After the outbreak of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the Chinese People's Liberation Army faced the most difficult, challenging, and uncertain large-scale modernization war since the founding of the army. After entering the Korean battlefield, the Chinese People's Liberation Army not only faced the US military armed to the teeth, but also the "United Nations Army" known as Britain, France, Australia, Canada and other countries. This situation was no small challenge for Chairman Mao and his generals.
Therefore, under such circumstances, Chairman Mao was very cautious in choosing the supreme commander for the operation to enter the DPRK. At first, Chairman Mao chose Su Yu, but later, due to Su Yu's physical reasons, Chairman Mao had to give up. After that, Chairman Mao's ideal candidate was Lin Biao, and in order to wait for Lin Biao, Chairman Mao deliberately left the post of commander of the Northeast Border Defense Army vacant for a month, but in the end Chairman Mao waited for Lin Biao's opinion. After that, Chairman Mao ordered Peng Dehuai to lead troops into korea.
Chairman Mao
So what reasons did Lin Biao put forward to oppose joining the DPRK? What are the reasons for Chairman Mao's decision to send troops? Today we will talk about the process of Lin Biao's opposition to sending troops and Chairman Mao's unified opinion on sending troops.
After the outbreak of the Korean War, there were different opinions within the CPC Central Committee on whether to send troops or not, and only a few people, including Premier Zhou, supported Chairman Mao's views. In a subsequent operation by the US military, Chairman Mao's thorough decision was that China would send troops to Korea to repel the aggression of US imperialism. So what prompted Chairman Mao to make this decision?
On June 25, 1950, the Korean People's Army launched an attack on the South Korean army, which was ill-prepared for war and collapsed all the way. With the advance of Korean People's Army tanks, South Korean towns fell. Three days after the fighting broke out, Syngman Rhee led South Korean officials out of Seoul. After more than a month of advance, the South Korean army represented by Syngman Rhee was compressed along the Busan line and confronted the Korean People's Army along the Nakdong River.
North Korean leader Kim Il Sung is very optimistic about the war situation, and in his eyes it is only a matter of time before the Korean People's Army unifies the Korean Peninsula. At this time, Chairman Mao, who was in Zhongnanhai, was vaguely worried about the war situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Korean People's Army front was too long, and once the US troops landed from The Port of Inchon, the Korean People's Army on the southern front would certainly face a catastrophe. Therefore, the Chinese side constantly reminded the North Korean and Soviet sides through diplomatic channels that it was very likely that the US military would land from the port of Inchon.
In the face of Chinese warnings, neither Kim Il Sung nor Stalin paid attention. So on September 15, 1950, MacArthur commanded U.S. troops to land at The Port of Inchon. After the landing, the US troops and the "United Nations Army" on the southern front attacked each other, and the 6 columns of the Korean People's Army were broken. The U.S. army pursued the retreating Korean People's Army all the way and reoccupied Seoul on September 28.
In the face of the tremendous changes that have taken place in the Korean battlefield, the Chinese side has issued a warning to the US side through diplomatic channels that once the US military breaks through the 38th Line and pursues the Korean People's Army, the Chinese army will not ignore it! In the face of China's diplomatic warnings, MacArthur and a group of White House think tanks believed that this was China's "diplomatic blackmail", and at this time the United Nations army had met, MacArthur decided to cross the 38th Line and beautifully end the war on the Korean Peninsula before Christmas. On October 3, 1950, U.S. troops near the 38th Parallel, under the orders of the Tokyo Command, crossed the 38th Parallel and pursued the Korean People's Army northward.
MacArthur
In fact, as early as the outbreak of the Korean War, Chairman Mao considered that China's strategic northeast would directly face the threat of war. In order to strengthen the security of the strategic northeast, Chairman Mao suggested that the central authorities set up a northeast border defense army as a strategic measure to prevent problems before they occur. Soon after, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to form the Northeast Border Defense Army on the basis of the Four Fields and Thirteen Corps stationed in the Central Plains.
On July 7, 1950, Premier Zhou held a meeting in Huairen Hall in Zhongnanhai to discuss national defense issues, and conveyed to everyone chairman Mao's decision to establish the Northeast Border Defense Army to safeguard the national defense and security of northeast China. From this list, it can be seen from this list that quite a few cadres of the Fourth Field Army spoke actively at the meeting, stressing the urgency of forming a northeast border defense army and putting forward some principles for forming a northeast border defense army.
On July 10, Premier Zhou held a second meeting to discuss national defense, and this time it was still the last time personnel attended the meeting, and Lin Biao said at the meeting: The Fourth Field Army is duty-bound on this issue, how many people it wants, how much equipment it needs. After the meeting, the central authorities drew troops from Henan, Liangguang, Heilongjiang and other places to strengthen the strength of the Thirteenth Corps and form a 253,000-strong Northeast Border Defense Army.
