In April 1946, something terrible happened in the Soviet Union: Goyakino Customs intercepted a train full of valuables at the western border, which was described to fill 85 boxes with large cargo boxes. Embarrassingly, under some investigation, all the evidence indicated that their owner was Marshal Zhukov.
In fact, this kind of thing is not small to say, and it is indeed not too big to say big. Looting for booty has been a common tactic of superiority on the victorious side of wars throughout the ages, and even a leader like Napoleon didn't mind his subordinates doing it. Judging from the data, after the end of World War II, many Soviet generals moved things back and forth from Germany in trucks, and everyone tacitly agreed. Although Zhukov pulled seven carriages at once was indeed a bit of an overheated, given his identity and contribution to World War II, it didn't seem too appalling, but a playful scene emerged.
Objectively speaking, among the many participating countries in World War II, the military discipline of the Soviet army is still relatively strict, and the above behavior is obviously a violation of discipline. Punishment was imposed for doing something wrong, and the investigation of the matter, whether handed over to Beria of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Prosecutor General of the USSR Vyshinsky, was considered to be in accordance with the procedure and there was no problem at all, but it ended up in the hands of Victor Semyonovich Abakumov.
Who is this gentleman? In 1932, while still working in a district-level unit in Moscow, he was transferred to the internal affairs system because of a mysterious "internal introduction letter". A year before the outbreak of World War II, Abakumov had become the number one in the Rostov region of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; in February 1941, the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs merged with the State Security Department, and In this shuffle Abakumov directly became the new Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, and his immediate boss was the powerful Beria. Shortly after the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet high-level set up a special operations department in the internal system to collect intelligence and ensure internal security, which we can colloquially regard as the "Hoeing Bureau", and Abakumov was personally corrected by the supreme leader Stalin. In 1946, shortly after Zhukov's case, he was appointed Minister of State Security of the Soviet Union, and although nominally under the jurisdiction of Beria, it was clear to everyone with a discerning eye that he had been developed by Stalin into a direct subordinate, and that he was placed under Beria not to assist in the work, but to use the separation of powers.
Then again, the designation of such a role to be in charge of the case may indicate an attitude at the top that generals like Zhukov have accumulated great merits in the war, which makes them have an incalculable influence at home. If nothing else, at present, it is not clear whether the Soviet army has the surname "Su" or "Zhu". Now that the war is gone, these nobles have become negative factors that may affect the stability of the country, but Zhukov is not a fuel-saving lamp, first, he has his own thinking, he will not easily submit to authority; second, he has shown his desire for political power early on, which he does not want to see above. With all this in mind, the intention of the matter is clear — at least to properly strike the ambitious "Marshal of Victory."
Apparently, Abakumov has done a very good job of the work assigned by the leadership, and after the preliminary investigation, in his report to the supreme leader, he has listed the composition of the goods in great detail. According to the literature, the goods alone have more than 4,000 meters of high-grade fabrics such as brocade and velvet, which can span a full 6 Red Square; various expensive porcelain is filled with 7 large boxes, and gold and silver utensils are also filled with 2 large boxes. In addition, there are dozens of expensive blankets in the goods, one of which is surprisingly large. Of course, the above list is only the tip of their iceberg, and all in all, Abakumov's report seems to be described as "shocking".
At the same time, Bulganin, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, intervened, not only criticizing the seven carriages for their extravagant nature, but also accusing Zhukov of having "almost as if it were in Germany" (meaning that it was stuffed with loot from Germany). Sure enough, after this incident, Zhukov's political career was almost over, he was relegated to a remote military district, and his situation deteriorated further, and he seemed to be at risk of arrest.
On the surface, this case looks like a typical story in history of "birds do their best to hide their bows", is the intention behind the people in power really so simple and direct? In my opinion, although At that point in time Zhukov's prestige overshadowed the leadership, Stalin's ultimate goal was not just to bring down a military commander who was eager to find a presence in the political arena, but to be a super-powerful beria. We might as well start at the beginning.
Whether looking through the literature or the fragments of information, it is not difficult to see in many ways that Stalin was a brilliant leader who played almost all political means to the fullest. In addition, a good politician has a necessary quality, that is, to look at two or three steps more than others. Rather than tossing Zhukov coldly, Stalin's defenses against Beria were solid. There is a small episode in history: one day, Stalin was bored, began to have a large number of police officers around him, and suddenly became irritable. He called out to Beria and asked in a loud voice: Why are these guards all Georgians?
It is worth mentioning that Beria was a Georgian, and Stalin was overly vigilant, believing that the other side had filled his "hardcore henchmen" with him. In fact, Stalin himself was a Georgian, and it was a tradition in the Soviet Union for many years to put the "fellow countrymen" responsible for defending the leadership. After being disciplined with a split head, Beria was confused on the spot. This anecdote is from the recollection of Stalin's close attendant, and it is not difficult to see from it that Stalin was wary of this powerful minister. In fact, whether it is the decentralization of the placement of direct subordinates such as Abakumov in a key position under Beria's command, or the connivance of Zhdanov to drive his own men to attack Beria's henchmen, these actions are enough to show that the Minister of Internal Affairs has become a major problem for Stalin in the context of the new era. By contrast, Zhukov, whose political talent was relatively mediocre, was nothing at all.
