After the establishment of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area, the Kuomintang side seemed to feel tremendous pressure and began to continuously encircle and suppress them with heavy troops; in the face of such a dangerous situation, after the "Second National Congress," according to Mao Zedong's instructions, the military and civilians of the two military base areas on the border of Xianggangshan and Gansu, Jinggangshan and "Jiulongshan," acted nervously, constantly consolidating the military base areas, and preparing to meet the enemy's heavy troops.
The military and people of Jinggangshan first set up five major sentries in Huangyangjie, Bamian Mountain, Shuangshi, Zhumashi, Cinnabar Chong, Tongmucui and other places, built strong fortifications, set up watch posts and battle fortresses at each post, and lined up bamboo nail arrays on the several miles under the mountain.
In order to effectively deal with the enemy, Mao Zedong and Zhu De, as experts in guerrilla warfare in the mountains, also attached great importance to the study of the Red Army's guerrilla warfare strategy. The variability of his tactics, the profundity of his strategy, the variety of tactics, and the fact that he was fixed and uncertain were indeed the culminations of the art of war of successive Generations of China, and even Chiang Kai-shek had to bow to the inferiority. The "Sixteen Character Recipe" has played a great role under such conditions.
As early as the early years of the Republic of China, Zhu De entered the Yunnan Wushu Academy as a field tactics instructor. At that time, bandits were rampant in Yunnan, often attacking officers and civilians, posing a serious threat to regional peace, but although the authorities sent troops to attack many times, the results were all the same.
Later, Jude was sent to fight the bandits. He found that the bandits' combat characteristics were very flexible, and when faced with the advance of large soldiers, they would be reduced to pieces and hide in the deep mountains and old forests, so that the army would have no way to catch them.
Subsequently, Zhu De combined the fighting characteristics of the bandits, flexibly changed the tactics of the army, adopted the tactics of attacking and harassing from all sides, and combined "fighting and running"; he treated the people in his own way, disguised the army as villagers, hid them in the houses of the people, and once the bandits were discovered, they quickly concentrated on encirclement and annihilation, and after applying this method, they really balanced the bandits.
Zhu De also felt from the setbacks and lessons of the Nanchang uprising that the enemy is strong and we are weak, and the weak revolutionary forces can only lead to defeat if they fight hard against the strong enemy. Therefore, when the plough was laying out the training troops, he wrote the "Infantry Exercise Code" and "Duty in the Formation", which more systematically summarized some of the guerrilla tactics he used in actual combat.
Later, mao Zedong, based on the principle of "going for the best strategy" in sun tzu's Art of War, summed up Zhu De's set of tactics as: "scattering against scattering, and attacking the weak with the strong", which is actually the prototype of the Red Army's "sixteen-character recipe" tactic.
Later, Mao Zedong led the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army into the border of Xianggan and Gansu, and deeply studied the key points of guarding the mountain by Zhu Kongyang, the "mountain king" of Jinggangshan. Zhu Kongyang believes that there is no need to fight in Jinggangshan, as long as the enemy can go around in circles, in the process of going around, even the most powerful enemy will expose the weakness, and after grasping the weakness, it can be clean and clean.
At the same time, Zhu Kongyang also adhered to the principle of not trading at a loss, making money and not doing anything, and this set of tactics had a major impact on Mao Zedong. He revised this set of tips and pointed out in combination with experience: division of troops is easy to defeat.
In the battles against Chaling, Suichuan, Xincheng, and Wudoujiang, Zhu De and Mao Zedong conducted more in-depth tactical exchanges, further summed up the experience of guerrilla warfare, and gradually formed the basic principles of guerrilla warfare suited to the conditions at that time.
For this set of "sixteen-character techniques" of warfare jointly created by Mao Zedong and Zhu De, the enemy was invincible, and in order to crack this set of tactics, the enemy even specially summoned officers to study it. Whether it was Liu Shiyi and Yang Chisheng of the Gansu enemy, or Wu Shangbu of the Xiang Army, they all imitated this set of tactics in an attempt to use the method of the Red Army to put the Red Army to death.
But the result is always smart but clever, never saving their fate of failure. Mao's opponents were always puzzled by the implications.
With the support of overall tactics, the Red Army, under the leadership of Mao Zedong and Zhu De, actively prepared to crush the new heavy "encirclement and suppression" launched by the enemy, and at this time, the Xiang enemy Wu Shangbu also entered the mountains again under the personal supervision of Chiang Kai-shek to encircle and suppress.
This time, Wu Shang still tried to adopt the Red Army's "sixteen-character technique" tactics, dividing his troops into two groups, the left wing, composed of Zhang Jingxi's regiment, who was old and cunning and good at deceit, in an attempt to pretend to attack Maoping along the trail and contain the main force of the Red Army; the right wing was composed of the main force, gathered in the direction of Shidu and Maoping, in an attempt to take advantage of the open terrain in this area with the cooperation of the left wing and to launch a large force to press against the red army base camp.
In the face of the powerful Xiang army's advance and suppression, Mao Zedong and Zhu De quickly held an emergency pre-war meeting to discuss strategies for retreating from the enemy.
At the meeting, Mao Zedong analyzed that the enemy's defense was weak on the left wing and strong on the right wing, forming two fists with unbalanced force, which our army could use as a breakthrough point, and in view of this characteristic of the enemy situation, Zhu Yunqing, commander of the Thirty-first Regiment, first suggested that Zhang Jingxi be ambushed in the area of the dangerous terrain of Qiudu.