Lin Biao
With regard to the commander of the Northeast Border Defense Army, Lin Biao recommended Su Yu to Chairman Mao and proposed that Su Yu should serve as commander and political commissar of the Northeast Border Defense Army, Xiao Jinguang as deputy commander, and Xiao Hua as deputy political commissar. Subsequently, Premier Zhou slightly revised Lin Biao's opinion and reported it to Chairman Mao. At that time, Chairman Mao's ideal candidate for the Northeast Frontier Defense Army was also Su Yu. But unfortunately, Su Yu's health was not good enough to fight in Korea.
At that time, when Chairman Mao learned that Su Yu's physical condition was not good, he originally planned to wait for Su Yu's condition to improve, but then the situation on the Korean Peninsula was urgent, and Su Yu's physical condition did not improve, and Chairman Mao considered making Lin Biao the commander of the Northeast Border Defense Army.
Although Chairman Mao was busy with state affairs all day, he never relaxed his security problems with China after the founding of the People's Republic of China. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the first thing Chairman Mao did before getting up was to check the report on the Korean battlefield and understand the situation of the northeast border defense forces. At that time, Lin Biao, as the commander of the largest field army and the fourth field army, attached great importance to the development of the situation in the Korean battlefield.
During that time, Premier Zhou, President Zhu Lao, Liu Shaoqi, and other central leaders also paid attention to the situation on the Korean battlefield all day long, because this war was bound to happen on China's doorstep. Under the unified arrangements of the central authorities, the northeast border defense army is making intensive preparations for the construction of troops, weapons and equipment, and logistical materials.
Premier Zhou
Under such circumstances, chairman Mao and Premier Zhou could not fail to think about the commander of the Northeast Border Defense Army, and the ideal candidate in their hearts was Lin Biao. So why did the two of them think of Lin Biao at the same time?
The first reason is that the Korean operation belongs to the cold climate operation, while the Fourth Field Army has been fighting in the northeast all year round and has rich experience in cold zone operations. Lin Biao is the commander of the Fourth Field Army, and he has a better understanding of the situation in the northeast and Korea, and in addition, the Northeast Border Defense Army is mainly drawn from the Fourth Field Army, Lin Biao participated in the preparatory work of the Northeast Border Defense Army, and the command is relatively smooth.
The second reason is that Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou believe that Lin Biao has military ability. The long-term revolutionary war proved that Lin Biao could fight a hard battle, among which Lin Biao participated in the three major battles of the People's Liberation Army, Lin Biao participated in the Liaoshen and Pingjin, and the Battle of Crossing the River commanded the troops to fight on the western front. At the same time, Chairman Mao attached great importance to Lin Biao's military ability, and Chairman Mao commented on Lin Biao: Lin Biao fought fiercely and fiercely.
The third reason is that considering that this dispatch of troops is indispensable to cooperate with the Soviet Union and North Korea, during his time in the northeast, Lin Biao fought together with the Leaders of The DPRK, and many generals in the DPRK army were lin Biao's subordinates. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Lin Biao went to the Soviet Union to recuperate, and had a good relationship with senior Soviet generals at that time.
After Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou had finished their deliberations, Chairman Mao began to formulate Lin Biao's command of the Korean war. Chairman Mao first consulted with several secretaries of the Secretariat of the CENTRAL Committee and received a favorable opinion. After the Incheon landings, Chairman Mao had to begin to step up the task of appointing commanders to attack Korea.
At that time, Chairman Mao, for the sake of Lin Biao's health, did not directly order Lin Biao to command troops to enter the DPRK to fight, but first raised the issue of sending troops to Korea, and then asked Lin Biao's opinion. In late September 1950, Chairman Mao and Lin Biao had an in-depth conversation about North Korea's troop dispatch.
Lin Biao summed up the situation inside and outside the country and told Chairman Mao that the country had already experienced more than twenty years of war, and the country had just been established, so the country should be stabilized first. The United States is the world's most developed industrial power, the degree of modernization of military equipment is high, the US military has 1500 guns per army, while our army has only 36 guns.
At the same time, Lin Biao believes that for the sake of North Korea's small country with only a few million people, China with a population of 500 million people will be plunged into this war, and once the United States uses the atomic bomb, it will have unpredictable consequences. At this stage, the Korean People's Army should turn to guerrilla warfare and continue to fight with the US military, the Soviet Union behind it has been established for decades, and the Soviet Union should send troops to aid the DPRK.
Chairman Mao did not blame Lin Biao, but could not accept his opinion. Ever since the Un army crossed the 38th Parallel, Chairman Mao had made up his mind to send troops. Since then, Chairman Mao has sought out Lin Biao several times and done his work, not to make Lin Biao the commander of the Northeast Border Defense Army, but more to let Lin Biao understand why China sent troops and the strategic significance of sending troops to Korea, in order to win Lin Biao's support in the Politburo.
