherlands in 1940 made French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies an unprotected and highly vulnerable region.
Britain was also doing everything in its power to defend against German attacks on its homeland, and was forced to shrink its military presence in Southeast Asia.
The United States, an ally of the democracies of Western Europe, aided britain and other countries by deploying a quarter of its fleet to the Atlantic in the spring of 1941, making it even weaker in the Pacific.
Finally, in order to prepare for a German attack, the Soviet Union reduced the risk of being attacked from the north by the Soviet Union when Japan attacked south.
These events greatly surprised the Japanese decision-makers, who had a deep concern for the strength of Britain and the United States, so they unanimously agreed not to intervene in the European war.
However, Germany's great victory in Europe, and the vulnerability of Britain and France, have caused Japanese decision-makers to feel superstitious and anxious about Germany's military strength.
They believed that under such a powerful German offensive, the alliance between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union against Germany would not last long. A great opportunity was taking shape for Japan to conquer Asia, but if Germany quickly ended its war in Europe and was bound to take over the colonies of Britain, France, the Netherlands and other countries in Asia, it would deprive Japan of the opportunity to completely occupy Asia.
Therefore, the Japanese decision-makers quickly agreed that they must seize Southeast Asia before Germany ended the war.
The reason why Japan was so eager to conquer the "borderlands" of Southeast Asia had a lot to do with the abandonment of the "god-given opportunity" at that time, the Japan-US Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. The abandonment of this treaty puts Japan in a disadvantageous situation where it can be embargoed by the United States at any time.
Japan is an island country with extremely scarce resources, if the United States imposes an embargo on it, Japan's industrial production will stagnate, its national strength will decline rapidly, and its foreign expansion will be unsustainable, and southeast Asia's rich strategic resources will help japan get rid of the upcoming corner.
Japanese policymakers optimistically estimate that the annual oil production of the Palembang oil field in the Dutch East Indies alone can already reach 4.7 million tons, and with a little additional production, Japan's annual demand for 5 million tons is not enough.
In addition, Southeast Asia also has abundant resources such as grain and rubber, which will not only enable Japan to expand its self-sufficient economic circle, but also completely break the situation of dependence on the British and American resource markets for many years.
Shigeru Fujii, who was in charge of policy drafting for the Navy, declared at the decision-making meeting: "As long as it is stationed in the southern region of French Indochina, the Navy can indeed have resources such as rice, metal, and rubber." At the same time, pressure was put on the Dutch East Indies, so that the attitude of the Dutch and Indians would improve, and the oil would naturally be available. ”
Based on the above analysis, the Japanese decision-making level finally made the decision to attack Southeast Asia.
In 1941, japan attacked Pearl Harbor in the United States, kicking off the Pacific War. In this war, Japan simultaneously waged war against more than 30 countries in the Pacific, Indian Ocean and East Asia, with more than 60 million participants.
However, in this battle, Japan not only failed to achieve its war goals, but accelerated its defeat.
Third, Japan's end of the road
Obviously, Japan's "southward" policy can only temporarily alleviate Japan's huge attrition caused by the war, and cannot fundamentally change the balance of power between Japan and the anti-fascist alliance.
In the early stage of the Pacific War, the United States, Britain, and other countries were not prepared enough and strategically neglected, and Japan seized the opportunity and achieved tremendous strategic results. It quickly occupied many islands in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and its strategic supplies were guaranteed.
But as far as the Axis and allies as a whole are concerned, the output of both production capacity and raw materials that the Axis powers can provide cannot be compared with the Allies.
In addition, Japan is simultaneously engaged in two-front operations in the Pacific Theater and the Chinese Theater, and the scale of the war is extremely asymmetrical with Japan's own national strength. With the deepening of Japan's "southward advance", the battle line was lengthened, the troops were dispersed, and more countries joined the war with Japan, making it difficult for Japan to withstand the huge pressure brought about by this huge war machine.
With the start of the war between the United States and Japan, the countries that Japan wants to oppose have developed from one China to the entire anti-fascist alliance, and the opponents have been dozens of countries.
At that time, the total strength of the Japanese Army was 51 divisions, including 2 local divisions, 2 Korean divisions, 13 divisions in northeast China, 22 divisions in China headquarters, and 10 divisions in the south. Japan's remaining strength available for the Pacific Theater is only one-fifth of its total army strength, and there is no way to increase its strength.
After the Battle of Midway in June 1942, Japan's sea and air supremacy through raids was lost, and the situation in the Pacific Theater began to change. From then on, the Japanese army suffered repeated defeats in the Pacific, until August 15, 1945, when Japan announced its unconditional surrender, and Japan's "southward policy" was a complete failure.
From the moment Japan decided to launch a war of aggression against the outside world, it was already doomed to the ultimate defeat. The ambitions of the militarists will never be satisfied, and the Japanese militarist clique headed by the Japanese Emperor has planned a war of aggression against the outside world, and in the end it is even more crazy to go to war with the outside world at the same time. If they choose to use war to solve the problem of development, then they will inevitably be destroyed by war.
Text/Leyu
Resources:
1. Japanese Militarism and the Pacific War, Liu Shilong
2. "On Japan's Southward and Northward Advance Strategy in World War II", Xu Yong