Author: Mast
I have written a series of articles on four field generals, and have published 18 of them. I wanted to write about Han Xianchu for a long time, but I didn't write for a long time. The reason is that General Han is too famous, and there are already many articles about him. First, with the author's skill, it is difficult to write characteristics; second, General Han is already a god of war level in the hearts of many military fans, and his image is relatively fixed, and it is difficult to write it out.
A few days ago, the author published an article in the red column of the battle flag in which the 40th Army and the 43rd Army joined hands to liberate Hainan, which aroused the attention and discussion of some friends. It suddenly occurred to me that in fact, the liberation of Hainan Island was the most emblematic campaign of Han Xianchu's character and command style. This article will talk about general Han Xianchu, who was a bit "untamed" in personality from the decision-making process of the Battle of Hainan Island.
1. The Chairman called for caution in dealing with sea crossing operations
In December 1949, as the Guangxi Campaign was coming to an end, Siye began to plan his march into Hainan Island. On the 9th, Shino decided to transfer the 43rd Army and the 40th Army to the 15th Corps at the same time. On the 10th, Lin Biao called the chairman and suggested that "the 43rd Army and the 40th Army, a total of 2 armies, should prepare to attack Qiongya (that is, Hainan Island)."
On the 14th, Lin Biao called Deng Hua, commander of the 15th Corps, Li Zuopeng, commander of the 43rd Army, and Han Xianchu, commander of the 40th Army: "Deng Hua will lead the 15th Corps to unify the command of the 40th Army and the 43rd Army, and assign them to the 28th Cannon Regiment, the 1st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment and their support detachments, and with the cooperation of the Qiongya Column, they will prepare to liberate Hainan Island." On the 18th, the chairman replied in Moscow to agree to Lin Biao's deployment.
In the later stages of the War of Liberation, our army had been tempered into a fierce tiger on land. However, the battle against the sea crossing was still a new thing, especially the fiasco of Sanye's attack on Kinmen in October 1949, and the chairman could not help but pay special attention to the battle of Hainan Island, and in the telegram he particularly emphasized that "after the Sanye YeFei Regiment occupied Xiamen, it did not know the above situation, attacked the enemy on Kinmen Island with 3,000 enemies with 9,000 people in 3 and a half regiments, with no aid and no food, besieged by the enemy, and the whole army was destroyed... The enemy on Hainan Island may be inferior in combat strength than the enemy in Kinmen, but it is still not a light enemy." "I hope that you will investigate with Su Yu all your experience in crossing the sea and fighting, so as not to repeat the mistakes of Kinmen." It should be said that the chairman attached particular importance to the battle of Hainan Island and was also very cautious. The 15th Corps always carried out this policy in the preparatory process.
Second, the time for cross-sea operations was postponed twice
In late December, the 40th and 43rd Armies marched from Guangxi to the Leizhou Peninsula and completed their assembly in mid-January 1950. Pre-war preparations such as collecting ships and training troops were then launched. On the 27th, Deng Hua and others called Lin Biao and headquarters to "strive to attack Hainan Island before the Spring Festival."
However, the preparation work was unexpectedly difficult, especially the collection and modification of the ships, which could not be completed in a short time. To this end, on January 5, 1950, the 15th Corps sent a telegram to Lin Biao and the headquarters, proposing to postpone the operation time, and specially sent Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Hong Xuezhi to Wuhan to report to Lin Biao in person, and to seek solutions to the funds and channels for purchasing and modifying ships. After hearing the report, Lin agreed with the opinion of the 15 corps.
On January 10, the chairman in Moscow called Lin Biao, agreeing to postpone the operation and asking the 15th Corps to "prepare instead of following the direction of the north wind and relying on modified machine ships, and strive to solve the Hainan Island problem within the spring and summer." At the same time, it was emphasized that "as long as 20,000 people can be landed at a time, and there are military-level command institutions to land with them, we can establish a foothold and wait for the follow-up troops to continue." According to this instruction, Deng Hua and other telegrams ordered Han Xianchu and Li Zuopeng: "In the battle against crossing the sea, we do not rely on the direction of the wind, but mainly modify the aircraft and sailboats." It is hoped that the two armies will complete the task of converting the machine ship in a short period of time. On the 23rd, after listening to Hong Xuezhi's report in Wuhan, Lin Biao proposed to "strive to complete the preparation for crossing the sea in 5 or 6 months."