However, Chairman Mao searched for Lin Biao several times and did not do the work of tonglin Biao. Nevertheless, Chairman Mao asked Lin Biao about the strategy and tactics of the Korean battlefield, and Lin Biao always actively offered advice and talked endlessly. Chairman Mao very much agreed with Lin Biao's views on how to fight the war of annihilation and how to stabilize the situation on the Korean battlefield.
At that time, the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee had many hopes that Lin Biao would serve as the commander of the Northeast Border Defense Army, and Lin Biao was very clear about these situations, so Lin Biao had to truthfully inform himself in front of Chairman Mao. Regarding Lin Biao's physical condition, during the Liberation War, his body was devastated by fear of wind, light, and water, and when pursuing Bai Chongxi in South China, Lin Biao relied on the natural competitive spirit of the soldiers to barely support him, and during the Battle of Hainan Island, Lin Biao's physical condition could no longer command the battle, and he was arranged to recuperate in the rear. At this time, Lin Biao raised a health question to the central authorities, and the meaning was very clear: the CENTRAL Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to send troops to Korea, please send someone else to lead the troops.
When Chairman Mao received Lin Biao's advice, he no longer regarded Lin Biao as the commander of the army to aid the DPRK. As Lin Biao made his attitude clear, Chairman Mao couldn't help but feel the trickiness of the matter. Just when Chairman Mao felt that the problem was serious, he thought of General Peng Da, who was accustomed to fighting hard battles.
On October 1, 1950, the people of Beijing city sang and danced to celebrate the first anniversary of the founding of New China. At this time, in the conference hall of the Zhongnanhai Yinian Hall, Chairman Mao and the central leaders had a serious expression and were doing discussions on sending troops to Korea until dawn. On October 3, Chairman Mao received a report from Gao Gang, commander of the Northeast Military Region, that the U.S. army had crossed the 38th Line, and that the Northeast Military Region had received letters of help from Kim Il Sung and Stalin.
Since then, at the meeting of the CPC Central Committee, there have been only two things discussed from morning to night, one is who will be in charge, and the other is when to send troops. After much thought, Chairman Mao decided to put Peng Dehuai, who had been in charge of the Southern Expedition and the Northern War for more than twenty years. Peng Dehuai is a handsome man who is not afraid of danger, stands up at critical moments, and has excellent military ability.
Chairman Mao's proposal at the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee was endorsed by several members of the Standing Committee. As a result, Peng Dehuai was appointed commander-in-chief of the Chinese Volunteer Army. So on October 4, a plane landed at beijing's western suburbs airport, where several cars were already waiting, and it was Peng Dehuai, commander of the Northwest Field Army, and several comrades of the Northwest Bureau who came down.
After Peng Dehuai got into the car, he sped all the way to Zhongnanhai. "Old Peng, it's hard, you've come just in time!" Chairman Mao and Peng Dehuai shook hands tightly, and Chairman Mao then brought Peng Dehuai into his office and asked him about his views on the Korean battlefield. Peng Dehuai believes that once the US military occupies the DPRK and garrisons the Sino-DPRK border, it can launch an attack on New China at any time in the future. At that time, New China will never have a peaceful day, and the situation will be even more unfavorable, and it will resolutely support Chairman Mao's decision to send troops.
Peng Dehuai
On the afternoon of October 5, at the meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, after Chairman Mao's speech, the Standing Committee members unanimously agreed that Peng Dehuai should serve as the commander of the Chinese Volunteer Army and lead the troops into the KOREAN War. After the meeting, Chairman Mao revealed to Peng Dehuai that the time for the volunteer army to send troops was initially set for October 15.
On October 18, Chairman Mao raised a toast to Peng Dehuai. At dawn on October 19, Peng Dehuai departed from the Beijing Hotel by car, then changed planes to Shenyang, and finally arrived in Andong by plane. At 5:30 p.m., at dusk, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army crossed the Yalu River with great strength and vigor, and pulled up the prelude to the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
From the National Day on October 1 to the entry of the volunteer army into the DPRK, Chairman Mao spared no effort to send troops to Korea and made the decision to send troops with extraordinary courage and courage. We can't help but feel admiration for extraordinary boldness and boldness, but coincidentally, Kissinger mentioned in his work "On China" that Mao Zedong's strategic thinking is a comprehensive speculation on long-term considerations, strategic principles and psychological factors.
It was precisely because of Chairman Mao's painstaking efforts and the bloody sacrifice of the volunteer soldiers that the dangerous situation we faced in the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China was far away from us, and let us pay tribute to the great volunteer army!