Zhu De had doubts about this, believing that since Qiudu was a natural place to set up ambushes, not only could our army think of setting up an ambush here, but the enemy army would also think that Zhang Jingxi himself was extremely cunning and acted deviously, and that he would definitely not easily drill into the ambush circle under the pendulum of Qiudu. Jude's idea was supported by most of the attendees.
While everyone was actively talking, Mao Zedong listened carefully to everyone's speeches while gazing intently at the map. For a moment, he held out his index finger to Mumura and said, "What do you think about starting here?" This idea has puzzled many people, because the terrain of Mucun is open, it is not easy to hide soldiers, and it is convenient for the enemy to deploy, and it is a bit contrary to the common way of soldiers to set up ambushes here.
Zhu De, on the other hand, understood Mao Zedong's meaning and laughed: "Only by surprise can we attack them unprepared." The reason why Zhu De said this is because from his past experience, Zhang Jingxi was most afraid of being ambushed, and although he paid much attention to strange and strange places, he was often easy to ignore those places with better terrain.
According to the conventional saying, Mucun is the most difficult place to fight an ambush, and it will be despised by Zhang Jingxi, so the Red Army can take advantage of this conceptual contrast and catch him off guard. Therefore, the overall battle plan was decided.
In the early morning of the next day, Zhu Deqin led the Twenty-eighth Regiment, the Thirty-first Regiment, the Thirty-second Regiment, and the Red Guards of the Fourth District to set up an ambush position in Mucun, and lured the enemy with some of his troops. Zhang Jingxi originally wanted to emulate the Red Army and use the method of attacking the east and the west to directly attack Maoping, but whoever expected the road to be one foot high and the devil to be one foot taller, our army would make a plan, lead Zhang Jingxi's nose step by step to lead him to the ambush circle of Mucun, and annihilate him in one fell swoop.
Zhang Jingxi saw that the whole army was destroyed, the general trend had gone, changed into agricultural clothes, and fled in the black night. When Wu Shang received the news that Zhang Jingxi had been annihilated, it was like being hit in the head, and he was frightened and scattered, and hurriedly retracted the black hand that had just been stretched out.
Not only Wu Shang, but also Mao Zedong and Zhu De's successive victories at Jinggangshan also shocked Chiang Kai-shek. To this end, he urgently sent Zhu Peide to establish strongholds and pillboxes around Jinggangshan, cutting off all economic resources of the Red Army, and attempting to adopt a strategy of pressing forward step by step.
At this time, Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan had already led the Red Fifth Army to break through the enemy's blockade and drive up Jinggang Mountain to meet the Red Fourth Army in victory. At this point, the autumn harvest uprising team, the Nanchang uprising team, the Guangzhou uprising team, the Shonan rebellion team, and the Pingjiang team successively met at Jinggangshan, further strengthening the strength of the base areas.
Mao Zedong and Zhu De added Peng Dehuai, a brave warrior, and even more so, they frequently attacked, defeated the Gansu enemies Yang Chisheng, Wang Jun, Jin Handing, and other troops, and effectively defended the red area. Later, the Red Fifth Army of the Red Fourth Army developed into the First and Third Armies of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.
In the winter of 1928, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized the strength of 18 regiments in the three provinces of Xiang, Guangdong, and Gansu, with the Hunan warlord He Jian as the commander-in-chief, to launch the third large-scale "meeting and suppression" against the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area.
Such a grim situation really upset Peng Dehuai and others. In this regard, Mao Zedong and Zhu De also pondered night and night, hoping to find an effective solution. At this moment, a new idea appeared in Mao Zedong's mind.
In Mao Zedong's view, the Jinggangshan base area was not easy to gain, and it was not easy to go to war and lose this banner. However, in the face of the enemy's siege, we cannot hold on to it and must take positive action.
In this regard, his method is to play a tai chi and make the enemy lose sight of one or the other. That is to say, the enemy is coming from this side, and we are fighting from that side, so that the enemy will not only not be able to destroy the Red Army, but will give the Red Army an opportunity to develop a new base area.
Subsequently, Mao Zedong gave a detailed explanation of this idea, holding that there was a base area opened by Fang Zhimin in northeastern Jiangxi; there were Huang Gongluo's troops fighting guerrilla warfare in western Jiangxi; and there was a situation of division formed by jute rebel troops in northern Jiangxi. As long as the Red Army captures Gannan Province, it will be able to echo and coordinate with the revolutionary base areas in the east, west, and north.
Gannan Mountain's steep terrain and inconvenient transportation are beneficial to the Long-term Guerrilla Red Army and not to the enemy; in addition, Gannan is a rich area, and the supply of troops will also be guaranteed. At the same time, the encirclement of He Jian's troops seemed to be impeccable, but if the Red Army left some people to guard Jinggangshan and another part of the people to fight out, and go around to the rear of the enemy to contain the enemy's troops, It would make He Jian lose sight of one or the other and be poor at coping. In this way, we can not only relieve the siege of Jinggangshan, but also take the opportunity to develop the Gannan base area. "A good plan to encircle Wei and save Zhao", Mao Zedong's suggestion, was unanimously approved by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Chen Yi.
The next day, Mao Zedong held a joint meeting of party organizations in the village of Bailu in Ninggang, at which mao zedong's proposal was unanimously adopted. The meeting decided that Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Chen Yi would lead the main force of the Red Fourth Army to attack Gannan Province, leaving the Red Fifth Army and the Red Thirty-second Regiment to hold Jinggangshan.
On the third day, in mid-January 1929, the main force of the Red Fourth Army, led by Zhu De, Mao Zedong, and Chen Yi, set out from Ciping Xiaoxingzhou, broke through to the bottom of the mountain, and advanced towards Gannan ...
Take this article to pay tribute to the Central Red Army!