At this time, the headquarters and Shino's opinions: first, the sea crossing ships are mainly modified aircraft sailboats, and do not rely on sailing ships that need to use wind power and wind direction; second, the time for crossing the sea is postponed to June and July.
3. The battle of Weizhou Island achieved unexpected results
From February 1 to 2, Deng Hua presided over an operational meeting attended by the 40th Army, the 43rd Army, and the commanders of the Qiong column, and determined the campaign guidelines for "active smuggling, combining small crossings in batches with the final landing", and the operation time was tentatively set for June. It should be said that up to this time, Han Xianchu and the leaders of the 15th Corps had no differences on issues such as the time of crossing the sea. But the windfall of the battle on Weizhou Island has changed the situation significantly.
Deng Hua
On March 7, the 119th Division of the 40th Army raided Weizhou Island and achieved a major unexpected result: more than 300 large wooden sailing ships were captured. In this way, the ships collected by the 40th Army were already equipped to carry 2 divisions at a time. To this end, Han Xianchu proposed three times on March 12, 21 and April 7 to launch a sea crossing operation in advance. Although these suggestions were made in the name of the 40th Army collective, they were certainly put forward and adhered to by Han Xianchu.
It should be said that after the battle of Weizhou Island captured more than 300 large wooden sailing ships, coupled with the successful smuggling of the reinforcement battalion of the 352nd Regiment of the 118th Division of the 40th Army on March 6, Han Xianchu had the confidence to repeatedly suggest launching a sea crossing operation in advance. In the month after March 7, he and Deng Hua had major differences: the head of the 15th Corps still insisted on crossing the sea mainly by aircraft sailing ships, which Deng Hua still had when he called the headquarters of Siye on March 27; and Han Xianchu advocated relying on sailing ships and crossing the sea before Gu Yuqian.
Why valley before the rain? Because the wind direction of the Qiongzhou Strait is characterized by the northeast monsoon before the valley rain, from the valley rain to the southwest wind. That is to say, if you rely on sailing ships to cross the sea, you can only cross the sea before the valley rain.
Fourth, the 40th Army will land on Hainan Island alone
In fact, Deng Hua and Han Xianchu were both extremely individual generals, and it may not be possible to form a consensus. Han Xianchu's three telegrams suggesting an advance crossing of the sea were all sent directly to the Siye Headquarters, of which the first and third letters did not seem to have been copied to the 15th Corps. In particular, the Telegram of April 7, from the content point of view, Han Xianchu obviously has the meaning of bypassing the 15th Corps and launching a large-scale landing operation by the 40th Army alone.
It should be said that this is unconventional. Although he was the deputy commander of the 12th Corps, he was also the commander of the 40th Army, and before The Four Wilds ordered the 40th Army to be part of the 15th Corps. This may be the "untamed" side of Han Xianchu. His daring to do so was based on a thorough study of the enemy's situation, our own situation, and the sea situation; more importantly, he correctly understood the core element of the campaign of "transporting 20,000 people at a time" in the chairman's instructions. That is, no matter what kind of ship is used, being able to "transport 20,000 people at a time" is the key.
After all, the risk of crossing the sea is huge, and the Battle of Kinmen is not far away. Therefore, deng Hua, as the commander-in-chief of the campaign, was not wrong to take a cautious attitude. It can only be said that Han Xianchu's judgment of the situation is more accurate, and his desire to fight is even stronger. Under the strong impetus of Han Xianchu, the proposal to cross the sea in advance was finally adopted by Deng Hua on April 8, and after reporting to the Siye Headquarters for approval, the order for crossing the sea was issued on April 15.
On April 16, four days before Gu Yu, Han Xianchu led the 40th Army and the 43rd Army to launch a large-scale sea-crossing landing operation, liberating the entire Hainan Island on May 1.
More than a month later, on June 25, the Korean War broke out, and the United States immediately announced on the 27th that it would blockade the strait to "prevent any attack on Taiwan." If you miss the monsoon period before the valley rains, the sea crossing operation will definitely be postponed until after the outbreak of the Korean War. At that time, it is really difficult to say whether hainan island will be able to carry out the sea crossing operation and whether Hainan Island will become the second Taiwan island.
Later, some people said that Han Xianchu strongly recommended launching a sea crossing operation in advance, which was strategic. In fact, neither Han Xianchu nor anyone else could have imagined that there would be a Korean war in the near future. In fact, it was his desire to fight coupled with a somewhat "untamed" personality that eventually contributed to the early launch of the campaign.
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