Abakumov was in charge of Zhukov's case and initially put up a posture of exterminating himself, and seemed eager to completely destroy the other party. In fact, however, just as Zhukov was being beaten to the point of no return, Beria was suddenly ordered to take over the censorship. Interestingly, it was Beria who directly saved Zhukov, who was in a precarious situation.
Although Beria's methods were excellent, and it was easy to overthrow Zhukov, who was completely passive, the former quickly gave a report of a summative nature, although he was very sure that Zhukov had violated the discipline of the Soviet army, but it was quite "on the facts", almost cutting off the possibility of others wanting to continue to make a fuss about the matter.
At the same time, other military bigwigs took a look at it, and suddenly felt that this case was just like this, although Zhukov had looted the so-called seven big wagons, but there were not many of them that were really valuable, for example, the gold ring and gold necklace added up to more than 30 pieces, most of which were not very valuable furniture, these things could be easily obtained by changing a colonel, and to check others according to the standards of this case, then the Soviet army must not be thrown to the sky? To save Zhukov at the moment is to save the entire military. As a result, Rokossovsky, Konev, Vasilevsky and other old comrades-in-arms interceded one after another, and Zhukov was not further punished.
There is no doubt that in this back and forth, Beria acted as the "savior" of Zhukov and even the Soviet military. Of course, the former is not a good man, and he has his own purpose in doing so, hoping to make friends with the military in this way and consolidate his power. It has to be said that Beria's methods are indeed very clever, ostensibly falling into the well, currying favor with his superior Stalin, and in fact sparing the real victims from further harm. Zhukov's wounded skin did not hurt his bones, and he retained the possibility of a comeback in the future, and everyone was happy.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="13" > but the question arises: Can He see this at Zhukov's political level? </h1>
Judging from Zhukov's performance in Soviet politics throughout the second half of his career, his political ability is not exaggerated to describe his political ability as "clumsy" compared to his military talent. This Jun is a rectum, does not play with means, and can not see the deep meaning behind those operations. In the 1946 case, Beria was obviously favored by Zhukov, but I am afraid that in the latter's view, countless Soviet generals made the same mistake, only they were arrested, not only their homes were raided, but also kicked into the Ural Military District, which had no sense of existence. Even if Zhukov did not hate Beria for this, he also learned the horrors of the special state apparatus of the internal affairs system, and most of the Soviet generals themselves had a grudge against the secret police, so they were even more reluctant to trust each other.
On the surface, this is a fight between several major forces at the top of the Soviet Union, but from a far-reaching point of view, the author believes that this is probably a situation carefully made by supreme leader Stalin.
First of all, as we have just said, after the end of the Second World War, the struggle between several major groups for power and profit, the struggle between the centers of power became more and more acute, and the war gave birth to superstars such as Zhukov, whose prestige even overshadowed the supreme leader of the Soviet Union, which made Stalin feel uneasy. At such a sensitive point in time, Stalin urgently needed to grasp a typical example, even if his purpose was not to destroy anyone, and the "seven wagons" happened to hit the muzzle of the gun. Obviously, the outcome of this incident was satisfactory: from Stalin's point of view, he wanted to start the whole person, and even the role of Zhukov was like fish on a chopping board, to be played with, which greatly reduced the worries in his heart, so he was happy to stop. At the same time, he let his confidant Abakumov act as a "churning stick", forcing some unpleasantness between the military and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, making each other suspicious of each other, and ensuring that they would not join forces to cause trouble.
Second, in the longer term, Beria has a terrible state apparatus, hundreds of thousands of internal affairs troops, and he also holds the black material of almost everyone, and the others are already far behind in the next power struggle. If Beria had won the support of the military, the Soviet Union would have ushered in a ruler with superpower, which was directly contrary to Comrade Lenin's principle of "collective leadership", which Stalin did not want to see happen. Although his "successor" Malenkov is a political ally with Beria at the moment, after all, there is only one top seat, and no one can guarantee that in order to compete for it, the two sides will do something out of the ordinary in the future. What Stalin wanted to ensure was to weaken Beria's control over the entire state system as much as possible.
Sure enough, on March 5, 1953, Stalin died unexpectedly, and Beria immediately used his position to seize the opportunity, just one step away from the top spot. At the crucial moment, out of extreme distrust of the secret police, the military, represented by Zhukov, finally sided with Beria's opponents without hesitation and eliminated the super-powerful minister with lightning speed. Who can imagine that Zhukov, who was cornered and almost ruined his entire career, actually became a key factor in rewriting history.
It is worth mentioning that in 1952, zhukov, the "criminal minister", was again downplayed and transferred back to the core of power and obtained the status of alternate commissioner. Perhaps the toss was precisely Stalin's deliberate arrangement; and his right-hand man, Zhukov, inadvertently fought him the last victory. As for killing Khrushchev halfway and stealing the fruits of victory and taking the Soviet Union on another path, these are all later words.